Organizational Malfunctions and the Notions of Health and Disease

Modularity in biological thought: Sketch of a unifying theoretical framework

This paper sketches a theoretical conception of modularity by generalizing Herbert Simon's idea of near-decomposability, showing that it could constitute a framework for the unification of the notion of modularity in the history and philosophy of biology. To put the framework to test, first a main problematic area is highlighted--the evolution of modularity--focusing on a historical and rational reconstruction of two ways of viewing it that appeared in the second half of the 20th century: one, due to Herbert Simon, rooted in a generic Darwinian mindset, the other, by Stuart Kauffman, inspired by a systemic-oriented approach tending to demote the importance of natural selection. It is shown that, under the light of the general view of modularity proposed here, these two apparently incompatible views can be interpreted as fundamentally homologous. The paper then engages with some current prominent views on modularity in biology, in order to show that the proposed framework is largely compatible with them, and able to accommodate cases of emergent modularity. The facilitating role of modularity in mechanistic and functional explanations is also highlighted. As a conclusion, it seems the proposed sketch of a theoretical view of modularity, open to further improvement, already shows potentiality as a unifying framework for the notion of modularity in philosophy and history of biology, and possibly, other disciplines.

The Dynamics of Disease: Toward a Processual Theory of Health

The following article presents preliminary reflections on a processual theory of health and disease. It does this by steering the discussion more toward an ontology of organisms rather than conceptual analysis of the semantic content of the terms "health" and "disease." In the first section, four meta-theoretical assumptions of the traditional debate are identified and alternative approaches to the problems are presented. Afterwards, the view that health and disease are constituted by a dynamic relation between demands imposed on an organism and individual presuppositions for adequate response is developed. In the last section, the paper takes stock of three possible objections to and clarifies some implications of this approach to the notions of health and disease.

Ecosystem health and malfunctions: an organisational perspective

A recent idea of "ecosystem health" was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to draws attention to the fact that ecosystems can become ill because of a reduction of properties such as primary productivity, functions and diversity of interactions among system components. Starting from the 1990s, this idea has been deeply criticized by authors who argued that, insofar as ecosystems show many differences with respect to organismic features, these two kinds of systems cannot share a typical organismic property such as health. In recent years, an organisational approach in philosophy of biology and ecology argued that both organisms and ecosystems may share a fundamental characteristic despite their differences, namely, organisational closure. Based on this kind of closure, scholars have also discussed health and malfunctional states in organisms. In this paper, we examine the possibility of expanding such an organisational approach to health and malfunctions to the ecological domain. Firstly, we will see that a malfunction is related to a lower effectiveness in the functional behaviour of some biotic components with respect to other systemic components. We will then show how some introduced species do not satisfactorily interact in an organisational closure with other ecosystem components, thus posing a threat to the self-maintenance of the ecosystem in which they are found. Accordingly, we will argue that an ecosystem can be said to be healthy when it is a vital environment organisationally grounded on its intrinsic capacity to ensure, under favourable conditions, appropriate functional behaviours for ecosystem components and ecosystem self-maintenance.

Is Aging a Disease? The Theoretical Definition of Aging in the Light of the Philosophy of Medicine

In the philosophical debate on aging, it is common to raise the question of the theoretical definition of aging in terms of its possible characterization as a disease. Understanding aging as a disease seems to imply its medicalization, which has important practical consequences. In this paper, we analyze the question of whether aging is a disease by appealing to the concept of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result of this analysis, we argue that a pragmatist approach to the conception of disease is the best alternative to highlight the relevance of the medicalization of aging. From this pragmatist perspective, it can be seen that the notion of aging is going through a conceptual change, and aging can today be understood as a not radically different process from any other condition that is usually considered a disease.

Georges Canguilhem on sex determination and the normativity of life

Our goal in this paper is to reassess the relationship between norms and life by drawing on the philosophy of Georges Canguilhem, particularly some of his unpublished lectures about teratology and sexual determination. First, we discuss the difficulties Canguilhem identified in the introduction of life and sexuality as objects of philosophical reflection. Second, we reassess Canguilhem's understanding of normativity as rooted in life and the axiological activity of the living. Third, we analyze how Canguilhem drew from past and contemporary teratology to conceive of the notions of anomaly and abnormality. Finally, we reconstruct Canguilhem's analysis of a case of hermaphroditism, highlighting how he presented it as evidence that sexual determination is the result of a normative choice. One of the key contributions of the paper to scholarly literature on Canguilhem is a better understanding of his notion of choice, which was considered not the conscious and intentional act of a subject but rather an axiological activity of the living. We conclude by positioning Canguilhem's concept of normativity and his belief that norms are produced by the living in relation to the naturalist/normativist divide in medicine.

Health and environment from adaptation to adaptivity: a situated relational account

The definitions and conceptualizations of health, and the management of healthcare have been challenged by the current global scenarios (e.g., new diseases, new geographical distribution of diseases, effects of climate change on health, etc.) and by the ongoing scholarship in humanities and science. In this paper we question the mainstream definition of health adopted by the WHO-'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity' (WHO in Preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the international health conference, The World Health Organization, 1948)-and its role in providing tools to understand what health is in the contemporary context. More specifically, we argue that this context requires to take into account the role of the environment both in medical theory and in the healthcare practice. To do so, we analyse WHO documents dated 1984 and 1986 which define health as 'coping with the environment'. We develop the idea of 'coping with the environment', by focusing on two cardinal concepts: adaptation in public health and adaptivity in philosophy of biology. We argue that the notions of adaptation and adaptivity can be of major benefit for the characterization of health, and have practical implications. We explore some of these implications by discussing two recent case studies of adaptivity in public health, which can be valuable to further develop adaptive strategies in the current pandemic scenario: community-centred care and microbiologically healthier buildings.

Biological normativity: a new hope for naturalism?

Since Boorse [Philos Sci 44(4):542-573, 1977] published his paper "Health as a theoretical concept" one of the most lively debates within philosophy of medicine has been on the question of whether health and disease are in some sense 'objective' and 'value-free' or 'subjective' and 'value-laden'. Due to the apparent 'failure' of pure naturalist, constructivist, or normativist accounts, much in the recent literature has appealed to more conciliatory approaches or so-called 'hybrid accounts' of health and disease. A recent paper by Matthewson and Griffiths [J Med Philos 42(4):447-466, 2017], however, may bear the seeds for the revival of purely naturalist approach to health and disease. In this paper, I defend their idea of Biological Normativity against recent criticism by Schwartz [J Med Philos Forum Bioethics Philos Med 42(4):485-502, 2017] and hope to help it flower into a revival of naturalist approaches in the philosophy of medicine.

A new model for chronic diseases

Chronic diseases are defined diseases whose symptoms last for at least six months and tend to worsen over time. In Europe, they cause at least 86% of deaths. In this speculative unifying model I set a new hypothesis for the etiology of the majority of chronic diseases. The main aim is to put order and observe our organism in a systemic way, connecting pathologies we now see as disconnected phenomena, with the conceptual frameworks of complex systems and network medicine. Chronic diseases could be caused by a first unsolved acute infection. In case the pathogen cannot be completely eliminated, it becomes a persistent infectious. After the acute episode, some mild symptoms will occur and probably disappear; the chronic disease will remain latent over time. It will manifest even after years or decades, in the presence of another acute infection, a particular stress, trauma, or another event. The presence of the persistent infectious elicits changes in the immune and systemic regulation, and these processes degenerate over time. They will assume their rules and patterns, being independent from the initial stimulus. The key to understand the dynamics and individuality of chronic diseases is the immune system and its networks. The immune mechanisms that can lead to the persistent response are mainly the switch from the Th1 to the Th2 immunity and the molecular mimicry. The first persistent infectious will also modify the susceptibility to other pathogens, facilitating new infections and new consequent persistent infectious. From the immune point of view, our organism is divided into three compartments: the outer one, which comprehend all the surfaces in contact with the environment, the intermediate one, which comprehend the internal organs and tissues, and the innermost one, comprehending the Central Nervous System and the adluminal compartment of the seminiferous tubule. The immune key-role is played respectively by the mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue, the endothelium, the blood-brain barrier and blood-testis barrier. The chronic diseases follow a progressive scheme, involving the three compartments from the outer to the innermost one. The primer microorganism at the origin of the majority of diseases could be streptococcus, or staphylococcus. Both cause acute in children, with a great variability of responses and symptoms, and both cause molecular mimicry. This model can be tested and proved in more ways, I propose here some of them. It could pave the way to a radical change in our comprehension and therapeutic approaches to chronic diseases.

An enactive account of placebo effects

Placebos are commonly defined as ineffective treatments. They are treatments that lack a known mechanism linking their properties to the properties of the condition on which treatment aims to intervene. Given this, the fact that placebos can have substantial therapeutic effects looks puzzling. The puzzle, we argue, arises from the relationship placebos present between culturally meaningful entities (such as treatments or therapies), our intentional relationship to the environment (such as implicit or explicit beliefs about a treatment's healing powers) and bodily effects (placebo responses). How can a mere attitude toward a treatment result in appropriate bodily changes? We argue that an 'enactive' conception of cognition accommodates and renders intelligible the phenomenon of placebo effects. Enactivism depicts an organism's adaptive bodily processes, its intentional directedness, and the meaningful properties of its environment as co-emergent aspects of a single dynamic system. In doing so it provides an account of the interrelations between mind, body and world that demystifies placebo effects.