A Characterization of World Union Patterns at the National and Regional Level

Ancestral marriage cultures and first partnership choices of the children of immigrants

Using Norwegian register data and data from the World Marriage Database, we investigate how marriage behaviour in countries of origin is associated with the first partnership choices of the children of immigrants (i.e. the second generation and childhood migrants). We consider the timing and type of first partnership, distinguishing between marriage and cohabitation and between endogamous, exogamous, and majority-background partner choices. Results from discrete-time multilevel models confirm that less traditional partnership behaviour in origin countries, characterized by a later singulate mean age at marriage and a higher share unmarried at ages 25-29, is associated with less traditional behaviour in Norway, such as cohabitation and choosing a majority-background partner. We also examine heterogeneity by sex and migrant generation as well as the importance of the local partner market. Together, our results underscore the significance of origin-country norms and behaviours in shaping the partnership formation of young adults with migrant backgrounds.

A decomposition study on the factors influencing China's total fertility rate changes between 1990 and 2020

Low fertility is not conducive to healthy population development. The total fertility rate (TFR) is influenced by the education expansion (measured by the proportion of non-student women, NSP), marriage delay (measured by the proportion of married women, MP), and marital fertility rate (MFR). This study decomposes the TFR change into the changes in NSP, MP, and MFR using China's census and 1% population sample survey data. During 1990-2020, the changes in NSP, MP, and MFR contributed - 22%, - 90%, and 12%, respectively, to the changes in TFR. The continuous decline in NSP reduced the TFR, and the intensity continued to increase over time. As the primary negative driving force, the rapid decline in MP also consistently reduced the TFR. The marital fertility rate had a downward effect on the TFR before 2000 and an upward effect after 2000. The effects of NSP, MP, and MFR on the TFR varied with the birth order, age and region (among cities, towns, and villages). In summary, China's TFR has considerably changed in combination with changes in NSP, MP, and MFR. Without effective measures, China's TFR may further decline into the lowest-low fertility trap.

Measuring age differences among different-sex couples: Across religions and 130 countries, men are older than their female partners

Cross-national studies of age patterns among couples have tended to compare the ages at which men and women first marry, but few have analysed age differences between current spouses or cohabiting partners (i.e. partner age gaps). We address this gap in the literature by using recent census and survey data to analyse age differences between current partners in 130 countries. Worldwide, men are an average of 4.2 years older than their wives or cohabiting partners. However, age gaps vary by region, ranging from 8.6 years in sub-Saharan Africa to 2.2 years in North America. The religious group with the largest age gap is Muslims (6.6 years), while the smallest age gap is seen among Jews (2.2 years). Differences between Muslims and non-Muslims remain even after controlling for country-level gender inequality and per-capita GDP.Supplementary material is available for this article at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2022.2094452.

Marital duration in China: Trends and gender differences, 1982-2015

Objectives

With the postponement in age at marriage, increase in life expectancy, and acceptance of divorce in China, the marital duration in each state has changed gradually. This study seeks to depict the trends and gender differences of marital duration in China from 1982 to 2015.

Design

We calculated and depicted the trends of and gender differences in marital duration, including single, marriage, divorce, widowhood duration and the proportion of each duration to the remaining life expectancy at 15.

Results

The single duration of Chinese men and women was slightly reduced and then extended, with that of men longer than women, showing a narrowing trend in gender difference. The marriage duration of Chinese men and women is lengthening, with that of women longer than men, demonstrating a widening gap in gender difference. However, the proportion of marriage duration in life expectancy at age 15 increased and then declined, with that of men higher than women. The divorce duration of Chinese men and women slightly reduced and then lengthened, but men tend to stay divorced for longer periods than women, and the gender difference is narrowing. The widowhood duration of Chinese men and women is shortening, with women having longer widowhood than men, and the gender difference has been shrinking.

Conclusions

With the socio-economic and demographic transition, the marital duration in each state has changed gradually, and will have an important impact on fertility level and pension burden.

A Good Age to Marry? An Intergenerational Model of the Influence of Timing Attitudes on Entrance into Marriage

Do timing attitudes-subjective evaluations of particular ages as good ages to marry-influence entrance into marriage? To address this question, we formulated an intergenerational model of how parents' and children's timing attitudes influence children's marriage behavior. We theorized that both parents' and children's timing attitudes influence expectations of when children will marry. In turn, both parents' and children's marital expectations would influence children's actual entrance into marriage. We tested the model using intergenerational panel data from Nepal collected in 2008-2014. Timing attitudes of young people and their parents did influence expectations, as well as entrance into marriage. Young people's own attitudes were more influential than their parents' attitudes in determining children's expectations, but not behavior. Further, while the influence of parents was relatively even, mothers appear slightly more influential than fathers.

Early Family Life Course Standardization in Sweden: The Role of Compositional Change

The diversity of early family life courses is thought to have increased, although empirical evidence is mixed. Less standardized family formation is attributed to compositional changes in educational attainment, labour market participation, and childhood living conditions. I investigate whether and why family trajectories have become more or less standardized across birth cohorts in Sweden. I combine sequence metrics with Oaxaca–Blinder decompositions to assess the compositional shifts that drive changes in family formation standardization. Family trajectories of individuals born in 1952, 1962, and 1972 from age 18 to 35 are reconstructed using Swedish register data. My results demonstrate that early family formation has become more standardized across birth cohorts. Further, compositional differences between birth cohorts partially account for this standardization, especially for women. For example, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with family formation standardization. This substantiates arguments that family formation may re-standardize following the second demographic transition.

Kinlessness Around the World

OBJECTIVES

The first and second demographic transitions have led to profound changes in family networks. However, the timing and extent of these transitions vary widely across contexts. We examine how common it is for contemporary older adults to lack living kin and whether such individuals are uniformly disadvantaged around the world.

METHODS

Using surveys from 34 countries that together contain 69.6% of the world's population over age 50 and come from all regions of the world, we describe the prevalence and correlates of lacking immediate kin. We examine macro-level demographic indicators associated with the prevalence of kinlessness as well as micro-level associations between kinlessness and sociodemographic and health indicators.

RESULTS

There is great variation in levels of kinlessness, from over 10% with neither a spouse nor a biological child in Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland to levels below 2% in China and the Republic of Korea. There are strong macro-level relationships between kinlessness and lagged or contemporaneous fertility, mortality, and nuptiality measures and more marginal relationships with other demographic forces. Micro-level associations between kinlessness and respondent attributes are varied. The kinless are more likely to live alone than those with kin in all countries. In most countries, they have equivalent or worse self-rated health and lower education, although there are notable exceptions. There is substantial variation in the gender composition of the kinless population.

DISCUSSION

As demographic changes affecting kinlessness continue, we expect the scale of the kinless population to grow around the world.

Declining realisation of reproductive intentions with age

STUDY QUESTION

What is the likelihood of having a child within 4 years for men and women with strong short-term reproductive intentions, and how is it affected by age?

SUMMARY ANSWER

For women, the likelihood of realising reproductive intentions decreased steeply from age 35: the effect of age was weak and not significant for men.

WHAT IS KNOWN ALREADY

Men and women are postponing childbearing until later ages. For women, this trend is associated with a higher risk that childbearing plans will not be realised due to increased levels of infertility and pregnancy complications.

STUDY DESIGN, SIZE, DURATION

This study analyses two waves of the nationally representative Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The analytical sample interviewed in 2011 included 447 men aged 18–45 and 528 women aged 18–41. These respondents expressed a strong intention to have a child in the next 3 years. We followed them up in 2015 to track whether their reproductive intention was achieved or revised.

PARTICIPANTS/MATERIALS, SETTINGS, METHODS

Multinomial logistic regression is used to account for the three possible outcomes: (i) having a child, (ii) not having a child but still intending to have one in the future and (iii) not having a child and no longer intending to have one. We analyse how age, parity, partnership status, education, perceived ability to conceive, self-rated health, BMI and smoking status are related to realising or changing reproductive intentions.

MAIN RESULTS AND THE ROLE OF CHANCE

Almost two-thirds of men and women realised their strong short-term fertility plans within 4 years. There was a steep age-related decline in realising reproductive intentions for women in their mid- and late-30s, whereas men maintained a relatively high probability of having the child they intended until age 45. Women aged 38–41 who planned to have a child were the most likely to change their plan within 4 years. The probability of realising reproductive intention was highest for married and highly educated men and women and for those with one child.

LIMITATIONS, REASONS FOR CAUTION

Our study cannot separate biological, social and cultural reasons for not realising reproductive intentions. Men and women adjust their intentions in response to their actual circumstances, but also in line with their perceived ability to have a child or under the influence of broader social norms on reproductive age.

WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

Our results give a new perspective on the ability of men and women to realise their reproductive plans in the context of childbearing postponement. They confirm the inequality in the individual consequences of delayed reproduction between men and women. They inform medical practitioners and counsellors about the complex biological, social and normative barriers to reproduction among women at higher childbearing ages.

STUDY FUNDING/COMPETING INTEREST(S)

This research was partly supported by a Research School of Social Sciences Visiting Fellowship at the Australian National University and an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP150104248). Éva Beaujouan’s work was partly funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project ‘Later Fertility in Europe’ (Grant agreement no. P31171-G29). This paper uses unit record data from the HILDA Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to either DSS or the Melbourne Institute. The authors have no conflicts of interest.

A Cohort Comparison of Predictors of Young Adult Union Formation and Dissolution in the US

The theory of the second demographic transition argues that as educated Americans began valuing self-actualization and individual autonomy, delays in union formation spread through the US. The accelerated adulthood theory suggests that socioeconomic disadvantage distinguishes young adulthood such that those with fewer resources have shorter, more informal (i.e. cohabitation) unions, and those with more resources delay but achieve marriage and have greater union stability. We use two large, nationally representative samples of young adults collected about twenty years apart, the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1979 and 1997 cohorts to examine cohort differences in union formation and dissolution and test interaction effects in demographic and socioeconomic correlates. We found that the NLSY97 cohort 1) entered into unions earlier than the NLSY79 cohort, 2) entered direct marriage (marriage without premarital cohabitation) later than the NLSY79 cohort, and 3) entered cohabiting unions earlier than the NLSY79 cohort. A greater proportion of young adults in the NLSY97 cohort dissolved their first union between ages 16 and 30. We found that socioeconomically disadvantaged young adults had earlier unions by some indicators (e.g. lower maternal education) and later unions by other indicators (e.g. unemployment) in both cohorts. We also found that in both cohorts, socioeconomic disadvantage undermined union stability. We also found evidence for interaction effects; some indicators of socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g. income, employment, and maternal education) had exacerbated effects on union formation and stability in the NLSY97 as compared to the NLSY79 cohorts perhaps because inequality grew over the twenty years between cohorts.

Early Women, Late Men: Timing Attitudes and Gender Differences in Marriage

Around the world, women marry earlier than men, but it is not well understood why this gender gap exists. Using panel data collected in Nepal, the authors investigate whether attitudes about marital timing held by unmarried youth and their parents account for women marrying earlier than men. They also examine whether the influence of timing attitudes differs by gender. On average, unmarried youth and their parents viewed 20 to 25 as acceptable ages for women to marry, while ages 23 to 30 were appropriate for men. In turn, women entering the acceptable marriage age range earlier than men accounted for a third of the gender gap in marital timing. The influence of youth and parents' timing attitudes did differ by gender, but only at the extreme. When they were much too young for marriage, both genders were less likely to marry, but this dampening effect was substantially larger for women.

THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY: A Review and Appraisal

References to the second demographic transition (SDT) concept/theoretical framework have increased dramatically in the last two decades. The SDT predicts unilinear change toward very low fertility and a diversity of union and family types. The primary driver of these changes is a powerful, inevitable and irreversible shift in attitudes and norms in the direction of greater individual freedom and self-actualization. First, we describe the origin of this framework and its evolution over time. Second, we review the empirical fit of the framework to major changes in demographic and family behavior in the U.S., the West, and beyond. As has been the case for other unilinear, developmental theories of demographic/family change, the SDT failed to predict many contemporary patterns of change/difference. Finally, we review previous critiques and identify fundamental weaknesses of this perspective, and provide brief comparisons to selected alternative approaches.

The Decline of Arranged Marriage? Marital Change and Continuity in India

This article evaluates whether arranged marriage declined in India from 1970 to 2012. Specifically, the authors examine trends in spouse choice, the length of time spouses knew each other prior to marriage, intercaste marriage, and consanguineous marriage at the national level, as well as by region, urban residence, and religion/caste. During this period, women were increasingly active in choosing their own husbands, spouses meeting on their wedding day decreased, intercaste marriage rose, and consanguineous marriage fell. However, many of these changes were modest in size and substantial majorities of recent marriages still show the hallmarks of arranged marriage. Further, instead of displacing parents, young women increasingly worked with parents to choose husbands collectively. Rather than unilateral movement towards Western marriage practices, as suggested by theories of family change and found in other Asian contexts, these trends point to a hybridization of customary Western and Indian practices.

Developmental Idealism: The Cultural Foundations of World Development Programs

This paper extends theory and research concerning cultural models of development beyond family and demographic matters to a broad range of additional factors, including government, education, human rights, daily social conventions, and religion. Developmental idealism is a cultural model-a set of beliefs and values-that identifies the appropriate goals of development and the ends for achieving these goals. It includes beliefs about positive cause and effect relationships among such factors as economic growth, educational achievement, health, and political governance, as well as strong values regarding many attributes, including economic growth, education, small families, gender equality, and democratic governance. This cultural model has spread from its origins among the elites of northwest Europe to elites and ordinary people throughout the world. Developmental idealism has become so entrenched in local, national, and global social institutions that it has now achieved a taken-for-granted status among many national elites, academics, development practitioners, and ordinary people around the world. We argue that developmental idealism culture has been a fundamental force behind many cultural clashes within and between societies, and continues to be an important cause of much global social change. We suggest that developmental idealism should be included as a causal factor in theories of human behavior and social change.