Abstract
In his classic overview, Mayer-Gross indicated two clinical features of depersonalization to be taken as starting points for future investigation: excessive difficulty in describing it and its relatively rare appearance in organic disorders. Neither characteristic has so far been discussed sufficiently in psychopathology and neurobiology. In this article, we examine the language aspect of depersonalization by comparisons with aphasia, in which the two objects of study described by Mayer-Gross, speech and organic disorders, intertwine. Concerning amnestic aphasia, Gelb and Goldstein insist that an object cannot be grasped as a generally understood fact using a categorical attitude but only experienced subjectively in its this-ness with a concrete attitude. The particular experience of depersonalization is the reverse of that in amnestic aphasia, as the relation of the depersonalized patient to this-ness is disturbed but an ideal view of the generality remains.
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