Shadowing the wandering mind: how understanding the mind-wandering state can inform our appreciation of conscious experience

Bore me (not): boredom impairs recognition memory but not the pupil old/new effect

Mind-wandering and boredom are common phenomena, characterized by shifts in attention and difficulties in sustaining focus. Despite extensive research on the costs and benefits of these states, our understanding of the relationship between mind-wandering, boredom, attention, and memory remains limited. In the current study, we examined the impact that mind-wandering and boredom during encoding have on recognition. In particular, we investigated what impact mind-wandering and boredom have during the encoding of visual stimuli on the pupil old/new effect during recognition. We used an incidental memory task and measured mind-wandering and boredom with thought probes during encoding. Furthermore, we used the pupil old/new effect, assessed via eye-tracking, as a measure of recognition memory. We found a significant effect of boredom on recognition memory and observed the pupil old/new effect in participants regardless of instances of mind-wandering or boredom during encoding. Our findings point toward different mechanisms that underlie mind-wandering and boredom's obstruction of attention during stimuli encoding and their effects on stimuli processing. In addition, these findings reinforce the idea of the pupil old/new effect as a reliable measure of recognition memory as it remained consistent irrespective of attentional lapses due to mind-wandering and boredom.

Working memory capacity predicts focus back effort under different task demands

According to the cognitive flexibility view, individuals with higher cognitive control ability are more flexible in experiencing on task or mind wandering during tasks with different loads. On the other hand, the resource-control theory posits that executive control is essential for allocating attentional resources between mind wandering and tasks. Focus back effort may reflect the adjustment of executive control in the resource-control theory. Here, 121 participants completed two span tasks, as well as high- and low-load tasks, while mind wandering and focus back effort were measured. Our findings indicated that mind wandering was influenced by working memory capacity (WMC) and focus back effort. Additionally, participants demonstrated a higher focus back effort during the higher load task. This effect was particularly pronounced in individuals with lower WMC, which was treated as a continuous variable. These findings integrate the cognitive flexibility view and resource-control theory to describe how individuals modulate mind wandering.

A "Goldilocks zone" for mind-wandering reports? A secondary data analysis of how few thought probes are enough for reliable and valid measurement

Mind-wandering assessment relies heavily on the thought probe technique as a reliable and valid method to assess momentary task-unrelated thought (TUT), but there is little guidance available to help researchers decide how many probes to include within a task. Too few probes may lead to unreliable measurement, but too many probes might artificially disrupt normal thought flow and produce reactive effects. Is there a "Goldilocks zone" for how few thought probes can be used to reliably and validly assess individual differences in mind-wandering propensity? We address this question by reanalyzing two published datasets (Study 1, n = 541; Study 2, ns ≈ 260 per condition) in which thought probes were presented in multiple tasks. Our primary analyses randomly sampled probes in increments of two for each subject in each task. A series of confirmatory factor analyses for each probe "bin" size tested whether the latent correlations between TUT rate and theoretically relevant constructs like working memory capacity, attention-control ability, disorganized schizotypy, and retrospective self-reported mind wandering changed as more probes assessed the TUT rate. TUT rates were remarkably similar across increasing probe-bin sizes and zero-order correlations within and between tasks stabilized at 8-10 probes; moreover, TUT-rate correlations with other latent variables stabilized at about 8 thought probes. Our provisional recommendation (with caveats) is that researchers may use as few as 8 thought probes in prototypical cognitive tasks to gain reliable and valid information about individual differences in TUT rate.

Revisiting consciousness: Distinguishing between states of conscious focused attention and mind wandering with EEG

Fluctuating between external conscious processing and mind wandering is inherent to the human condition. Past research showed that in tasks requiring sustained attention, mind wandering episodes in which attention is directed internally constrain conscious processing of external stimuli. Conversely, conscious processing of internal stimuli is enhanced during mind wandering. To investigate this, we developed and administered a visuomotor tracking task in which participants were instructed to track the path of a stimulus on a screen with a mouse while responding to rare targets. Prior to reports of mind wandering we found the following: The P3 event-related potential component for targets, indicative of conscious stimulus processing, was attenuated at electrodes Cz and Pz. Moreover, alpha power, indicative of internal mental states, increased globally. Theta power increased along the centroparietal area, and beta decreased along right frontal and right centroparietal areas. Interestingly, trait mind wandering was positively correlated with delta power and gamma power, but negatively correlated with the theta-beta ratio. These results demonstrate that mind wandering is characterized by distinct neural signatures at both a state and trait level.

Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: the surrealist method

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one's own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility–restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they’d been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn’t offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some “good news”—that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods—and some “bad news”—that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.

Reconsidering the Mind-Wandering Reader: Predictive Processing, Probability Designs, and Enculturation

Studies on mind-wandering frequently use reading as an experimental task. In these studies, reading is conceived as a cognitive process that potentially offers a contrast to mind-wandering, because it seems to be task-related, goal-directed and stimulus-dependent. More recent work attempts to avoid the dichotomy of successful cognitive processes and processes of mind-wandering found in earlier studies. We approach the issue from the perspective that texts provoke modes of cognitive involvement different from the information processing and recall account that underlies many early mind-wandering studies. After all, reading itself is an umbrella term for activities that are characterized by a variety of phenomenological and functional signatures. We conceptualize reading and mind-wandering in relation to each other through the framework of enculturated predictive processing, which is informed by research in literary studies. Earlier accounts think of reading predominantly in terms of the construction of situation models that organize textual information. By contrast, enculturated predictive processing foregrounds shifting stances readers can take in relation to the text. Characters featuring in literary texts might be mind-wandering themselves, or passages in literary style might make the construction of a clearly defined situational model impossible. Furthermore, we take into account that texts often elicit mind-wandering through the construction of task-relevant and attention-driven virtual scenarios in readers' minds. This more complex account of reading can enrich recent attempts to understand mind-wandering as a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon. The study of mind-wandering can benefit, we argue, from a closer attention to the process of reading and to the texts it deploys as stimuli. The emerging perspective from enculturated predictive processing and literary studies makes distinctions in reading that in turn enable research on mind-wandering to ask more precise questions about (1) different kinds of mind-wandering, (2) different modes of reading, and (3) how and where they interconnect across time.

The ebb and flow of attention: Between-subject variation in intrinsic connectivity and cognition associated with the dynamics of ongoing experience

Cognition is dynamic, allowing us the flexibility to shift focus from different aspects of the environment, or between internally- and externally-oriented trains of thought. Although we understand how individuals switch attention across different tasks, the neurocognitive processes that underpin the dynamics of less constrained elements of cognition are less well understood. To explore this issue, we developed a paradigm in which participants intermittently responded to external events across two conditions that systematically vary in their need for updating working memory based on information in the external environment. This paradigm distinguishes the influences on cognition that emerge because of demands placed by the task (sustained) from changes that result from the time elapsed since the last task response (transient). We used experience sampling to identify dynamic changes in ongoing cognition in this paradigm, and related between subject variation in these measures to variations in the intrinsic organisation of large-scale brain networks. We found systems important for attention were involved in the regulation of off-task thought. Coupling between the ventral attention network and regions of primary motor cortex was stronger for individuals who were able to regulate off-task thought in line with the demands of the task. This pattern of coupling was linked to greater task-related thought when environmental demands were high and elevated off-task thought when demands were low. In contrast, the coupling of the dorsal attention network with a region of lateral visual cortex was stronger for individuals for whom off-task thoughts transiently increased with the time since responding to the external world . This pattern is consistent with a role for this system in the time-limited top-down biasing of visual processing to increase behavioural efficiency. Unlike the attention networks, coupling between regions of the default mode network and dorsal occipital cortex was weaker for individuals for whom the level of detail decreased with the passage of time when the external task did not require continuous monitoring of external information. These data provide novel evidence for how neural systems vary across subjects and may underpin individual variation in the dynamics of thought, linking attention systems to the maintenance of task-relevant information, and the default mode network to supporting experiences with vivid detail.

Towards a new methodological approach: A novel paradigm for covertly inducing and sampling different forms of spontaneous cognition

A wide range of cognitions is generated involuntarily in the human mind daily. We developed a paradigm, which covertly induces and samples spontaneous cognitions in the visual and auditory modalities, focusing on 3 key characteristics: spontaneity, repetition, and emotional valence. Sixty participants watched two visual clips while listening to music and assessed their characteristics. Post-induction, participants closed their eyes for 5 min and then completed a questionnaire, which indirectly samples different forms of spontaneous cognition. Induction was effective in all categories. Results indicated that different forms of spontaneous musical cognitions are experienced as longer in duration and less negative in emotional valence compared to visual cognitions. The findings are discussed in relation to spontaneous cognition methodology and experiences in different modalities. Spontaneous cognitions are multifaceted and not unitary constructs as previously considered and studied, and as such the novel induction and sampling paradigm presents a promising line of research.

Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche

According to Thomas Metzinger, many human cognitive processes in the waking state are spontaneous and are deprived of the experience of epistemic agency. He considers mind wandering as a paradigm example of our recurring loss of epistemic agency. I will enrich this view by extending the scope of the concept of epistemic agency to include cases of depressive rumination and creative cognition, which are additional types of spontaneous cognition. Like mind wandering, they are characterized by unique phenomenal and functional properties that give rise to varying degrees of epistemic agency. The main claim of this paper will be that the experience of being an epistemic agent within a certain time frame is a relational phenomenon that emerges from the organism’s capacity to interact with its cognitive niche. To explore this relation, I develop a new framework that integrates phenomenological considerations on epistemic agency with a functional account of the reciprocal coupling of the embodied organism with its cognitive niche. This account rests upon dynamical accounts of strong embodied and embedded cognition and recent work on cognitive niche construction. Importantly, epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling are gradual phenomena ranging from weak to strong realizations. The emerging framework will be employed to analyze mind wandering, depressive rumination, and creative cognition as well as their commonalities and differences. Mind wandering and depressive rumination are cases of weak epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling. However, there are also important phenomenological, functional, and neuronal differences. In contrast, creative cognition is a case of strong epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling. By providing a phenomenological and functional analysis of these distinct types of spontaneous cognition, we can gain a better understanding of the importance of organism-niche interaction for the realization of epistemic agency.

Dissociating the Neural Basis of Conceptual Self-Awareness from Perceptual Awareness and Unaware Self-Processing

Conceptual self-awareness is a mental state in which the content of one's consciousness refers to a particular aspect of semantic knowledge about oneself. This form of consciousness plays a crucial role in shaping human behavior; however, little is known about its neural basis. Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a visual masked priming paradigm to dissociate the neural responses related to the awareness of semantic autobiographical information (one's own name, surname, etc.) from the awareness of information related to any visual stimulus (perceptual awareness), as well as from the unaware processing of self-relevant stimuli. To detect brain activity that is highly selective for self-relevant information, we used the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) adaptation approach, which goes beyond the spatial limitations of conventional fMRI. We found that self-awareness was associated with BOLD adaptation in the medial frontopolar-retrosplenial areas, whereas perceptual awareness and unaware self-processing were associated with BOLD adaptation in the lateral fronto-parietal areas and the inferior temporal cortex, respectively. Thus, using a direct manipulation of conscious awareness we demonstrate for the first time that the neural basis of conceptual self-awareness is neuroanatomically distinct from the network mediating perceptual awareness of the sensory environment or unaware processing of self-related stimuli.

The role of the default mode network in component processes underlying the wandering mind

Experiences such as mind-wandering illustrate that cognition is not always tethered to events in the here-and-now. Although converging evidence emphasises the default mode network (DMN) in mind-wandering, its precise contribution remains unclear. The DMN comprises cortical regions that are maximally distant from primary sensory and motor cortex, a topological location that may support the stimulus-independence of mind-wandering. The DMN is functionally heterogeneous, comprising regions engaged by memory, social cognition and planning; processes relevant to mind-wandering content. Our study examined the relationships between: (i) individual differences in resting-state DMN connectivity, (ii) performance on memory, social and planning tasks and (iii) variability in spontaneous thought, to investigate whether the DMN is critical to mind-wandering because it supports stimulus-independent cognition, memory retrieval, or both. Individual variation in task performance modulated the functional organization of the DMN: poor external engagement was linked to stronger coupling between medial and dorsal subsystems, while decoupling of the core from the cerebellum predicted reports of detailed memory retrieval. Both patterns predicted off-task future thoughts. Consistent with predictions from component process accounts of mind-wandering, our study suggests a 2-fold involvement of the DMN: (i) it supports experiences that are unrelated to the environment through strong coupling between its sub-systems; (ii) it allows memory representations to form the basis of conscious experience.

The wandering self: Tracking distracting self-generated thought in a cognitively demanding context

We investigated how self-referential processing (SRP) affected self-generated thought in a complex working memory task (CWM) to test the predictions of a computational cognitive model. This model described self-generated thought as resulting from competition between task- and distracting processes, and predicted that self-generated thought interferes with rehearsal, reducing memory performance. SRP was hypothesized to influence this goal competition process by encouraging distracting self-generated thinking. We used a spatial CWM task to examine if SRP instigated such thoughts, and employed eye-tracking to examine rehearsal interference in eye-movement and self-generated thinking in pupil size. The results showed that SRP was associated with lower performance and higher rates of self-generated thought. Self-generated thought was associated with less rehearsal and we observed a smaller pupil size for mind wandering. We conclude that SRP can instigate self-generated thought and that goal competition provides a likely explanation for how self-generated thoughts arises in a demanding task.