Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion

What are delusions? Examining the typology problem

Delusions are a heterogenous transdiagnostic phenomenon with a higher prevalence in schizophrenia. One of the most fundamental debates surrounding the philosophical understanding of delusions concerns the question about the type of mental state in which reports that we label as delusional are grounded, namely, the typology problem. The formulation of potential answers for this problem seems to have important repercussions for experimental research in clinical psychiatry and the development of psychotherapeutic tools for the treatment of delusions in clinical psychology. Problematically, such alternatives are scattered in the literature, making it difficult to follow the current development and state of the target discussion. This paper offers an updated critical examination of the alternatives to the typology problem currently available in the literature. After clarifying the two main philosophical views underlying the dominant formulation of the debate (interpretivism and functionalism), we follow the usual distinction between doxastic (the idea that delusions are a type of belief) and anti-doxastic views. We then introduce two new sub-distinctions; on the doxastic camp, we distinguish between revisionist and non-revisionist proposals; on the anti-doxastic camp, we distinguish between commonsensical and non-commonsensical anti-doxasticisms. After analyzing the main claims of each view, we conclude with some of the most fundamental challenges that remain open within the discussion. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Neuroscience > Cognition.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (2. Theoretical Revision-Hyperreflexivity)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum conditions. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. This is the second of two articles that aim to clarify the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by considering the currently most influential, phenomenological model of schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). The previous paper (article 1) presented a state-of-the-art overview of this model and critically assessed its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical heterogeneity and variability of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. This paper (article 2) proposes a theoretical revision by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline implications of our revised model (IDMrevised) for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

'Are these my thoughts?': A 20-year prospective study of thought insertion, thought withdrawal, thought broadcasting, and their relationship to auditory verbal hallucinations

The co-occurrence of delusions and other symptoms at the onset of psychosis is a challenge for theories about the aetiology of psychosis. This paper explores the relatedness of delusions about the experience of thinking (thought insertion, thought withdrawal, and thought broadcasting) and auditory verbal hallucinations by describing their trajectories over a 20-year period in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, affective and other psychosis, and unipolar depression nonpsychosis. The sample consisted of 407 participants who were recruited at index hospitalization and evaluated over six follow-ups over 20 years. The symptom structure associated with thought insertion included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusions of control, delusion of self-depreciation, depersonalization and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought withdrawal included somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought dissemination, delusions of control, sexual delusions, depersonalization, negative symptoms, depression, and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought broadcasting included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusion of self-depreciation, fantastic delusions, sexual delusions, and depersonalization. Auditory verbal hallucinations and delusions of self-depreciation were significantly associated with both thought insertion and thought broadcasting. Thought insertion and thought withdrawal were significantly associated with other hallucinations, delusions of control, and anxiety; thought withdrawal and thought broadcasting were significantly related to sexual delusions. We hypothesize that specific symptom constellations over time might be explained as the product of pseudo-coherent realities created to give meaning to the experience of the world and the self of individuals in psychosis based on both prior top-down and ongoing bottom-up elements.

The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia and the challenge from pseudohallucinations

In trying to make sense of the extensive phenomenological variation of first-personal reports on auditory verbal hallucinations, the concept of pseudohallucination is originally introduced to designate any hallucinatory-like phenomena not exhibiting some of the paradigmatic features of "genuine" hallucinations. After its introduction, Karl Jaspers locates the notion of pseudohallucinations into the auditory domain, appealing to a distinction between hallucinatory voices heard within the subjective inner space (pseudohallucination) and voices heard in the outer external space (real hallucinations) with differences in their sensory richness. Jaspers' characterization of the term has been the target of a number of phenomenological, conceptual and empirically-based criticisms. From this latter point of view, it has been claimed that the concept cannot capture distinct phenomena at the neurobiological level. Over the last years, the notion of pseudohallucination seems to be falling into disuse as no major diagnostic system seems to refer to it. In this paper, we propose that even if the concept of pseudohallucination is not helpful to differentiate distinct phenomena at the neurobiological level, the inner/outer distinction highlighted by Jaspers' characterization of the term still remains an open explanatory challenge for dominant theories about the neurocognitive origin of auditory verbal hallucinations. We call this, "the challenge from pseudohallucinations". After exploring this issue in detail, we propose some phenomenological, conceptual, and empirical paths for future research that might help to build up a more contextualized and dynamic view of auditory verbal hallucinatory phenomena.