Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological analysis

Emotion processing and the amygdala: from a 'low road' to 'many roads' of evaluating biological significance

A subcortical pathway through the superior colliculus and pulvinar to the amygdala is commonly assumed to mediate the non-conscious processing of affective visual stimuli. We review anatomical and physiological data that argue against the notion that such a pathway plays a prominent part in processing affective visual stimuli in humans. Instead, we propose that the primary role of the amygdala in visual processing, like that of the pulvinar, is to coordinate the function of cortical networks during evaluation of the biological significance of affective visual stimuli. Under this revised framework, the cortex has a more important role in emotion processing than is traditionally assumed.

The neurodevelopment of empathy in humans

Empathy, which implies a shared interpersonal experience, is implicated in many aspects of social cognition, notably prosocial behavior, morality and the regulation of aggression. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the current knowledge in developmental and affective neuroscience with an emphasis on the perception of pain in others. It will be argued that human empathy involves several components: affective arousal, emotion understanding and emotion regulation, each with different developmental trajectories. These components are implemented by a complex network of distributed, often recursively connected, interacting neural regions including the superior temporal sulcus, insula, medial and orbitofrontal cortices, amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex, as well as autonomic and neuroendocrine processes implicated in social behaviors and emotional states. Decomposing the construct of empathy into subcomponents that operate in conjunction in the healthy brain and examining their developmental trajectory provides added value to our current approaches to understanding human development. It can also benefit our understanding of both typical and atypical development.

The amygdala and the experience of affect

The current study examined the hypothesis that amygdala activation serves as a neural precondition for negative affective experience. Participants' affective experience was measured by asking them to report on their momentary experiences several times a day over the course of a month using an electronic experience-sampling procedure. One year later, participants viewed backwardly masked depictions of fear while functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to measure their amygdala and fusiform gyrus activation. Negative affect, as measured during the experience-sampling procedure 1-year prior, was positively correlated with amygdala activation in response to these brief presentations of fear depictions. Furthermore, descriptive analyses indicated that fusiform gyrus activation and negative affective experience in the scanner were associated for participants reporting increased nervousness during the imaging procedure. The results are consistent with the interpretation that the amygdala contributes to negative affective experience by increasing perceptual sensitivity for negative stimuli.

Differential hemodynamic response in affective circuitry with aging: an FMRI study of novelty, valence, and arousal

Emerging evidence indicates that stimulus novelty is affectively potent and reliably engages the amygdala and other portions of the affective workspace in the brain. Using fMRI, we examined whether novel stimuli remain affectively salient across the lifespan, and therefore, whether novelty processing--a potentially survival-relevant function--is preserved with aging. Nineteen young and 22 older healthy adults were scanned during observing novel and familiar affective pictures while estimating their own subjectively experienced aroused levels. We investigated age-related difference of magnitude of activation, hemodynamic time course, and functional connectivity of BOLD responses in the amygdala. Although there were no age-related differences in the peak response of the amygdala to novelty, older individuals showed a narrower, sharper (i.e., "peakier") hemodynamic time course in response to novel stimuli, as well as decreased connectivity between the left amygdala and the affective areas including orbito-frontal regions. These findings have relevance for understanding age-related differences in memory and affect regulation.

Clinical and therapeutic aspects of Klinefelter's syndrome: sexual function

Klinefelter's syndrome (KS) is the most common sex chromosomal aberration among men, with estimated prevalence of about 1 in 500 newborn males. The classical phenotype of KS is widely recognized, but many affected subjects present only very mild signs. While the association between KS and infertility has been well documented, few studies have investigated sexual function in the KS patients. In the present paper we reviewed studies addressed to emotional processing and sexual function in KS. We searched the following databases Medline, Pubmed, Embase, for Klinefelter's syndrome, sexuality. We focus on the peculiar contribution of genetic and hormonal background, which characterizes sexual dysfunction in KS. Abnormal structure and function of the emotional brain circuits have been described in KS. These alterations were less pronounced when the patients underwent to testosterone replacement therapy suggesting that they were mediated by testosterone deficiency. Accordingly, clinical studies indicate that sexual dysfunctions, eventually present in KS, are not specifically associated with the syndrome but are related to the underlying hypogonadism. In conclusion, androgen deficiency more than chromosomal abnormality is the major pathogenic factor of sexual dysfunction in KS.

Novelty as a dimension in the affective brain

Many neuroscience studies have demonstrated that the human amygdala is a central element in the neural workspace that computes affective value. Emerging evidence suggests that novelty is an affective dimension that engages the amygdala independently of other affective properties. This current study is the first in which novelty, valence, and arousal were systematically examined for their relative contributions to amygdala activation during affective processing. Healthy young adults viewed International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images that varied along the dimensions of valence (positive, negative, neutral), arousal (high, mid, low), and novelty (novel, familiar). The results demonstrate that, in comparison to negative (vs. positive) and high (vs. low) arousal stimuli, the amygdala has higher peak responses and a selectively longer time course of activation to novel (vs. familiar) stimuli. In addition, novelty differentially engaged other affective brain areas including those involved in controlling and regulating amygdala responses (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex), as well as those transmitting sensory signals that the amygdala modulates (e.g., occipitotemporal visual cortex). Taken together with other findings, these results support the idea that an essential amygdala function is signaling stimulus importance or salience. The results also suggest that novelty is a critical stimulus dimension for amygdala engagement (in addition to valence and arousal).

Variety is the spice of life: A psychological construction approach to understanding variability in emotion

There is remarkable variety in emotional life. Not all mental states referred to by the same word (e.g., "fear") look alike, feel alike, or have the same neurophysiological signature. Variability has been observed within individuals over time, across individuals from the same culture, and of course across cultures. In this paper, I outline an approach to understanding the richness and diversity of emotional life. This model, called the conceptual act model, is not only well suited to explaining individual differences in the frequency and quality of emotion, but it also suggests the counter-intuitive view that the variety in emotional life extends past the boundaries of events that are conventionally called "emotion" to other classes of psychological events that people call by different names, such as "cognitions". As a result, the conceptual act model is a unifying account of the broad variety of mental states that constitute the human mind.

Reconstructing the Past: A Century of Ideas About Emotion in Psychology

Within the discipline of psychology, the conventional history outlines the development of two fundamental approaches to the scientific study of emotion-"basic emotion" and "appraisal" traditions. In this article, we outline the development of a third approach to emotion that exists in the psychological literature-the "psychological constructionist" tradition. In the process, we discuss a number of works that have virtually disappeared from the citation trail in psychological discussions of emotion. We also correct some misconceptions about early sources, such as work by Darwin and James. Taken together, these three contributions make for a fuller and more accurate account of ideas about emotion during the century stretching from 1855 to just before 1960.

Historical Research on the Self and Emotions

Research on this topic in Europe and North America has reached a new stage. Prior to 1970, historians told a story of progress in which modern individuals gradually gained mastery of emotions. After 1970 this older approach was put into doubt. Since 1990 research into the history of emotions has increasingly relied on a new methodology, based on the assumption that emotion is a domain of effort, and that it is possible to document variance between emotional standards, on the one hand, and the greater or lesser success of individuals in conforming to them, on the other. Emotional standards are now assumed to display a history that is not progressive, but reflects distinctive features of each period.

See it with feeling: affective predictions during object perception

People see with feeling. We 'gaze', 'behold', 'stare', 'gape' and 'glare'. In this paper, we develop the hypothesis that the brain's ability to see in the present incorporates a representation of the affective impact of those visual sensations in the past. This representation makes up part of the brain's prediction of what the visual sensations stand for in the present, including how to act on them in the near future. The affective prediction hypothesis implies that responses signalling an object's salience, relevance or value do not occur as a separate step after the object is identified. Instead, affective responses support vision from the very moment that visual stimulation begins.

The Future of Psychology: Connecting Mind to Brain

Psychological states such as thoughts and feelings are real. Brain states are real. The problem is that the two are not real in the same way, creating the mind-brain correspondence problem. In this article, I present a possible solution to this problem that involves two suggestions. First, complex psychological states such as emotion and cognition can be thought of as constructed events that can be causally reduced to a set of more basic, psychologically primitive ingredients that are more clearly respected by the brain. Second, complex psychological categories like emotion and cognition are the phenomena that require explanation in psychology, and, therefore, they cannot be abandoned by science. Describing the content and structure of these categories is a necessary and valuable scientific activity.

Affective learning enhances activity and functional connectivity in early visual cortex

This study examined the impact of task-irrelevant affective information on early visual processing regions V1-V4. Fearful and neutral faces presented with rings of different colors were used as stimuli. During the conditioning phase, fearful faces presented with a certain ring color (e.g., black) were paired with mild electrical stimulation. Neutral faces shown with rings of that color, as well as fearful or neutral faces shown with another ring color (e.g., white), were never paired with shock. Our findings revealed that fearful faces evoked enhanced blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) responses in V1 and V4 compared to neutral faces. Faces embedded in a color ring that was paired with shock (e.g., black) evoked greater BOLD responses in V1-V4 compared to a ring color that was never paired with shock (e.g., white). Finally, BOLD responses in early visual cortex were tightly interrelated (i.e., correlated) during an affectively potent context (i.e., ring color) but not during a neutral one, suggesting that increased functional integration was present with affective learning. Taken together, the results suggest that task-irrelevant affective information not only influences evoked responses in early, retinotopically organized visual cortex, but also determines the pattern of responses across early visual cortex.

Reason, emotion and decision-making: risk and reward computation with feeling

Many models of judgment and decision-making posit distinct cognitive and emotional contributions to decision-making under uncertainty. Cognitive processes typically involve exact computations according to a cost-benefit calculus, whereas emotional processes typically involve approximate, heuristic processes that deliver rapid evaluations without mental effort. However, it remains largely unknown what specific parameters of uncertain decision the brain encodes, the extent to which these parameters correspond to various decision-making frameworks, and their correspondence to emotional and rational processes. Here, I review research suggesting that emotional processes encode in a precise quantitative manner the basic parameters of financial decision theory, indicating a reorientation of emotional and cognitive contributions to risky choice.

How do you feel--now? The anterior insula and human awareness

The anterior insular cortex (AIC) is implicated in a wide range of conditions and behaviours, from bowel distension and orgasm, to cigarette craving and maternal love, to decision making and sudden insight. Its function in the re-representation of interoception offers one possible basis for its involvement in all subjective feelings. New findings suggest a fundamental role for the AIC (and the von Economo neurons it contains) in awareness, and thus it needs to be considered as a potential neural correlate of consciousness.

Affect as a Psychological Primitive

In this article, we discuss the hypothesis that affect is a fundamental, psychologically irreducible property of the human mind. We begin by presenting historical perspectives on the nature of affect. Next, we proceed with a more contemporary discussion of core affect as a basic property of the mind that is realized within a broadly distributed neuronal workspace. We then present the affective circumplex, a mathematical formalization for representing core affective states, and show that this model can be used to represent individual differences in core affective feelings that are linked to meaningful variation in emotional experience. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that core affect has psychological consequences that reach beyond the boundaries of emotion, to influence learning and consciousness.

Explaining Away: A Model of Affective Adaptation

We propose a model of affective adaptation, the processes whereby affective responses weaken after one or more exposures to emotional events. Drawing on previous research, our approach, represented by the acronym AREA, holds that people attend to self-relevant, unexplained events, react emotionally to these events, explain or reach an understanding of the events, and thereby adapt to the events (i.e., they attend less and have weaker emotional reactions to them). We report tests of new predictions about people's reactions to pleasurable events and discuss the implications of the model for how people cope with negative events, experience emotion in different cultures, and other topics.

On the relationship between emotion and cognition

The current view of brain organization supports the notion that there is a considerable degree of functional specialization and that many regions can be conceptualized as either 'affective' or 'cognitive'. Popular examples are the amygdala in the domain of emotion and the lateral prefrontal cortex in the case of cognition. This prevalent view is problematic for a number of reasons. Here, I will argue that complex cognitive-emotional behaviours have their basis in dynamic coalitions of networks of brain areas, none of which should be conceptualized as specifically affective or cognitive. Central to cognitive-emotional interactions are brain areas with a high degree of connectivity, called hubs, which are critical for regulating the flow and integration of information between regions.

The role of the amygdala in visual awareness

Pessoa and colleagues recently reported the novel finding that objective awareness of a negative stimulus is associated with coactivation of the amygdala and fusiform gyrus. Based on the neuroanatomical connections of the amygdala, we suggest that the amygdala is acting to increase neural activity in the fusiform gyrus, thereby increasing the likelihood that visual representations that have affective value reach awareness. The psychological consequence is that a person's momentary affective state might help to select the contents of conscious experience.

On the interdependence of cognition and emotion

Affect and cognition have long been treated as independent entities, but in the current review we suggest that affect and cognition are in fact highly interdependent. We open the article by discussing three classic views for the independence of affect. These are (i) the affective independence hypothesis, that emotion is processed independently from cognition, (ii) the affective primacy hypothesis, that evaluative processing precedes semantic processing, and (iii) the affective automaticity hypothesis, that affectively potent stimuli commandeer attention and evaluation is automatic. We argue that affect is not independent from cognition, that affect is not primary to cognition, nor is affect automatically elicited. The second half of the paper discusses several instances of how affect influences cognition. We review experiments showing affective involvement in perception, semantic activation, and attitude activation. We conclude that one function of affect is to regulate cognitive processing.