Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological analysis

Effect of spinning workouts on affect

BACKGROUND

Numerous physical exercises trigger positive changes in affect after relatively short workouts. Spinning, also known as indoor-cycling, is a very popular form of exercise, especially among women, but its impact on affect have not been examined to date.

AIMS

The purpose of the current work was to investigate the possible benefits of spinning on affect in self-controlled and in instructor-led exercise sessions.

METHODS

Using baseline measures and pre- to post-exercise design with a psychometrically validated questionnaire, the net effects of spinning (without music) on positive- and negative-affect were measured in two exercise conditions: (1) self-controlled workout (i.e. without an instructor) and (2) instructor-led workout. After both conditions, 18 women rated the extent which they enjoyed the exercise session on a 10-point Likert scale.

RESULTS

The findings revealed that positive affect increased while negative affect decreased after both workouts. Exerted effort, measured through the heart rate, did not differ between the two conditions. However, participants enjoyed more the instructor-led exercise session than the self-regulated workout (effect size, Cohen's d = 0.93).

CONCLUSIONS

This research reveals that spinning improves post-exercise affect, even without music and regardless of instructor's presence. Therefore, it demonstrates the net benefits of this popular exercise on affect.

Audience entrainment during live contemporary dance performance: physiological and cognitive measures

Perceiving and synchronizing to a piece of dance is a remarkable skill in humans. Research in this area is very recent and has been focused mainly on entrainment produced by regular rhythms. Here, we investigated entrainment effects on spectators perceiving a non-rhythmic and extremely slow performance issued from contemporary dance. More specifically, we studied the relationship between subjective experience and entrainment produced by perceiving this type of performance. We defined two types of entrainment. Physiological entrainment corresponded to cardiovascular and respiratory coordinated activities. Cognitive entrainment was evaluated through cognitive tasks that quantified time distortion. These effects were thought to reflect attunement of a participant’ internal temporal clock to the particularly slow pace of the danced movement. Each participant’ subjective experience—in the form of responses to questionnaires—were collected and correlated with cognitive and physiological entrainment. We observe: (a) a positive relationship between psychological entrainment and attention to breathing (their own one or that of dancers); and (b) a positive relationship between cognitive entrainment (reflected as an under-estimation of time following the performance) and attention to their own breathing, and attention to the muscles’ dancers. Overall, our results suggest a close relationship between attention to breathing and entrainment. This proof-of-concept pilot study was intended to prove the feasibility of a quantitative situated paradigm. This research is inscribed in a large-scale interdisciplinary project of dance spectating (labodanse.org).

Psychological antecedents of excess gestational weight gain: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Excess gestational weight gain (GWG), which has reached epidemic proportions, is associated with adverse outcomes during pregnancy and postpartum obesity in women and children. Psychological variables represent potentially modifiable factors. Moreover, previous systematic reviews on GWG interventions have called for the need for a clearer understanding of psychological factors affecting GWG. Hence, a systematic review was conducted to summarize the relation between psychological factors and GWG.

METHODS

Eight databases were searched, and the guidelines on Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses were followed. Methodological quality of the included studies was assessed using a modified Newcastle-Ottawa scale. Two assessors independently reviewed titles, abstracts and full articles, extracted data and assessed quality.

RESULTS

A total of 6198 titles and abstracts were reviewed of which 90 full text articles were retrieved. Thirty-five studies (25 cohort, eight cross-sectional and two case-control) met the inclusion criteria, assessing 26 different psychological constructs in affect, cognitions and personality. Negative affective states such as depression, anxiety and stress were not related to excess GWG. Among weight-related and dietary-related cognitions, risk factors for excess GWG included concern about weight gain, negative body image and attitude towards weight gain, inaccurate perceptions regarding weight, higher than recommended target weight gain, less knowledge about weight gain, higher levels of cognitive dietary restraint, and perceived barriers to healthy eating. Protective factors included an internal locus of control for weight gain, lower than recommended target weight gain and higher self-efficacy for healthy eating. Only one study examined the relation between personality and excess GWG.

CONCLUSION

In this systematic review, a number of cognitive factors were identified that were associated with excess GWG. To address excess GWG, more high quality, adequately powered studies are required examining cognitions, motivation and personality factors.

The neurobiology of emotion-cognition interactions: fundamental questions and strategies for future research

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of powerful new tools for assaying the brain and a remarkable acceleration of research focused on the interplay of emotion and cognition. This work has begun to yield new insights into fundamental questions about the nature of the mind and important clues about the origins of mental illness. In particular, this research demonstrates that stress, anxiety, and other kinds of emotion can profoundly influence key elements of cognition, including selective attention, working memory, and cognitive control. Often, this influence persists beyond the duration of transient emotional challenges, partially reflecting the slower molecular dynamics of catecholamine and hormonal neurochemistry. In turn, circuits involved in attention, executive control, and working memory contribute to the regulation of emotion. The distinction between the 'emotional' and the 'cognitive' brain is fuzzy and context-dependent. Indeed, there is compelling evidence that brain territories and psychological processes commonly associated with cognition, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and working memory, play a central role in emotion. Furthermore, putatively emotional and cognitive regions influence one another via a complex web of connections in ways that jointly contribute to adaptive and maladaptive behavior. This work demonstrates that emotion and cognition are deeply interwoven in the fabric of the brain, suggesting that widely held beliefs about the key constituents of 'the emotional brain' and 'the cognitive brain' are fundamentally flawed. We conclude by outlining several strategies for enhancing future research. Developing a deeper understanding of the emotional-cognitive brain is important, not just for understanding the mind but also for elucidating the root causes of its disorders.

Mechanisms of change in an emotion regulation group therapy for deliberate self-harm among women with borderline personality disorder

Despite growing evidence for the efficacy of Gratz and colleagues' emotion regulation group therapy (ERGT) for deliberate self-harm (DSH) among women with borderline personality disorder (BPD), the proposed mechanism of change in this treatment (i.e., emotion regulation) remains largely unexamined. This study examined change in emotion dysregulation as a mediator of the effects of this ERGT on DSH and BPD symptoms, as well as the extent to which change in emotion dysregulation during treatment predicts further improvements in DSH during a 9-month follow-up. Participants included 61 female outpatients with BPD and recent DSH who were randomly assigned to receive this ERGT in addition to their ongoing outpatient therapy immediately (n = 31) or after 14 weeks (n = 30). Measures of emotion dysregulation, DSH, and BPD symptoms were administered pre- and post-treatment or -waitlist, and at 9-months post-treatment (for participants in both conditions who received ERGT). Results from a series of mediation analyses provide further support for emotion regulation as a mechanism of change in this treatment. Specifically, results revealed that improvements in emotion dysregulation over the course of treatment mediated the observed reductions in BPD cognitive and affective symptoms during treatment and predicted further improvements in DSH during follow-up.

Patient-centered care in cancer treatment programs: the future of integrative oncology through psychoeducation

ABSTRACT 

The reciprocal relationship between the mind and body has been a neglected process for improving the psychosocial care of cancer patients. Emotions form an important link between the mind and body. They play a fundamental role in the cognitive functions of decision-making and symptom control. Recognizing this relationship is important for integrative oncology. We define psychoeducation as the teaching of self-evaluation and self-regulation of the mind–body process. A gap exists between research evidence and implementation into clinical practice. The patients’ search for self-empowerment through the pursuit of complementary therapies may be a surrogate for inadequate psychoeducation. Integrative oncology programs should implement psychoeducation that helps patients to improve both emotional and cognitive intelligence, enabling them to better negotiate cancer treatment systems.

Toward a Better Understanding of Self-Construal Theory: An Agency View of the Processes of Self-Construal

This article offers a novel perspective on self-construal theory. Self-construal concerns how individuals understand who they are in relation to the broad set of cultural influences in which they live. We look at the nature and antecedents of self-construal, and characterize it as a self-process, rather than self-knowledge. Integrating work from the literature on social and evolutionary psychology, and philosophy, we suggest that the differences between independent and interdependent self-construal are best understood from a self-agency perspective. This concerns how people assess whether they are the causes of an action and, if so, whether their causal role depends on other people. We introduce and discuss the roles of 3 different modalities of agency involved in self-agency assessment: implicit (sensorimotor), intermediate (self-related affordances), and explicit (reflective) self-agency. We offer a conceptual model on how self-agency relates to power, evolutionary motivations and to social and cultural affordances, in the formation of, and interaction with, different types of dominant independent and interdependent self-construals.

Dynamic musical communication of core affect

Is there something special about the way music communicates feelings? Theorists since Meyer (1956) have attempted to explain how music could stimulate varied and subtle affective experiences by violating learned expectancies, or by mimicking other forms of social interaction. Our proposal is that music speaks to the brain in its own language; it need not imitate any other form of communication. We review recent theoretical and empirical literature, which suggests that all conscious processes consist of dynamic neural events, produced by spatially dispersed processes in the physical brain. Intentional thought and affective experience arise as dynamical aspects of neural events taking place in multiple brain areas simultaneously. At any given moment, this content comprises a unified "scene" that is integrated into a dynamic core through synchrony of neuronal oscillations. We propose that (1) neurodynamic synchrony with musical stimuli gives rise to musical qualia including tonal and temporal expectancies, and that (2) music-synchronous responses couple into core neurodynamics, enabling music to directly modulate core affect. Expressive music performance, for example, may recruit rhythm-synchronous neural responses to support affective communication. We suggest that the dynamic relationship between musical expression and the experience of affect presents a unique opportunity for the study of emotional experience. This may help elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying arousal and valence, and offer a new approach to exploring the complex dynamics of the how and why of emotional experience.

Anterior insular cortex and emotional awareness

This paper reviews the foundation for a role of the human anterior insular cortex (AIC) in emotional awareness, defined as the conscious experience of emotions. We first introduce the neuroanatomical features of AIC and existing findings on emotional awareness. Using empathy, the awareness and understanding of other people's emotional states, as a test case, we then present evidence to demonstrate: 1) AIC and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are commonly coactivated as revealed by a meta-analysis, 2) AIC is functionally dissociable from ACC, 3) AIC integrates stimulus-driven and top-down information, and 4) AIC is necessary for emotional awareness. We propose a model in which AIC serves two major functions: integrating bottom-up interoceptive signals with top-down predictions to generate a current awareness state and providing descending predictions to visceral systems that provide a point of reference for autonomic reflexes. We argue that AIC is critical and necessary for emotional awareness.

Validation of a novel cognitive bias task based on difference in quantity of reinforcement for assessing environmental enrichment

Cognitive bias tasks purport to assess affective states via responses to ambiguous stimuli. We hypothesized that a novel cognitive bias task based on positive reinforcement using quantity differences would detect changes in affect in captive grizzly bears (Ursus arctos horribilis). We trained bears (n = 8) to respond differently (nose or paw touch) to two stimuli (light or dark gray cue cards), with responses counterbalanced across bears. The two cues signaled a small or large food reward, respectively. Responses to ambiguous probe stimuli (i.e., shades of gray) intermediate to the trained stimuli were classified as either 'optimistic,' appropriate for the larger reward, or 'pessimistic,' appropriate for the smaller reward. In Experiment 1, we explored the contrast in reward size necessary to detect a change in response across probe stimuli (large reward, 3 or 6 apple slices: small reward, 1 slice). We observed a change in response across probe stimuli, with no difference in response between reward-value groups, indicating that a contrast of 3:1 apple slices was sufficient to affect responses. In Experiment 2, we investigated cognitive bias after 2.1 h of exposure to enrichment items varying in attractiveness. Results were unaffected by enrichment type or time spent interacting with enrichments, indicating that the task failed to demonstrate criterion validity for comparing mood following exposure to different enrichment items. However, greater time spent pacing prior to testing was associated with 'optimistic' judgments. The data provide some support for use of cognitive bias tasks based on quantity differences in animal welfare assessments involving captive wildlife.

Emotions Emerge from More Basic Psychological Ingredients: A Modern Psychological Constructionist Model

Over a century ago, William James outlined the first psychological constructionist model of emotion, arguing that emotions are phenomena constructed of more basic psychological parts. In this article, I outline a modern psychological constructionist model of emotion. I first explore the history of psychological construction to demonstrate that psychological constructionist models have historically emerged in an attempt to explain variability in emotion that cannot be accounted for by other approaches. I next discuss the modern psychological constructionist model of emotion that I take in my own research, outlining its hypotheses, existing empirical support, and areas of future research. I conclude by arguing that psychological constructionist models can help scientists better understand the human mind.

Affective meanings of stereotyped social groups in cross-cultural comparison

This paper compares affective meanings of various stereotyped social groups in U.S., German, and Japanese cultures along the three basic dimensions of emotional experience (evaluation, potency, and activity). Analyses exploring similarities in affective meanings between respondents revealed considerable consensus within cultures, but less across cultures. These analyses indicated greater consensus for the U.S. and German sample than for the Japanese sample, supporting past research which indicates that Japanese social perception is more contextualized than in Western cultures. Analyses of cross-cultural differences also identified meaningful patterns of culture-specific deviation, interpretable in terms of the placement of each national sample on cultural dimensions such as power distance, masculinity, and individualism/collectivism. We argue that affective meanings reflect the social order of specific cultures, making variations in consensus significant as affective meanings guide intergroup behavior and emotion.

The Affective Structure of Stereotype Content

Affect control theory and the stereotype content model share explanatory goals and employ compatible measurement strategies but have developed in largely separate literatures. The present article examines the models’ commensurability and discusses new insights that can be gained by comparing theories. We first demonstrate that the unique measurement dimensions used by each theory (evaluation/potency/activity vs. warmth/competence) describe much of the same semantic content. We then show how simulation techniques developed by affect control theorists can be applied to the study of interactions with stereotyped groups. These simulations indicate broad consistencies between the theories’ predictions but highlight three distinctive emphases of affect control theory. Specifically, affect control models predict that actors are motivated to behave in ways that (1) are consistent with self-meanings, (2) maintain cultural norms about the suitability of behaviors and emotions to role relations, and (3) account for behavior and emotion in prior interactions.

Issues in localization of brain function: The case of lateralized frontal cortex in cognition, emotion, and psychopathology

The appeal of simple, sweeping portraits of large-scale brain mechanisms relevant to psychological phenomena competes with a rich, complex research base. As a prominent example, two views of frontal brain organization have emphasized dichotomous lateralization as a function of either emotional valence (positive/negative) or approach/avoidance motivation. Compelling findings support each. The literature has struggled to choose between them for three decades, without success. Both views are proving untenable as comprehensive models. Evidence of other frontal lateralizations, involving distinctions among dimensions of depression and anxiety, make a dichotomous view even more problematic. Recent evidence indicates that positive valence and approach motivation are associated with different areas in the left-hemisphere. Findings that appear contradictory at the level of frontal lobes as the units of analysis can be accommodated because hemodynamic and electromagnetic neuroimaging studies suggest considerable functional differentiation, in specialization and activation, of subregions of frontal cortex, including their connectivity to each other and to other regions. Such findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of functional localization that accommodates aspects of multiple theoretical perspectives.

Large-scale brain networks in affective and social neuroscience: towards an integrative functional architecture of the brain

Understanding how a human brain creates a human mind ultimately depends on mapping psychological categories and concepts to physical measurements of neural response. Although it has long been assumed that emotional, social, and cognitive phenomena are realized in the operations of separate brain regions or brain networks, we demonstrate that it is possible to understand the body of neuroimaging evidence using a framework that relies on domain general, distributed structure-function mappings. We review current research in affective and social neuroscience and argue that the emerging science of large-scale intrinsic brain networks provides a coherent framework for a domain-general functional architecture of the human brain.

Unseen fearful faces promote amygdala guidance of attention

Little is known about the network of brain regions activated prior to explicit awareness of emotionally salient social stimuli. We investigated this in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study using a technique that combined elements of binocular rivalry and motion flash suppression in order to prevent awareness of fearful faces and houses. We found increased left amygdala and fusiform gyrus activation for fearful faces compared to houses, despite suppression from awareness. Psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that amygdala activation was associated with task-specific (fearful faces greater than houses) modulation of an attention network, including bilateral pulvinar, bilateral insula, left frontal eye fields, left intraparietal sulcus and early visual cortex. Furthermore, we report an unexpected main effect of increased left parietal cortex activation associated with suppressed fearful faces compared to suppressed houses. This parietal finding is the first report of increased dorsal stream activation for a social object despite suppression, which suggests that information can reach parietal cortex for a class of emotionally salient social objects, even in the absence of awareness.

Authors’ response: what are emotions and how are they created in the brain?

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

Emotions of "higher" cognition

The target article by Lindquist et al. considers discrete emotions. This commentary argues that these are but a minor part of human emotional abilities, unifying us with animals. Uniquely human emotions are aesthetic emotions related to the need for the knowledge of "high" cognition, including emotions of the beautiful, cognitive dissonances, and musical emotions. This commentary touches on their cognitive functions and origins.

States of mind: emotions, body feelings, and thoughts share distributed neural networks

Scientists have traditionally assumed that different kinds of mental states (e.g., fear, disgust, love, memory, planning, concentration, etc.) correspond to different psychological faculties that have domain-specific correlates in the brain. Yet, growing evidence points to the constructionist hypothesis that mental states emerge from the combination of domain-general psychological processes that map to large-scale distributed brain networks. In this paper, we report a novel study testing a constructionist model of the mind in which participants generated three kinds of mental states (emotions, body feelings, or thoughts) while we measured activity within large-scale distributed brain networks using fMRI. We examined the similarity and differences in the pattern of network activity across these three classes of mental states. Consistent with a constructionist hypothesis, a combination of large-scale distributed networks contributed to emotions, thoughts, and body feelings, although these mental states differed in the relative contribution of those networks. Implications for a constructionist functional architecture of diverse mental states are discussed.

The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

Mental states inside out: switching costs for emotional and nonemotional sentences that differ in internal and external focus

Mental states-such as thinking, remembering, or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy-have a clear internal component. We feel a certain way when we are in these states. These internal experiences may be simulated when people understand conceptual references to mental states. However, mental states can also be described from an "external" perspective, for example when referring to "smiling." In those cases, simulation of visible outside features may be more relevant for understanding. In a switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional mental states while manipulating their internal or external focus. The results show that switching costs occur when participants shift between sentences with an internal and an external focus. This suggests that different forms of simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemotional mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a similar way-through the process of simulation.

Out of sight but not out of mind: unseen affective faces influence evaluations and social impressions

Using Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS), we demonstrated in four experiments that affective information extracted from unseen faces influences both affective and personality judgments of neutral faces. In four experiments, participants judged neutral faces as more pleasant or unpleasant (Studies 1 and 2) or as more or less trustworthy, likable, and attractive (Study 3) or as more or less competent or interpersonally warm (Study 4) when paired with unseen smiling or scowling faces compared to when paired with unseen neutral faces. These findings suggest that affective influences are a normal part of everyday experience and provide evidence for the affective foundations consciousness. Affective misattribution arises even when affective changes occur after a neutral stimulus is presented, demonstrating that these affective influences cannot be explained as a simple semantic priming effect. These findings have implications for understanding the constructive nature of experience, as well as the role of affect in social impressions.

Cognition-emotion integration in the anterior insular cortex

Both cognitive and affective processes require mental resources. However, it remains unclear whether these 2 processes work in parallel or in an integrated fashion. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we investigated their interaction using an empathy-for-pain paradigm, with simultaneous manipulation of cognitive demand of the tasks and emotional valence of the stimuli. Eighteen healthy adult participants viewed photographs showing other people's hands and feet in painful or nonpainful situations while performing tasks of low (body part judgment) and high (laterality judgment) cognitive demand. Behavioral data showed increased reaction times and error rates for painful compared with nonpainful stimuli under laterality judgment relative to body part judgment, indicating an interaction between cognitive demand and stimulus valence. Imaging analyses showed activity in bilateral anterior insula (AI) and primary somatosensory cortex (SI), but not posterior insula, for main effects of cognitive demand and stimulus valence. Importantly, cognitive demand and stimulus valence showed a significant interaction in AI, SI, and regions of the frontoparietal network. These results suggest that cognitive and emotional processes at least partially share common brain networks and that AI might serve as a key node in a brain network subserving cognition-emotion integration.

Putting together phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives on empathy

The ontogeny of human empathy is better understood with reference to the evolutionary history of the social brain. Empathy has deep evolutionary, biochemical, and neurological underpinnings. Even the most advanced forms of empathy in humans are built on more basic forms and remain connected to core mechanisms associated with affective communication, social attachment, and parental care. In this paper, we argue that it is essential to consider empathy within a neurodevelopmental framework that recognizes both the continuities and changes in socioemotional understanding from infancy to adulthood. We bring together neuroevolutionary and developmental perspectives on the information processing and neural mechanisms underlying empathy and caring, and show that they are grounded in multiple interacting systems and processes. Moreover, empathy in humans is assisted by other abstract and domain-general high-level cognitive abilities such as executive functions, mentalizing and language, as well as the ability to differentiate another's mental states from one's own, which expand the range of behaviors that can be driven by empathy.

Putting reward in art: A tentative prediction error account of visual art

The predictive coding model is increasingly and fruitfully used to explain a wide range of findings in perception. Here we discuss the potential of this model in explaining the mechanisms underlying aesthetic experiences. Traditionally art appreciation has been associated with concepts such as harmony, perceptual fluency, and the so-called good Gestalt. We observe that more often than not great artworks blatantly violate these characteristics. Using the concept of prediction error from the predictive coding approach, we attempt to resolve this contradiction. We argue that artists often destroy predictions that they have first carefully built up in their viewers, and thus highlight the importance of negative affect in aesthetic experience. However, the viewer often succeeds in recovering the predictable pattern, sometimes on a different level. The ensuing rewarding effect is derived from this transition from a state of uncertainty to a state of increased predictability. We illustrate our account with several example paintings and with a discussion of art movements and individual differences in preference. On a more fundamental level, our theorizing leads us to consider the affective implications of prediction confirmation and violation. We compare our proposal to other influential theories on aesthetics and explore its advantages and limitations.

As especificidades humanas e a aprendizagem: relações entre cognição, afeto e cultura

O artigo tem por objetivo discutir questões que periodicamente provocam polêmica na Psicologia da Aprendizagem, que são as relações entre cognição, cultura e afeto e as especificidades humanas nesses processos. Assim, a aprendizagem é discutida em termos de processos partilhados com outras espécies, como a associação e a recursividade, e outros que são especificamente humanos, como a abstração e a metacognição. São examinadas algumas hipóteses sobre como a mente humana pode ter evoluído em direção à essas diferenças. Na conclusão, é explicitado o posicionamento sobre as relações entre cognição, cultura e afeto, em dois níveis de funcionamento psicológico e da influência decisiva da cultura e seu principal instrumento, a linguagem, na promoção das especificidades humanas.

What You Feel Influences What You See: The Role of Affective Feelings in Resolving Binocular Rivalry

It seems obvious that what you see influences what you feel, but what if the opposite were also true? What if how you feel can shape your visual experience? In this experiment, we demonstrate that the affective state of a perceiver influences the contents of visual awareness. Participants received positive, negative, and neutral affect inductions and then completed a series of binocular rivalry trials in which a face (smiling, scowling or neutral) was presented to one eye and a house to the other. The percepts "competed" for dominance in visual consciousness. We found, as predicted, that all faces (smiling, scowling, and neutral) were dominant for longer when perceivers experienced unpleasant affect compared to when they were in a neutral state (a social vigilance effect), although scowling faces increased their dominance when perceivers felt unpleasant (a relative negative congruence effect). Relatively speaking, smiling faces increased their dominance more when perceivers were experiencing pleasant affect (a positive congruence effect). These findings illustrate that the affective state of a perceiver serves as a context that influences the contents of consciousness.

Rapid communication: Global-local processing affects recognition of distractor emotional faces

Recent studies have shown links between happy faces and global, distributed attention as well as sad faces to local, focused attention. Emotions have been shown to affect global-local processing. Given that studies on emotion-cognition interactions have not explored the effect of perceptual processing at different spatial scales on processing stimuli with emotional content, the present study investigated the link between perceptual focus and emotional processing. The study investigated the effects of global-local processing on the recognition of distractor faces with emotional expressions. Participants performed a digit discrimination task with digits at either the global level or the local level presented against a distractor face (happy or sad) as background. The results showed that global processing associated with broad scope of attention facilitates recognition of happy faces, and local processing associated with narrow scope of attention facilitates recognition of sad faces. The novel results of the study provide conclusive evidence for emotion-cognition interactions by demonstrating the effect of perceptual processing on emotional faces. The results along with earlier complementary results on the effect of emotion on global-local processing support a reciprocal relationship between emotional processing and global-local processing. Distractor processing with emotional information also has implications for theories of selective attention.

The visual impact of gossip

Gossip is a form of affective information about who is friend and who is foe. We show that gossip does not influence only how a face is evaluated--it affects whether a face is seen in the first place. In two experiments, neutral faces were paired with negative, positive, or neutral gossip and were then presented alone in a binocular rivalry paradigm (faces were presented to one eye, houses to the other). In both studies, faces previously paired with negative (but not positive or neutral) gossip dominated longer in visual consciousness. These findings demonstrate that gossip, as a potent form of social affective learning, can influence vision in a completely top-down manner, independent of the basic structural features of a face.

Affect and loneliness among centenarians and the oldest old: the role of individual and social resources

OBJECTIVES

Affect and loneliness are important indicators of mental health and well-being in older adulthood and are linked to significant outcomes including physical health and mortality. Given a large focus on young-old adults within gerontological research, the primary aim of this study was to examine the ability of individual and social resources in predicting affect and loneliness within a sample of oldest-old individuals including centenarians, an understudied population.

METHODS

Participants were assessed during the most recent cross-sectional data collection of the Georgia Centenarian Study. The eligible sample included 55 octogenarians (M = 83.70 years, SD = 2.68; range = 81-90) and 77 centenarians (M = 99.78 years, SD = 1.64; range = 98-109). Subjects scored 17 or greater on the Mini-Mental Status Exam and completed mental health assessments.

RESULTS

Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the relation of affect and loneliness with demographic characteristics, physical and social functioning, cognition, and personality. Within this sample of cognitively intact oldest old, measures of executive control and cognitive functioning demonstrated limited association with mental health. Personality, specifically neuroticism, was strongly related to mental health indicators for both age groups and social relations were particularly important associates of centenarians' mental health.

DISCUSSION

Findings indicate the distinctiveness of mental health indicators and the need to distinguish differential roles of individual and social resources in determining these outcomes among octogenarians and centenarians.

Grounding emotion in situated conceptualization

According to the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, the situated conceptualization used to construe a situation determines the emotion experienced. A neuroimaging experiment tested two core hypotheses of this theory: (1) different situated conceptualizations produce different forms of the same emotion in different situations, (2) the composition of a situated conceptualization emerges from shared multimodal circuitry distributed across the brain that produces emotional states generally. To test these hypotheses, the situation in which participants experienced an emotion was manipulated. On each trial, participants immersed themselves in a physical danger or social evaluation situation and then experienced fear or anger. According to Hypothesis 1, the brain activations for the same emotion should differ as a function of the preceding situation (after removing activations that arose while constructing the situation). According to Hypothesis 2, the critical activations should reflect conceptual processing relevant to the emotion in the current situation, drawn from shared multimodal circuitry underlying emotion. The results supported these predictions and demonstrated the compositional process that produces situated conceptualizations dynamically.

The functions of nonsuicidal self-injury: support for cognitive-affective regulation and opponent processes from a novel psychophysiological paradigm

Although research on the reasons for engaging in nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) has increased dramatically in the last few years, there are still many aspects of this pernicious behavior that are not well understood. The purpose of this study was to address these gaps in the literature, with a particular focus on investigating whether NSSI (a) regulates affective valence in addition to affective arousal and (b) serves a cognitive regulation function in addition to an affect regulation function. To elucidate these issues, the present study utilized a sample of 112 participants (33 controls, 39 no pain controls, 16 NSSI individuals, and 24 controls matching the affect dysregulation levels of the NSSI group), employed psychophysiological measures of affective valence (startle-alone reactivity) and quality of information processing (prepulse inhibition), and used experimental methods involving an NSSI-proxy to model the NSSI process. Results largely were consistent with predictions, supporting the hypotheses that NSSI serves to regulate cognitive processing and affective valence. On this latter point, however, the control groups also showed a decrease in negative affective valence after the NSSI-proxy. This unexpected finding is consistent with the hypothesis that opponent processes may contribute to the development of self-injurious behaviors (Joiner, 2005). Overall, the present study represents an important extension of previous laboratory NSSI studies and provides a fertile foundation for future studies aimed at understanding why people engage in NSSI.

Emergent processes in cognitive-emotional interactions

Emotion and cognition have been viewed as largely separate entities in the brain. Within this framework, significant progress has been made in understanding specific aspects of behavior. Research in the past two decades, however, has started to paint a different picture of brain organization, one in which network interactions are key to understanding complex behaviors. From both basic and clinical perspectives, the characterization of cognitive-emotional interactions constitutes a fundamental issue in the investigation of the mind and brain. This review will highlight the interactive and integrative potential that exists in the brain to bring together the cognitive and emotional domains. First, anatomical evidence will be provided, focusing on structures such as hypothalamus, basal forebrain, amygdala, cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and insula. Data on functional interactions will then be discussed, followed by a discussion of a dual competition framework, which describes cognitive-emotional interactions in terms of perceptual and cognitive competition mechanisms.

Considering PTSD from the perspective of brain processes: a psychological construction approach

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a complex psychiatric disorder that involves symptoms from various domains that appear to be produced by the combination of several mechanisms. The authors contend that existing neural accounts fail to provide a viable model that explains the emergence and maintenance of PTSD and the associated heterogeneity in the expression of this disorder (cf. Garfinkel & Liberzon, 2009). They introduce a psychological construction approach as a novel framework to probe the brain basis of PTSD, where distributed networks within the human brain are thought to correspond to the basic psychological ingredients of the mind. The authors posit that it is the combination of these ingredients that produces the heterogeneous symptom clusters in PTSD. Their goal is show that a constructionist approach has significant heuristic value in understanding the emergence and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, and leads to different and perhaps more useful conjectures about the origins and maintenance of the syndrome than the traditional hyperreactive fear account.