To what extent do beliefs affect apparent motion?

Invariant representations in abstract concept grounding - the physical world in grounded cognition

Grounded cognition states that mental representations of concepts consist of experiential aspects. For example, the concept "cup" consists of the sensorimotor experiences from interactions with cups. Typical modalities in which concepts are grounded are: The sensorimotor system (including interoception), emotion, action, language, and social aspects. Here, we argue that this list should be expanded to include physical invariants (unchanging features of physical motion; e.g., gravity, momentum, friction). Research on physical reasoning consistently demonstrates that physical invariants are represented as fundamentally as other grounding substrates, and therefore should qualify. We assess several theories of concept representation (simulation, conceptual metaphor, conceptual spaces, predictive processing) and their positions on physical invariants. We find that the classic grounded cognition theories, simulation and conceptual metaphor theory, have not considered physical invariants, while conceptual spaces and predictive processing have. We conclude that physical invariants should be included into grounded cognition theories, and that the core mechanisms of simulation and conceptual metaphor theory are well suited to do this. Furthermore, conceptual spaces and predictive processing are very promising and should also be integrated with grounded cognition in the future.

The Perception of Relations

The world contains not only objects and features (red apples, glass bowls, wooden tables), but also relations holding between them (apples contained in bowls, bowls supported by tables). Representations of these relations are often developmentally precocious and linguistically privileged; but how does the mind extract them in the first place? Although relations themselves cast no light onto our eyes, a growing body of work suggests that even very sophisticated relations display key signatures of automatic visual processing. Across physical, eventive, and social domains, relations such as support, fit, cause, chase, and even socially interact are extracted rapidly, are impossible to ignore, and influence other perceptual processes. Sophisticated and structured relations are not only judged and understood, but also seen - revealing surprisingly rich content in visual perception itself.

Can semantic knowledge influence motion correspondence?

Semantic factors are presumed to have little influence on motion perception. Two experiments examined the effects of an object's semantic identity on motion correspondence using the Ternus paradigm. Motion correspondence was not influenced by whether the object depicted is typically moving or stationary, but it was influenced by the way(s) in which an object's components typically move relative to one another: perceived correspondence differed depending on whether the motion tokens constituted the feet of a person walking or the wheels of a car. Apparently, semantic knowledge can influence motion correspondence, although such influence is weak and may be restricted to certain types of semantic information. The adaptive significance of such restricted influences is considered.

Chinese and Americans see opposite apparent motions in a Chinese character

The perceived direction of apparent motion can be influenced by both "top-down" factors, such as expectation, and by "bottom-up" or stimulus-driven factors, such as grouping (Tse, P., Cavanagh, P. & Nakayama, K. (1998). The role of parsing in high-level motion processing. In T. Watanabe, High-level motion processing - computational, neurobiological and psychophysical perspectives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Here we report the results of a single experiment that pitted top-down cues against bottom-up cues in an apparent motion sequence over the successive strokes of a Chinese character. Although each stroke was in fact presented all at once, subjects raised in China tended to see apparent motion over a single stroke in the direction it would have taken when drawn by hand, even though bottom-up cues drive a percept of apparent motion in the opposite direction for observers unfamiliar with the Chinese language. There is therefore a learned component to motion perception arising from top-down expectations capable of overriding bottom-up cues to motion.