Effort avoidance is not simply error avoidance

Noninvasive Brain Stimulation over the Frontopolar Cortex Promotes Willingness to Exert Cognitive Effort in a Foraging-Like Sequential Choice Task

Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives suggests causal involvement of the frontopolar cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC's role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within-subject design, 46 participants (36 female, 8 male, 1 "neither/other") received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., exhibited lower exit thresholds) when traveling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions, and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications.

Towards a common code for difficulty: Navigating a narrow gap is like memorizing an extra digit

What makes a task hard or easy? The question seems easy, but answering it has been hard. The only consensus has been that, all else being equal, easy tasks can be performed by more individuals than hard tasks, and easy tasks are usually preferred over hard tasks. Feghhi and Rosenbaum (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 45, 983-994, 2019) asked whether task difficulty might reflect a single amodal quantity. Based on their subjects' two-alternative forced-choice data from tasks involving choices of tasks with graded physical and mental challenges, the authors showed that the difficulty of passing through a narrow gap rather than a wide gap was psychologically equivalent to memorizing an extra .55 digits. In the present study, we extended this approach by adding new arguments for the hypothesis that task difficulty might reflect a single amodal quantity (inspired by considerations of physics, economics, and the common code hypothesis for the study of perception and action), and we tested narrower gaps than before to see whether we would find a larger equivalent memory-digit. Consistent with our prediction, we obtained a value of .95. We suggest that our multi-modal two-alternative forced-choice procedure can pave the way toward a better understanding of task difficulty.

What matters in making demand-based decisions: Time alone or difficulty too?

Which task is easier, doing arithmetic problems of specified form for some specified duration, or carrying a bucket of specified weight over some specified distance? If it is possible to choose between the “more cognitive” task and the “more physical” task, how are the difficulty levels of the tasks compared? We conducted two experiments in which participants chose the easier of two tasks, one that involved solving addition or multiplication problems (Experiment 1) or addition problems with different numbers of addends (Experiment 2) for varying amounts of time (in both experiments), and one that involved carrying a bucket of different weights over a fixed distance (in both experiments). We found that the probability of choosing to do the bucket task was higher when the bucket was empty than when it was weighted, and increased when the cognitive task was harder and its duration grew. We could account for the choice probabilities by mapping the independent variables onto one abstract variable, Φ. The functional identity of Φ remains to be determined. It could be interpreted as an inferred effort variable, subjective duration, or an abstract, amodal common code for difficulty.

Perceived effort for reaching is associated with self-reported fatigue

Perceived effort for goal-directed reaching may be impacted by the level of self-reported fatigue, however, the relationship between self-reported fatigue and perceived effort has not been examined. We examined how perceived effort changed under varied reach conditions and the relationship between fatigue, perceived effort and reach performance. Twenty-three young adults performed reach actions toward 9 different targets on a digitizing tablet. Perceived effort was measured using the Borg Rate of Perceived Exertion and Paas Mental Effort Rating Scale. Self-reported fatigue was quantified using the Fatigue Scales for Motor and Cognitive Functions. As reach conditions became more difficult, perceived effort increased significantly. Further, individuals who reported greater fatigue also reported greater perceived effort and showed greater endpoint error during reaching.

Does attention solve the "apples-and-oranges" problems of judging task difficulty and task order?

How do we compare the difficulty of different kinds of tasks, and how we do sequence tasks of different kinds when the basis for the ordering is the tasks' difficulty levels? The ability to do these things requires a common currency, but the identity of that currency, if it exists, is unknown. We hypothesized that people may believe that the time that attention is paid to tasks enables people to compare and sequence tasks of different kinds. To evaluate this hypothesis, we tested three groups of participants. One group estimated the proportion of time that performance of a task requires attention-what we called attention time proportions or ATPs. We obtained ATPs for tasks that were "more intellectual" (counting) and others that were "more physical" (locomotion). Two additional groups made 2-alternative-forced-choice decisions about the relative ease and preferred sequencing of all possible pairs of tasks for which ATPs were independently obtained. We found that ATPs predicted judgments of task difficulty and preferred task order.

Precrastination and individual differences in working memory capacity

When ordering tasks, people tend to first perform the task that can be started or completed sooner (precrastination) even if it requires more physical effort. Evidence from transport tasks suggests that precrastination can reduce cognitive effort and will likely not occur if it increases cognitive effort. However, some individuals precrastinate even when it increases cognitive effort. We examined whether individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) influence this suboptimal choice. Participants retrieved two cups of water along a corridor, in the order of their choosing. We measured the frequency of choosing the close cup first (precrastination) while varying water levels in each cup (attention demand) located at different distances. Results showed that the tendency to select the far cup first (avoid precrastination) increases when the close cup is full (high attention demand) vs. not full (low attention demand). Post-hoc results showed high (vs. low) WMC individuals more frequently bypass decisions with relatively higher costs of cognitive effort, avoiding precrastination when the attentional demand of carrying the close (vs. far) cup is relatively high (close-cup full and far-cup half full), but not when it is relatively low (far-cup full). However, there was no evidence that WMC could explain why some individuals always precrastinated, at costs of cognitive effort. Instead, individuals who always precrastinated reported automatic behavior, and those who avoided precrastinating reported decisions of efficiency. Learning, the relationship between precrastination and tendencies to enjoy/engage in thinking or procrastinate, and evidence that precrastination required more cognitive effort in our task, are discussed.