Towards a reliable repeated-measures beads task for assessing the jumping to conclusions bias

The influence of mood on the jumping to conclusions bias in individuals with schizotypal traits: an experience sampling paradigm

The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) refers to making a decision before collecting a sufficient amount of information to warrant doing so. Very little research has been conducted on the ways in which mood influences JTC in schizophrenia and healthy individuals along the continuum of risk for psychosis. It was hypothesized that elevations in schizotypal traits will be associated with greater JTC, and that negative affect will moderate the relationship between schizotypal traits and JTC. 100 undergraduate students enrolled at the University of Toronto Scarborough (UTSC) were recruited for this study. The study employed an experience-sampling approach. Positive affect demonstrated a small positive relationship to JTC, meaning that as an individual's positive affect increased so too did their JTC tendency, regardless of their elevations on schizotypal traits. While a significant negative relationship was found between schizotypal traits and JTC, the effect size was negligible, which may highlight the need for effort testing in undergraduate populations and evaluating the sensitivity of experimental tasks to increase data quality. Overall, identifying the influence of mood on metacognition is critical in determining how JTC functions within the illness.

Information gathered through draws-to-decision, social functioning, and personal recovery among patients with schizophrenia in Japan

INTRODUCTION

In schizophrenia, social functioning and personal recovery are pivotal outcomes potentially influenced by cognitive biases such as Jumping to Conclusions (JTC). Despite their significance, the relationship between JTC, social functioning, and personal recovery remains unclear. This study aims to investigate this relationship to inform tailored interventions for schizophrenia management.

METHODS

Data were collected from 94 schizophrenia patients using standardised measures. The Beads Task assessed JTC, whereas the Brief PANSS, TMT-J, SLOF-J, and RAS-J evaluated psychiatric symptoms, neurocognitive functioning, social functioning, and personal recovery, respectively. Statistical analyses included correlation and hierarchical regression.

RESULTS

Correlation analyses revealed a significant negative correlation between JTC and personal recovery (r = -0.27, p < 0.05). Hierarchical regression indicated JTC as a significant negative predictor of personal recovery (β = -0.33, p = 0.01). No significant correlation was found between JTC and social functioning.

DISCUSSION

Increased JTC was associated with lower levels of personal recovery in schizophrenia patients, independent of demographic and clinical factors. In the case of individuals with schizophrenia who demonstrate JTC, there is a potential to suggest the paradox of insight or apparent personal recovery scores.

Associations of conservatism and jumping to conclusions biases with aberrant salience and default mode network

AIM

While conservatism bias refers to the human need for more evidence for decision-making than rational thinking expects, the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias refers to the need for less evidence among individuals with schizophrenia/delusion compared to healthy people. Although the hippocampus-midbrain-striatal aberrant salience system and the salience, default mode (DMN), and frontoparietal networks ("triple networks") are implicated in delusion/schizophrenia pathophysiology, the associations between conservatism/JTC and these systems/networks are unclear.

METHODS

Thirty-seven patients with schizophrenia and 33 healthy controls performed the beads task, with large and small numbers of bead draws to decision (DTD) indicating conservatism and JTC, respectively. We performed independent component analysis (ICA) of resting functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. For systems/networks above, we investigated interactions between diagnosis and DTD, and main effects of DTD. We similarly applied ICA to structural and diffusion MRI to explore the associations between DTD and gray/white matter.

RESULTS

We identified a significant main effect of DTD with functional connectivity between the striatum and DMN, which was negatively correlated with delusion severity in patients, indicating that the greater the anti-correlation between these networks, the stronger the JTC and delusion. We further observed the main effects of DTD on a gray matter network resembling the DMN, and a white matter network connecting the functional and gray matter networks (all P < 0.05, family-wise error [FWE] correction). Function and gray/white matter showed no significant interactions.

CONCLUSION

Our results support the novel association of conservatism and JTC biases with aberrant salience and default brain mode.

A Bayesian model of the jumping-to-conclusions bias and its relationship to psychopathology

The mechanisms by which delusion and anxiety affect the tendency to make hasty decisions (Jumping-to-Conclusions bias) remain unclear. This paper proposes a Bayesian computational model that explores the assignment of evidence weights as a potential explanation of the Jumping-to-Conclusions bias using the Beads Task. We also investigate the Beads Task as a repeated measure by varying the key aspects of the paradigm. The Bayesian model estimations from two online studies showed that higher delusional ideation promoted reduced belief updating but the impact of general and social anxiety on evidence weighting was inconsistent. The altered evidence weighting as a result of a psychopathological trait appeared insufficient in contributing to the Jumping-to-Conclusions bias. Variations in Beads Task aspects significantly affected subjective certainty at the point of decisions but not the number of draws to decisions. Repetitions of the Beads Task are feasible if one assesses the Jumping-to-Conclusions bias using number of draws to decisions.

Improving the Reliability of Cognitive Task Measures: A Narrative Review

Cognitive tasks are capable of providing researchers with crucial insights into the relationship between cognitive processing and psychiatric phenomena. However, many recent studies have found that task measures exhibit poor reliability, which hampers their usefulness for individual differences research. Here, we provide a narrative review of approaches to improve the reliability of cognitive task measures. Specifically, we introduce a taxonomy of experiment design and analysis strategies for improving task reliability. Where appropriate, we highlight studies that are exemplary for improving the reliability of specific task measures. We hope that this article can serve as a helpful guide for experimenters who wish to design a new task, or improve an existing one, to achieve sufficient reliability for use in individual differences research.

Individual differences in computational psychiatry: a review of current challenges

Bringing precision to the understanding and treatment of mental disorders requires instruments for studying clinically relevant individual differences. One promising approach is the development of computational assays: integrating computational models with cognitive tasks to infer latent patient-specific disease processes in brain computations. While recent years have seen many methodological advancements in computational modelling and many cross-sectional patient studies, much less attention has been paid to basic psychometric properties (reliability and construct validity) of the computational measures provided by the assays. In this review, we assess the extent of this issue by examining emerging empirical evidence. We find that many computational measures suffer from poor psychometric properties, which poses a risk of invalidating previous findings and undermining ongoing research efforts using computational assays to study individual (and even group) differences. We provide recommendations for how to address these problems and, crucially, embed them within a broader perspective on key developments that are needed for translating computational assays to clinical practice.

Functional brain networks underlying probabilistic reasoning and delusions in schizophrenia

Delusions in schizophrenia are false beliefs that are assigned certainty and not afforded the scrutiny that normally gives rise to doubt, even under conditions of weak evidence. The goal of the current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study is to identify the brain network(s) involved in gathering information under conditions of weak evidence, in people with schizophrenia experiencing delusions. fMRI activity during probabilistic reasoning in people with schizophrenia experiencing delusions (n = 29) compared to people with schizophrenia not experiencing delusions (n = 41) and healthy controls (n = 41) was observed when participants made judgments based on evidence that weakly or strongly matched (or mismatched) with the focal hypothesis. A brain network involved in visual attention was strongly elicited for conditions of weak evidence for healthy controls and patients not experiencing delusions, but this increase was absent for patients experiencing delusions. This suggests that the state associated with delusions manifests in fMRI as reduced activity in an early visual attentional process whereby weak evidence is incorrectly stamped as conclusive, manifestating as a feeling of fluency and misplaced certainty, short-circuiting the search for evidence, and providing a candidate neural process for 'seeding' delusions.

Rethinking delusions: A selective review of delusion research through a computational lens

Delusions are rigid beliefs held with high certainty despite contradictory evidence. Notwithstanding decades of research, we still have a limited understanding of the computational and neurobiological alterations giving rise to delusions. In this review, we highlight a selection of recent work in computational psychiatry aimed at developing quantitative models of inference and its alterations, with the goal of providing an explanatory account for the form of delusional beliefs in psychosis. First, we assess and evaluate the experimental paradigms most often used to study inferential alterations in delusions. Based on our review of the literature and theoretical considerations, we contend that classic draws-to-decision paradigms are not well-suited to isolate inferential processes, further arguing that the commonly cited 'jumping-to-conclusion' bias may reflect neither delusion-specific nor inferential alterations. Second, we discuss several enhancements to standard paradigms that show promise in more effectively isolating inferential processes and delusion-related alterations therein. We further draw on our recent work to build an argument for a specific failure mode for delusions consisting of prior overweighting in high-level causal inferences about partially observable hidden states. Finally, we assess plausible neurobiological implementations for this candidate failure mode of delusional beliefs and outline promising future directions in this area.

Hasty decision-making in individuals at higher risk of developing an eating disorder

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The Jumping to Conclusions (JTC) bias is the tendency to make hasty decisions based on limited evidence and may contribute to the formation of over-valued beliefs about the importance of weight, shape and eating. Previous research investigating the JTC bias in clinical eating disorder samples, as assessed by the beads task, is inconclusive. The current study investigated the JTC bias in a non-clinical sample of undergraduate students identified as being lower or higher risk of developing an eating disorder. The study used a more reliable 'distractor' beads task that also incentivised hastier decisions by elevating the pressure of the task.

METHODS

Female undergraduate students (N = 156, 48%, classified as higher risk) completed a pressure and non-pressure distractor beads task, along with measures of weight concern and body-image flexibility.

RESULTS

Higher risk participants displayed a hastier decision-making style than lower risk participants. Task pressure elicited a hastier decision-making style across the whole sample, however, was unable to distinguish between higher and lower eating disorder risk status.

LIMITATIONS

Interpretation of findings are limited to non-clinical samples and may not generalise to clinical eating disorder populations.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings suggest the need for replication in a clinical eating disorder sample using the distractor beads task. Future research should investigate whether eating disorder salient stimuli elicits a stronger bias.

Jumping to conclusions correlates with negative symptoms, poor response inhibition, and impaired functioning in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

The jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias is the tendency to make immediate decisions based on little information. There are few studies that have investigated the relationship between JTC and frontal lobe function. We examined the association between JTC and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB), and Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale in individuals with schizophrenia.

METHODS

In total, 50 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and 50 healthy control individuals were administered the beads task. Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia were assessed using the FAB, BPRS, and GAF.

RESULTS

There was a significant negative correlation between JTC and the negative symptoms of the BPRS (rs=-.368, p = .008). There was a significant positive correlation between JTC and the Go/No-Go task of the FAB (rs=.319, p = .026), and the GAF (rs=.433, p = .002).

CONCLUSION

JTC in individuals with schizophrenia may be categorized according to several causes, including negative symptoms and poor response inhibition.

The relationship between jumping to conclusions and social cognition in first-episode psychosis

Jumping to conclusions (JTC) and impaired social cognition (SC) affect the decoding, processing, and use of social information by people with psychosis. However, the relationship between them had not been deeply explored within psychosis in general, and in first-episode psychosis (FEP) in particular. Our aim was to study the relationship between JTC and SC in a sample with FEP. We conducted a cross-sectional study with 121 patients with FEP, with measures to assess JTC (easy, hard, and salient probability tasks) and SC (emotional recognition, attributional style, and theory of mind). We performed Student's t-test and logistic regression in order to analyse these associations.We found a statistically significant and consistent relationship of small-moderate effect size between JTC (all three tasks) and impaired emotional recognition. Also, our results suggest a relationship between JTC and internal attributions for negative events. Relationships between JTC and theory of mind were not found. These results highlight the importance of psychological treatments oriented to work on a hasty reasoning style and on improving processing of social information linked to emotional recognition and single-cause attributions.

People with schizophrenia use less information to interpret ambiguous social situations

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The tendency of people with schizophrenia to gather insufficient information before making decisions or jumping to conclusions has been repeatedly reported. However, criticism has also been expressed regarding the ecological validity of this finding. Here we present the results obtained by a group of people with schizophrenia and a control group in a non-probabilistic task that requires obtaining items of information before interpreting an ambiguous social situation.

METHODS

Patients with schizophrenia (n = 48) and controls (n = 44) aged 18-50 years participated in the study. All subjects completed the Beads Task and the modified Social Information Preference Task.

RESULTS

Patients with schizophrenia showed a statistically significant tendency to jump to conclusions, including in the proposed novel social task. Unlike other studies, we were unable to find a relationship between this bias and greater severity of psychotic symptoms.

LIMITATIONS

We did not include patients with high levels of psychotic symptoms or a clinical control group.

CONCLUSIONS

The tendency to jump to conclusions in schizophrenia could be present in everyday interpersonal situations.

The relationship between early symptom severity, improvement and remission in first episode psychosis with jumping to conclusions

It is suggested that Jumping To Conclusions (JTC) reasoning bias might contribute to the distortion of external reality. However, the association between psychotic manifestations and JTC is obscure, especially if general intelligence is considered as a mediator. The aim of this study is to investigate the relation between severity, early clinical improvement and remission of symptoms in First Episode Psychosis (FEP) with JTC as an explanatory factor. One hundred seventy-one FEP individuals were evaluated with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) at baseline and one month after treatment initiation. Clinical improvement was ascribed as symptom change one-month post-baseline measurements. Symptomatic remission was assessed with the Andreasen severity criteria and JTC with the Beads Task, operationalized through Draws To Decision (DTD) (the lower the number of DTD, the higher the JTC bias). Regarding symptoms severity, total psychotic, total positive psychotic, and hallucinations-item PANSS scores showed a negative association with JTC after controlling for IQ. Regarding early clinical improvement, the association with JTC was non-significant. No significant association was detected between one month remission status of FEP and JTC. Our findings indicate that severity of positive symptoms is not associated with hastiness in decision-making, but rather with a heightened conservatism in terms of increased data gathering. Further research is required to replicate the results and clarify the cognitive processes involved.

People with jumping to conclusions bias tend to make context-independent decisions rather than context-dependent decisions

Beads task (BT) uses a probabilistic reasoning paradigm and reveals jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias, the tendency to make premature judgments based on insufficient information (i.e., making fewer draws to decision-DTD). In this study, healthy participants (N = 207) were tested on the 80:20 and 60:40 color ratio versions of BT. We investigated associations of JTC bias with a set of cognitive bias problems and Cognitive Bias Task (CBT), a non-veridical (agent-centered) decision-making task that determines context-dependent and context-independent decision-making bias.Results showed that the converted CBT scores were negatively, and cognitive bias scores were positively correlated with JTC bias (DTD ≤ 2) on both versions of the BT. The CBT demonstrated to have satisfactory convergent and predictive validity for JTC bias. The findings suggest that people with JTC bias fail to solve cognitive bias problems and are more likely to make context-independent response selections than context-dependent response selections.

Assessing Impulsivity in Humans and Rodents: Taking the Translational Road

Impulsivity is a multidimensional construct encompassing domains of behavioral inhibition as well as of decision making. It is often adaptive and associated with fast responses, being in that sense physiological. However, abnormal manifestations of impulsive behavior can be observed in contexts of drug abuse and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), among others. A number of tools have therefore been devised to assess the different facets of impulsivity in both normal and pathological contexts. In this narrative review, we systematize behavioral and self-reported measures of impulsivity and critically discuss their constructs and limitations, establishing a parallel between assessments in humans and rodents. The first rely on paradigms that are typically designed to assess a specific dimension of impulsivity, within either impulsive action (inability to suppress a prepotent action) or impulsive choice, which implies a decision that weighs the costs and benefits of the options. On the other hand, self-reported measures are performed through questionnaires, allowing assessment of impulsivity dimensions that would be difficult to mimic in an experimental setting (e.g., positive/negative urgency and lack of premeditation) and which are therefore difficult (if not impossible) to measure in rodents.

Jumping to conclusions in the less-delusion-prone? Preliminary evidence from a more reliable beads task

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Several meta-analyses have shown that people with psychosis tend to gather less information (i.e., they make fewer draws to decision, or DTD) on the beads task than healthy controls. A single meta-analysis has also found a small negative association between delusion-proneness and DTD in healthy samples, but with considerable heterogeneity.

METHODS

We used the new and more reliable "distractor sequences" beads task to clarify the nature of the relationship between delusion-proneness and DTD in a healthy sample. Healthy participants (N = 203) completed the distractor sequences beads task and the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI), which measures delusion-proneness.

RESULTS

PDI and DTD were positively correlated, and those who jumped to conclusions (DTD ≤ 2) had lower PDI than those who did not. Comparing PDI quartiles on DTD provided some evidence the positive association did not extend to the highest PDI quartile. We found that DTD and delusion-proneness were positively related in our non-clinical sample, which was unexpected.

LIMITATIONS

Results need replication with a clinical sample.

CONCLUSIONS

Considering the well-established association between the JTC bias and clinical delusions, the current finding may reflect a relationship that differs between non-clinical and clinically significant delusional groups, or one which reverses sign at some level of delusion-proneness.

Jumping to conclusions in the less-delusion-prone? Further evidence from a more reliable beads task

BACKGROUND

A single meta-analysis has found that healthy people with higher delusion-proneness tend to gather less information (i.e., make fewer draws to decision, or DTD) on the beads task, although the findings of contributing studies were mixed, and the pooled effect size was small. However, using a new and more reliable "distractor sequences" beads task, we recently found a positive relationship between delusion-proneness and DTD in a healthy sample. In the current study, we re-tested this relationship in a new sample, and tested the possibility that the relationship is driven by participant's ability to understand and use odds or likelihood information ("odds literacy").

METHODS

Healthy participants (N = 167) completed the distractor sequences beads task, the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI) which measures delusion-proneness, a measure of odds literacy, and the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scale.

RESULTS

PDI and DTD were positively correlated, and comparing PDI quartiles on DTD confirmed a statistically significant trend of increasing DTD with PDI quartile. Odds literacy was positively rather than negatively associated with both DTD and PDI. Anxiety was positively correlated with PDI and DTD.

CONCLUSIONS

We replicated our earlier finding that DTD and delusion-proneness were positively related in a non-clinical sample, but found that increased odds-literacy did not drive lower PDI and DTD, and hence did not explain their covariance. It is possible however that anxiety and co-occurring risk aversion drive increased delusion-proneness and information-gathering, potentially accounting for the positive relationship between PDI and DTD.

Individualized Metacognitive Training (MCT+) Reduces Delusional Symptoms in Psychosis: A Randomized Clinical Trial

Individualized metacognitive training (MCT+) is a novel psychotherapy that has been designed to specifically target delusional beliefs in people with psychosis. It works by developing an awareness of the implausible content of delusional beliefs, while also targeting the cognitive biases that contribute to their formation and maintenance. It was expected that MCT+ would lead to significantly greater reductions in delusional severity compared to a cognitive remediation (CR) active control condition. A total of 54 patients with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder and active delusions were randomized into four 2-hourly sessions of MCT+ (n = 27) or CR (n = 27). All participants completed posttreatment assessment, and only 2 participants did not complete 6-month follow-up assessment, resulting in MCT+ (n = 26) and CR (n = 26) for final analysis. The primary outcome measures of delusional and positive symptom severity were assessed rater-blind; secondary outcome assessment was non-blinded and included clinical and cognitive insight, the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias, and cognitive functioning. Participants in the MCT+ condition showed significant reductions in delusional and overall positive symptom severity (large effect) and improved clinical insight (moderate effect) relative to CR controls. In contrast, CR controls showed moderate improvement in problem-solving ability relative to MCT+, but no other cognitive domain. Importantly, these findings were maintained at 6-month follow-up. The study adds further efficacy to the MCT program, and suggests that even brief psychotherapy can help to ameliorate the symptoms of psychosis.