Mapping spatial frames of reference onto time: a review of theoretical accounts and empirical findings

Do Writing Directions Influence How People Map Space onto Time?

Abstract. The causal role of a unidirectional orthography in shaping speakers’ mental representations of time seems to be well established by many psychological experiments. However, the question of whether bidirectional writing systems in some languages can also produce such an impact on temporal cognition remains unresolved. To address this issue, the present study focused on Japanese and Taiwanese, both of which have a similar mix of texts written horizontally from left to right (HLR) and vertically from top to bottom (VTB). Two experiments were performed which recruited Japanese and Taiwanese speakers as participants. Experiment 1 used an explicit temporal arrangement design, and Experiment 2 measured implicit space-time associations in participants along the horizontal (left/right) and the vertical (up/down) axis. Converging evidence gathered from the two experiments demonstrate that neither Japanese speakers nor Taiwanese speakers aligned their vertical representations of time with the VTB writing orientation. Along the horizontal axis, only Japanese speakers encoded elapsing time into a left-to-right linear layout, which was commensurate with the HLR writing direction. Therefore, two distinct writing orientations of a language could not bring about two coexisting mental time lines. Possible theoretical implications underlying the findings are discussed.

Nature and nurture effects on the spatiality of the mental time line

The nature-nurture debate regarding the origin of mental lines is fundamental for cognitive neuroscience. We examined natural-nurture effects on the mental time line, applying three different challenges to the directionality of time representation. We tested (1) patients with left-neglect and healthy participants, who are (2) left-to-right or right-to-left readers/writers, using (3) a lateralized left-right button press or a vocal mode in response to a mental time task, which asks participants to judge whether events have already happened in the past or are still to happen in the future. Using lateralized responses, a spatial-temporal association of response code (STEARC) effect was found, in concordance with the cultural effects. With vocal responses (no lateralization), past and future events showed similar results in both cultures. In patients with neglect, who have a deficit of spatial attention in processing the left side of space, future events were processed more slowly and less accurately than past events in both cultures. Our results indicate the existence of a “natural” disposition to map past and future events along a horizontal mental time line, which is affected by the different ways in which spatial representation of time is introduced.

A Mental Timeline for Duration From the Age of 5 Years Old

Both time and number can be represented in spatial terms. While their representation in terms of spatial magnitude (distance or size) might be innate, their representation in terms of spatial position (left/right or up/down) is acquired. In Western culture, the mental timeline represents past/future events or short/long duration on the left/right sides of space, respectively. We conducted two developmental studies to pinpoint the age at which the mental timeline for duration begins to be acquired. Children (aged 5–6, 8, or 10 years old) and adults performed temporal bisection tasks in which relative spatial position (left/right) was manipulated by either arrow direction (Experiment 1) and/or lateralized stimulus location (Experiments 1 and 2). Results first confirmed previous findings that the symbolic representation of spatial position conveyed by arrow stimuli influences the perception of duration in older children. Both 8 and 10 year olds judged the duration of leftward arrows to be shorter than that of rightward arrows. We also showed for the first time that as long as position is manipulated in a non-symbolic way by the visual eccentricity of the stimuli, then even 5–6 year olds’ perception of duration is influenced by spatial position. These children judged the duration of left-lateralized stimuli to be shorter than that of either right-lateralized or centrally located stimuli. These data are consistent with the use of a mental timeline for stimulus duration from the age of 5 years old, with short duration being represented on the left side of space and long duration on the right. Nevertheless, the way in which left and right were manipulated determined the age at which spatial position influenced duration judgment: physical spatial location influenced duration perception from the age of 5 years old whereas arrow direction influenced it from the age of 8. This age-related dissociation may reflect distinct developmental trajectories of automatic versus voluntary spatial attentional mechanisms and, more generally highlights the importance of accounting for attentional ability when interpreting results of duration judgment tasks.

The mental timeline is gradually constructed in childhood

When reasoning about time, English-speaking adults often invoke a "mental timeline" stretching from left to right. Although the direction of the timeline varies across cultures, the tendency to represent time as a line has been argued to be ubiquitous and primitive. On this hypothesis, we might predict that children also spontaneously invoke a spatial timeline when reasoning about time. However, little is known about how and when the mental timeline develops, or to what extent it is variable and malleable in childhood. Here, we used a sticker placement task to test whether preschoolers and kindergarteners spontaneously map temporal events (breakfast, lunch, and dinner) and deictic time words (yesterday, today, tomorrow) onto lines, and to what degree their representations of time are adult-like. We found that, at age 4, preschoolers were able to arrange temporal items in lines with minimal spatial priming. However, unlike kindergarteners and adults, most preschoolers did not represent time as a line spontaneously, in the absence of priming, and did not prefer left-to-right over right-to-left lines. Furthermore, unlike most adults, children of all ages could be easily primed to adopt an unconventional vertical timeline. Our findings suggest that mappings between time and space in children are initially flexible, and become increasingly automatic and conventionalized in the early school years.

The spatial representation of number, time, and serial order following sensory deprivation: A systematic review

The spatial representation of numerical and temporal information is thought to be rooted in our multisensory experiences. Accordingly, we may expect visual or auditory deprivation to affect the way we represent numerical magnitude and time spatially. Here, we systematically review recent findings on how blind and deaf individuals represent abstract concepts such as magnitude and time (e.g., past/future, serial order of events) in a spatial format. Interestingly, available evidence suggests that sensory deprivation does not prevent the spatial "re-mapping" of abstract information, but differences compared to normally sighted and hearing individuals may emerge depending on the specific dimension considered (i.e., numerical magnitude, time as past/future, serial order). Herein we discuss how the study of sensory deprived populations may shed light on the specific, and possibly distinct, mechanisms subserving the spatial representation of these concepts. Furthermore, we pinpoint unresolved issues that need to be addressed by future studies to grasp a full understanding of the spatial representation of abstract information associated with visual and auditory deprivation.

Wednesday's Meeting Really Is on Friday: A Meta-Analysis and Evaluation of Ambiguous Spatiotemporal Language

Experimental work has shown that spatial experiences influence spatiotemporal metaphor use. In these studies, participants are asked a question that yields different responses depending on the metaphor participants use. It has been claimed that English speakers are equally likely to respond with either variant in the absence of priming. Related studies testing non-spatial experiences demonstrate varied results with a wide range of primes. Here, the effects of eye movement and stimuli presentation modality on comprehension of this question are investigated in different formats. In addition, the results of prior reported controls are re-analyzed in a meta-analysis to verify reliable ambiguity of the test question. Results suggest that English speakers have a baseline preference for the Moving Ego metaphor variant, with a stronger preference in verbal rather than written presentation. The findings have implications both for (re)interpretation of prior studies' results and future study designs.

Both Earlier Times and the Future Are "Front": The Distinction Between Time- and Ego-Reference-Points in Mandarin Speakers' Temporal Representation

Mandarin speakers, like most other language speakers around the world, use spatial terms to talk about time. However, the direction of their mental temporal representation along the front-back axis remains controversial because they use the spatial term "front" to refer to both earlier times (e.g., front-year means "the year before last") and the future (e.g., front-road means "prospect"). Although the linguistic distinction between time- and ego-reference-point spatiotemporal metaphors in Mandarin suggests a promising clarification of the above controversy, there is little empirical evidence verifying this distinction. In this study, Mandarin speakers' time- and ego-reference-point temporal representations on three axes (i.e., sagittal, lateral, and vertical) were separately examined through two tasks. In a time-reference-point task, Mandarin speakers judged whether the time point of the second picture was earlier or later than the time point of the first picture, while in an ego-reference-point task, they judged whether an event or phase had happened in the past or would happen in the future. The results indicate that Mandarin speakers construe an earlier-times-in-front-of-later-times temporal sequence and adopt the front-to-the-future orientation.

Theory, the Final Frontier? A Corpus-Based Analysis of the Role of Theory in Psychological Articles

Contemporary psychology regards itself as an empirical science, at least in most of its subfields. Theory building and development are often considered critical to the sciences, but the extent to which psychology can be cast in this way is under debate. According to those advocating a strong role of theory, studies should be designed to test hypotheses derived from theories (theory-driven) and ideally should yield findings that stimulate hypothesis formation and theory building (theory-generating). The alternative position values empirical findings over theories as the lasting legacy of science. To investigate which role theory actually plays in current research practice, we analyse references to theory in the complete set of 2,046 articles accepted for publication in Frontiers of Psychology in 2015. This sample of articles, while not representative in the strictest sense, covers a broad range of sub-disciplines, both basic and applied, and a broad range of article types, including research articles, reviews, hypothesis & theory, and commentaries. For the titles, keyword lists, and abstracts in this sample, we conducted a text search for terms related to empiricism and theory, assessed the frequency and scope of usage for six theory-related terms, and analyzed their distribution over different article types and subsections of the journal. The results indicate substantially lower frequencies of theoretical than empirical terms, with references to a specific (named) theory in less than 10% of the sample and references to any of even the most frequently mentioned theories in less than 0.5% of the sample. In conclusion, we discuss possible limitations of our study and the prospect of theoretical advancement.

Linguistic asymmetry, egocentric anchoring, and sensory modality as factors for the observed association between time and space perception

Temporal and spatial representations have been consistently shown to be inextricably intertwined. However, the exact nature of time-space mapping remains unknown. On the one hand, the conceptual metaphor theory postulates unilateral, asymmetric mapping of time onto space, that is, time is perceived in spatial terms but the perception of space is relatively independent of time. On the other hand, a theory of magnitude assumes bilateral and symmetric interactions between temporal and spatial perceptions. In the present paper, we argue that the concepts of linguistic asymmetry, egocentric anchoring, and sensory modality provide potential explanations for why evidences favoring both asymmetry and symmetry have been obtained. We first examine the asymmetry model and suggest that language plays a critical role in it. Next, we discuss the symmetry model in relation to egocentric anchoring and sensory modality. We conclude that since these three factors may jointly account for some conflicting past results regarding the strength and directionality of time-space mapping, they should be taken into serious consideration in future test designs.

Die Beziehung zwischen sprachlicher und nicht-sprachlicher Kognition

Zusammenfassung. Die Beziehung zwischen sprachlicher und nicht-sprachlicher Kognition ist wenig verstanden. In der Vergangenheit wurden einige Arbeiten veröffentlicht, deren Ergebnisse in der Regel so interpretiert wurden, dass die sprachliche Kognition kaum oder gar nicht die nicht-sprachliche Kognition beeinflusst. Dies hat unseres Erachtens in der Vergangenheit dazu geführt, dass sprachliche und nicht-sprachliche Kognition eher separat beforscht wurden und zu der Vorstellung beigetragen, dass Sprache ein eigenständiges Modul innerhalb des kognitiven Systems besitzt, das funktional unabhängig von nicht-sprachlichen Prozessen ist. In jüngerer Zeit werden diese beiden Bereiche der Kognition im Rahmen des Grounded-Cognition-Ansatzes zusammengeführt, wobei allerdings linguistische Gesichtspunkte unberücksichtigt bleiben (z. B. die kompositionale Struktur sprachlicher Bedeutung). Daher sind die theoretischen Grenzen dieses Ansatzes als umfassendes Modell des menschlichen Sprachverstehens schon jetzt erkennbar. Nicht ganz unabhängig davon, erlebt die Forschung über das Verhältnis von Sprache und Denken in den letzten Jahren eine Wiederbelebung, die im Gegensatz zum Grounded-Cognition-Ansatz eher für die Vorstellung einer funktionalen Trennung von sprachlicher und nicht-sprachlicher Kognition spricht. Wir vertreten hier die These, dass das Verhältnis von sprachlicher und nicht-sprachlicher Kognition stark davon abhängt, welche Repräsentationsformen die beiden Bereiche involvieren. Wir diskutieren dabei zwei Sichtweisen (eine Zwei-Format-Sichtweise und eine Ein-Format-Sichtweise) und analysieren deren Implikationen für das theoretische Verständnis über den Zusammenhang von und sprachlicher und nicht-sprachlicher Kognition. Wir verdeutlichen diese Konzepte anhand aktueller Forschungsergebnisse. Unserer Meinung nach generiert die Ein–Format-Hypothese derzeit mehr Fragen als sie beantwortet. Im Gegensatz dazu erscheint uns die Zwei-Format-Hypothese als Forschungsansatz für die Kognitionspsychologie vielversprechender.

The spatial alignment of time: Differences in alignment of deictic and sequence time along the sagittal and lateral axes

People use space in a variety of ways to structure their thoughts about time. The present report focuses on the different ways that space is employed when reasoning about deictic (past/future relationships) and sequence (earlier/later relationships) time. In the first study, we show that deictic and sequence time are aligned along the lateral axis in a manner consistent with previous work, with past and earlier events associated with left space and future and later events associated with right space. However, the alignment of time with space is different along the sagittal axis. Participants associated future events and earlier events-not later events-with the space in front of their body and past and later events with the space behind, consistent with the sagittal spatial terms (e.g., ahead, in front of) that we use to talk about deictic and sequence time. In the second study, we show that these associations between sequence time and sagittal space are sensitive to person-perspective. This suggests that the particular space-time associations observed in English speakers are influenced by a variety of different spatial properties, including spatial location and perspective.

A monolingual mind can have two time lines: Exploring space-time mappings in Mandarin monolinguals

Can a mind accommodate two time lines? Miles, Tan, Noble, Lumsden and Macrae (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 18, 598-604, 2011) shows that Mandarin-English bilinguals have both a horizontal space-time mapping consistent with linguistic conventions within English and a vertical representation of time commensurate with Mandarin. However, the present study, via two experiments, demonstrates that Mandarin monolinguals possess two mental time lines, i.e., one horizontal and one vertical line. This study concludes that a Mandarin speaker has two mental time lines not because he/she has acquired L2 English, but because there are both horizontal and vertical expressions in Mandarin spatiotemporal metaphors. Specifically, this study highlights the fact that a horizontal time line does exist in a Mandarin speaker's cognition, even if he/she is a Mandarin monolingual instead of a ME bilingual. Taken together, the evidence in hand is far from sufficient to support Miles et al.'s (2011) conclusion that ME bilinguals' horizontal concept of time is manipulated by English. Implications for theoretical issues concerning the language-thought relationship in general and the effect of bilingualism on cognition in particular are discussed.

Current Perspectives on Cognitive Diversity

To what extent is cognition influenced by a person’s cultural background? This question has remained controversial in large fields of the cognitive sciences, including cognitive psychology, and is also underexplored in anthropology. In this perspective article, findings from a recent wave of cross-cultural studies will be outlined with respect to three aspects of cognition: perception and categorization, number representation and counting, and explanatory frameworks and beliefs. Identifying similarities and differences between these domains allows for general conclusions regarding cognitive diversity and helps to highlight the importance of culturally shaped content for a comprehensive understanding of cognition.

The Role of Perspective in Mental Time Travel

Recent years have seen accumulating evidence for the proposition that people process time by mapping it onto a linear spatial representation and automatically “project” themselves on an imagined mental time line. Here, we ask whether people can adopt the temporal perspective of another person when travelling through time. To elucidate similarities and differences between time travelling from one's own perspective or from the perspective of another person, we asked participants to mentally project themselves or someone else (i.e., a coexperimenter) to different time points. Three basic properties of mental time travel were manipulated: temporal location (i.e., where in time the travel originates: past, present, and future), motion direction (either backwards or forwards), and temporal duration (i.e., the distance to travel: one, three, or five years). We found that time travels originating in the present lasted longer in the self- than in the other-perspective. Moreover, for self-perspective, but not for other-perspective, time was differently scaled depending on where in time the travel originated. In contrast, when considering the direction and the duration of time travelling, no dissimilarities between the self- and the other-perspective emerged. These results suggest that self- and other-projection, despite some differences, share important similarities in structure.

Perspective taking in referring to objects behind versus in front of an observer: Frames of reference, intraindividual consistency, and response latencies

Speakers of English and German typically adopt the reflection variant of the relative frame of reference (FoR) in order to describe how nonoriented objects that are located in front of them are related to one another. Little is known, however, about how they proceed in dorsal settings, with objects located in their back. In this article, we explore the turn hypothesis, which assumes a (mental) 180° turn of the observer to face the objects, converting the dorsal into a frontal situation, so that the preferred FoR variant for frontal settings can be applied. To elicit spatial references, we used photographs that showed an observer and two objects either in the observer's visual field (frontal condition) or in the observer's back (dorsal condition). The observer was looking either in the same direction as the referencing individual (aligned perspectives) or in the opposite direction (vis-à-vis perspective). Data from two experiments show that while participants do adopt the observer's perspective, their references in dorsal settings are incompatible with the turn hypothesis. Analyses of response latencies indicate additional cognitive costs for establishing a FoR for the very first item in the dorsal condition as compared to the frontal condition, but fast adaption for subsequent items, and high intraindividual consistency in FoR choice in both conditions. Maintaining the assumption that references in dorsal settings should be compatible with the variant of the relative FoR adopted in frontal settings, participants' references can be explained by assuming a backward projection that gets by without a (mental) turn of the observer.

Turn around to have a look? Spatial referencing in dorsal vs. frontal settings in cross-linguistic comparison

When referring to an object in relation to another, speakers of many languages can adopt a relative frame of reference (FoR). Following Levinson (2003), this kind of FoR can be established by projecting an observer's perspective onto the ground object either by translation, reflection, or rotation. So far, research on spatial FoRs has largely ignored the extent of variation in which of these projections are preferred generally, and specifically what kind of FoR is established for spatial arrays in one's back. This may seem justified by assumptions on “natural” preferences: for reflection in frontal settings (Canonical Encounter Hypothesis), and for converting dorsal into frontal situations by a turn of the observer before a reference is made (Turn Hypothesis). We scrutinize these assumptions by comparing the FoRs adopted for small-scale, static spatial arrays by speakers of four languages (German, US-English, Mandarin Chinese, and Tongan). Addressing the problem of inherent ambiguities on the item level when assessing FoRs from spatial prepositions, we use a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model for estimating probabilities of referencing strategies across sets of items. Substantial differences in frontal settings, both between and within languages, disprove the Canonical Encounter Hypothesis—translation occurs as frequently as reflection across samples. In dorsal settings, in contrast, the same type of response dominates in all samples. We suggest that this response is produced by a backward projection of the observer's coordinate system in correspondence with the two main FoR preferences for frontal settings. However, none of these strategies involves a turn of the observer, thus also disproving the Turn Hypothesis. In conclusion, we discuss possible causes of the observed variability, explore links between the domains of space and time, and reflect the relation between language, communication, and culture.

Temporal frames of reference in three Germanic languages: Individual consistency, interindividual consensus, and cross-linguistic variability

A task like “moving a meeting forward” reveals the ambiguity inherent in temporal references. That speakers of U.S. English do not agree on how to solve it is well established: Roughly one half moves the meeting futurewards, the other half pastwards. But the extent to which individual speakers, rather than groups of speakers, consider such phrases as ambiguous has not been scrutinized. Does the split in readings result from a lack of intraindividual consistency or from a lack of interindividual consensus? And how specific is U.S. English in this regard when compared to other closely related Germanic languages? Based on a taxonomy of spatiotemporal frames of reference (FoRs), we conducted two experiments with speakers of Swedish, U.S. English, and German to assess individual preferences for temporal FoRs, intra- and cross-linguistic variability, consistency and long-term stability of these preferences, and possible effects of priming a spatial FoR. The data reveal cross-linguistic differences, both in terms of which temporal FoRs speakers prefer (the absolute FoR in Sweden, the intrinsic FoR in German, and both of these in the US) and in terms of the extent to which these preferences are shared and stable (high consensus and consistency in Sweden and Germany, and low consensus and partial consistency in the US). Overall, no effect of spatial priming was observed; only speakers of U.S. English with a baseline preference for the absolute temporal FoR seemed to be susceptible to spatial priming. Thus, the assumption that temporal references are affected by spatial references is only weakly supported.

Learning the language of time: Children's acquisition of duration words

Children use time words like minute and hour early in development, but take years to acquire their precise meanings. Here we investigate whether children assign meaning to these early usages, and if so, how. To do this, we test their interpretation of seven time words: second, minute, hour, day, week, month, and year. We find that preschoolers infer the orderings of time words (e.g., hour>minute), but have little to no knowledge of the absolute durations they encode. Knowledge of absolute duration is learned much later in development - many years after children first start using time words in speech - and in many children does not emerge until they have acquired formal definitions for the words. We conclude that associating words with the perception of duration does not come naturally to children, and that early intuitive meanings of time words are instead rooted in relative orderings, which children may infer from their use in speech.