A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

Innovation as a practice: Why automation will not kill innovation

As a result of contemporary culture's focus on continuous innovation and "change before you have to," innovation has been identified with economic gains rather than with creating added value for society. At the same time, given current trends related to the automation of business models, workers seem all but destined to be replaced by machines in the labor market. In this context, we attempt to explore whether robots and Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be able to innovate, and the extent to which said activity is exclusively inherent to human nature. Following the need for a more anthropological view of innovation, we make use of MacIntyrean categories to present innovation as a domain-relative practice with creativity and practical wisdom as its corresponding virtues. We explain why innovation can only be understood within a tradition as it implies participating in inquiry about the principle and end of practical life. We conclude that machines and "intelligent" devices do not have the capacity to innovate and they never will. They may replicate the human capacity for creativity, but they squarely lack the necessary conditions to be a locus of virtue or engage with a tradition.

Children-Robot Friendship, Moral Agency, and Aristotelian Virtue Development

Social robots are increasingly developed for the companionship of children. In this article we explore the moral implications of children-robot friendships using the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. We adopt a moderate position and argue that, although robots cannot be virtue friends, they can nonetheless enable children to exercise ethical and intellectual virtues. The Aristotelian requirements for true friendship apply only partly to children: unlike adults, children relate to friendship as an educational play of exploration, which is constitutive of the way they acquire and develop virtues. We highlight that there is a relevant difference between the way we evaluate adult-robot friendship compared to children-robot friendship, which is rooted in the difference in moral agency and moral responsibility that generate the asymmetries in the moral status ascribed to adults versus children. We look into the role played by imaginary companions (IC) and personified objects (PO) in children’s moral development and claim that robots, understood as Personified Robotic Objects (PROs), play a similar role with such fictional entities, enabling children to exercise affection, moral imagination and reasoning, thus contributing to their development as virtuous adults. Nonetheless, we argue that adequate use of robots for children’s moral development is conditioned by several requirements related to design, technology and moral responsibility.