1
|
Nuiten SA, de Gee JW, Zantvoord JB, Fahrenfort JJ, van Gaal S. Pharmacological Elevation of Catecholamine Levels Improves Perceptual Decisions, But Not Metacognitive Insight. eNeuro 2024; 11:ENEURO.0019-24.2024. [PMID: 39029953 PMCID: PMC11287790 DOI: 10.1523/eneuro.0019-24.2024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2024] [Revised: 07/12/2024] [Accepted: 07/15/2024] [Indexed: 07/21/2024] Open
Abstract
Perceptual decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of decision confidence. Where the parietal cortex is known for its crucial role in shaping such perceptual decisions, metacognitive evaluations are thought to additionally rely on the (pre)frontal cortex. Because of this supposed neural differentiation between these processes, perceptual and metacognitive decisions may be divergently affected by changes in internal (e.g., attention, arousal) and external (e.g., task and environmental demands) factors. Although intriguing, causal evidence for this hypothesis remains scarce. Here, we investigated the causal effect of two neuromodulatory systems on behavioral and neural measures of perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. Specifically, we pharmacologically elevated levels of catecholamines (with atomoxetine) and acetylcholine (with donepezil) in healthy adult human participants performing a visual discrimination task in which we gauged decision confidence, while electroencephalography was measured. Where cholinergic effects were not robust, catecholaminergic enhancement improved perceptual sensitivity, while at the same time leaving metacognitive sensitivity unaffected. Neurally, catecholaminergic elevation did not affect sensory representations of task-relevant visual stimuli but instead enhanced well-known decision signals measured over the centroparietal cortex, reflecting the accumulation of sensory evidence over time. Crucially, catecholaminergic enhancement concurrently impoverished neural markers measured over the frontal cortex linked to the formation of metacognitive evaluations. Enhanced catecholaminergic neuromodulation thus improves perceptual but not metacognitive decision-making.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Stijn A Nuiten
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Department of Psychiatry (UPK), University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Jan Willem de Gee
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Jasper B Zantvoord
- Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC location AMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Neuroscience, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Institute for Brain and Behavior Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology - Cognitive Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Sachdeva C, Gilbert SJ. Intention offloading: Domain-general versus task-specific confidence signals. Mem Cognit 2024; 52:1125-1141. [PMID: 38381314 PMCID: PMC11315783 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01529-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/22/2024] [Indexed: 02/22/2024]
Abstract
Intention offloading refers to the use of external reminders to help remember delayed intentions (e.g., setting an alert to help you remember when you need to take your medication). Research has found that metacognitive processes influence offloading such that individual differences in confidence predict individual differences in offloading regardless of objective cognitive ability. The current study investigated the cross-domain organization of this relationship. Participants performed two perceptual discrimination tasks where objective accuracy was equalized using a staircase procedure. In a memory task, two measures of intention offloading were collected, (1) the overall likelihood of setting reminders, and (2) the bias in reminder-setting compared to the optimal strategy. It was found that perceptual confidence was associated with the first measure but not the second. It is shown that this is because individual differences in perceptual confidence capture meaningful differences in objective ability despite the staircase procedure. These findings indicate that intention offloading is influenced by both domain-general and task-specific metacognitive signals. They also show that even when task performance is equalized via staircasing, individual differences in confidence cannot be considered a pure measure of metacognitive bias.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Chhavi Sachdeva
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK.
- Faculty of Psychology, Swiss Distance University Institute, UniDistance Suisse, Schinerstrasse 18, 3900, Brig, Switzerland.
| | - Sam J Gilbert
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Le Denmat P, Verguts T, Desender K. A low-dimensional approximation of optimal confidence. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1012273. [PMID: 39047032 PMCID: PMC11299811 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012273] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2023] [Revised: 08/05/2024] [Accepted: 06/24/2024] [Indexed: 07/27/2024] Open
Abstract
Human decision making is accompanied by a sense of confidence. According to Bayesian decision theory, confidence reflects the learned probability of making a correct response, given available data (e.g., accumulated stimulus evidence and response time). Although optimal, independently learning these probabilities for all possible data combinations is computationally intractable. Here, we describe a novel model of confidence implementing a low-dimensional approximation of this optimal yet intractable solution. This model allows efficient estimation of confidence, while at the same time accounting for idiosyncrasies, different kinds of biases and deviation from the optimal probability correct. Our model dissociates confidence biases resulting from the estimate of the reliability of evidence by individuals (captured by parameter α), from confidence biases resulting from general stimulus independent under and overconfidence (captured by parameter β). We provide empirical evidence that this model accurately fits both choice data (accuracy, response time) and trial-by-trial confidence ratings simultaneously. Finally, we test and empirically validate two novel predictions of the model, namely that 1) changes in confidence can be independent of performance and 2) selectively manipulating each parameter of our model leads to distinct patterns of confidence judgments. As a tractable and flexible account of the computation of confidence, our model offers a clear framework to interpret and further resolve different forms of confidence biases.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Tom Verguts
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent Belgium
| | | |
Collapse
|
4
|
Amerio P, Michel M, Goerttler S, Peters MAK, Cleeremans A. Unconscious Perception of Vernier Offsets. Open Mind (Camb) 2024; 8:739-765. [PMID: 38895041 PMCID: PMC11185422 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00145] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2023] [Accepted: 04/15/2024] [Indexed: 06/21/2024] Open
Abstract
The comparison between conscious and unconscious perception is a cornerstone of consciousness science. However, most studies reporting above-chance discrimination of unseen stimuli do not control for criterion biases when assessing awareness. We tested whether observers can discriminate subjectively invisible offsets of Vernier stimuli when visibility is probed using a bias-free task. To reduce visibility, stimuli were either backward masked or presented for very brief durations (1-3 milliseconds) using a modern-day Tachistoscope. We found some behavioral indicators of perception without awareness, and yet, no conclusive evidence thereof. To seek more decisive proof, we simulated a series of Bayesian observer models, including some that produce visibility judgements alongside type-1 judgements. Our data are best accounted for by observers with slightly suboptimal conscious access to sensory evidence. Overall, the stimuli and visibility manipulations employed here induced mild instances of blindsight-like behavior, making them attractive candidates for future investigation of this phenomenon.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Pietro Amerio
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles
| | - Matthias Michel
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles
- Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, New York University
| | - Stephan Goerttler
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles
| | | | - Axel Cleeremans
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Sherman MT, Seth AK. Knowing that you know that you know? An extreme-confidence heuristic can lead to above-chance discrimination of metacognitive performance. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae020. [PMID: 38779689 PMCID: PMC11110933 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2023] [Revised: 04/14/2024] [Accepted: 04/25/2024] [Indexed: 05/25/2024] Open
Abstract
In daily life, we can not only estimate confidence in our inferences ('I'm sure I failed that exam'), but can also estimate whether those feelings of confidence are good predictors of decision accuracy ('I feel sure I failed, but my feeling is probably wrong; I probably passed'). In the lab, by using simple perceptual tasks and collecting trial-by-trial confidence ratings visual metacognition research has repeatedly shown that participants can successfully predict the accuracy of their perceptual choices. Can participants also successfully evaluate 'confidence in confidence' in these tasks? This is the question addressed in this study. Participants performed a simple, two-interval forced choice numerosity task framed as an exam. Confidence judgements were collected in the form of a 'predicted exam grade'. Finally, we collected 'meta-metacognitive' reports in a two-interval forced-choice design: trials were presented in pairs, and participants had to select that in which they thought their confidence (predicted grade) best matched their accuracy (actual grade), effectively minimizing their quadratic scoring rule (QSR) score. Participants successfully selected trials on which their metacognition was better when metacognitive performance was quantified using area under the type 2 ROC (AUROC2) but not when using the 'gold-standard' measure m-ratio. However, further analyses suggested that participants selected trials on which AUROC2 is lower in part via an extreme-confidence heuristic, rather than through explicit evaluation of metacognitive inferences: when restricting analyses to trials on which participants gave the same confidence rating AUROC2 no longer differed as a function of selection, and likewise when we excluded trials on which extreme confidence ratings were given. Together, our results show that participants are able to make effective metacognitive discriminations on their visual confidence ratings, but that explicit 'meta-metacognitive' processes may not be required.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Maxine T Sherman
- Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, United Kingdom
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, United Kingdom
| | - Anil K Seth
- Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, United Kingdom
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, United Kingdom
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Program on Brain, Mind and Consciousness, Toronto M5G 1M1, Canada
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Haddara N, Rahnev D. Threat Expectation Does Not Improve Perceptual Discrimination despite Causing Heightened Priority Processing in the Frontoparietal Network. J Neurosci 2024; 44:e1219232023. [PMID: 38395615 PMCID: PMC11007364 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.1219-23.2023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Revised: 11/21/2023] [Accepted: 12/28/2023] [Indexed: 02/25/2024] Open
Abstract
Threat cues have been widely shown to elicit increased sensory and attentional neural processing. However, whether this enhanced recruitment leads to measurable behavioral improvements in perception is still in question. Here, we adjudicate between two opposing theories: that threat cues do or do not enhance perceptual sensitivity. We created threat stimuli by pairing one direction of motion in a random dot kinematogram with an aversive sound. While in the MRI scanner, 46 subjects (both men and women) completed a cued (threat/safe/neutral) perceptual decision-making task where they indicated the perceived motion direction of each moving dot stimulus. We found strong evidence that threat cues did not increase perceptual sensitivity compared with safe and neutral cues. This lack of improvement in perceptual decision-making ability occurred despite the threat cue resulting in widespread increases in frontoparietal BOLD activity, as well as increased connectivity between the right insula and the frontoparietal network. These results call into question the intuitive claim that expectation automatically enhances our perception of threat and highlight the role of the frontoparietal network in prioritizing the processing of threat-related environmental cues.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Nadia Haddara
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Zhu JQ, Sundh J, Spicer J, Chater N, Sanborn AN. The autocorrelated Bayesian sampler: A rational process for probability judgments, estimates, confidence intervals, choices, confidence judgments, and response times. Psychol Rev 2024; 131:456-493. [PMID: 37289507 PMCID: PMC11115360 DOI: 10.1037/rev0000427] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Normative models of decision-making that optimally transform noisy (sensory) information into categorical decisions qualitatively mismatch human behavior. Indeed, leading computational models have only achieved high empirical corroboration by adding task-specific assumptions that deviate from normative principles. In response, we offer a Bayesian approach that implicitly produces a posterior distribution of possible answers (hypotheses) in response to sensory information. But we assume that the brain has no direct access to this posterior, but can only sample hypotheses according to their posterior probabilities. Accordingly, we argue that the primary problem of normative concern in decision-making is integrating stochastic hypotheses, rather than stochastic sensory information, to make categorical decisions. This implies that human response variability arises mainly from posterior sampling rather than sensory noise. Because human hypothesis generation is serially correlated, hypothesis samples will be autocorrelated. Guided by this new problem formulation, we develop a new process, the Autocorrelated Bayesian Sampler (ABS), which grounds autocorrelated hypothesis generation in a sophisticated sampling algorithm. The ABS provides a single mechanism that qualitatively explains many empirical effects of probability judgments, estimates, confidence intervals, choice, confidence judgments, response times, and their relationships. Our analysis demonstrates the unifying power of a perspective shift in the exploration of normative models. It also exemplifies the proposal that the "Bayesian brain" operates using samples not probabilities, and that variability in human behavior may primarily reflect computational rather than sensory noise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Jake Spicer
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick
| | - Nick Chater
- Warwick Business School, University of Warwick
| | | |
Collapse
|
8
|
Matsuyoshi D, Isato A, Yamada M. Overlapping yet dissociable contributions of superiority illusion features to Ponzo illusion strength and metacognitive performance. BMC Psychol 2024; 12:108. [PMID: 38429795 PMCID: PMC10905904 DOI: 10.1186/s40359-024-01625-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 03/03/2024] Open
Abstract
Humans are typically inept at evaluating their abilities and predispositions. People dismiss such a lack of metacognitive insight into their capacities while even enhancing (albeit illusorily) self-evaluation such that they should have more desirable traits than an average peer. This superiority illusion helps maintain a healthy mental state. However, the scope and range of its influence on broader human behavior, especially perceptual tasks, remain elusive. As belief shapes the way people perceive and recognize, the illusory self-superiority belief potentially regulates our perceptual and metacognitive performance. In this study, we used hierarchical Bayesian estimation and machine learning of signal detection theoretic measures to understand how the superiority illusion influences visual perception and metacognition for the Ponzo illusion. Our results demonstrated that the superiority illusion correlated with the Ponzo illusion magnitude and metacognitive performance. Next, we combined principal component analysis and cross-validated regularized regression (relaxed elastic net) to identify which superiority components contributed to the correlations. We revealed that the "extraversion" superiority dimension tapped into the Ponzo illusion magnitude and metacognitive ability. In contrast, the "honesty-humility" and "neuroticism" dimensions only predicted Ponzo illusion magnitude and metacognitive ability, respectively. These results suggest common and distinct influences of superiority features on perceptual sensitivity and metacognition. Our findings contribute to the accumulating body of evidence indicating that the leverage of superiority illusion is far-reaching, even to visual perception.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Daisuke Matsuyoshi
- Institute of Quantum Life Science, National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology, 4-9-1 Anagawa, Inage, Chiba, 263-8555, Japan
- Department of Functional Brain Imaging Research, Institute of Quantum Medical Science, National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology, 4-9-1 Anagawa, Inage, Chiba, 263-8555, Japan
- Araya Inc., 1-11 Kanda-sakumacho, Chiyoda, Tokyo, 101-0025, Japan
| | - Ayako Isato
- Department of Functional Brain Imaging Research, Institute of Quantum Medical Science, National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology, 4-9-1 Anagawa, Inage, Chiba, 263-8555, Japan
- Faculty of Humanities, Saitama Gakuen University, Saitama, 333-0831, Japan
| | - Makiko Yamada
- Institute of Quantum Life Science, National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology, 4-9-1 Anagawa, Inage, Chiba, 263-8555, Japan.
- Department of Functional Brain Imaging Research, Institute of Quantum Medical Science, National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology, 4-9-1 Anagawa, Inage, Chiba, 263-8555, Japan.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Shekhar M, Rahnev D. How do humans give confidence? A comprehensive comparison of process models of perceptual metacognition. J Exp Psychol Gen 2024; 153:656-688. [PMID: 38095983 PMCID: PMC10922729 DOI: 10.1037/xge0001524] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/23/2024]
Abstract
Humans have the metacognitive ability to assess the accuracy of their decisions via confidence judgments. Several computational models of confidence have been developed but not enough has been done to compare these models, making it difficult to adjudicate between them. Here, we compare 14 popular models of confidence that make various assumptions, such as confidence being derived from postdecisional evidence, from positive (decision-congruent) evidence, from posterior probability computations, or from a separate decision-making system for metacognitive judgments. We fit all models to three large experiments in which subjects completed a basic perceptual task with confidence ratings. In Experiments 1 and 2, the best-fitting model was the lognormal meta noise (LogN) model, which postulates that confidence is selectively corrupted by signal-dependent noise. However, in Experiment 3, the positive evidence (PE) model provided the best fits. We evaluated a new model combining the two consistently best-performing models-LogN and the weighted evidence and visibility (WEV). The resulting model, which we call logWEV, outperformed its individual counterparts and the PE model across all data sets, offering a better, more generalizable explanation for these data. Parameter and model recovery analyses showed mostly good recoverability but with important exceptions carrying implications for our ability to discriminate between models. Finally, we evaluated each model's ability to explain different patterns in the data, which led to additional insight into their performances. These results comprehensively characterize the relative adequacy of current confidence models to fit data from basic perceptual tasks and highlight the most plausible mechanisms underlying confidence generation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Medha Shekhar
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology
| | | |
Collapse
|
10
|
Shekhar M, Rahnev D. Human-like dissociations between confidence and accuracy in convolutional neural networks. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2024:2024.02.01.578187. [PMID: 38352596 PMCID: PMC10862905 DOI: 10.1101/2024.02.01.578187] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/25/2024]
Abstract
Prior research has shown that manipulating stimulus energy by changing both stimulus contrast and variability results in confidence-accuracy dissociations in humans. Specifically, even when performance is matched, higher stimulus energy leads to higher confidence. The most common explanation for this effect is the positive evidence heuristic where confidence neglects evidence that disconfirms the choice. However, an alternative explanation is the signal-and-variance-increase hypothesis, according to which these dissociations arise from low-level changes in the separation and variance of perceptual representations. Because artificial neural networks lack built-in confidence heuristics, they can serve as a test for the necessity of confidence heuristics in explaining confidence-accuracy dissociations. Therefore, we tested whether confidence-accuracy dissociations induced by stimulus energy manipulations emerge naturally in convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We found that, across three different energy manipulations, CNNs produced confidence-accuracy dissociations similar to those found in humans. This effect was present for a range of CNN architectures from shallow 4-layer networks to very deep ones, such as VGG-19 and ResNet -50 pretrained on ImageNet. Further, we traced back the reason for the confidence-accuracy dissociations in all CNNs to the same signal-and-variance increase that has been proposed for humans: higher stimulus energy increased the separation and variance of the CNNs' internal representations leading to higher confidence even for matched accuracy. These findings cast doubt on the necessity of the positive evidence heuristic to explain human confidence and establish CNNs as promising models for adjudicating between low-level, stimulus-driven and high-level, cognitive explanations of human behavior.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Medha Shekhar
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Katyal S, Fleming SM. The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor. Cortex 2024; 171:223-234. [PMID: 38041921 PMCID: PMC11139654 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.11.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2023] [Revised: 10/20/2023] [Accepted: 11/02/2023] [Indexed: 12/04/2023]
Abstract
Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sucharit Katyal
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Stephen M Fleming
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK; Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Çapan D, Furman R, Göksun T, Eskenazi T. Hands of confidence: When gestures increase confidence in spatial problem-solving. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2024; 77:257-277. [PMID: 36890437 DOI: 10.1177/17470218231164270] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/10/2023]
Abstract
This study examined whether the metacognitive system monitors the potential positive effects of gestures on spatial thinking. Participants (N = 59, 31F, Mage = 21.67) performed a mental rotation task, consisting of 24 problems varying in difficulty, and they evaluated their confidence in their answers to problems in either gesture or control conditions. The results revealed that performance and confidence were higher in the gesture condition, in which the participants were asked to use their gestures during problem-solving, compared with the control condition, extending the literature by evidencing gestures' role in metacognition. Yet, the effect was only evident for females, who already performed worse than males, and when the problems were difficult. Encouraging gestures adversely affected performance and confidence in males. Such results suggest that gestures selectively influence cognition and metacognition and highlight the importance of task-related (i.e., difficulty) and individual-related variables (i.e., sex) in elucidating the links between gestures, confidence, and spatial thinking.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Dicle Çapan
- Department of Psychology, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
| | - Reyhan Furman
- School of Psychology and Computer Science, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
| | - Tilbe Göksun
- Department of Psychology, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
| | - Terry Eskenazi
- Department of Psychology, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Calder-Travis J, Bogacz R, Yeung N. Expressions for Bayesian confidence of drift diffusion observers in fluctuating stimuli tasks. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2023; 117:102815. [PMID: 38188903 PMCID: PMC7615478 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmp.2023.102815] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/09/2024]
Abstract
We introduce a new approach to modelling decision confidence, with the aim of enabling computationally cheap predictions while taking into account, and thereby exploiting, trial-by-trial variability in stochastically fluctuating stimuli. Using the framework of the drift diffusion model of decision making, along with time-dependent thresholds and the idea of a Bayesian confidence readout, we derive expressions for the probability distribution over confidence reports. In line with current models of confidence, the derivations allow for the accumulation of "pipeline" evidence that has been received but not processed by the time of response, the effect of drift rate variability, and metacognitive noise. The expressions are valid for stimuli that change over the course of a trial with normally-distributed fluctuations in the evidence they provide. A number of approximations are made to arrive at the final expressions, and we test all approximations via simulation. The derived expressions contain only a small number of standard functions, and require evaluating only once per trial, making trial-by-trial modelling of confidence data in stochastically fluctuating stimuli tasks more feasible. We conclude by using the expressions to gain insight into the confidence of optimal observers, and empirically observed patterns.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Rafal Bogacz
- MRC Brain Network Dynamics Unit, Nuffield Department of Clinical Neuroscience, University of Oxford, UK
| | - Nick Yeung
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, UK
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Mihali A, Broeker M, Ragalmuto FDM, Horga G. Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7826. [PMID: 38030601 PMCID: PMC10687029 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-42813-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2022] [Accepted: 10/23/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We develop a Bayesian modeling framework and a psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while people experience a motion after-effect illusion. People can incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all show signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Andra Mihali
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA.
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA.
| | - Marianne Broeker
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA
- Columbia University, Teachers College, New York, NY, USA
- University of Oxford, Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford, UK
| | - Florian D M Ragalmuto
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA
- Vrije Universiteit, Faculty of Behavioral and Movement Science, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Berliner FortbildungsAkademie, Berlin, DE, Germany
| | - Guillermo Horga
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA.
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Zheng Y, Recht S, Rahnev D. Common computations for metacognition and meta-metacognition. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad023. [PMID: 38046654 PMCID: PMC10693288 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2023] [Revised: 09/05/2023] [Accepted: 10/23/2023] [Indexed: 12/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Recent evidence shows that people have the meta-metacognitive ability to evaluate their metacognitive judgments of confidence. However, it is unclear whether meta-metacognitive judgments are made by a different system and rely on a separate set of computations compared to metacognitive judgments. To address this question, we asked participants (N = 36) to perform a perceptual decision-making task and provide (i) an object-level, Type-1 response about the identity of the stimulus; (ii) a metacognitive, Type-2 response (low/high) regarding their confidence in their Type-1 decision; and (iii) a meta-metacognitive, Type-3 response (low/high) regarding the quality of their Type-2 rating. We found strong evidence for the existence of Type-3, meta-metacognitive ability. In a separate condition, participants performed an identical task with only a Type-1 response followed by a Type-2 response given on a 4-point scale. We found that the two conditions produced equivalent results such that the combination of binary Type-2 and binary Type-3 responses acts similar to a 4-point Type-2 response. Critically, while Type-2 evaluations were subject to metacognitive noise, Type-3 judgments were made at no additional cost. These results suggest that it is unlikely that there is a distinction between Type-2 and Type-3 systems (metacognition and meta-metacognition) in perceptual decision-making and, instead, a single system can be flexibly adapted to produce both Type-2 and Type-3 evaluations recursively.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Yunxuan Zheng
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, United States
| | - Samuel Recht
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 7JX, United Kingdom
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, United States
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Lebuda I, Benedek M. A systematic framework of creative metacognition. Phys Life Rev 2023; 46:161-181. [PMID: 37478624 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.07.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Accepted: 07/03/2023] [Indexed: 07/23/2023]
Abstract
Creative cognition does not just involve cognitive processes in direct service of the main task objective (e.g., idea generation), but also metacognitive processes that monitor and regulate cognition adaptively (e.g., evaluation of ideas and task performance, or development and selection of task strategies). Although metacognition is vital for creative performance, relevant work is sparse, which may be partly due to persistent ambiguities in the theoretical conceptualization of creative metacognition. Therefore, this article proposes a systematic framework of creative metacognition (CMC), which builds on recent advancements in metacognition theory and extends them to meet the specifics of creative cognition. The CMC framework consists of two dynamic components-monitoring and control-and a more static component of metacognitive knowledge, each subsuming metacognitive processes applying to the level of task, performance, and responses. We describe the presumed function of these metacognitive components in the creative process, present evidence in support of each, and discuss their association with related constructs, such as creative self-beliefs. We further highlight the dynamic interplay of metacognitive processes across task performance and identify promising avenues for future research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Izabela Lebuda
- University of Graz, Austria; University of Wrocław, Poland.
| | | |
Collapse
|
17
|
Arnold DH, Johnston A, Adie J, Yarrow K. On why we lack confidence in some signal-detection-based analyses of confidence. Conscious Cogn 2023; 113:103532. [PMID: 37295196 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103532] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2022] [Revised: 05/12/2023] [Accepted: 05/12/2023] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Signal-detection theory (SDT) is one of the most popular frameworks for analyzing data from studies of human behavior - including investigations of confidence. SDT-based analyses of confidence deliver both standard estimates of sensitivity (d'), and a second estimate informed by high-confidence decisions - meta d'. The extent to which meta d' estimates fall short of d' estimates is regarded as a measure of metacognitive inefficiency, quantifying the contamination of confidence by additional noise. These analyses rely on a key but questionable assumption - that repeated exposures to an input will evoke a normally-shaped distribution of perceptual experiences (the normality assumption). Here we show, via analyses inspired by an experiment and modelling, that when distributions of experience do not conform with the normality assumption, meta d' can be systematically underestimated relative to d'. Our data highlight that SDT-based analyses of confidence do not provide a ground truth measure of human metacognitive inefficiency. We explain why deviance from the normality assumption is especially a problem for some popular SDT-based analyses of confidence, in contrast to other analyses inspired by the SDT framework, which are more robust to violations of the normality assumption.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Derek H Arnold
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Australia.
| | - Alan Johnston
- School of Psychology, The University of Nottingham, United Kingdom
| | - Joshua Adie
- Research Institute for Sport & Exercise, University of Canberra, Australia
| | - Kielan Yarrow
- Department of Psychology, City University London, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Dayan P. Metacognitive Information Theory. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:392-411. [PMID: 37637303 PMCID: PMC10449404 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00091] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2022] [Accepted: 06/25/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
The capacity that subjects have to rate confidence in their choices is a form of metacognition, and can be assessed according to bias, sensitivity and efficiency. Rich networks of domain-specific and domain-general regions of the brain are involved in the rating, and are associated with its quality and its use for regulating the processes of thinking and acting. Sensitivity and efficiency are often measured by quantities called meta-d' and the M-ratio that are based on reverse engineering the potential accuracy of the original, primary, choice that is implied by the quality of the confidence judgements. Here, we advocate a straightforward measure of sensitivity, called meta-𝓘, which assesses the mutual information between the accuracy of the subject's choices and the confidence reports, and two normalized versions of this measure that quantify efficiency in different regimes. Unlike most other measures, meta-𝓘-based quantities increase with the number of correctly assessed bins with which confidence is reported. We illustrate meta-𝓘 on data from a perceptual decision-making task, and via a simple form of simulated second-order metacognitive observer.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Peter Dayan
- Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen, Germany
- University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
19
|
Haddara N, Rahnev D. Threat expectation does not improve perceptual discrimination despite causing heightened priority processing in the frontoparietal network. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2023:2023.07.06.547999. [PMID: 37503060 PMCID: PMC10369873 DOI: 10.1101/2023.07.06.547999] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/29/2023]
Abstract
Threat cues have been widely shown to elicit increased sensory and attentional neural processing. However, whether this enhanced recruitment leads to measurable behavioral improvements in perception is still in question. Here we adjudicate between two opposing theories: that threat cues do or do not enhance perceptual sensitivity. We created threat stimuli by pairing one direction of motion in a random dot kinematogram with an aversive sound. While in the MRI scanner, 46 subjects (both men and women) completed a cued (threat/safe/neutral) perceptual decision-making task where they indicated the perceived motion direction of each moving dots stimulus. We found strong evidence that threat cues did not increase perceptual sensitivity compared to safe and neutral cues. This lack of improvement in perceptual decision-making ability occurred despite the threat cue resulting in widespread increases in frontoparietal BOLD activity, as well as increased connectivity between the right insula and the frontoparietal network. These results call into question the intuitive claim that expectation automatically enhances our perception of threat, and highlight the role of the frontoparietal network in prioritizing the processing of threat-related environmental cues.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Nadia Haddara
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
20
|
Chen S, Rahnev D. Confidence response times: Challenging postdecisional models of confidence. J Vis 2023; 23:11. [PMID: 37450286 PMCID: PMC10353741 DOI: 10.1167/jov.23.7.11] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2022] [Accepted: 06/14/2023] [Indexed: 07/18/2023] Open
Abstract
Even though the nature of confidence computations has been the topic of intense interest, little attention has been paid to what confidence response times (cRTs) reveal about the underlying confidence computations. Several previous studies found cRTs to be negatively correlated with confidence in the group as a whole and consequently hypothesized the existence of an intrinsic relationship of cRT with confidence for all subjects. This hypothesis was further used to support postdecisional models of confidence that predict that cRT and confidence should always be negatively correlated. Here we test the alternative hypothesis that cRT is driven by the frequency of confidence responses such that the most frequent confidence ratings are inherently made faster regardless of whether they are high or low. We examined cRTs in three large data sets from the Confidence Database and found that the lowest cRTs occurred for the most frequent confidence rating. In other words, subjects who gave high confidence ratings most frequently had negative confidence-cRT relationships, whereas subjects who gave low confidence ratings most frequently had positive confidence-cRT relationships. In addition, we found a strong across-subject correlation between response time and cRT, suggesting that response speed for both the decision and the confidence rating is influenced by a common factor. Our results show that cRT is not intrinsically linked to confidence and strongly challenge several postdecisional models of confidence.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sixing Chen
- School of Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Peking University, Beijing, China
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
Gao Y, Xue K, Odegaard B, Rahnev D. Common computations in automatic cue combination and metacognitive confidence reports. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2023:2023.06.07.544029. [PMID: 37333352 PMCID: PMC10274803 DOI: 10.1101/2023.06.07.544029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/20/2023]
Abstract
Appropriate perceptual decision making necessitates the accurate estimation and use of sensory uncertainty. Such estimation has been studied in the context of both low-level multisensory cue combination and metacognitive estimation of confidence, but it remains unclear whether the same computations underlie both sets of uncertainty estimation. We created visual stimuli with low vs. high overall motion energy, such that the high-energy stimuli led to higher confidence but lower accuracy in a visual-only task. Importantly, we tested the impact of the low- and high-energy visual stimuli on auditory motion perception in a separate task. Despite being irrelevant to the auditory task, both visual stimuli impacted auditory judgments presumably via automatic low-level mechanisms. Critically, we found that the high-energy visual stimuli influenced the auditory judgments more strongly than the low-energy visual stimuli. This effect was in line with the confidence but contrary to the accuracy differences between the high- and low-energy stimuli in the visual-only task. These effects were captured by a simple computational model that assumes common computational principles underlying both confidence reports and multisensory cue combination. Our results reveal a deep link between automatic sensory processing and metacognitive confidence reports, and suggest that vastly different stages of perceptual decision making rely on common computational principles.
Collapse
|
22
|
Michel M. Confidence in consciousness research. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023; 14:e1628. [PMID: 36205300 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1628] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2022] [Revised: 09/14/2022] [Accepted: 09/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, New York University, New York, New York, USA
| |
Collapse
|
23
|
Bruno A, Sudkamp J, Souto D. A metacognitive approach to the study of motion-induced duration biases reveals inter-individual differences in forming confidence judgments. J Vis 2023; 23:15. [PMID: 36971682 PMCID: PMC10064922 DOI: 10.1167/jov.23.3.15] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Our ability to estimate the duration of subsecond visual events is prone to distortions, which depend on both sensory and decisional factors. To disambiguate between these two influences, we can look at the alignment between discrimination estimates of duration at the point of subjective equality and confidence estimates when the confidence about decisions is minimal, because observers should be maximally uncertain when two stimuli are perceptually the same. Here, we used this approach to investigate the relationship between the speed of a visual stimulus and its perceived duration. Participants were required to compare two intervals, report which had the longer duration, and then rate their confidence in that judgment. One of the intervals contained a stimulus drifting at a constant speed, whereas the stimulus embedded in the other interval could be stationary, linearly accelerating or decelerating, or drifting at the same speed. Discrimination estimates revealed duration compression for the stationary stimuli and, to a lesser degree, for the accelerating and decelerating stimuli. Confidence showed a similar pattern, but, overall, the confidence estimates were shifted more toward higher durations, pointing to a small contribution of decisional processes. A simple observer model, which assumes that both judgments are based on the same sensory information, captured well inter-individual differences in the criterion used to form a confidence judgment.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Aurelio Bruno
- Department of Psychology, University of York, York, UK
- School of Psychology and Vision Sciences, College of Life Sciences, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
| | - Jennifer Sudkamp
- School of Psychology and Vision Sciences, College of Life Sciences, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
| | - David Souto
- School of Psychology and Vision Sciences, College of Life Sciences, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
| |
Collapse
|
24
|
Confidence reflects a noisy decision reliability estimate. Nat Hum Behav 2023; 7:142-154. [PMID: 36344656 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-022-01464-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 16.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/07/2022] [Accepted: 09/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Decisions vary in difficulty. Humans know this and typically report more confidence in easy than in difficult decisions. However, confidence reports do not perfectly track decision accuracy, but also reflect response biases and difficulty misjudgements. To isolate the quality of confidence reports, we developed a model of the decision-making process underlying choice-confidence data. In this model, confidence reflects a subject's estimate of the reliability of their decision. The quality of this estimate is limited by the subject's uncertainty about the uncertainty of the variable that informs their decision ('meta-uncertainty'). This model provides an accurate account of choice-confidence data across a broad range of perceptual and cognitive tasks, investigated in six previous studies. We find meta-uncertainty varies across subjects, is stable over time, generalizes across some domains and can be manipulated experimentally. The model offers a parsimonious explanation for the computational processes that underlie and constrain the sense of confidence.
Collapse
|
25
|
Peters MA. Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 142:104903. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104903] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/28/2022] [Revised: 09/27/2022] [Accepted: 10/01/2022] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
|
26
|
Rahnev D, Balsdon T, Charles L, de Gardelle V, Denison R, Desender K, Faivre N, Filevich E, Fleming SM, Jehee J, Lau H, Lee ALF, Locke SM, Mamassian P, Odegaard B, Peters M, Reyes G, Rouault M, Sackur J, Samaha J, Sergent C, Sherman MT, Siedlecka M, Soto D, Vlassova A, Zylberberg A. Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:1746-1765. [PMID: 35839099 PMCID: PMC9633335 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221075615] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Tarryn Balsdon
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Lucie Charles
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, UK
| | | | - Rachel Denison
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, USA
| | | | - Nathan Faivre
- Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Univ. Savoie Mont Blanc, CNRS, LPNC, 38000 Grenoble, France
| | - Elisa Filevich
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin, Philippstraβe 13 Haus 6, 10115 Berlin, Germany
| | - Stephen M. Fleming
- Department of Experimental Psychology and Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | | | | | - Alan L. F. Lee
- Department of Applied Psychology and Wofoo Joseph Lee Consulting and Counselling Psychology Research Centre, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
| | - Shannon M. Locke
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Brian Odegaard
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA
| | - Megan Peters
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA USA
| | - Gabriel Reyes
- Facultad de Psicología, Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile
| | - Marion Rouault
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres (PSL University), Paris, France
| | - Jerome Sackur
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres (PSL University), Paris, France
| | - Jason Samaha
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz
| | - Claire Sergent
- Université de Paris, INCC UMR 8002, 75006, Paris, France
| | - Maxine T. Sherman
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Marta Siedlecka
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| | - David Soto
- Basque Center on Cognition Brain and Language, San Sebastián, Spain. Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Alexandra Vlassova
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Ariel Zylberberg
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, USA
| |
Collapse
|
27
|
Abstract
The human ability to introspect on thoughts, perceptions or actions − metacognitive ability − has become a focal topic of both cognitive basic and clinical research. At the same time it has become increasingly clear that currently available quantitative tools are limited in their ability to make unconfounded inferences about metacognition. As a step forward, the present work introduces a comprehensive modeling framework of metacognition that allows for inferences about metacognitive noise and metacognitive biases during the readout of decision values or at the confidence reporting stage. The model assumes that confidence results from a continuous but noisy and potentially biased transformation of decision values, described by a confidence link function. A canonical set of metacognitive noise distributions is introduced which differ, amongst others, in their predictions about metacognitive sign flips of decision values. Successful recovery of model parameters is demonstrated, and the model is validated on an empirical data set. In particular, it is shown that metacognitive noise and bias parameters correlate with conventional behavioral measures. Crucially, in contrast to these conventional measures, metacognitive noise parameters inferred from the model are shown to be independent of performance. This work is accompanied by a toolbox (ReMeta) that allows researchers to estimate key parameters of metacognition in confidence datasets. Metacognition is a person’s ability to think about their own thoughts. For example, imagine you are walking in a dark forest when you see an elongated object. You think it is a stick rather than a snake, but how sure are you? Reflecting on one’s certainty about own thoughts or perceptions – confidence – is a prime example of metacognition. While our ability to think about our own thoughts in this way provides many, perhaps uniquely human, advantages, confidence judgements are prone to biases. Often, humans tend to be overconfident: we think we are right more often than we actually are. Internal noise of neural processes can also affect confidence. Understanding these imperfections in metacognition could shed light on how humans think, but studying this phenomenon is challenging. Current methods are lacking either mechanistic insight about the sources of metacognitive biases and noise or rely on unrealistic assumptions. A better model for how metacognition works could provide a clearer picture. Guggenmos developed a mathematical model and a computer toolbox to help researchers investigate how humans or animals estimate confidence in their own thoughts and resulting decisions . The model splits metacognition apart, allowing scientists to explore biases and sources of noise at different phases in the process. It takes two kinds of data: the decisions study participants make, and how sure they are about their decision being correct. It then recreates metacognition in three phases: the primary decision, the metacognitive readout of the evidence, and the confidence report. This allows investigators to see where and when noise and bias come into play. Guggenmos tested the model using independent data from a visual discrimination task and found that it was able to predict how confident participants reported to be in their decisions. Metacognitive ability can change in people with mental illness. People with schizophrenia have often been found to be overconfident in their decisions, while people with depression can be underconfident. Using this model to separate the various facets of metacognition could help to explain why. It could also shed light on human thinking in general.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Guggenmos
- Health and Medical University, Institute for Mind, Brain and Behavior
- Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Department of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
| |
Collapse
|
28
|
Miyoshi K, Sakamoto Y, Nishida S. On the assumptions behind metacognitive measurements: Implications for theory and practice. J Vis 2022; 22:18. [PMID: 36149676 PMCID: PMC9520519 DOI: 10.1167/jov.22.10.18] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2021] [Accepted: 08/30/2022] [Indexed: 12/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Theories of visual confidence have largely been grounded in the gaussian signal detection framework. This framework is so dominant that idiosyncratic consequences from this distributional assumption have remained unappreciated. This article reports systematic comparisons of the gaussian signal detection framework to its logistic counterpart in the measurement of metacognitive accuracy. Because of the difference in their distribution kurtosis, these frameworks are found to provide different perspectives regarding the efficiency of confidence rating relative to objective decision (the logistic model intrinsically gives greater meta-d'/d' ratio than the gaussian model). These frameworks can also provide opposing conclusions regarding the metacognitive inefficiency along the internal evidence continuum (whether meta-d' is larger or smaller for higher levels of confidence). Previous theories developed on these lines of analysis may need to be revisited as the gaussian and logistic metacognitive models received somewhat equivalent support in our quantitative model comparisons. Despite these discrepancies, however, we found that across-condition or across-participant comparisons of metacognitive measures are relatively robust against the distributional assumptions, which provides much assurance to conventional research practice. We hope this article promotes the awareness for the significance of hidden modeling assumptions, contributing to the cumulative development of the relevant field.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Shin'ya Nishida
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
- NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Kanagawa, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
29
|
Benwell CSY, Mohr G, Wallberg J, Kouadio A, Ince RAA. Psychiatrically relevant signatures of domain-general decision-making and metacognition in the general population. NPJ MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH 2022; 1:10. [PMID: 38609460 PMCID: PMC10956036 DOI: 10.1038/s44184-022-00009-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2022] [Accepted: 08/04/2022] [Indexed: 04/14/2024]
Abstract
Human behaviours are guided by how confident we feel in our abilities. When confidence does not reflect objective performance, this can impact critical adaptive functions and impair life quality. Distorted decision-making and confidence have been associated with mental health problems. Here, utilising advances in computational and transdiagnostic psychiatry, we sought to map relationships between psychopathology and both decision-making and confidence in the general population across two online studies (N's = 344 and 473, respectively). The results revealed dissociable decision-making and confidence signatures related to distinct symptom dimensions. A dimension characterised by compulsivity and intrusive thoughts was found to be associated with reduced objective accuracy but, paradoxically, increased absolute confidence, whereas a dimension characterized by anxiety and depression was associated with systematically low confidence in the absence of impairments in objective accuracy. These relationships replicated across both studies and distinct cognitive domains (perception and general knowledge), suggesting that they are reliable and domain general. Additionally, whereas Big-5 personality traits also predicted objective task performance, only symptom dimensions related to subjective confidence. Domain-general signatures of decision-making and metacognition characterise distinct psychological dispositions and psychopathology in the general population and implicate confidence as a central component of mental health.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christopher S Y Benwell
- Division of Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK.
| | - Greta Mohr
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
| | - Jana Wallberg
- Division of Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK
| | - Aya Kouadio
- Division of Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK
| | - Robin A A Ince
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
| |
Collapse
|
30
|
Jin S, Verhaeghen P, Rahnev D. Across-subject correlation between confidence and accuracy: A meta-analysis of the Confidence Database. Psychon Bull Rev 2022; 29:1405-1413. [PMID: 35129781 PMCID: PMC10777204 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02063-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/22/2022] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
Abstract
If one friend confidently tells us to buy Product A while another friend thinks that Product B is better but is not confident, we may go with the advice of our confident friend. Should we? The relationship between people's confidence and accuracy has been of great interest in many fields, especially in high-stakes situations like eyewitness testimony. However, there is still little consensus about how much we should trust someone's overall confidence level. Here, we examine the across-subject relationship between average accuracy and average confidence in 213 unique datasets from the Confidence Database. This approach allows us to empirically address this issue with unprecedented statistical power and check for the presence of various moderators. We find an across-subject correlation between average accuracy and average confidence of R = .22. Importantly, this relationship is much stronger for memory than for perception tasks ("domain effect"), as well as for confidence scales with fewer points ("granularity effect"). These results show that we should take one's confidence seriously (and perhaps buy Product A) and suggest several factors that moderate the relative consistency of how people make confidence judgments.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sunny Jin
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, 654 Cherry Str. NW, Atlanta, GA, 30332, USA
| | - Paul Verhaeghen
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, 654 Cherry Str. NW, Atlanta, GA, 30332, USA
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, 654 Cherry Str. NW, Atlanta, GA, 30332, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
31
|
Di Luzio P, Tarasi L, Silvanto J, Avenanti A, Romei V. Human perceptual and metacognitive decision-making rely on distinct brain networks. PLoS Biol 2022; 20:e3001750. [PMID: 35944012 PMCID: PMC9362930 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3001750] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2021] [Accepted: 07/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Perceptual decisions depend on the ability to exploit available sensory information in order to select the most adaptive option from a set of alternatives. Such decisions depend on the perceptual sensitivity of the organism, which is generally accompanied by a corresponding level of certainty about the choice made. Here, by use of corticocortical paired associative transcranial magnetic stimulation protocol (ccPAS) aimed at inducing plastic changes, we shaped perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive ability in a motion discrimination task depending on the targeted network, demonstrating their functional dissociation. Neurostimulation aimed at boosting V5/MT+-to-V1/V2 back-projections enhanced motion sensitivity without impacting metacognition, whereas boosting IPS/LIP-to-V1/V2 back-projections increased metacognitive efficiency without impacting motion sensitivity. This double-dissociation provides causal evidence of distinct networks for perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive ability in humans.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Paolo Di Luzio
- Center for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
| | - Luca Tarasi
- Center for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
| | - Juha Silvanto
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom
| | - Alessio Avenanti
- Center for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
- Centro de Investigación en Neuropsicología y Neurociencias Cognitivas, Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca, Chile
| | - Vincenzo Romei
- Center for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
- IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, Rome, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
32
|
Locke SM, Landy MS, Mamassian P. Suprathreshold perceptual decisions constrain models of confidence. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010318. [PMID: 35895747 PMCID: PMC9359550 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010318] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2021] [Revised: 08/08/2022] [Accepted: 06/19/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Perceptual confidence is an important internal signal about the certainty of our decisions and there is a substantial debate on how it is computed. We highlight three confidence metric types from the literature: observers either use 1) the full probability distribution to compute probability correct (Probability metrics), 2) point estimates from the perceptual decision process to estimate uncertainty (Evidence-Strength metrics), or 3) heuristic confidence from stimulus-based cues to uncertainty (Heuristic metrics). These metrics are rarely tested against one another, so we examined models of all three types on a suprathreshold spatial discrimination task. Observers were shown a cloud of dots sampled from a dot generating distribution and judged if the mean of the distribution was left or right of centre. In addition to varying the horizontal position of the mean, there were two sensory uncertainty manipulations: the number of dots sampled and the spread of the generating distribution. After every two perceptual decisions, observers made a confidence forced-choice judgement whether they were more confident in the first or second decision. Model results showed that the majority of observers were best-fit by either: 1) the Heuristic model, which used dot cloud position, spread, and number of dots as cues; or 2) an Evidence-Strength model, which computed the distance between the sensory measurement and discrimination criterion, scaled according to sensory uncertainty. An accidental repetition of some sessions also allowed for the measurement of confidence agreement for identical pairs of stimuli. This N-pass analysis revealed that human observers were more consistent than their best-fitting model would predict, indicating there are still aspects of confidence that are not captured by our modelling. As such, we propose confidence agreement as a useful technique for computational studies of confidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the idiosyncratic nature of confidence computations for complex decision contexts and the need to consider different potential metrics and transformations in the confidence computation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shannon M. Locke
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Michael S. Landy
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York, United States of America
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| |
Collapse
|
33
|
Abstract
Visual metacognition is the ability to evaluate one's performance on visual perceptual tasks. The field of visual metacognition unites the long tradition of visual psychophysics with the younger field of metacognition research. This article traces the historical roots of the field and reviews progress in the areas of (a) constructing appropriate measures of metacognitive ability, (b) developing computational models, and (c) revealing the neural correlates of visual metacognition. First, I review the most popular measures of metacognitive ability with an emphasis on their psychophysical properties. Second, I examine the empirical targets for modeling, the dominant modeling frameworks and the assumed computations underlying visual metacognition. Third, I explore the progress on understanding the neural correlates of visual metacognition by focusing on anatomical and functional studies, as well as causal manipulations. What emerges is a picture of substantial progress on constructing measures, developing models, and revealing the neural correlates of metacognition, but very little integration between these three areas of inquiry. I then explore the deep, intrinsic links between the three areas of research and argue that continued progress requires the recognition and exploitation of these links. Throughout, I discuss the implications of progress in visual metacognition for other areas of metacognition research, and pinpoint specific advancements that could be adopted by researchers working in other subfields of metacognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
Collapse
|
34
|
Guggenmos M. Measuring metacognitive performance: type 1 performance dependence and test-retest reliability. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab040. [PMID: 34858637 PMCID: PMC8633424 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab040] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/29/2021] [Revised: 10/25/2021] [Accepted: 11/02/2021] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Research on metacognition-thinking about thinking-has grown rapidly and fostered our understanding of human cognition in healthy individuals and clinical populations. Of central importance is the concept of metacognitive performance, which characterizes the capacity of an individual to estimate and report the accuracy of primary (type 1) cognitive processes or actions ensuing from these processes. Arguably one of the biggest challenges for measures of metacognitive performance is their dependency on objective type 1 performance, although more recent methods aim to address this issue. The present work scrutinizes the most popular metacognitive performance measures in terms of two critical characteristics: independence of type 1 performance and test-retest reliability. Analyses of data from the Confidence Database (total N = 6912) indicate that no current metacognitive performance measure is independent of type 1 performance. The shape of this dependency is largely reproduced by extending current models of metacognition with a source of metacognitive noise. Moreover, the reliability of metacognitive performance measures is highly sensitive to the combination of type 1 performance and trial number. Importantly, trial numbers frequently employed in metacognition research are too low to achieve an acceptable level of test-retest reliability. Among common task characteristics, simultaneous choice and confidence reports most strongly improved reliability. Finally, general recommendations about design choices and analytical remedies for studies investigating metacognitive performance are provided.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Guggenmos
- Department of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Charitéplatz 1, Berlin 10117, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
35
|
Rahnev D. A robust confidence-accuracy dissociation via criterion attraction. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab039. [PMID: 34804591 PMCID: PMC8599199 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2021] [Revised: 09/28/2021] [Accepted: 10/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Many studies have shown that confidence and accuracy can be dissociated in a variety of tasks. However, most of these dissociations involve small effect sizes, occur only in a subset of participants, and include a reaction time (RT) confound. Here, I develop a new method for inducing confidence-accuracy dissociations that overcomes these limitations. The method uses an external noise manipulation and relies on the phenomenon of criterion attraction where criteria for different tasks become attracted to each other. Subjects judged the identity of stimuli generated with either low or high external noise. The results showed that the two conditions were matched on accuracy and RT but produced a large difference in confidence (effect appeared for 25 of 26 participants, effect size: Cohen's d = 1.9). Computational modeling confirmed that these results are consistent with a mechanism of criterion attraction. These findings establish a new method for creating conditions with large differences in confidence without differences in accuracy or RT. Unlike many previous studies, however, the current method does not lead to differences in subjective experience and instead produces robust confidence-accuracy dissociations by exploiting limitations in post-perceptual, cognitive processes.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, 654 Cherry Str. NW, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA
| |
Collapse
|
36
|
Xue K, Shekhar M, Rahnev D. Examining the robustness of the relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. Conscious Cogn 2021; 95:103196. [PMID: 34481178 PMCID: PMC8560567 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103196] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2021] [Revised: 08/16/2021] [Accepted: 08/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
We recently found a positive relationship between estimates of metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. However, this relationship was only examined on a within-subject level and required binarizing the confidence scale, a technique that introduces methodological difficulties. Here we examined the robustness of the positive relationship between estimates of metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias by conducting two different types of analyses. First, we developed a new within-subject analysis technique where the original n-point confidence scale is transformed into two different (n-1)-point scales in a way that mimics a naturalistic change in confidence. Second, we examined the across-subject correlation between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. Importantly, for both types of analyses, we not only established the direction of the effect but also computed effect sizes. We applied both techniques to the data from three tasks from the Confidence Database (N > 400 in each). We found that both approaches revealed a small to medium positive relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias. These results demonstrate that the positive relationship between metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive bias is robust across several analysis techniques and datasets, and have important implications for future research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Kai Xue
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States.
| | - Medha Shekhar
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States
| |
Collapse
|