"Non-heart-beating," or "cardiac death," organ donation: why we should care

Organ Donation and the Dead Donor Rule: A Synopsis of Pressing Ethical Controversies and Practical Questions

OBJECTIVES

As a result of recent biomedical advancements, organ donation continues to save and enhance countless lives globally.Yet,the gap between the organ supply and demand persists, leading to approximately 17 people dying each day waiting for an organ transplant and another person being added to the transplant waiting list every 9 minutes. This gap persists, in part, because of ethical and practical concerns arising from ambiguities surrounding death determination before donation and the dead donor rule. In this study, we discuss challenges related to defining death in the context of organ donation, critical and tolerant views on the dead donorrule, and possible avenues by which some of the ambiguities and ethicaltensions related to organ donation may be resolved.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We reviewed literature opinions and data pertaining to cultural and religious influences affecting societal attitudes toward death determination and organ donation and examined the future of deceased organ donation.

RESULTS

Cultural and religious influences affect societal attitudes toward death determination and organ donation. There is a plurality of views on the matter that may be assuaged to an extent by standardized death determination criterion that could be implemented globally or by identifying alternative therapies other than human organ transplant.

CONCLUSIONS

The debate regarding death and the acceptability of dead donor organs fortransplant does not have a straightforward solution, and efforts are needed to overcome social, cultural and religious objections.

Practice and challenges for organ donation after medical assistance in dying: A scoping review including the results of the first international roundtable in 2021

The procedure combining medical assistance in dying (MAiD) with donations after circulatory determination of death (DCDD) is known as organ donation after euthanasia (ODE). The first international roundtable on ODE was held during the 2021 WONCA family medicine conference as part of a scoping review. It aimed to document practice and related issues to advise patients, professionals, and policymakers, aiding the development of responsible guidelines and helping to navigate the issues. This was achieved through literature searches and national and international stakeholder meetings. Up to 2021, ODE was performed 286 times in Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and Belgium, including eight cases of ODE from home (ODEH). MAiD was provided 17,217 times (2020) in the eight countries where ODE is permitted. As of 2021, 837 patients (up to 14% of recipients of DCDD donors) had received organs from ODE. ODE raises some important ethical concerns involving patient autonomy, the link between the request for MAiD and the request to donate organs and the increased burden placed on seriously ill MAiD patients.

Procedural safeguards cannot disentangle MAiD from organ donation decisions

In the past, a vast majority of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) patients were elderly patients with cancer who are not suitable for organ donation, making organ donation from such patients a rare event. However, more expansive criteria for MAiD combined with an increased participation of MAiD patients in organ donation is likely to drastically increase the pool of MAiD patients who can serve as organ donors. Previous discussions of ethical issues arising from these trends have not fully addressed difficulties involved in separating decision to end one's life from the one to donate one's organs. However, realities of organ donation logistics and human decision making suggest that this separation can be extraordinary difficult. The need to maximise quality of donated organs complicates dying experience of the donor and is likely in tension with the dying experience the patient envisioned when first considering MAiD. Furthermore, the idea that patients will think about MAiD first, and only when firmly decided to end their life, consider organ donation, runs contrary to organ donation policies in some countries as well as end of life and everyday decision making. This opens the door for organ donation to serve as an incentive in MAiD decisions. Dispensing with the simplistic assumption that organ donation can never be a factor in MAiD decisions is, therefore, essential first step to properly addressing ethical issues at hand.

Intent-to-treat survival in liver transplantation has not improved in 3 decades due to donor shortage relative to waitlist growth

BACKGROUND

Liver Transplantation has advanced over the past 3 decades, with 1-year survival rates improving 25%. Survival rates for those transplanted has increased to remarkable levels, but survival from the time of listing may not be as revolutionary.

METHODS

Kaplan-Meier with log-rank test as well as Cox regression analysis was used to retrospectively analyze 211 610 adults listed for LT and 116 299 adult transplant recipients from 1987 to 2016. Our primary endpoints were survival from time of listing to waitlist death or posttransplant death.

RESULTS

One-year survival following LT improved dramatically (68% in 1987-1988 vs. 93% in 2016, P < .001). There was no improvement in 1-year intent-to-treat survival: 78.4% for those listed in 1987 and 81.8% for those listed in 2016 (P = .1). Also observed were decreases in the percentage of transplanted candidates from 74.8% in 1987-1988 to 54.7% in 2016 (P < .001) and increased 1-year wait-list mortality from 12.5% in 1987-1988 to 22.6% in 2016 (P = .002).

CONCLUSION

As transplant rate has decreased while waitlist mortality has increased, no improvements have been made in intent-to-treat survival of patients listed for transplant over the past 3 decades. We speculate this observation to be resultant of a relative donor shortage outpaced by waitlist growth.

SUMMARY

Liver Transplantation has experienced vast increases in survival rates over the past 3 decades; however, due to an increased donor supply outpaced by waitlist growth, the rate of transplantation has decreased significantly while the waitlist mortality has increased, leading to no improvement in 1-year intent-to-treat survival rates.

Criteria to Identify a Potential Deceased Organ Donor: A Systematic Review

OBJECTIVES

To systematically review the global published literature defining a potential deceased organ donor and identifying clinical triggers for deceased organ donation identification and referral.

DATA SOURCES

Medline and Embase databases from January 2006 to September 2017.

STUDY SELECTION

All published studies containing a definition of a potential deceased organ donor and/or clinical triggers for referring a potential deceased organ donor were eligible for inclusion. Dual, independent screening was conducted of 3,857 citations.

DATA EXTRACTION

Data extraction was completed by one team member and verified by a second team member. Thematic content analysis was used to identify clinical criteria for potential deceased organ donation identification from the published definitions and clinical triggers.

DATA SYNTHESIS

One hundred twenty-four articles were included in the review. Criteria fell into four categories: Neurological, Medical Decision, Cardiorespiratory, and Administrative. Distinct and globally consistent sets of clinical criteria by type of deceased organ donation (neurologic death determination, controlled donation after circulatory determination of death, and uncontrolled donation after circulatory determination of death) are reported.

CONCLUSIONS

Use of the clinical criteria sets reported will reduce ambiguity associated with the deceased organ donor identification and the subsequent referral process, potentially reducing the number of missed donors and saving lives globally through increased transplantation.

Heart transplantation after the circulatory death; The ethical dilemma

Donors after brain death (DBD) have been the major source of organ donation due to good perfusion of the organs. However, owing to the mismatch in demand and supply of the organ donors and recipients, donors after circulatory death (DCDDs) has increased recently all over the world. Kidneys, liver, and lungs are being used for transplantation from DCDDs. Recently, heart transplantation from DCDDs has been started, which is under the firestorm of scrutiny by the ethicists. The ethical dilemma revolves around the question whether the donors are actually dead when they are declared dead by cardiocirculatory death criteria for organ procurement. The subsequent literature review addresses all the perspectives by differentiating between the donation methods known as DBDs and DCDDs, explaining the implications of the dead-donor rule on the organ donation pool, and categorizing the determinants of death leading to separation of the arguments under the two methods of donations.

Controlled Donation After Circulatory Determination of Death

Controlled donation after circulatory determination of death (cDCDD) concerns donation after withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy (W-LST). We examine the ethical issues raised by W-LST in the cDCDD context in the light of a review of cDCDD protocols and the ethical literature. Our analysis confirms that W-LST procedures vary considerably among cDCDD centers and that despite existing recommendations, the conflict of interest in the W-LST decision and process might be difficult to avoid, the process of W-LST might interfere with usual end-of-life care, and there is a risk of hastening death. In order to ensure that the practice of W-LST meets already well-established ethical recommendations, we suggest that W-LST should be managed in the ICU by an ICU physician who has been part of the W-LST decision. Recommending extubation for W-LST, when this is not necessarily the preferred procedure, is inconsistent with the recommendation to follow usual W-LST protocol. As the risk of conflicts of interest in the decision of W-LST and in the process of W-LST exists, this should be acknowledged and disclosed. Finally, when cDCDD programs interfere with W-LST and end-of-life care, this should be transparently disclosed to the family, and specific informed consent is necessary.

A 10min "no-touch" time - is it enough in DCD? A DCD animal study

Donation after cardiac death (DCD) is under investigation because of the lack of human donor organs. Required times of cardiac arrest vary between 75s and 27min until the declaration of the patients' death worldwide. The aim of this study was to investigate brain death in pigs after different times of cardiac arrest with subsequent cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) as a DCD paradigm. DCD was simulated in 20 pigs after direct electrical induction of ventricular fibrillation. The "no-touch" time varied from 2min up to 10min; then 30min of CPR were performed. Brain death was determined by established clinical and electrophysiological criteria. In all animals with cardiac arrest of at least 6min, a persistent loss of brainstem reflexes and no reappearance of bioelectric brain activity occurred. Reappearance of EEG activity was found until 4.5min of cardiac arrest and subsequent CPR. Brainstem reflexes were detectable until 5min of cardiac arrest and subsequent CPR. According to our experiments, the suggestion of 10min of cardiac arrest being equivalent to brain death exceeds the minimum time after which clinical and electrophysiological criteria of brain death are fulfilled. Therefore shorter "no-touch" times might be ethically acceptable to reduce warm ischemia time.

Can we handle the truth? Legal fictions in the determination of death

Advances in life-saving technologies in the past few decades have challenged our traditional understandings of death. People can be maintained on life-support even after permanently losing the ability to breathe spontaneously and remaining unconscious and unable to interact meaningfully with others. In part because this group of people could help fulfill the growing need for organ donation, there has been a great deal of pressure on the way we determine death. The determination of death has been modified from the old way of understanding death as occurring when a person stops breathing, her heart stops beating, and she is cold to the touch. Today, physicians determine death by relying on a diagnosis of total brain failure or by waiting a short while after circulation stops. Evidence has emerged that the conceptual bases for these approaches to determining death are fundamentally flawed and depart substantially from our biological and common-sense understandings of death. We argue that the current approach to determining death consists of two different types of unacknowledged legal fictions. These legal fictions were developed for practices that are largely ethically legitimate but need to be reconciled with the law. However, the considerable debate over the determination of death in the medical and scientific literature has not informed the public of the fact that our current determinations of death do not adequately establish that a person has died. It seems unlikely that this information can remain hidden for long. Given the instability of the status quo and the difficulty of making the substantial legal changes required by complete transparency, we argue for a second-best policy solution of acknowledging the legal fictions involved in determining death. This move in the direction of greater transparency may someday result in allowing us to face squarely these issues and effect the legal changes necessary to permit ethically appropriate vital organ transplantation. Finally, this paper also provides the beginnings of a taxonomy of legal fictions, concluding that a more systematic theoretical treatment of legal fictions is warranted to understand their advantages and disadvantages across a variety of legal domains.

Presumed consent for organ preservation in uncontrolled donation after cardiac death in the United States: a public policy with serious consequences

Organ donation after cessation of circulation and respiration, both controlled and uncontrolled, has been proposed by the Institute of Medicine as a way to increase opportunities for organ procurement. Despite claims to the contrary, both forms of controlled and uncontrolled donation after cardiac death raise significant ethical and legal issues. Identified causes for concern include absence of agreement on criteria for the declaration of death, nonexistence of universal guidelines for duration before stopping resuscitation efforts and techniques, and assumption of presumed intent to donate for the purpose of initiating temporary organ-preservation interventions when no expressed consent to donate is present. From a legal point of view, not having scientifically valid criteria of cessation of circulation and respiration for declaring death could lead to a conclusion that organ procurement itself is the proximate cause of death. Although the revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 provides broad immunity to those involved in organ-procurement activities, courts have yet to provide an opinion on whether persons can be held liable for injuries arising from the determination of death itself. Preserving organs in uncontrolled donation after cardiac death requires the administration of life-support systems such as extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. These life-support systems can lead to return of signs of life that, in turn, have to be deliberately suppressed by the administration of pharmacological agents. Finally, allowing temporary organ-preservation interventions without expressed consent is inherently a violation of the principle of respect for a person's autonomy. Proponents of organ donation from uncontrolled donation after cardiac death, on the other hand, claim that these nonconsensual interventions enhance respect for autonomy by allowing people, through surrogate decision making, to execute their right to donate organs. However, the lack of transparency and the absence of protection of individual autonomy, for the sake of maximizing procurement opportunities, have placed the current organ-donation system of opting-in in great jeopardy. Equally as important, current policies enabling and enhancing organ procurement practices, pose challenges to the constitutional rights of individuals in a pluralistic society as these policies are founded on flawed medical standards for declaring death.

Enforcement of presumed-consent policy and willingness to donate organs as identified in the European Union Survey: the role of legislation in reinforcing ideology in pluralistic societies

To increase the supply of transplantable organs, some European Union (EU) countries have begun implementing and enforcing presumed consent policies for organ donation. Mossialos and colleagues performed an analysis of samples of citizens in 15 EU countries and found that legislation, enforcement, and awareness of presumed consent policies for organ donation increase people's willingness to donate their own organs and those of a deceased relative. The authors concluded that, in countries with enforced presumed consent, citizens are willing to donate because they accept organ donation as an ideology. This ideology originates in the thinking that organ donation is an implicit communal contract i.e., a mechanism by which individuals pay back society for the inclusion and social support that they have already experienced and hope to experience in the future. Acceptance of this ideology enhances people's willingness to donate organs and the efficiency in pursuing this collective action, thus, paving the way toward increased paternalism in society. We highlight some potential biases that may have been incorporated in the survey design and in Mossialos et al.'s conclusions, including (1) how the survey questions were constructed, (2) whether sufficient information was communicated about organ procurement practices in heart-beating and non-heart-beating donation before participants responded to the survey, and (3) whether respondents' knowledge about donation legislation can be equated with understanding of processes involved in organ donation. We address the consequences of using legislative authority to enforce the ideology of organ donation, thereby superseding the varying moral values, beliefs, and attitudes about human life and culture that are inherent in multicultural societies.

Organ Procurement After Cardiocirculatory Death: A Critical Analysis

To shorten the transplantation waiting time in the United States, federal regulations have been introduced requiring hospitals to develop policies for organ donation after cardiac (or circulatory) death (DCD). The practice of DCD is invoked based on the validity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) protocol and relies on the accuracy of the University of Wisconsin (UW) evaluation tool to appropriately identify organ donors. There is little evidence to support the position that the criteria for organ procurement adopted from the UPMC protocol complies with the dead donor rule. A high false-positive rate of the UW evaluation tool can expose many dying patients to unnecessary perimortem interventions because of donation failure. The medications and/or interventions for the sole purpose of maintaining organ viability can have unintended negative consequences on the timing and quality of end-of-life care offered to organ donors. It is essential to address and manage the evolving conflict between optimal end-of-life care and the necessary sacrifices for the procurement of transplantable organs from the terminally ill. The recipients of marginal organs recovered from DCD can also suffer higher mortality and morbidity than recipients of other types of donated organs. Finally, transparent disclosure to the public of the risks involved to both organ donors and recipients may contribute to open societal debate on the ethical acceptability of DCD.

The United States Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006): new challenges to balancing patient rights and physician responsibilities

Advance health care directives and informed consent remain the cornerstones of patients' right to self-determination regarding medical care and preferences at the end-of-life. However, the effectiveness and clinical applicability of advance health care directives to decision-making on the use of life support systems at the end-of-life is questionable. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) has been revised in 2006 to permit the use of life support systems at or near death for the purpose of maximizing procurement opportunities of organs medically suitable for transplantation. Some states have enacted the Revised UAGA (2006) and a few of those have included amendments while attempting to preserve the uniformity of the revised Act. Other states have introduced the Revised UAGA (2006) for legislation and remaining states are likely to follow soon. The Revised UAGA (2006) poses challenges to the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA) embodied in advance health care directives and individual expression about the use of life support systems at the end-of-life. The challenges are predicated on the UAGA revising the default choice to presumption of donation intent and the use of life support systems to ensure medical suitability of organs for transplantation. The default choice trumps the expressed intent in an individual's advance health care directive to withhold and/or withdraw life support systems at the end-of-life. The Revised UAGA (2006) overrides advance directives on utilitarian grounds, which is a serious ethical challenge to society. The subtle progression of the Revised UAGA (2006) towards the presumption about how to dispose of one's organs at death can pave the way for an affirmative "duty to donate". There are at least two steps required to resolve these challenges. First, physicians and hospitals must fulfill their responsibilities to educate patients on the new legislations and document their preferences about the use of life support systems for organ donation at the end-of-life. Second, a broad based societal discussion must be initiated to decide if the Revised UAGA (2006) infringes on the PSDA and the individual's right of autonomy. The discussion should also address other ethical concerns raised by the Revised UAGA (2006), including the moral stance on 1) the interpretation of the refusal of life support systems as not applicable to organ donation and 2) the disregarding of the diversity of cultural beliefs about end-of-life in a pluralistic society.