Mechanistic ontology and contextualistic epistemology: A contradiction within behavior analysis

The Relevance of Metaphysics to Behavior Analysis

Behavior analysis takes a natural science approach to human and animal behavior. Some basic tenets are widely agreed in the field but it can be argued that some other assumptions are implicit in our approach and, if unexamined, may impair progress. Since the time of David Hume, there has been a strong Western philosophical tradition of naturalism and realism. Although behavior analysis has from the outset embraced pragmatism, features of naturalism are embedded in the metaphysics of science and thus have been imported into behavior analysis. Many versions of naturalism imply dualism, but this can be avoided without abandoning a naturalist-realist position either by adopting the historicist approach of Rorty, which suggests that apparently a priori truths are often merely conventions of a philosophical tradition, or by accepting Wittgenstein's view that there are hinge statements that are fundamental to our thinking but are not propositional beliefs and do not entail dualism. As an alternative, we can adopt the metaphysical assumptions of monism, possibly starting from William James's approach of neutral monism. Revising our metaphysical assumptions while retaining the pragmatism that is central to behavior analysis may enable us to engage more effectively with cognitive psychology, to develop stronger links with ecological psychology and other approaches that reject representationalism, and to move beyond the debate about the status of private events.

Behavioral Pragmatism: Making A Place for Reality and Truth

In "Behavioral Pragmatism: No Place for Reality and Truth," Barnes-Holmes (2000) proposed a behavior-analytic version of philosophical pragmatism he called behavioral pragmatism (BP), a perspective which challenges two bedrock tenets of Western culture: (1) metaphysical realism, the view that an external, physical reality exists which is mind-independent and (2) the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), a theory which maintains that true statements are those which correspond to mind-independent reality. Many (perhaps most) behavior analysts accept both of these tenets (though they typically name and describe these tenets using different terms). By contrast, in lieu of the first, BP offers, as a replacement tenet, nonrealism, in place of the second, the pragmatic truth criterion. The account of reality and truth of BP has gained increasing prominence within behavior analysis because of its inclusion within relational frame theory, a perspective with a growing number of adherents. In this paper, I first argue that the realism/pragmatism dispute needs to be resolved because it threatens the coherence of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Next, I present a detailed account of the differing conceptions of reality and truth as articulated within: (1) metaphysical realism, (2) behavioral pragmatism, and (3) Richard Rorty's version of pragmatism (Rortian pragmatism). Finally, using the insights of Rortian pragmatism (RP), I offer three proposals for modifying the core tenets of behavioral pragmatism. If adopted, these proposals would help narrow the realism/pragmatism divide, thereby reducing the threat to radical behaviorism's coherence.

Behavioral pragmatism: no place for reality and truth

The current article begins by reviewing L. J. Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies on a correspondence-based truth criterion. To evaluate her claim, the concept of the observation sentence, proposed by the pragmatist philosopher W. V. Quine, is examined. The observation sentence appears to remove the issue of correspondence from Quine's pragmatist philosophy. Nevertheless, the issue of correspondence reemerges, as the problem of homology, when Quine appeals to agreement between or among observation sentences as the basis for truth. Quine also argues, however, that the problem of homology (i.e., correspondence) should be ignored on pragmatic grounds. Because the problem is simply ignored, but not resolved, there appears to be some substance to Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies ultimately on correspondence as a truth criterion. Behavioral pragmatism is then introduced to circumvent both Hayes's claim and Quine's implicit appeal to correspondence. Behavioral pragmatism avoids correspondence by appealing to the personal goals (i.e., the behavior) of the scientist or philosopher as the basis for establishing truth. One consequence of this approach, however, is that science and philosophy are robbed of any final or absolute objectives and thus may not be a satisfactory solution to philosophers. On balance, behavioral pragmatism avoids any appeal to correspondence-based truth, and thus it cannot be criticized for generating the same philosophical problems that have come to be associated with this truth criterion.

Sources cited most frequently in the experimental analysis of human behavior

We conducted an analysis of the sources cited most frequently in primary empirical reports in the experimental analysis of human behavior (EAHB) published in four journals between 1990 and 1999. Citation patterns suggest that modern EAHB is topically focused and relatively independent of both animal operant research and human research conducted outside of behavior analysis.

Behavior analysis and social constructionism: some points of contact and departure

Social constructionists occasionally single out behavior analysis as the field of psychology that most closely resembles the natural sciences in its commitment to empiricism, and accuses it of suffering from many of the limitations to science identified by the postmodernist movement (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; Soyland, 1994). Indeed, behavior analysis is a natural science in many respects. However, it also shares with social constructionism important epistemological features such as a rejection of mentalism, a functional-analytic approach to language, the use of interpretive methodologies, and a reflexive stance on analysis. The current paper outlines briefly the key tenets of the behavior-analytic and social constructionist perspectives before examining a number of commonalties between these approaches. The paper aims to show that far from being a nemesis to social constructionism, behavior analysis may in fact be its close ally.

Relacionismo substancial: a ontologia do comportamento à luz do behaviorismo radical

Sob a influência do pragmatismo e contextualismo pepperiano, analistas do comportamento extraíram do behaviorismo radical qualquer posição ontológica. Como resultado, há a defesa de um relacionismo radical no qual a única propriedade relevante para a existência do comportamento é a própria relação que o define. O objetivo deste ensaio é avaliar a pertinência dessa posição. Três questões guiram esse trabalho: (1) Por que a substância não é importante para o behaviorismo radical?; (2) Por que a substância é importante para o behaviorismo radical?; e (3) Qual seria, de fato, o posicionamento ontológico mais condizente com o behaviorismo radical? Argumenta-se que o relacionismo radical não reflete com acurácia a ontologia behaviorista radical e sugere-se que o relacionismo substancial seja a posição mais coerente.

Values and the scientific culture of behavior analysis

As scientists and practitioners, behavior analysts must make frequent decisions that affect many lives. Scientific principles have been our guide as we work to promote effective action across a broad spectrum of cultural practices. Yet scientific principles alone may not be sufficient to guide our decision making in cases with potentially conflicting outcomes. In such cases, values function as guides to work through ethical conflicts. We will examine two ethical systems, radical behaviorism and functional contextualism, from which to consider the role of values in behavior analysis, and discuss potential concerns. Finally, we propose philosophical pragmatism, focusing on John Dewey's notions of community and dialogue, as a tradition that can help behavior analysts to integrate talk about values and scientific practices in ethical decision making.

Conseqüências do externalismo behaviorista radical

O artigo discute a proposta de Skinner para a ciência do comportamento, caracterizando-a como "externalista" (voltada para as relações do organismo com eventos que lhe são externos). Examina-se o discurso de Skinner sobre diferentes explicações para o comportamento, em obras de 1938, 1953 e 1990, a fim de indicar sua preocupação permanente com a definição das fronteiras entre análise do comportamento e (neuro)fisiologia. Apontam-se aspectos da elaboração skinneriana que a tornam insuficiente para sustentar uma declaração coerente sobre a autonomia de uma ciência do comportamento e procura-se ilustrar como essa dificuldade se reflete na literatura contemporânea da área.