Split-Brain: What We Know Now and Why This is Important for Understanding Consciousness

Dichotic listening and interhemispheric integration after callosotomy: A systematic review

The right-ear advantage (REA) for recalling dichotically presented auditory-verbal stimuli has been traditionally linked to the dominance of the left cerebral hemisphere for speech processing. Early studies on patients with callosotomy additionally found that the removal of the corpus callosum leads to a complete extinction of the left ear, and consequently the today widely used models to explain the REA assume a central role of callosal axons for recalling the left-ear stimulus in dichotic listening. However, later dichotic-listening studies on callosotomy patients challenge this interpretation, as many patients appear to be able to recall left-ear stimuli well above chance level, albeit with reduced accuracy. The aim of the present systematic review was to identify possible experimental and patient variables that explain the inconsistences found regarding the effect of split-brain surgery on dichotic listening. For this purpose, a systematic literature search was conducted (databases: Pubmed, Web of Knowledge, EBSChost, and Ovid) to identify all empirical studies on patients with surgical section of the corpus callosum (complete or partial) that used a verbal dichotic-listening paradigm. This search yielded ks = 32 publications reporting patient data either on case or group level, and the data was analysed by comparing the case-level incidence of left-ear suppression, left-ear extinction, and right-ear enhancement narratively or statistically considering possible moderator variables (i.a., extent of the callosal surgery, stimulus material, response format, selective attention). The main finding was an increased incidence of left-ear suppression (odds ratio = 7.47, CI95%: [1.21; 83.49], exact p = .02) and right-ear enhancement (odds ratio = 21.61, CI95%: [4.40; 154.11], p < .01) when rhyming as compared with non-rhyming stimuli were used. Also, an increase in left-ear reports was apparent when a response by the right hemisphere was allowed (i.e., response with the left hand). While the present review is limited by the overall small number of cases and a lack of an appropriate control sample in most of the original studies, the findings nevertheless suggest an adjustment of the classical dichotic-listening models incorporating right-hemispheric processing abilities as well as the perceptual competition of the left- and right-ear stimuli for attention.

Mapping Brain Synergy Dysfunction in Schizophrenia: Understanding Individual Differences and Underlying Molecular Mechanisms

To elucidate the brain-wide information interactions that vary and contribute to individual differences in schizophrenia (SCZ), an information-resolved method is employed to construct individual synergistic and redundant interaction matrices based on regional pairwise BOLD time-series from 538 SCZ and 540 normal controls (NC). This analysis reveals a stable pattern of regionally-specific synergy dysfunction in SCZ. Furthermore, a hierarchical Bayesian model is applied to deconstruct the patterns of whole-brain synergy dysfunction into three latent factors that explain symptom heterogeneity in SCZ. Factor 1 exhibits a significant positive correlation with Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) positive scores, while factor 3 demonstrates significant negative correlations with PANSS negative and general scores. By integrating the neuroimaging data with normative gene expression information, this study identifies that each of these three factors corresponded to a subset of the SCZ risk gene set. Finally, by combining data from NeuroSynth and open molecular imaging sources, along with a spatially heterogeneous mean-field model, this study delineates three SCZ synergy factors corresponding to distinct symptom profiles and implicating unique cognitive, neurodynamic, and neurobiological mechanisms.

Modelling developments in consciousness within a multidimensional framework

A recent advancement in consciousness science has been the introduction of a multidimensional framework of consciousness. This framework has been applied to global states of consciousness, including psychedelic states and disorders of consciousness, and the consciousness of non-human animals. The multidimensional framework enables a finer parsing of both various states of consciousness and forms of animal consciousness, paving the way for new scientific investigations into consciousness. In this paper, the multidimensional model is expanded by constructing temporal profiles. This expansion allows for the modelling of changes in consciousness across the life cycles of organisms and the progression over time of disorders of consciousness. The result of this expansion is 2-fold: (i) it enables new modes of comparison, both across stages of development and across species; (ii) it proposes that more attention be given to the various types of fluctuations that occur in patients who are suffering from disorders of consciousness.

Carving Nature at Its Joints: A Comparison of CEMI Field Theory with Integrated Information Theory and Global Workspace Theory

The quest to comprehend the nature of consciousness has spurred the development of many theories that seek to explain its underlying mechanisms and account for its neural correlates. In this paper, I compare my own conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory with integrated information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT) for their ability to 'carve nature at its joints' in the sense of predicting the entities, structures, states and dynamics that are conventionally recognized as being conscious or nonconscious. I go on to argue that, though the cemi field theory shares features of both integrated information theory and global workspace theory, it is more successful at carving nature at its conventionally accepted joints between conscious and nonconscious systems, and is thereby a more successful theory of consciousness.

Visual integration across fixation: automatic processes are split but conscious processes remain unified in the split-brain

The classic view holds that when "split-brain" patients are presented with an object in the right visual field, they will correctly identify it verbally and with the right hand. However, when the object is presented in the left visual field, the patient verbally states that he saw nothing but nevertheless identifies it accurately with the left hand. This interaction suggests that perception, recognition and responding are separated in the two isolated hemispheres. However, there is now accumulating evidence that this interaction is not absolute; for instance, split-brain patients are able to detect and localise stimuli anywhere in the visual field verbally and with either hand. In this study we set out to explore this cross-hemifield interaction in more detail with the split-brain patient DDC and carried out two experiments. The aim of these experiments is to unveil the unity of deliberate and automatic processing in the context of visual integration across hemispheres. Experiment 1 suggests that automatic processing is split in this context. In contrast, when the patient is forced to adopt a conscious, deliberate, approach, processing seemed to be unified across visual fields (and thus across hemispheres). First, we looked at the confidence that DDC has in his responses. The experiment involved a simultaneous "same" versus "different" matching task with two shapes presented either within one hemifield or across fixation. The results showed that we replicated the observation that split brain patients cannot match across fixation, but more interesting, that DDC was very confident in the across-fixation condition while performing at chance-level. On the basis of this result, we hypothesised a two-route explanation. In healthy subjects, the visual information from the two hemifields is integrated in an automatic, unconscious fashion via the intact splenium, and this route has been severed in DDC. However, we know from previous experiments that some transfer of information remains possible. We proposed that this second route (perhaps less visual; more symbolic) may become apparent when he is forced to use a deliberate, consciously controlled approach. In an experiment where he is informed, by a second stimulus presented in one hemifield, what to do with the first stimulus that was presented in the same or the opposite hemifield, we showed that there was indeed interhemispheric transfer of information. We suggest that this two-route model may help in clarifying some of the controversial issues in split-brain research.

An evidence-based critical review of the mind-brain identity theory

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.

Don't forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness

The boundary problem is related to the binding problem, part of a family of puzzles and phenomenal experiences that theories of consciousness (ToC) must either explain or eliminate. By comparison with the phenomenal binding problem, the boundary problem has received very little scholarly attention since first framed in detail by Rosengard in 1998, despite discussion by Chalmers in his widely cited 2016 work on the combination problem. However, any ToC that addresses the binding problem must also address the boundary problem. The binding problem asks how a unified first person perspective (1PP) can bind experiences across multiple physically distinct activities, whether billions of individual neurons firing or some other underlying phenomenon. To a first approximation, the boundary problem asks why we experience hard boundaries around those unified 1PPs and why the boundaries operate at their apparent spatiotemporal scale. We review recent discussion of the boundary problem, identifying several promising avenues but none that yet address all aspects of the problem. We set out five specific boundary problems to aid precision in future efforts. We also examine electromagnetic (EM) field theories in detail, given their previous success with the binding problem, and introduce a feature with the necessary characteristics to address the boundary problem at a conceptual level. Topological segmentation can, in principle, create exactly the hard boundaries desired, enclosing holistic, frame-invariant units capable of effecting downward causality. The conclusion outlines a programme for testing this concept, describing how it might also differentiate between competing EM ToCs.

Influence of Multimodal Emotional Stimulations on Brain Activity: An Electroencephalographic Study

This study aimed to reveal the influence of emotional valence and sensory modality on neural activity in response to multimodal emotional stimuli using scalp EEG. In this study, 20 healthy participants completed the emotional multimodal stimulation experiment for three stimulus modalities (audio, visual, and audio-visual), all of which are from the same video source with two emotional components (pleasure or unpleasure), and EEG data were collected using six experimental conditions and one resting state. We analyzed power spectral density (PSD) and event-related potential (ERP) components in response to multimodal emotional stimuli, for spectral and temporal analysis. PSD results showed that the single modality (audio only/visual only) emotional stimulation PSD differed from multi-modality (audio-visual) in a wide brain and band range due to the changes in modality and not from the changes in emotional degree. The most pronounced N200-to-P300 potential shifts occurred in monomodal rather than multimodal emotional stimulations. This study suggests that emotional saliency and sensory processing efficiency perform a significant role in shaping neural activity during multimodal emotional stimulation, with the sensory modality being more influential in PSD. These findings contribute to our understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in multimodal emotional stimulation.

Electrophysiological Evidence for Interhemispheric Connectivity and Communication in Young Human Infants

Little is known empirically about connectivity and communication between the two hemispheres of the brain in the first year of life, and what theoretical opinion exists appears to be at variance with the meager extant anatomical evidence. To shed initial light on the question of interhemispheric connectivity and communication, this study investigated brain correlates of interhemispheric transmission of information in young human infants. We analyzed EEG data from 12 4-month-olds undergoing a face-related oddball ERP protocol. The activity in the contralateral hemisphere differed between odd-same and odd-difference trials, with the odd-different response being weaker than the response during odd-same trials. The infants' contralateral hemisphere "recognized" the odd familiar stimulus and "discriminated" the odd-different one. These findings demonstrate connectivity and communication between the two hemispheres of the brain in the first year of life and lead to a better understanding of the functional integrity of the developing human infant brain.

Functional Alteration in the Brain Due to Tumour Invasion in Paediatric Patients: A Systematic Review

Working memory, language and speech abilities, motor skills, and visual abilities are often impaired in children with brain tumours. This is because tumours can invade the brain's functional areas and cause alterations to the neuronal networks. However, it is unclear what the mechanism of tumour invasion is and how various treatments can cause cognitive impairment. Therefore, this study aims to systematically evaluate the effects of tumour invasion on the cognitive, language, motor, and visual abilities of paediatric patients, as well as discuss the alterations and modifications in neuronal networks and anatomy. The electronic database, PubMed, was used to find relevant studies. The studies were systematically reviewed based on the type and location of brain tumours, cognitive assessment, and pre- and post-operative deficits experienced by patients. Sixteen studies were selected based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria following the guidelines from PRISMA. Most studies agree that tumour invasion in the brain causes cognitive dysfunction and alteration in patients. The effects of a tumour on cognition, language, motor, and visual abilities depend on the type of tumour and its location in the brain. The alteration to the neuronal networks is also dependent on the type and location of the tumour. However, the default mode network (DMN) is the most affected network, regardless of the tumour type and location.Furthermore, our findings suggest that different treatment types can also contribute to patients' cognitive function to improve or deteriorate. Deficits that persisted or were acquired after surgery could result from surgical manipulation or the progression of the tumour's growth. Meanwhile, recovery from the deficits indicated that the brain has the ability to recover and reorganise itself.

The hard problem of consciousness—A perspective from holistic philosophy

Based on a material view and reductionism, science has achieved great success. These cognitive paradigms treat the external as an objective existence and ignore internal consciousness. However, this cognitive paradigm, which we take for granted, has also led to some dilemmas related to consciousness in biology and physics. Together, these phenomena reveal the interaction and inseparable side of matter and consciousness (or body and mind) rather than the absolute opposition. However, a material view that describes matter and consciousness in opposition cannot explain the underlying principle, which causes a gap in interpretation. For example, consciousness is believed to be the key to influencing wave function collapse (reality), but there is a lack of a scientific model to study how this happens. In this study, we reveal that the theory of scientific cognition exhibits a paradigm shift in terms of perception. This tendency implies that reconciling the relationship between matter and consciousness requires an abstract theoretical model that is not based on physical forms. We propose that the holistic cognitive paradigm offers a potential solution to reconcile the dilemmas and can be scientifically proven. In contrast to the material view, the holistic cognitive paradigm is based on the objective contradictory nature of perception rather than the external physical characteristics. This cognitive paradigm relies on perception and experience (not observation) and summarizes all existence into two abstract contradictory perceptual states (Yin-Yang). Matter and consciousness can be seen as two different states of perception, unified in perception rather than in opposition. This abstract perspective offers a distinction from the material view, which is also the key to falsification, and the occurrence of an event is inseparable from the irrational state of the observer’s conscious perception. Alternatively, from the material view, the event is random and has nothing to do with perception. We hope that this study can provide some new enlightenment for the scientific coordination of the opposing relationship between matter and consciousness.

Reversible Splenial Lesion Syndrome as a Challenging Casuistry

The corpus callosum plays a vital role in brain function. In particular, in the trunk of the corpus callosum, in the course of various diseases, there may be temporary, reversible changes (reversible splenial lesion syndrome (RESLES)), as well as partially reversible and irreversible changes. This article discusses the differentiation of RESLES and other conditions with changes in the corpus callosum lobe, as well as the accompanying clinical symptoms. Moreover, a case report of a patient in whom the above changes appeared in the nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) image is presented. A 20-year-old patient with the diagnosis of Ehlers-Danlos syndrome type VI was admitted to the psychiatric ward in an emergency because of psychomotor agitation, refusal to take food and fluids, delusional statements with a message, grandeur, and auditory hallucinations. In the performed magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, the corpus callosum non-characteristic in T2-weighted images revealed a hyperintensive area, which was significantly hyperintensive in diffusion magnetic resonance (DWI) sequences and in apparent diffusion coefficient (ADC) sequences with reduced signal intensity and no signs of bleeding. The hypothesis of subacute ischemic stroke of the corpus callosum was presented. In the control MRI of the brain, changes in the corpus callosum completely regressed, thus excluding an ischemic etiology and favoring the diagnosis of RESLES. During hospitalization, the patient experienced significant fluctuations in mental status, with the dominant symptoms typical of the paranoid syndrome in the form of disturbances in the course and structure of thinking and perception, and a clear and stable improvement was obtained after the administration of long-acting intramuscular olanzapine. Taking into account the clinical and radiological picture, the age of the episode, the rapidity of the disease development, the persistence of its clinical symptoms after the withdrawal of radiological changes in the brain NMR image, as well as the significant improvement in the clinical condition after the introduction of antipsychotic drugs, the final diagnosis was made of schizophrenia.

Bidirectionally connected cores in a mouse connectome: towards extracting the brain subnetworks essential for consciousness

Where in the brain consciousness resides remains unclear. It has been suggested that the subnetworks supporting consciousness should be bidirectionally (recurrently) connected because both feed-forward and feedback processing are necessary for conscious experience. Accordingly, evaluating which subnetworks are bidirectionally connected and the strength of these connections would likely aid the identification of regions essential to consciousness. Here, we propose a method for hierarchically decomposing a network into cores with different strengths of bidirectional connection, as a means of revealing the structure of the complex brain network. We applied the method to a whole-brain mouse connectome. We found that cores with strong bidirectional connections consisted of regions presumably essential to consciousness (e.g. the isocortical and thalamic regions, and claustrum) and did not include regions presumably irrelevant to consciousness (e.g. cerebellum). Contrarily, we could not find such correspondence between cores and consciousness when we applied other simple methods that ignored bidirectionality. These findings suggest that our method provides a novel insight into the relation between bidirectional brain network structures and consciousness.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

A Dynamic Mechanistic Model of Perceptual Binding

The brain’s ability to create a unified conscious representation of an object by integrating information from multiple perception pathways is called perceptual binding. Binding is crucial for normal cognitive function. Some perceptual binding errors and disorders have been linked to certain neurological conditions, brain lesions, and conditions that give rise to illusory conjunctions. However, the mechanism of perceptual binding remains elusive. Here, I present a computational model of binding using two sets of coupled oscillatory processes that are assumed to occur in response to two different percepts. I use the model to study the dynamic behavior of coupled processes to characterize how these processes can modulate each other and reach a temporal synchrony. I identify different oscillatory dynamic regimes that depend on coupling mechanisms and parameter values. The model can also discriminate different combinations of initial inputs that are set by initial states of coupled processes. Decoding brain signals that are formed through perceptual binding is a challenging task, but my modeling results demonstrate how crosstalk between two systems of processes can possibly modulate their outputs. Therefore, my mechanistic model can help one gain a better understanding of how crosstalk between perception pathways can affect the dynamic behavior of the systems that involve perceptual binding.

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), and Morita therapy (MT); comparison of three established psychotherapies and possible common neural mechanisms of psychotherapies

Psychotherapies aim to relieve patients from mental distress by guiding them toward healthier attitudes and behaviors. Psychotherapies can differ substantially in concepts and approaches. In this review article, we compare the methods and science of three established psychotherapies: Morita Therapy (MT), which is a 100-year-old method established in Japan; Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), which-worldwide-has become the major psychotherapy; and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), which is a relatively young psychotherapy that shares some characteristics with MT. The neuroscience of psychotherapy as a system is only beginning to be understood, but relatively solid scientific information is available about some of its important aspects such as learning, physical health, and social interactions. On average, psychotherapies work best if combined with pharmacotherapies. This synergy may rely on the drugs helping to "kickstart" the use of neural pathways (behaviors) to which a patient otherwise has poor access. Improved behavior, guided by psychotherapy, can then consolidate these pathways by their continued usage throughout a patient's life.

The Case for Octopus Consciousness: Unity

Birch et al. suggest that consciousness in any animal group must involve four aspects—perceptual richness, evaluative richness (affectivity), integration at one time (unity), and integration across time (temporality). This review will evaluate integration at one time in cephalopods, an area that offers many challenges. First, like most animals with a bilateral nervous system, cephalopods have laterality of brain function, and this challenges unity of function. Second, unlike most mammals, cephalopods have a heavy allocation of both neural and behavioural control to the periphery, especially in the case of octopuses. Third, like all animals, cephalopods gather information through several senses and there can be both unity within and competition between such information, challenging unity. Information gained across all these areas needs to be evaluated both in terms of the methodology used to gather information and the results of the investigation.

The functional characterization of callosal connections

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The functional characterization of callosal connections is informed by anatomical data.

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Callosal connections play a conditional driving role depending on the brain state and behavioral demands.

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Callosal connections play a modulatory function, in addition to a driving role.

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The corpus callosum participates in learning and interhemispheric transfer of sensorimotor habits.

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The corpus callosum contributes to language processing and cognitive functions.

The brain operates through the synaptic interaction of distant neurons within flexible, often heterogeneous, distributed systems. Histological studies have detailed the connections between distant neurons, but their functional characterization deserves further exploration. Studies performed on the corpus callosum in animals and humans are unique in that they capitalize on results obtained from several neuroscience disciplines. Such data inspire a new interpretation of the function of callosal connections and delineate a novel road map, thus paving the way toward a general theory of cortico-cortical connectivity. Here we suggest that callosal axons can drive their post-synaptic targets preferentially when coupled to other inputs endowing the cortical network with a high degree of conditionality. This might depend on several factors, such as their pattern of convergence-divergence, the excitatory and inhibitory operation mode, the range of conduction velocities, the variety of homotopic and heterotopic projections and, finally, the state-dependency of their firing. We propose that, in addition to direct stimulation of post-synaptic targets, callosal axons often play a conditional driving or modulatory role, which depends on task contingencies, as documented by several recent studies.

A Novel Perspective for Examining and Comparing Real and Virtual Test Tasks Performed by the Dominant and Non-Dominant Hand in Healthy Adults

This study presents a novel perspective for the study of functional lateralization in a virtual reality environment. In the model study of handedness, the recognition of the dominant and non-dominant hand in real and virtual conditions was assessed using selected tests, such as a real light exposure test of Piórkowski’s apparatus and classical clinical tests, as well as virtual test tasks, in healthy adults. Statistically significant differences between the dominant and non-dominant hand were observed for tests carried out both in classical conditions and the virtual environment. The results and findings of other studies suggest that the virtual reality approach is a very promising and sensitive tool in the research on functional asymmetries in healthy and disease for motor skills and cognition processes.

Exploring Signatures of Neurodegeneration in Early-Onset Older-Age Bipolar Disorder and Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia

Introduction: Older-age bipolar disorder (OABD) may involve neurocognitive decline and behavioral disturbances that could share features with the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), making the differential diagnosis difficult in cases of suspected dementia.

Objective: To compare the neuropsychological profile, brain morphometry, and structural connectivity patterns between patients diagnosed with bvFTD, patients classified as OABD with an early onset of the disease (EO-OABD), and healthy controls (HC).

Methods: bvFTD patients (n = 25, age: 66 ± 7, female: 64%, disease duration: 6 ± 4 years), EO-OABD patients (n = 17, age: 65 ± 9, female: 71%, disease duration: 38 ± 8 years), and HC (n = 28, age: 62 ± 7, female: 64%) were evaluated through neuropsychological tests concerning attention, memory, executive function, praxis, and language. Brain morphometry was analyzed through surface-based morphometry (SBM), while structural brain connectivity was assessed through diffusion tensor imaging (DTI).

Results: Both bvFTD and EO-OABD patients showed lower performance in neuropsychological tests of attention, verbal fluency, working memory, verbal memory, and praxis than HC. Comparisons between EO-OABD and bvFTD showed differences limited to cognitive flexibility delayed recall and intrusion errors in the memory test. SBM analysis demonstrated that several frontal, temporal, and parietal regions were altered in both bvFTD and EO-OABD compared to HC. In contrast, comparisons between bvFTD and EO-OABD evidenced differences exclusively in the right temporal pole and the left entorhinal cortex. DTI analysis showed alterations in association and projection fibers in both EO-OABD and bvFTD patients compared to HC. Commissural fibers were found to be particularly affected in EO-OABD. The middle cerebellar peduncle and the pontine crossing tract were exclusively altered in bvFTD. There were no significant differences in DTI analysis between EO-OABD and bvFTD.

Discussion: EO-OABD and bvFTD may share an overlap in cognitive, brain morphometry, and structural connectivity profiles that could reflect common underlying mechanisms, even though the etiology of each disease can be different and multifactorial.

Consciousness after split-brain surgery: The recent challenge to the classical picture

In a recent series of experiments, Pinto and colleagues found that the split-brain patient D.D.C. was able to respond accurately to stimuli in either visual field, whether using his right hand, his left hand, or verbally. Pinto and colleagues argue that this demonstrates that a split-brain patient remains a unitary agent and thus continues to possess a unified consciousness. This paper provides a critical evaluation of that claim. First, we argue that two conceptions of the unity of consciousness need to be distinguished: an agency-based conception and an experience-based conception. Second, we argue that it is an open question whether the data presented by Pinto and colleagues is best understood in terms of the unity of agency. Whether that interpretation is correct depends not only on the mechanisms that produce split-brain behaviour, but also on what is involved in being a single agent. Third, we argue that even if the behavioral data indicated that D.D.C has a unified consciousness in the agency-based sense of the term, it is difficult to reconcile them with the claim that his consciousness is fully unified in the experience-based sense.

Independent and unified consciousness co-existence in commissurotomy cases

Independent hemispheric consciousness was observed following complete commissurotomy under controlled laboratory conditions that restricted stimulus input and response output to a single hemisphere. Hemispheric specialization was investigated in this way. Consciousness of the self was tested directly as well and found to be represented in each of the hemispheres. Unified consciousness was evidenced in unaltered personality, character, humor, and past knowledge (autobiographical and knowledge of the world). Intact cortico-subcortical projections to intact subcortical regions are offered as explanation for why both unified and independent are possible in the same brain.

Handedness Development: A Model for Investigating the Development of Hemispheric Specialization and Interhemispheric Coordination

The author presents his perspective on the character of science, development, and handedness and relates these to his investigations of the early development of handedness. After presenting some ideas on what hemispheric specialization of function might mean for neural processing and how handedness should be assessed, the neuroscience of control of the arms/hands and interhemispheric communication and coordination are examined for how developmental processes can affect these mechanisms. The author’s work on the development of early handedness is reviewed and placed within a context of cascading events in which different forms of handedness emerge from earlier forms but not in a deterministic manner. This approach supports a continuous rather than categorical distribution of handedness and accounts for the predominance of right-handedness while maintaining a minority of left-handedness. Finally, the relation of the development of handedness to the development of several language and cognitive skills is examined.

A novel virtual reality approach for functional lateralization in healthy adults

Functional lateralization relates to a natural asymmetry in the dominance right or left body side, and is a fundamental principle of the brain. The hemispheres of the brain control the contralateral body side, and show subtle, yet striking, anatomical asymmetries and functional lateralization. Innovative technologies, including Virtual Reality (VR), are entering the areas of experimental research, modeling and simulation related to the study of lateralization, with new perspectives of different applications in modern medical practice. Researchers/clinicians note that there are fewer VR studies with healthy participants, and which are important in evaluating/interpreting clinical outcomes, and testing the usefulness, limitations, and sensitivity of VR. The presented influence of the domination of upper/lower limbs on the performance of VR exercises was studied in healthy right-handed adults. Virtual testing sessions were performed independently with both/ dominant/ non-dominant hands, and the similar VR sessions were conduced on a Wii Balance Board (WBB) with the choice of body side, at different levels of the difficulty. The obtained results are consistent with other studies which show that cognitive-motor training in VR with the WBB platform is a very sensitive and promising tool for recognizing/assessing functional asymmetries of the right-left body side not only in disturbed lateralization, but also in the test training of healthy subjects.

The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity

Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousness ex hypothesi, IIT is led towards the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view.

Dr. Strangelove demystified: Disconnection of hand and language dominance explains alien-hand syndrome after corpus callosotomy

BACKGROUND

Alien hand syndrome (AHS) is a disabling condition in which one hand behaves in a way that the person finds "alien". This feeling of alienation is related to the occurrence of movements of the respective hand performed without or against conscious intention. Most information on AHS stems from single case observations in patients with frontal, callosal, or parietal brain damage.

METHODS

Retrospective analysis of distinctive clinical features of three out of 18 epilepsy patients who developed AHS with antagonistic movements of the left hand after corpus callosotomy (CC) (one anterior, two complete) for the control of epileptic seizures, particularly epileptic drop attacks (EDA).

RESULTS

Remarkably, these three patients, two men and one woman, displayed atypical language dominance with a bilateral, left more than right hemisphere language representation in intracarotidal amobarbital testing before surgery. The overall additional distinctive feature of the target patients was genuine left-handedness, with writing retrained to right-handedness in two patients. After surgery the left hands became alien. The problem was permanent, despite strategies for compensation.

CONCLUSION

From this observation we suggest that under the conditions of dissociation of language and motor dominance, loss of both intentional control of contralateral action and physiological inhibition of antagonistic movements lead to post-callosotomy alien-hand-like motor phenomena. The dissociation pattern posing this risk seems rare but needs to be considered when evaluating candidates for callosotomy.

Higher intelligence may be a risk factor for postoperative transient disturbance of consciousness after corpus callosotomy

INTRODUCTION

Corpus callosotomy (CC) is an established surgical option for palliative treatment of medically intractable epilepsy, especially for seizures with drop attacks. We postulated that specific risk factors for post-CC transient disturbance of consciousness (pCTDC) are associated with CC. The purpose of this study was to review patients with intractable epilepsy who underwent CC and to statistically analyze risk factors for pCTDC.

METHODS

Inclusion criteria for patients who underwent CC between January 2009 and November 2019 were: (1) ≥2 years old and (2) followed up for more than 8 months. The state of consciousness before and after CC was evaluated with the Glasgow coma scale. We statistically assessed predictors for pCTDC as the primary outcome.

RESULTS

Fifty-six patients (19 females, 37 males) were enrolled, and the age range was 2-57 years old. Thirty-seven (66.1%) patients developed pCTDC. The mean period from the beginning of the state of pCTDC to recovery to their baseline conscious level was 4.9 days (range: 2-25 days). All three (100%) normal intelligence level patients, 13 (81%) of 16 patients with a moderately impaired level of intelligence, and 21 (57%) of 37 patients with a severely impaired level of intelligence exhibited pCTDC. Univariate (p = 0.044) and multivariate (p = 0.006) logistic regression analyses for predictors of pCTDC showed that intellectual function was statistically significant.

CONCLUSION

Two-thirds of patients developed pCTDC. One risk factor for pCTDC may be higher intellectual function.

Unified Visual Working Memory without the Anterior Corpus Callosum

One of the most fundamental, and most studied, human cognitive functions is working memory. Yet, it is currently unknown how working memory is unified. In other words, why does a healthy human brain have one integrated capacity of working memory, rather than one capacity per visual hemifield, for instance. Thus, healthy subjects can memorize roughly as many items, regardless of whether all items are presented in one hemifield, rather than throughout two visual hemifields. In this current research, we investigated two patients in whom either most, or the entire, corpus callosum has been cut to alleviate otherwise untreatable epilepsy. Crucially, in both patients the anterior parts connecting the frontal and most of the parietal cortices, are entirely removed. This is essential, since it is often posited that working memory resides in these areas of the cortex. We found that despite the lack of direct connections between the frontal cortices in these patients, working memory capacity is similar regardless of whether stimuli are all presented in one visual hemifield or across two visual hemifields. This indicates that in the absence of the anterior parts of the corpus callosum working memory remains unified. Moreover, it is important to note that memory performance was not similar across visual fields. In fact, capacity was higher when items appeared in the left visual hemifield than when they appeared in the right visual hemifield. Visual information in the left hemifield is processed by the right hemisphere and vice versa. Therefore, this indicates that visual working memory is not symmetric, with the right hemisphere having a superior visual working memory. Nonetheless, a (subcortical) bottleneck apparently causes visual working memory to be integrated, such that capacity does not increase when items are presented in two, rather than one, visual hemifield.

Dimensions of Animal Consciousness

How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals 'more conscious' than others? This article presents a multidimensional framework for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness, evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and self-consciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are reviewed and future experiments are suggested. By assessing a given species against each dimension, we can construct a consciousness profile for that species. On this framework, there is no single scale along which species can be ranked as more or less conscious. Rather, each species has its own distinctive consciousness profile.