The effect of attribute framing on beliefs and attitudes toward branded and generic medications

Generic medications are developed to match brand-name medications in terms of active ingredients, quality, safety, and strength. Because generic medications cost less than their brand-name counterparts, they present an opportunity to reduce financial burden for patients and social institutions. Studies show, however, that patients often possess negative beliefs and evaluations of generic medications, thereby undermining use and effectiveness. In two pre-registered online experiments with community adults (Total N = 750), we tested the effect of attribute framing on attitudes, attitude certainty, and effectiveness beliefs regarding generic and brand-name medications. In both experiments, framing (positive vs. negative) and brand status (generic vs. brand name) of an allergy medication were manipulated in a 2 × 2 between-participant design. The results of both experiments produced strong effects of the framing and brand status manipulations. Specifically, allergy medicines were rated more favorably with a positive frame as compared to a negative frame. Also, branded allergy medicines were rated more positively than generic allergy medicines. In contrast with the pre-registered hypotheses, the two manipulated variables did not reliably interact to predict outcomes. These results held constant across multiple sets of stimuli and dependent measures. The findings support the position that positive framing can be employed to improve positive evaluations and effectiveness beliefs for both over-the-counter generic and branded medications.

Reliability of moral decision-making: Evidence from the trolley dilemma

The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgement has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people's moral judgements and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, this study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgements while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In this study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1,040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

The interplay between the importance of a decision and emotion in decision-making

Decision-making literature has demonstrated that individuals' preferences are strongly affected by the way in which choices are presented. This cognitive bias, termed the framing effect, is influenced by the importance of the possible outcomes that a decision can have. However, the direction of this influence remains poorly understood. The aim of this paper was to examine the role of the importance of a decision in framing susceptibility and to explore a potential mechanism underlying this influence. Our first study revealed that participants display a framing effect when their decision implies a high importance outcome, but resist framing manipulation when their decision implies a low importance outcome. Our second study confirmed that an increase in the importance of a decision is associated with increasing framing susceptibility. Moreover, a moderated mediation analysis revealed that the more a decision was important, the more the gain and loss frames aroused opposite emotions, and this accounted for the increase in framing susceptibility. The results of these two studies confirmed that an increase in the importance of a decision is associated with increasing framing susceptibility and suggest that this influence on framing susceptibility is underpinned by emotion. Implications and direction for future studies are discussed.