Transboundary pollution control in asymmetric countries: do assistant investments help?

Improving the effectiveness of watershed environmental management-dynamic coordination through government pollution control and resident participation

To improve the effectiveness of envir onmental management of watersheds and improve the environmental management mechanism of cross-administrative watersheds, we develop a neoliberal framework for action using incentives, examine the cooperative strategies of local governments in watershed treatment and people-oriented environmental protection under central government subsidies, and analyze the cost effectiveness of multiple strategies in a dynamic perspective, and we have the following important findings: (1) Compared to vertical ecological compensation, the introduction of horizontal cost-sharing contracts is more effective in enhancing inter-local cooperative environmental governance. (2) When the marginal benefit of the downstream local government is greater than half of the upstream marginal benefit, the upstream local government's pollution control investment and the effect of pollution control are improved, and the Pareto improvement of the environmental governance benefit of the watershed is realized, i.e., the cost-sharing contract driven by the downstream can achieve a win-win situation for both environmental and government governance benefits. (3) When the marginal benefit of downstream environmental advocacy is between 0.5 and 1.5 times the marginal benefit of upstream government, the cost-sharing contract is more effective in improving downstream benefits. Conversely, when the marginal benefit of downstream is greater than 1.5 times, the marginal benefit of upstream, the more effective the cost-sharing contract is in improving the marginal benefit of downstream. The results of the study provide useful insights for the government to develop reasonable pollution management cooperation mechanisms to improve environmental management performance and thus enhance the sustainable development of the watershed.

Decision analysis of international joint prevention and control of public health emergencies

COVID-19 has caused huge losses to countries around the world, and it will not end in a short time. The lack of motivation for international joint prevention and control is one of the important reasons for the global pandemic of COVID-19. How to improve the efforts and level of international joint prevention and control has become an urgent problem to be solved. Considering the long-term and dynamic nature of international joint prevention and control, the differential game method is used to compare and analyze the optimal decisions of countries in the three scenarios of spontaneous governance, external subsidies and internal cost sharing. The results show that the optimal prevention and control efforts of countries are negatively correlated with discount rates, prevention and control cost coefficients, decay rate and risk factors. It is positively correlated with the impact degree of social benefits, the impact degree of prevention and control efforts on the level of joint prevention and control, the distribution ratio of social benefits, and the impact degree of prevention and control level on social benefits. The prevention and control efforts, joint prevention and control level, social benefits and system benefits under spontaneous governance are the lowest and highest under the internal cost sharing. The internal cost sharing will only be carried out when social benefits distribution ratio obtained reach a certain threshold. This study provides decision-making support for the joint prevention and control of countries to defeat COVID-19 under the normalization of the epidemic.