Veit W. Biological normativity: a new hope for naturalism?
MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND PHILOSOPHY 2021;
24:291-301. [PMID:
33398488 DOI:
10.1007/s11019-020-09993-w]
[Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 05/28/2023]
Abstract
Since Boorse [Philos Sci 44(4):542-573, 1977] published his paper "Health as a theoretical concept" one of the most lively debates within philosophy of medicine has been on the question of whether health and disease are in some sense 'objective' and 'value-free' or 'subjective' and 'value-laden'. Due to the apparent 'failure' of pure naturalist, constructivist, or normativist accounts, much in the recent literature has appealed to more conciliatory approaches or so-called 'hybrid accounts' of health and disease. A recent paper by Matthewson and Griffiths [J Med Philos 42(4):447-466, 2017], however, may bear the seeds for the revival of purely naturalist approach to health and disease. In this paper, I defend their idea of Biological Normativity against recent criticism by Schwartz [J Med Philos Forum Bioethics Philos Med 42(4):485-502, 2017] and hope to help it flower into a revival of naturalist approaches in the philosophy of medicine.
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