How many ways can you die? Multiple biological deaths as a consequence of the multiple concepts of an organism

Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis

Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..

An Update on Brain Death/Death by Neurologic Criteria since the World Brain Death Project

The World Brain Death Project (WBDP) is a 2020 international consensus statement that provides historical background and recommendations on brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) determination. It addresses 13 topics including: (1) worldwide variance in BD/DNC, (2) the science of BD/DNC, (3) the concept of BD/DNC, (4) minimum clinical criteria for BD/DNC determination, (5) beyond minimum clinical BD/DNC determination, (6) pediatric and neonatal BD/DNC determination, (7) BD/DNC determination in patients on ECMO, (8) BD/DNC determination after treatment with targeted temperature management, (9) BD/DNC documentation, (10) qualification for and education on BD/DNC determination, (11) somatic support after BD/DNC for organ donation and other special circumstances, (12) religion and BD/DNC: managing requests to forego a BD/DNC evaluation or continue somatic support after BD/DNC, and (13) BD/DNC and the law. This review summarizes the WBDP content on each of these topics and highlights relevant work published from 2020 to 2023, including both the 192 citing publications and other publications on BD/DNC. Finally, it reviews questions for future research related to BD/DNC and emphasizes the need for national efforts to ensure the minimum standards for BD/DNC determination described in the WBDP are included in national BD/DNC guidelines and due consideration is given to the recommendations about social and legal aspects of BD/DNC determination.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

Death as the Cessation of an Organism and the Moral Status Alternative

The mainstream concept of death-the biological one-identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death-one similar to that of Robert Veatch-overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies death with the irreversible cessation of a patient's moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch's original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status.