The unresolved question on COVID-19 virus origin: The three cards game?

Genetic and structural analyses reveal the low potential of the SARS-CoV-2 EG.5 variant

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 EG.5 lineage is the latest variant under monitoring, and it is generating significant concern due to its recent upward trend in prevalence. Our aim was to gain insights into this emerging lineage and offer insights into its actual level of threat. Both genetic and structural data indicate that this novel variant presently lacks substantial evidence of having a high capacity for widespread transmission. Their viral population sizes expanded following a very mild curve and peaked several months after the earliest detected sample. Currently, neither the viral population size of EG.5 nor that of its first descendant is increasing. The genetic variability appear to be flattened, as evidenced by its relatively modest evolutionary rate (9.05 × 10-4 subs/site/year). As has been observed with numerous prior variants, attributes that might theoretically provide advantages seem to stem from genetic drift, enabling the virus to continually adjust to its host, albeit without a clear association with enhanced dangerousness. These findings further underscore the necessity for ongoing genome-based monitoring, ensuring preparedness and a well-documented understanding of the unfolding situation.

Integrative Genome-Based Survey of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron XBB.1.16 Variant

The XBB.1.16 SARS-CoV-2 variant, also known as Arcturus, is a recent descendant lineage of the recombinant XBB (nicknamed Gryphon). Compared to its direct progenitor, XBB.1, XBB.1.16 carries additional spike mutations in key antigenic sites, potentially conferring an ability to evade the immune response compared to other circulating lineages. In this context, we conducted a comprehensive genome-based survey to gain a detailed understanding of the evolution and potential dangers of the XBB.1.16 variant, which became dominant in late June. Genetic data indicates that the XBB.1.16 variant exhibits an evolutionary background with limited diversification, unlike dangerous lineages known for rapid changes. The evolutionary rate of XBB.1.16, which amounts to 3.95 × 10-4 subs/site/year, is slightly slower than that of its direct progenitors, XBB and XBB.1.5, which have been circulating for several months. A Bayesian Skyline Plot reconstruction suggests that the peak of genetic variability was reached in early May 2023, and currently, it is in a plateau phase with a viral population size similar to the levels observed in early March. Structural analyses indicate that, overall, the XBB.1.16 variant does not possess structural characteristics markedly different from those of the parent lineages, and the theoretical affinity for ACE2 does not seem to change among the compared variants. In conclusion, the genetic and structural analyses of SARS-CoV-2 XBB.1.16 do not provide evidence of its exceptional danger or high expansion capability. Detected differences with previous lineages are probably due to genetic drift, which allows the virus constant adaptability to the host, but they are not necessarily connected to a greater danger. Nevertheless, continuous genome-based monitoring is essential for a better understanding of its descendants and other lineages.

SARS-CoV-2 Recombinants: Genomic Comparison between XBF and Its Parental Lineages

Recombination events are very common and represent one of the primary drivers of RNA virus evolution. The XBF SARS-CoV-2 lineage is one of the most recently generated recombinants during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is a recombinant of BA.5.2.3 and BA.2.75.3, both descendants of lineages that caused many concerns (BA.5 and BA.2.75, respectively). Here, we performed a genomic survey focused on comparing the recombinant XBF with its parental lineages to provide a comprehensive assessment of the evolutionary potential, epidemiological trajectory, and potential risks. Genetic analyses indicated that although XBF initially showed the typical expansion depicted by a steep curve, causing several concerns, currently there is no indication of significant expansion potential or a contagion rate surpassing that of other currently active or previously prevalent lineages. BSP indicated that the peak has been reached around 19 October 2022 and then the genetic variability suffered slight oscillations until early 5 March 2023 when the population size reduced for the last time starting its last plateau that is still lasting. Structural analyses confirmed its reduced potential, also indicating that properties of NTDs and RBDs of XBF and its parental lineages present no significant difference. Of course, cautionary measures must still be taken and genome-based monitoring remains the best tool for detecting any important changes in viral genome composition.

Molecular In-Depth on the Epidemiological Expansion of SARS-CoV-2 XBB.1.5

Since the beginning of the pandemic, the generation of new variants periodically recurs. The XBB.1.5 SARS-CoV-2 variant is one of the most recent. This research was aimed at verifying the potential hazard of this new subvariant. To achieve this objective, we performed a genome-based integrative approach, integrating results from genetic variability/phylodynamics with structural and immunoinformatic analyses to obtain as comprehensive a viewpoint as possible. The Bayesian Skyline Plot (BSP) shows that the viral population size reached the plateau phase on 24 November 2022, and the number of lineages peaked at the same time. The evolutionary rate is relatively low, amounting to 6.9 × 10−4 subs/sites/years. The NTD domain is identical for XBB.1 and XBB.1.5 whereas their RBDs only differ for the mutations at position 486, where the Phe (in the original Wuhan) is replaced by a Ser in XBB and XBB.1, and by a Pro in XBB.1.5. The variant XBB.1.5 seems to spread more slowly than sub-variants that have caused concerns in 2022. The multidisciplinary molecular in-depth analyses on XBB.1.5 performed here does not provide evidence for a particularly high risk of viral expansion. Results indicate that XBB.1.5 does not possess features to become a new, global, public health threat. As of now, in its current molecular make-up, XBB.1.5 does not represent the most dangerous variant.

Analysis of the Virus SARS-CoV-2 as a Potential Bioweapon in Light of International Literature

INTRODUCTION

As of early 2022, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic still represents a worldwide medical emergency situation. The ongoing vaccination programs can slow down the spread of the virus; however, from time to time, the newly emerging variants of concern and antivaccination movements carry the possibility for the disease to remain in our daily lives. After the appearance of SARS-CoV-2, there was scholarly debate whether the virus was of natural origin, or it emerged from a laboratory, some even thinking the agent's potential biological weapon properties suggest the latter scenario. Later, the bioweapon theory was dismissed by the majority of experts, but the question remains that despite its natural origin, how potent a biological weapon the SARS-CoV-2 virus can become over time.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Based on 12 bioweapon threat assessment criteria already published in 2018, we performed a literature search and review, focusing on relevant potential bioweapon properties of the virus SARS-CoV-2. Instead of utilizing a survey among experts, we tried to qualify and quantify characteristics according to the available data found in peer-reviewed papers. We also identified other key elements not mentioned in the original 12 bioweapon criteria, which can play an important role in assessing future biological weapons.

RESULTS

According to the international literature we analyzed, SARS-CoV-2 is a moderately infectious agent (ID50 estimated between 100 and 1,000), with high infection-to-disease ratio (35%-45% rate of asymptomatic infected) and medium incubation period (1-34 days, mean 6-7 days). Its morbidity and mortality rate can be categorized as medium (high morbidity rate with significant mortality rate). It can be easily produced in large quantities, has high aerosol stability, and has moderate environmental stability. Based on laboratory experiments and statistical model analysis, it can form and is contagious with droplet nuclei, and with spray technique utilization, it could be weaponized effectively. Several prophylactic countermeasures are available in the form of vaccines; however, specific therapeutic options are much more limited. In connection with the original assessment criteria, the SARS-CoV-2 only achieved a "0" score on the ease of detection because of readily available, relatively sensitive, and specific rapid antigen tests. Based on the pandemic experience, we also propose three new assessment categories: one that establishes a mean to measure the necessary quarantine restrictions related to a biological agent, another one that can represent the personal protective equipment required to work safely with a particular agent, and a third one that quantifies the overall disruptive capability, based on previous real-life experiences. These factors could further specify the threat level related to potential biological weapons.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results show that the virus can become a potent bioweapon candidate in the future, achieving a total score of 24 out of 36 on the original 12 criteria. The SARS-CoV-2 has already proven its pandemic generating potential and, despite worldwide efforts, still remains an imminent threat. In order to be prepared for the future possibility of the virus arising as a bioweapon, we must remain cautious and take the necessary countermeasures.

Genetic and Structural Data on the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron BQ.1 Variant Reveal Its Low Potential for Epidemiological Expansion

The BQ.1 SARS-CoV-2 variant, also known as Cerberus, is one of the most recent Omicron descendant lineages. Compared to its direct progenitor BA.5, BQ.1 has some additional spike mutations in some key antigenic sites, which confer further immune escape ability over other circulating lineages. In such a context, here, we perform a genome-based survey aimed at obtaining a complete-as-possible nuance of this rapidly evolving Omicron subvariant. Genetic data suggest that BQ.1 represents an evolutionary blind background, lacking the rapid diversification that is typical of a dangerous lineage. Indeed, the evolutionary rate of BQ.1 is very similar to that of BA.5 (7.6 × 10-4 and 7 × 10-4 subs/site/year, respectively), which has been circulating for several months. The Bayesian Skyline Plot reconstruction indicates a low level of genetic variability, suggesting that the peak was reached around 3 September 2022. Concerning the affinity for ACE2, structure analyses (also performed by comparing the properties of BQ.1 and BA.5 RBD) indicate that the impact of the BQ.1 mutations may be modest. Likewise, immunoinformatic analyses showed moderate differences between the BQ.1 and BA5 potential B-cell epitopes. In conclusion, genetic and structural analyses on SARS-CoV-2 BQ.1 suggest no evidence of a particularly dangerous or high expansion capability. Genome-based monitoring must continue uninterrupted for a better understanding of its descendants and all other lineages.

An updated review of the scientific literature on the origin of SARS-CoV-2

More than two and a half years have already passed since the first case of COVID-19 was officially reported (December 2019), as well as more than two years since the WHO declared the current pandemic (March 2020). During these months, the advances on the knowledge of the COVID-19 and SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus responsible of the infection, have been very significant. However, there are still some weak points on that knowledge, being the origin of SARS-CoV-2 one of the most notorious. One year ago, I published a review focused on what we knew and what we need to know about the origin of that coronavirus, a key point for the prevention of potential future pandemics of a similar nature. The analysis of the available publications until July 2021 did not allow drawing definitive conclusions on the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Given the great importance of that issue, the present review was aimed at updating the scientific information on that origin. Unfortunately, there have not been significant advances on that topic, remaining basically the same two hypotheses on it. One of them is the zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV-2, while the second one is the possible leak of this coronavirus from a laboratory. Most recent papers do not include observational or experimental studies, being discussions and positions on these two main hypotheses. Based on the information here reviewed, there is not yet a definitive and well demonstrated conclusion on the origin of SARS-CoV-2.

Genetic Variability of the Monkeypox Virus Clade IIb B.1

Monkeypox is caused by a sylvatic, double-stranded DNA zoonotic virus. Since 1 January 2022, monkeypox cases have been reported to WHO from 106 Member States across six WHO regions, and as of 2 October 2022, a total of 68,900 confirmed cases, including 25 deaths, occurred. Here, by using a whole genome approach, we perform a genetic and phylodynamic survey of the monkeypox virus Clade IIb B.1, which is the lineage causing the current multi-country outbreak. Results suggest that outbreaks seem to be isolated and localized in several epidemic clusters with geographic consistency. Currently, monkeypox appears to be a virus with a flattened genetic variability in terms of evolutionary path, with a very slow rate of growth in the population size. This scenario confirms that the monkeypox virus lacks the evolutionary advantage, given by the high level of mutation rate, which is very strong in RNA viruses. Of course, constant genome-based monitoring must be performed over time in order to detect the change in its genetic composition, if any.

SARS-CoV-2 origins: zoonotic Rhinolophus vs contemporary models

The question of the origin of coronavirus spread like wildfire ever since it wreaked havoc among humankind, and ever since the scientific community has worked tirelessly to trace the history of the virus. In this review, we have tried to compile relevant literature pertaining to the different theories of origin of SARS-CoV-2, hopefully without any bias, and we strongly support the zoonotic origin of the infamous SARS-CoV-2 in bats and its transfer to human beings through the most probable evolutionary hosts, pangolins and minks. We also support the contemporary 'Circulation Model' that simply mirrors the concept of evolution to explain the origin of the virus which, the authors believe, is the most rational school of thought. The most recent variant of SARS-CoV-2, Omicron, has been taken as an example to clarify the concept. We recommend the community to refer to this model for further understanding and delving deep into this mystery of the origin of SARS-CoV-2.