Differentiating paranoia and conspiracy mentality using a network approach

Although mostly considered distinct, conspiracy mentality and paranoia share conceptual similarities (e.g., persecutory content, resistance to disconfirming evidence). Using self-report data from a large and multinational online sample (N = 2510; from the UK, the US, Hong Kong, Germany, and Australia), we examined whether paranoia and conspiracy mentality represent distinct latent constructs in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Utilising network analysis, we then explored common and unique correlates of paranoia and conspiracy mentality while accounting for their shared variance. Across sites, paranoia and conspiracy mentality presented distinct, yet weakly correlated (r = 0.26), constructs. Both were associated with past traumatic experiences, holding negative beliefs about the self and other people, sleep problems, and a tendency to worry. However, paranoia was related to increased negative affect (i.e., anxiety) and decreased social support, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for conspiracy mentality (i.e., decreased anxiety and depression, increased social support). Paranoia and conspiracy mentality are related but not the same constructs. Their similar and distinct correlates point to common and unique risk factors and underlying mechanisms.

Threat by Association, Islamic Puritanism and Conspiracy Beliefs Explain A Religious Majority Group’s Collective Protest Against Religious Minority Groups

This article addresses the question of why members of a majority group, despite their more powerful status, may protest against low-power minority groups. The present study addressed this question in the context of immanent intergroup relations between Muslims, as the majority group, and non-Muslims, as the minority group, in Indonesia. It is argued that at the core of such collective protests is a threat by association, a perception of the majority group members that the minority groups are in league with the West which threatens the existence of Muslims worldwide. Based on data collected using a survey questionnaire from Indonesian Muslims ( N = 418) this study tested a hypothesised model using threat by association posed by the minority groups, Islamic puritanism and beliefs relating to western conspiracy to predict collective protests and intolerant intentions against non-Muslim minorities in Indonesia by using MPlus version 7.0. The hypothesised model found empirical support. The relationship between threat by association and Islamic puritanism with collective protests was mediated by Western conspiracy beliefs. It was also found that support for collective protests got translated into majority group members’ religious intolerant intentions against the people belonging to the non-Muslim minority groups. The article discusses the theoretical implications and research limitations of these empirical findings.

Do we need a strong captain to navigate the COVID-19 pandemic? Social identification, conspiracy theory beliefs, and the wish for a strong leader

Introduction

In times of great uncertainty and hardship, calls for a strong leader tend to arise. The present study delved into this issue by examining possible sociopsychological antecedents of the wish for a strong leader during the COVID-19 crisis.

Methods

We examined the role of social identification, belief in conspiracy theories related to COVID-19, and trust in various relevant social actors in a sample of 350 Italian citizens.

Results

Structural equation modeling analyses showed that identification with Italians was related to a lower wish for a strong leader through the mediation of trust. Identification with Europeans had a direct and negative association with the wish for a strong leader. Finally, greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs was related to a greater wish for a strong leader, directly and through diminished trust.

Discussion

These findings suggest that belief in conspiracy theories might drive individuals to depart from democratic principles, whereas relying on meaningful social identities can effectively contrast possible authoritarian turns brought about by a global societal crisis, such as the coronavirus outbreak.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

Background

The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers' interest in this issue.

Methods

Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants' characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research.

Results

Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism).

Conclusion and limitations

The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

Conspiracy theories in online deliberation on gender identity legislation: Dilemmas of prejudice and political partisanship and implications for LGBTQI+ claims

Conspiracy theories have recently come under the scrutiny of social psychology. While some theorists have treated them as a deficient way of thinking, others have considered them as a form of political rhetoric with important social implications. We focus on conspiracy theories in the context of online public deliberation on legislation allowing registration of self-defined gender in Greece. Employing the tools of Critical Discursive Psychology, we analyse comments posted on the Ministry of Justice's website created for public consultation about the law change. We focus on the mobilization of conspiracy theories by people who oppose Law 4491/2017 (“Legal Recognition of Gender Identity – National Mechanism for the Development, Monitoring and Evaluation of Action Plans on Children's Rights and Other Provisions”). These commentators often argued that powerful groups are behind the proposed legislation, aiming at decreasing Earth's population, disrupting moral order, and violating humanness. We demonstrate how these constructions helped participants to perform various tasks, such as delegitimizing the legislation while at the same time avoiding the stigma of prejudice, promoting far-right political practices, and rebutting accusations of political partisanship. The results are discussed in relation to conspiracy theories’ role in countering “gender ideology” and in promoting cisgenderism and heteronormativity.

Conspiracy theories as opportunistic attributions of power

A significant trend of research construes conspiracy theories as a power challenging phenomenon. Yet, there is evidence that conspiracy theories are sometimes promoted by members of relatively powerful groups (e.g., a national majority) in order to target relatively powerless groups (e.g., immigrants). Thus, conspiracy theories are not necessarily beliefs held by the relatively powerless. However, they always attribute power to the allegedly conspiring parties. As a matter of fact, without such power, the groups accused of conspiring would be unable to carry out their plans. In contrast to assuming conspiracy theories reflect objective power imbalances, we propose that they may be construed as opportunistic attributions of power that allow individuals to advance their interests (e.g., validate their worldview, strengthen or challenge social hierarchies).

Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs and distrust of science predict risky public health behaviours through optimistically biased risk perceptions in Ukraine, Turkey, and Germany

The present paper examines the extent to which conspiracy beliefs about the COVID-19 outbreak and distrust of epidemiological science are likely to predict optimistically biased risk perceptions at the individual and group levels. We explored the factor structure of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs and their associations with trust in science in predicting risk perceptions using survey data collected in Ukraine ( N = 390), Turkey ( N = 290), and Germany ( N = 408). We further expected conspiracy beliefs and distrust of science to predict people’s willingness to attend public gatherings versus maintaining preventive physical distancing through optimistically biased risk perceptions. Metric noninvariance for key constructs across the samples was observed so the samples were analysed separately. In Ukraine, a two-factor structure of conspiracy beliefs was found wherein COVID-19 bioweapon (but not COVID-19 profit) beliefs were negatively associated with public gathering through optimistically biased individual risk perceptions. In Turkey and Germany, conspiracy beliefs showed a single-factor solution that was negatively associated with preventive distancing and positively related to public gathering through optimistically biased public risk metaperceptions. The hypothesis about the direct and indirect effects of trust in science on risky health behaviour was partially confirmed in all three samples. The observed discrepancies in our findings are discussed.

Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories

Although conspiracy theories are endorsed by about half the population and occasionally turn out to be true, they are more typically false beliefs that, by definition, have a paranoid theme. Consequently, psychological research to date has focused on determining whether there are traits that account for belief in conspiracy theories (BCT) within a deficit model. Alternatively, a two-component, socio-epistemic model of BCT is proposed that seeks to account for the ubiquity of conspiracy theories, their variance along a continuum, and the inconsistency of research findings likening them to psychopathology. Within this model, epistemic mistrust is the core component underlying conspiracist ideation that manifests as the rejection of authoritative information, focuses the specificity of conspiracy theory beliefs, and can sometimes be understood as a sociocultural response to breaches of trust, inequities of power, and existing racial prejudices. Once voices of authority are negated due to mistrust, the resulting epistemic vacuum can send individuals “down the rabbit hole” looking for answers where they are vulnerable to the biased processing of information and misinformation within an increasingly “post-truth” world. The two-component, socio-epistemic model of BCT argues for mitigation strategies that address both mistrust and misinformation processing, with interventions for individuals, institutions of authority, and society as a whole.

Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain

In this introduction to the EJSP Special Issue on conspiracy theories as a social psychological phenomenon, we describe how this emerging research domain has developed over the past decade and distill four basic principles that characterize belief in conspiracy theories. Specifically, conspiracy theories are consequential as they have a real impact on people's health, relationships, and safety; they are universal in that belief in them is widespread across times, cultures, and social settings; they are emotional given that negative emotions and not rational deliberations cause conspiracy beliefs; and they are social as conspiracy beliefs are closely associated with psychological motivations underlying intergroup conflict. We then discuss future research and possible policy interventions in this growing area of enquiry.

'We fight for a better future for our country': Understanding the Ukrainian Euromaidan movement as the emergence of a social competition strategy

The current research seeks to develop an analysis of Ukraine's Euromaidan social movement in psychological terms. Building on the classic understanding of social competition strategies, we argue that Euromaidan protests can be conceived as an attempt of pro-European Union (EU) Ukrainians to realign the boundaries of the Ukrainian national identity by defeating the alternative pro-Russia integration project championed by the government. In particular, building on the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action, we suggest that Euromaidan is an emergent opinion-based group identity, formed in response to injustice through two self-categorical processes - group-level self-investment into the shared entity (i.e., Ukrainian national category) and disidentification from the alternative Russia-led Customs Union. Using a sample of 3,096 participants surveyed during the protests, we tested our hypotheses with structural equation modelling, where the model accounting for the direct and indirect paths of the self-categorical processes was expected to explain collective action intentions to a great extent than models applying the social identity and encapsulation models of collective action. We found evidence consistent with the proposal that Euromaidan was a pro-EU opinion-based group, formed in response to the government's decision to suspend the EU-Ukraine agreement and around individuals' general perception of unfair government authorities.