Episodic foresight beyond the very next event in 3- and 4-year-old children

Consciousness, Memory, and the Human Self: Commentary on "Consciousness as a Memory System" by Budson et al (2022)

Philosophical theories have attempted to shed light on the intricate relationships between consciousness and memory since long before this became a major theme in psychology and neuroscience. In the December 2022 issue of Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology , Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) introduced a comprehensive theoretical framework pertaining to the origins of consciousness in relation to the memory system, its implications on our real-time perception of the world, and the neuroanatomical correlates underlying these phenomena. Throughout their paper, Budson et al (2022) focus on their theory's explanatory value regarding several clinical syndromes and experimental findings. In this commentary, we first summarize the theory presented by Budson and colleagues (2022). Then, we suggest a complementary approach of studying the relationships between consciousness and memory through the concept of the human self and its protracted representation through time (so-called mental time travel). Finally, we elaborate on Budson and colleagues' (2022) neuroanatomical explanation to their theory and suggest that adding the concepts of brain networks and cortical gradients may contribute to their theory's interpretability.

What is the role of episodic foresight in planning for future needs? Theory and two experiments

Considerable evidence suggests that episodic memory and foresight rely on the same underlying cognitive processes. Some theorists have suggested that the key role of episodic foresight is to allow an individual to disengage from current states to plan for future needs. However, the contribution of episodic cognition to this type of planning has not been investigated. We present two experiments exploring future-state planning in 3-6-year-old children and healthy young adults, finding that both groups were consistently biased towards current states. We further found that there were few relationships between episodic memory ability and future-state planning. Where there was a relationship, the degree of bias was positively related to episodic memory ability, such that those with better episodic were more biased by their current motivational state. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that episodic cognition is particularly vulnerable to bias from current feelings. We propose an account in which episodic cognition allows for cross-talk between current and future motivational states, and that while this can aid prospective decision-making in some scenarios, it may hinder it in others.

Children's behavior and spontaneous talk in a future thinking task

We explored 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 120) "explicit" and "spontaneous" future-oriented cognition. Specifically, children had to think ahead to meet a future physiological need (desire for food) or psychological need (avoiding boredom). One group of children alternated between a room with candy and a room without candy, spending 3 min per visit. Children were explicitly asked which room they wanted to put extra candy in for a future visit to the lab (correct answer: room without candy). A second group of children underwent the same procedure but with toys as the resource instead of food (a replication of Atance et al. in J Exp Child Psychol 129:98-109, 2015). In the food condition, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds all placed candy in the correct room above chance, but only 4- and 5-year-olds were above chance in the toy condition. Overall, 4- and 5-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds, and children performed better in the food condition than the toy condition. Children's spontaneous (or "involuntary") future thinking was assessed by coding their utterances while in the two rooms. Children who solved the explicit task uttered more task-relevant future and past statements than children who failed. Examining spontaneous talk also allowed us to explore children's spontaneous "solving" of the task before being asked an explicit test question. This research highlights the importance of varying stimuli in future thinking tasks and developing methods to capture spontaneous/involuntary future thinking in young children.

"What" and "where" was when? Memory for the temporal order of episodic events in children

In the past, researchers have shown that the individual components of episodic memory (i.e "what," "where," and "when") may emerge at different points in development. Specifically, while children as young as three can accurately report the "what" and "where" of an event, they struggle to accurately report when the event occurred. One explanation for children's difficulty in reporting when an event took place is a rudimentary understanding, and ability to use, temporal terms. In the current experiment, we employed a physical timeline to aid children's reporting of the order in which a series of episodic events occurred. Overall, while 4-, 5-, and 6-year olds performed above chance, 3-year olds did not. Our findings suggest that 3-year olds' limited ability to produce temporal terms may not be the rate-limiting step preventing them from identifying when events occurred in their recent past.