Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions

Nudging enforcers: how norm perceptions and motives for lying shape sanctions

We conduct three studies, employing diverse methodologies (a behavioral experiment, a vignette experiment, and a norm elicitation experiment), to investigate when and how norm enforcement patterns can be modified using norm interventions in the context of dishonesty. Our preregistered, three-part data collection effort explores the extent to which norm violations are sanctioned, the impact of norm-nudges on punishment behavior, and the connection to norm perception. Using a representative sample of US participants in Study 1, we present robust evidence that norm enforcement is sensitive not only to the magnitude of the observed transgression (i.e. the size of the lie) but also to its consequences (whether the lie addresses or creates payoff inequalities). We also find that norm enforcers respond to norm-nudges conveying social information about actual lying behavior or its social disapproval. The results of a separate vignette experiment in Study 2 are consistent with the results in our behavioral experiment, thus hinting at the generalizability of our findings. To understand the interplay of norms, information about them, and punishment, we examine norm perceptions across different transgressions in Study 3. We find that norm perceptions are malleable and norm-nudges are most effective when preexisting norms are ambiguous. In sum, we show how norm enforcement can be nudged and which factors matter for doing so across various contexts and discuss their policy implications.

Why cyberloafing can be socially learned in the workplace: the role of employees' perceived certainty of formal and informal sanctions

Purpose

This study investigated why employees' cyberloafing behavior is affected by their coworkers' cyberloafing behavior. By integrating social learning theory and deterrence theory, the authors developed a model to explain the role of employees' perceived certainty of formal and informal sanctions in understanding the effect of coworkers' cyberloafing behavior on employees' cyberloafing behavior.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors conducted a survey that involved a two-stage data collection process (including 293 respondents) to test our developed model. Mplus 7.0 was used to analyze the data.

Findings

The results revealed that employees' cyberloafing was positively affected by their coworkers' cyberloafing both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect of coworkers' cyberloafing on employees' cyberloafing was mediated by the employees' perceived certainty of formal and informal sanctions on cyberloafing. Employees' perceived certainty of formal and informal sanctions were found to mediate the relationship both separately (each type of sanctions mediates the relationship individually) and in combination (the two types of sanctions form a serial mediation effect).

Originality/value

The study reveals an important mechanism – employees’ perceived certainty of formal and informal sanctions – that underlies the relationship between coworkers' cyberloafing and employees' cyberloafing, thus, contributing to the cyberloafing literature. It also demonstrates the importance of negative reinforcement (perceived sanctions) in the social learning process, which contributes to the literature on social learning theory because previous studies have primarily focused on the role of positive reinforcement. Lastly, the study reveals a positive relationship between employees' perceived certainty of formal sanctions and informal sanctions, which has important implications for deterrence theory.