‘Of course I remember seeing that film’—how ambiguous questions generate crashing memories

Suggested false memories of a non-existent film: forensically relevant individual differences in the crashing memories paradigm

There is ample evidence to suggest that posing leading questions is dangerous, in that it may elicit compliant responses that are not necessarily accurate. Further, suggestive questioning is considered to possibly result in the development of false memories, implied in the suggestion. [Crombag, H. F. M., Wagenaar, W. A., & van Koppen, P. J. (1996). Crashing memories and the problem of 'source monitoring'. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10(2), 95-104. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199604)10:2<95::AID-ACP366>3.0.CO;2-#] introduced a crashing memories paradigm in which participants are asked a single leading question about a non-existent film. The present research sought to replicate the false-memory-eliciting effect of the crashing memory induction. Further, we sought to explore associations with forensically relevant personality traits, particularly acquiescence, compliance, and suggestibility. In two studies, a significant minority of participants endorsed the leading question about the non-existent film (25.7%, and 38% respectively). We found no support for an association with acquiescence or compliance, but suggestibility was associated with the development of false memories.

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Setting the Records Straight: Impossible Memories and the Persistence of Their Phenomenological Qualities

This article offers a new perspective on the study of “recollections” that feel like memories despite the fact that people come to believe they are based on events that could not possibly have happened. Indeed this feeling of remembering can persist long after people change their beliefs. This new perspective emerges from the integration of the work of memory scientists with that of literary writers and historians. Shedding light on assumptions about the strength of these persistence effects, the perspective serves as an effective heuristic for guiding the study of precipitating factors that may lead people to question their recollections in the first place. This integrative perspective also invites a broader consideration of the circumstances giving rise to changes in beliefs as well as resistance to such changes. In the process, this new perspective extends and sharpens theoretical discussions about memory reconstruction processes, highlighting the role of scene making and social interactions.

Seeing photos makes us read between the lines: The influence of photos on memory for inferences

Three studies examined how photos accompanying stories could contribute to people drawing inferences about outcomes from the stories and subsequently claiming that they had read what had actually only been inferred. Subjects read short stories designed to induce inferences about their conclusions (e.g., “Sabrina dropped the delicate vase” invites the inference that the vase broke) accompanied by a photo depicting the likely conclusion (the broken vase), a photo depicting a detail of the story but not the conclusion (the vase before it was dropped), or no photo. Results showed that seeing photographs consistent with inferred conclusions led people to falsely claim that they read those conclusions. Photo-boosted inferences were held with high confidence and were robust over time. Falsely recalled inferences were sometimes accompanied by false claims to have seen a photo depicting the inferred events when another photo or no photo had actually be seen. These findings support the source monitoring framework's prediction that people can mistakenly attribute their internally generated inferences about what occurred to externally derived sources when they have photographic “evidence” consistent with the inferred conclusions.

Is the truth in the details? Extended narratives help distinguishing false "memories" from false "reports"

The present study examined the effects of fantasy proneness on false "reports" and false "memories", of existent and non-existent footage of a public event. We predicted that highly fantasy prone individuals would be more likely to stand by their initial claim of having seen a film of the event than low fantasy prone participants when prompted for more details about their experiences. Eighty creative arts students and 80 other students were asked whether they had seen CCTV footage preceding the attack on Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh up to, and including, non-existent footage of the actual moment of the attack. If affirmative, they were probed for extended narratives of what they claimed to have seen. Overall, 64% of participants provided a false "report" by answering yes to the initial question. Of these, 30% provided no explicit details of the attack, and a further 15% retracted their initial answer in their narratives. This left 19% of the sample who appeared to have false "memories" because they provided explicit details of the actual moment of the attack. Women scored higher than men and art students scored higher than other students on fantasy proneness, but there was no effect on levels of false reporting or false "memory". Memories were rated more vivid and clear for existent compared to non-existent aspects of the event. In sum, these data suggest a more complex relationship between memory distortions and fantasy proneness than previously observed.

Familiarity breeds distortion: the effects of media exposure on false reports concerning media coverage of the terrorist attacks in london on 7 July 2005

The present experiment investigated whether increased media exposure could lead to an increase in memory distortions regarding a traumatic public event: the explosion of the No. 30 bus in Tavistock Square, London on 7 July 2005. A total of 150 Swedish and 150 UK participants completed a series of questionnaires about their memory of either (i) the aftermath of the explosion, (ii) a non-existent computerised reconstruction of the moment of the explosion, or (iii) non-existent closed circuit television footage of the moment of the explosion. In line with the availability heuristic, U.K. participants were more likely than Swedish participants to claim to have seen all three types of footage. Furthermore, a subsample of U.K. participants who appeared to have developed false "memories" of seeing the No. 30 bus explode scored significantly higher on measures of dissociation and fantasy proneness than participants who did not develop false "memories". This experiment provides further support for the role of imaginative processes in the development of false memories.