Cohabitation and Marital Expectations among Single Millennials in the U.S

Cohabiting couple's economic organization and marriage patterns across social classes

Objective

Empirically examine whether different economic theories of marriage formation predict the transition from cohabitation to marriage differently across social classes.

Background

Less-educated individuals marry their cohabiting partners at lower rates than their college-educated peers, but the reasons for this are unknown. Few studies have examined the intersection of social class and couple-level economic resources to understand if the potentially gendered economic determinants of marriage vary according to a couple's social location.

Method

Couple-month data come from the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation, including 1,879 cohabiting couples, 478 of whom transition to marriage. Logistic regression is used to test whether the marriage bar, gender specialization, gendered institutions, or gender revolution framework best predicts the likelihood of marrying.

Results

Joint indicators of the marriage bar and the gendered economic organization of couples both predict marriage, but the specific gendered organization varies by the couple's level of education. Among couples where neither partner has a college degree, male-breadwinning couples are most likely to marry; dual-earning couples are most likely to marry among more-educated couples.

Conclusion

Although college-educated couples seem to have shifted to a more egalitarian model of marriage, as predicted by the gender revolution framework, the marriages of the less-educated are still characterized by traditional arrangements, in line with the idea that marriage is a gendered institution. By showing that different theories predict marriage depending on the couple's social position, these findings provide groundwork to explore why the less educated are increasingly less likely to marry their cohabiting partners.

Marriage and Union Formation in the United States: Recent Trends Across Racial Groups and Economic Backgrounds

Family formation in the United States has changed dramatically: marriage has become less common, nonmarital cohabitation has become more common, and racial and economic inequalities in these experiences have increased. We provide insights into recent U.S. trends by presenting cohort estimates for people born between 1970 and 1997, who began forming unions between 1985 and 2015. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, we find that typical ages at marriage and union formation increased faster across these recent cohorts than across cohorts born between 1940 and 1969. As fewer people married at young ages, more cohabited, but the substitution was incomplete. We project steep declines in the probability of ever marrying, declines that are larger among Black people than White people. We provide novel information on the intergenerational nature of family inequalities by measuring parental income, wealth, education, and occupational prestige. Marriage declines are particularly steep among people from low-income backgrounds. Black people are overrepresented in this low-income group because of discrimination and opportunity denial. However, marriage declines are larger among Black people than White people across parental incomes. Further, most racial differences in marriage occur among people from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. Family inequalities increasingly reflect both economic inequalities and broader racial inequalities generated by racist structures; in turn, family inequalities may prolong these other inequalities across generations.

"I have no idea:" Uncertainty in high school seniors' marital expectations

Despite changes in marriage's role in young adulthood, youth in the United States report similar or higher expectations to marry than those from decades before, and very few report explicit expectations to not marry. Marital expectations may be one way to understand if the U.S. is indeed experiencing a second demographic transition, and uncertainty in those answers may provide additional information beyond simply yes and no. Using public-use data from 1976 to 2017 from the 12^th Grade Monitoring the Future annual cross-sectional surveys, I found that young men and women were more likely to report uncertainty than explicitly expect not to marry, and that boys were generally more uncertain than girls. Slight changes in past decades suggest that boys are becoming more certain regarding marriage, however, and gender differences have diminished over time. Additionally, between 2008 and 2017, I found that boys with the greatest educational prospects were the least likely to report uncertainty about marriage. Uncertainty is common in adolescent marital expectations and should be considered as a possibly informative answer to questions about hypothetical marriages. Results suggest that marriage continues to hold strong meaning in adolescents' ideals.

Young Adulthood Relationships in an Era of Uncertainty: A Case for Cohabitation

The young adulthood years are demographically dense. Dr. Ronald Rindfuss made this claim when he was Population Association of America (PAA) president in 1991 (Rindfuss 1991), and this conclusion holds today. I offer both an update of his work by including Millennials and a new view on young adulthood by focusing on an increasingly common experience: cohabitation. I believe we need to move away from our marriage-centric lens of young adulthood and embrace the complexity that cohabitation offers. The cohabitation boom is continuing with no evidence of a slowdown. Young adults are experiencing complex relationship biographies, and social science research is struggling to keep pace. Increasingly, there is a decoupling of cohabitation and marriage, suggesting new ways of framing our understanding of relationships in young adulthood. As a field, we can do better to ensure that our theories, methods, and data collections better reflect the new relationship reality faced by young adults.