Thinking is for doing: Portraits of social cognition from Daguerreotype to laserphoto

From the outset, perspectives on social cognition have taken an emphatically pragmatic stance, as evident in early writing by James, Allport, Bruner, Asch, Heider, Tagiuri, and Jones. After a hiatus, during which social cognition research neglected its proper attunement to social behavior, researchers again are emphasizing that thinking is for doing, that social understanding operates in the service of social interaction. Early and recent (but not intermediate) theories have reflected a pragmatic orientation in 3 recurring themes: People are good-enough social perceivers; people construct meaning through traits, stereotypes, and stories; and people's thinking strategies depend on their goals. The pragmatic viewpoint again opens up new areas for research and theory in social cognition.

Confusing one person with another: what errors reveal about the elementary forms of social relations

Seven studies investigated the cognitive structure of social relationships exhibited in the patterns of substitutions that occur when people confuse a person with another. The studies investigated natural errors in which people called a familiar person by the wrong name, misremembered with whom they had interacted, or mistakenly directed an action at an inappropriate person. These studies tested the relational-models theory of A. P. Fiske (1990b, 1991) that people use 4 basic models for social relationships. All 7 studies provide support for the theory; Ss tend to confuse people with whom they interact in the same basic relationship mode. In addition, Ss confuse people of the same gender. Other factors (age, race, role term, similarity of names) generally have smaller, less reliable effects, indicating that the 4 elementary modes of relationships are among the most salient schemata in everyday social cognition.

Confusing one person with another: What errors reveal about the elementary forms of social relations

Seven studies investigated the cognitive structure of social relationships exhibited in the patterns of substitutions that occur when people confuse a person with another. The studies investigated natural errors in which people called a familiar person by the wrong name, misremembered with whom they had interacted, or mistakenly directed an action at an inappropriate person. These studies tested the relational-models theory of A. P. Fiske (1990b, 1991) that people use 4 basic models for social relationships. All 7 studies provide support for the theory; Ss tend to confuse people with whom they interact in the same basic relationship mode. In addition, Ss confuse people of the same gender. Other factors (age, race, role term, similarity of names) generally have smaller, less reliable effects, indicating that the 4 elementary modes of relationships are among the most salient schemata in everyday social cognition.

Interpersonal competition can cause individuating processes

Two experiments investigated whether competitors attend to and individuate opponents. Interdependence theories predict that people individuate others on whom their outcomes depend rather than stereotyping them; this has been tested for cooperative but not for competitive interdependence. Competition separates such phenomena as unit formation in cooperation from interdependence per se, posited to be the crucial variable. In two experiments, Ss expected to compete or not compete with a competent or incompetent fictitious subject. Ss commented into a tape recorder about the person's attributes, some inconsistent and some consistent with expectations. As predicted, competitors (a) increased attention to inconsistencies, (b) drew more dispositional inferences about inconsistencies, and (c) formed more varied impressions. The role of competition in undercutting expectancy-based impressions and intergroup vs. interpersonal competition are discussed.

Interpersonal competition can cause individuating processes

Two experiments investigated whether competitors attend to and individuate opponents. Interdependence theories predict that people individuate others on whom their outcomes depend rather than stereotyping them; this has been tested for cooperative but not for competitive interdependence. Competition separates such phenomena as unit formation in cooperation from interdependence per se, posited to be the crucial variable. In two experiments, Ss expected to compete or not compete with a competent or incompetent fictitious subject. Ss commented into a tape recorder about the person's attributes, some inconsistent and some consistent with expectations. As predicted, competitors (a) increased attention to inconsistencies, (b) drew more dispositional inferences about inconsistencies, and (c) formed more varied impressions. The role of competition in undercutting expectancy-based impressions and intergroup vs. interpersonal competition are discussed.

Motivational influences on impression formation: outcome dependency, accuracy-driven attention, and individuating processes

How might being outcome dependent on another person influence the processes that one uses to form impressions of that person? We designed three experiments to investigate this question with respect to short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency. In all three experiments, subjects expected to interact with a young man formerly hospitalized as a schizophrenic, and they received information about the person's attributes in either written profiles or videotapes. In Experiment 1, short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency led subjects to use relatively individuating processes (i.e., to base their impressions of the patient on his particular attributes), even under conditions that typically lead subjects to use relatively category-based processes (i.e., to base their impressions on the patient's schizophrenic label). Moreover, in the conditions that elicited individuating processes, subjects spent more time attending to the patient's particular attribute information. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the attention effects in Experiment 1 were not merely a function of impression positivity and that outcome dependency did not influence the impression formation process when attribute information in addition to category-level information was unavailable. Finally, Experiment 3 manipulated not outcome dependency but the attentional goal of forming an accurate impression. We found that accuracy-driven attention to attribute information also led to individuating processes. The results of the three experiments indicate that there are important influences of outcome dependency on impression formation. These results are consistent with a model in which the tendency for short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency to facilitate individuating impression formation processes is mediated by an increase in accuracy-driven attention to attribute information.

Motivational influences on impression formation: Outcome dependency, accuracy-driven attention, and individuating processes

How might being outcome dependent on another person influence the processes that one uses to form impressions of that person? We designed three experiments to investigate this question with respect to short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency. In all three experiments, subjects expected to interact with a young man formerly hospitalized as a schizophrenic, and they received information about the person's attributes in either written profiles or videotapes. In Experiment 1, short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency led subjects to use relatively individuating processes (i.e., to base their impressions of the patient on his particular attributes), even under conditions that typically lead subjects to use relatively category-based processes (i.e., to base their impressions on the patient's schizophrenic label). Moreover, in the conditions that elicited individuating processes, subjects spent more time attending to the patient's particular attribute information. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the attention effects in Experiment 1 were not merely a function of impression positivity and that outcome dependency did not influence the impression formation process when attribute information in addition to category-level information was unavailable. Finally, Experiment 3 manipulated not outcome dependency but the attentional goal of forming an accurate impression. We found that accuracy-driven attention to attribute information also led to individuating processes. The results of the three experiments indicate that there are important influences of outcome dependency on impression formation. These results are consistent with a model in which the tendency for short-term, task-oriented outcome dependency to facilitate individuating impression formation processes is mediated by an increase in accuracy-driven attention to attribute information.