The Creativity of Natural Selection? Part I: Darwin, Darwinism, and the Mutationists

Environmental complexity is more important than mutation in driving the evolution of latent novel traits in E. coli

Recent experiments show that adaptive Darwinian evolution in one environment can lead to the emergence of multiple new traits that provide no immediate benefit in this environment. Such latent non-adaptive traits, however, can become adaptive in future environments. We do not know whether mutation or environment-driven selection is more important for the emergence of such traits. To find out, we evolve multiple wild-type and mutator E. coli populations under two mutation rates in simple (single antibiotic) environments and in complex (multi-antibiotic) environments. We then assay the viability of evolved populations in dozens of new environments and show that all populations become viable in multiple new environments different from those they had evolved in. The number of these new environments increases with environmental complexity but not with the mutation rate. Genome sequencing demonstrates the reason: Different environments affect pleiotropic mutations differently. Our experiments show that the selection pressure provided by an environment can be more important for the evolution of novel traits than the mutational supply experienced by a wild-type and a mutator strain of E. coli.

Novel traits without immediate fitness benefit evolve frequently but we don’t know whether mutation or environment-driven selection drives this evolution. Here, using experimental evolution of E. coli populations, the authors demonstrate the importance of selection in the evolution of latent novel traits.

The Synthesis and the Two Scenarios

On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Society for the Study of Evolution, I look back at the so-called "evolutionary synthesis," to which many of the Society's founders and prominent founding members were committed. An important plank in the synthesis platform had to do with the importance of selection relative to mutation. Of course, there is no evolutionary change without mutation, and no adaptive evolutionary change without selection. So how could selection be more important than mutation, or vice-versa? At issue was whether adaptive evolutionary change is initiated and directed by selection, or by the appearance of new advantageous variation. Proponents of the synthesis took the position that Darwin himself had defended, namely that adaptive evolutionary change is initiated and directed by natural selection on standing variation, no new variation, no mutation, required. Natural selection is, in this sense, not just "creative," but is the creative agent of evolutionary change. In taking this extreme position, proponents of the synthesis were reacting to the equally extreme position of Mendelian-mutationists, who held that adaptive evolutionary change always commences with, and is directed by, the appearance of new advantageous mutations, and for whom mutation is the creative agent of evolutionary change. I conclude with some comments on "relative significance" issues and controversies, and respects in which the relative significance issues at the heart of the synthesis persist. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Evolvability: A Quantitative-Genetics Perspective

The concept of evolvability emerged in the early 1990s and soon became fashionable as a label for different streams of research in evolutionary biology. In evolutionary quantitative genetics, evolvability is defined as the ability of a population to respond to directional selection. This differs from other fields by treating evolvability as a property of populations rather than organisms or lineages and in being focused on quantification and short-term prediction rather than on macroevolution. While the term evolvability is new to quantitative genetics, many of the associated ideas and research questions have been with the field from its inception as biometry. Recent research on evolvability is more than a relabeling of old questions, however. New operational measures of evolvability have opened possibilities for understanding adaptation to rapid environmental change, assessing genetic constraints, and linking micro- and macroevolution.

Eclipsing the Eclipse?: A Neo-Darwinian Historiography Revisited

Julian Huxley's eclipse of Darwinism narrative has cast a long shadow over the historiography of evolutionary theory around the turn of the nineteenth century. It has done so by limiting who could be thought of as Darwinian. Peter Bowler used the eclipse to draw attention to previously understudied alternatives to Darwinism, but maintained the same flaw. In his research on the Non-Darwinian Revolution, he extended this problematic element even further back in time. This paper explores how late nineteenth-century neo-Darwinian conceptualizations of Darwinism were later utilized by several advocates and detractors of the Modern Synthesis. John Beatty has shown how this continuity hinges at least partly on the perceived importance of the creativity of natural selection. The paper provides a more thorough look at Darwin's two conflicting accounts of variation, ascribed to struggles in explaining quantitative versus qualitative characters. In doing so, it suggests that other forms of Darwinism persisted, in both the non-Darwinian revolution and eclipse periods, because of tension between contingency and creativity in Darwin's own work. This tension is traced out from Darwin's conceptions of variation into the work of Alfred Russel Wallace, Hugo de Vries, and Thomas Henry Huxley. Based on this, the eclipse narrative is criticized for not considering the meaning of Darwinism in different geographical locations. Britain and the United States showed few signs of an eclipse. Rather, the rise of German debates about Haeckel's vision of Darwinism have been mistaken for a universal decline in support.

Heritable changeability: Epimutation and the legacy of negative definition in epigenetic concepts

Epigenetic concepts are fundamentally shaped by a legacy of negative definition, often understood by what they are not. Yet the function and implication of negative definition for scientific discourse has thus far received scant attention. Using the term epimutation as exemplar, we analyze the paradoxical like-but-unlike structure of a term that must simultaneously connect with but depart from genetic concepts. We assess the historical forces structuring the use of epimutation and like terms such as paramutation. This analysis highlights the positive characteristics defining epimutation: the regularity, oxymoronic temporality, and materiality of stable processes. Integrating historical work, ethnographic observation, and insights from philosophical practice-oriented conceptual analysis, we detail the distinctive epistemic goals the epimutation concept fulfils in medicine, plant biology and toxicology. Epimutation and allied epigenetic terms have succeeded by being mutation-like and recognizable, yet have failed to consolidate for exactly the same reason: they are tied simultaneously by likeness and opposition to nouns that describe things that are assumed to persist unchanged over space and time. Moreover, negative definition casts the genetic-epigenetic relationship as an either/or binary, overshadowing continuities and connections. This analysis is intended to assist practitioners and observers of genetics and epigenetics in recognizing and moving beyond the conceptual legacies of negative definition.

Population and organismal perspectives on trait origins

Some biologists and philosophers of biology claim selection can "create" novel traits. Others claim creativity is to be found only in development. I here endorse the former claim, but take seriously and address the concerns that underlie the latter. My discussion of these issues is informed by recent work that champions the "return of the organism" to mainstream evolutionary biology, and I suggest how population and organismal perspectives on trait origins can be reconciled.

The Creativity of Natural Selection? Part II: The Synthesis and Since

This is the second of a two-part essay on the history of debates concerning the creativity of natural selection, from Darwin through the evolutionary synthesis and up to the present. In the first part, I focussed on the mid-late nineteenth century to the early twentieth, with special emphasis on early Darwinism and its critics, the self-styled "mutationists." The second part focuses on the evolutionary synthesis and some of its critics, especially the "neutralists" and "neo-mutationists." Like Stephen Gould, I consider the creativity of natural selection to be a key component of what has traditionally counted as "Darwinism." I argue that the creativity of natural selection is best understood in terms of (1) selection initiating evolutionary change, and (2) selection directing evolutionary change, for example by creating the variation that it subsequently acts upon. I consider the respects in which both of these claims sound non-Darwinian, even though they have long been understood by supporters and critics alike to be virtually constitutive of Darwinism.

Why we don't want another "Synthesis"

High-level debates in evolutionary biology often treat the Modern Synthesis as a framework of population genetics, or as an intellectual lineage with a changing distribution of beliefs. Unfortunately, these flexible notions, used to negotiate decades of innovations, are now thoroughly detached from their historical roots in the original Modern Synthesis (OMS), a falsifiable scientific theory. The OMS held that evolution can be adequately understood as a process of smooth adaptive change by shifting the frequencies of small-effect alleles at many loci simultaneously, without the direct involvement of new mutations. This shifting gene frequencies theory was designed to support a Darwinian view in which the course of evolution is governed by selection, and to exclude a mutation-driven view in which the timing and character of evolutionary change may reflect the timing and character of events of mutation. The OMS is not the foundation of current thinking, but a special case of a broader conception that includes (among other things) a mutation-driven view introduced by biochemists in the 1960s, and now widely invoked. This innovation is evident in mathematical models relating the rate of evolution directly to the rate of mutation, which emerged in 1969, and now represent a major branch of theory with many applications. In evo-devo, mutationist thinking is reflected by a concern for the "arrival of the fittest". Though evolutionary biology is not governed by any master theory, and incorporates views excluded from the OMS, the recognition of these changes has been hindered by woolly conceptions of theories, and by historical accounts, common in the evolutionary literature, that misrepresent the disputes that defined the OMS.

REVIEWERS

This article was reviewed by W. Ford Doolittle, Eugene Koonin and J. Peter Gogarten.

Simplification, Innateness, and the Absorption of Meaning from Context: How Novelty Arises from Gradual Network Evolution

How does new genetic information arise? Traditional thinking holds that mutation happens by accident and then spreads in the population by either natural selection or random genetic drift. There have been at least two fundamental conceptual problems with imagining an alternative. First, it seemed that the only alternative is a mutation that responds "smartly" to the immediate environment; but in complex multicellulars, it is hard to imagine how this could be implemented. Second, if there were mechanisms of mutation that "knew" what genetic changes would be favored in a given environment, this would have only begged the question of how they acquired that particular knowledge to begin with. This paper offers an alternative that avoids these problems. It holds that mutational mechanisms act on information that is in the genome, based on considerations of simplicity, parsimony, elegance, etc. (which are different than fitness considerations). This simplification process, under the performance pressure exerted by selection, not only leads to the improvement of adaptations but also creates elements that have the capacity to serve in new contexts they were not originally selected for. Novelty, then, arises at the system level from emergent interactions between such elements. Thus, mechanistically driven mutation neither requires Lamarckian transmission nor closes the door on novelty, because the changes it implements interact with one another globally in surprising and beneficial ways. Finally, I argue, for example, that genes used together are fused together; that simplification leads to complexity; and that evolution and learning are conceptually linked.