Epistemic Virtue, Prospective Parents and Disability Abortion

Why Intellectual Disability is Not Mere Difference

A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall-any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes's Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad-by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (2) universally bad-it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad-it reduces a person's overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior-lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference.

The good, the bad, and the utilitarian: attitudes towards genetic testing and implications for disability

The present study focused on the link between the attitudes towards genetic testing and views on selective reproduction choices following genetic testing. First, we explored the potential demographical (age, gender, number of children, relationship status) and personal factors (perceived morality, religiosity, parenting intentions, instrumental harm) underlying these attitudes using a specific moral psychology approach, i.e., the two-dimension model of utilitarianism (i.e., instrumental harm and impartial beneficence). Next, we investigated participants' hypothetical reproduction choices depending on the future child's potential future condition, assessed through genetic screening. Our sample consisted of 1627 Romanian adults aged 17 to 70 (M = 24.46). Results indicated that one's perceived morality was the strongest predictor of positive attitudes towards genetic testing, and instrumental harm was the strongest predictor of negative attitudes. Also, more religious individuals with more children had more moral concerns related to genetic testing. Participants considered Down syndrome as the condition that parents (others than themselves) should most take into account when deciding to have children (35%), followed by progressive muscular dystrophy (29.1%) and major depressive disorder (29%). When expressing their choices for their future children (i.e., pregnancy termination decisions), participants' knowledge about potential deafness in their children generated the most frequent (37.7%) definitive termination decisions (i.e., "definitely yes" answers), followed by schizophrenia (35.8%), and major depressive disorder (35.2%). Finally, we discuss our results concerning their practical implications for disability and prenatal screening ethical controversies.

Culpable Ignorance, Professional Counselling, and Selective Abortion of Intellectual Disability

In this paper I argue that selective abortion for disability often involves inadequate counselling on the part of reproductive medicine professionals who advise prospective parents. I claim that prenatal disability clinicians often fail in intellectual duty-they are culpably ignorant about intellectual disability (or do not disclose known facts to parents). First, I explain why a standard motivation for selective abortion is flawed. Second, I summarize recent research on parent experience with prenatal professionals. Third, I outline the notions of epistemic excellence and deficiency. Fourth, I defend culpable ignorance as the best explanation of inadequate disability counselling. Fifth, I rebut alternative explanations. My focus is pregnancies diagnosed with mild or moderate intellectual disability.

The Complicated but Plain Relationship of Intellectual Disability and Well-being

The common belief is that disability is bad for the person who is disabled, that it has a negative effect on well-being. Some disability rights activists and philosophers, however, assert that disability has little or no impact on how well a person’s life goes, that it is neutral with respect to flourishing. In recent articles Stephen Campbell and Joseph Stramondo, while rejecting both views, claim that we cannot make any broad generalizations about the effect of disability on well-being. Whether they are right about physical and sensory disabilities, I do not know, but I argue that they are wrong about intellectual disabilities (ID). A broad generalization about intellectual disabilities is justified: it always has a negative impact on quality of life, even though there is no single negative impact. The disadvantages of ID are plain (all ID is bad) but complicated (its badness depends on multidimensional influences including biological condition, social environment and personal temperament).