Charlie Gard and the Limits of the Harm Principle-Reply

Best Interest Standard in School Health: A Concept Analysis

The bioethical concept of best interest standard is cited in courts across America and considered to be an effective method of managing pediatric health care decision-making. Although the best interest standard is referred to in an abundance of nursing, medical, legal, and bioethical literature, refinement and a clear definition of the concept are lacking in the context of school health. An exhaustive and methodical search was conducted across six databases revealing 41 articles from the past decade. The Wilsonian methodology was used to analyze, refine, and clarify the concept of best interest standard by presenting original case vignettes (model, contrary, related, and borderline) and an innovative conceptual model as it applies to school nursing. This concept analysis provides school nurses with a deeper understanding of the best interest standard to navigate the complex nature of making school health care decisions.

Whose harm? Which metaphysic?

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements (as they are for Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists), it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema's harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children's lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated.