Can they Feel? The Capacity for Pain and Pleasure in Patients with Cognitive Motor Dissociation

Covert consciousness

Covert consciousness is a state of residual awareness following severe brain injury or neurological disorder that evades routine bedside behavioral detection. Patients with covert consciousness have preserved awareness but are incapable of self-expression through ordinary means of behavior or communication. Growing recognition of the limitations of bedside neurobehavioral examination in reliably detecting consciousness, along with advances in neurotechnologies capable of detecting brain states or subtle signs indicative of consciousness not discernible by routine examination, carry promise to transform approaches to classifying, diagnosing, prognosticating and treating disorders of consciousness. Here we describe and critically evaluate the evolving clinical category of covert consciousness, including approaches to its diagnosis through neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and novel behavioral tools, its prognostic relevance, and open questions pertaining to optimal clinical management of patients with covert consciousness recovering from severe brain injury.

International survey on the implementation of the European and American guidelines on disorders of consciousness

Diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic procedures for patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness (pDoCs) vary significantly across countries and clinical settings, likely due to organizational factors (e.g., research vs. non-academic hospitals), expertise and availability of resources (e.g., financial and human). Two international guidelines, one from the European Academy of Neurology (EAN) and one from the American Academy of Neurology (AAN) in collaboration with the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine (ACRM) and the National Institute on Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research (NIDILRR), were developed to facilitate consistent practice among professionals working with this challenging patient population. While the recommendations of both guidelines agree in principle, it remains an open issue how to implement them into clinical practice in the care pathway for patients with pDoCs. We conducted an online survey to explore health professional clinical practices related to the management of patients with pDoCs, and compare said practices with selected recommendations from both the guidelines. The survey revealed that while some recommendations are being followed, others are not and/or may require more honing/specificity to enhance their clinical utility. Particular attention should be given to the implementation of a multimodal assessment of residual consciousness, to the detection and treatment of pain, and to the impact of restrictions imposed by COVID-19 pandemics on the involvement of patients' families/representatives.

What's the Harm in Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation?

In clinical ethics, there remains a great deal of uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of attempting cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for certain patients. Although the issue continues to receive ample attention and various frameworks have been proposed for navigating such cases, most discussions draw heavily on the notion of harm as a central consideration. In the following, I use emerging philosophical literature on the notion of harm to argue that the ambiguities and disagreement about harm create important and oft-overlooked challenges for the ethics of CPR. I begin by elucidating the standard account of harm, called the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA). I then show that three challenges to the CCA-preemptive harms, the harm of death, and non-experiential harms-are particularly salient when assessing potential harms for candidates of CPR and likely impact-related decision-making and communication. I extend this argument to explore how the ambiguities of harm might extend to other realms of clinical decision-making, such as the use and limitations of life-sustaining treatments. To address these challenges, I propose two strategies for identifying and minimizing the impact of such uncertainty: first, clinicians and ethicists ought to promote pluralistic conversations that account for different understandings of harm; second, they ought to invoke harm-independent considerations when discussing the ethics of CPR in order to reflect the nuances of such conversations. These strategies, coupled with a richer philosophical understanding of harm, promise to help clinicians and ethicists navigate the prevalent and difficult cases involving patient resuscitation and many other harm-based decisions in the clinical setting.

An evidence-based critical review of the mind-brain identity theory

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.

Prognostication, Ethical Issues, and Palliative Care in Disorders of Consciousness

Research advances in recent years have shown that some individuals with vegetative state or minimally conscious state can emerge to higher states of consciousness even years after injury. A minority of behaviorally unresponsive patients with vegetative state have also been shown to follow commands, or even communicate, using neuroimaging or electrophysiological techniques. These advances raise ethical questions that have important implications for clinical care. In this article, the authors argue that adopting a neuropalliative care approach can help clinicians provide ethical, compassionate care to these patients and their caregivers.

Well-Being After Severe Brain Injury: What Counts as Good Recovery?

Disorders of consciousness (DOC) continue to profoundly challenge both families and medical professionals. Once a brain-injured patient has been stabilized, questions turn to the prospect of recovery. However, what “recovery” means in the context of patients with prolonged DOC is not always clear. Failure to recognize potential differences of interpretation—and the assumptions about the relationship between health and well-being that underlie these differences—can inhibit communication between surrogate decisionmakers and a patient’s clinical team, and make it difficult to establish the goals of care. The authors examine the relationship between health and well-being as it pertains to patients with prolonged DOC. They argue that changes in awareness or other function should not be equated to changes in well-being, in the absence of a clear understanding of the constituents of well-being for that particular patient. The authors further maintain that a comprehensive conception of recovery for patients with prolonged DOC should incorporate aspects of both experienced well-being and evaluative well-being.

Pain Perception in Disorder of Consciousness: A Scoping Review on Current Knowledge, Clinical Applications, and Future Perspective

Pain perception in individuals with prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC) is still a matter of debate. Advanced neuroimaging studies suggest some cortical activations even in patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) compared to those with a minimally conscious state (MCS). Therefore, pain perception has to be considered even in individuals with UWS. However, advanced neuroimaging assessment can be challenging to conduct, and its findings are sometimes difficult to be interpreted. Conversely, multichannel electroencephalography (EEG) and laser-evoked potentials (LEPs) can be carried out quickly and are more adaptable to the clinical needs. In this scoping review, we dealt with the neurophysiological basis underpinning pain in PDOC, pointing out how pain perception assessment in these individuals might help in reducing the misdiagnosis rate. The available literature data suggest that patients with UWS show a more severe functional connectivity breakdown among the pain-related brain areas compared to individuals in MCS, pointing out that pain perception increases with the level of consciousness. However, there are noteworthy exceptions, because some UWS patients show pain-related cortical activations that partially overlap those observed in MCS individuals. This suggests that some patients with UWS may have residual brain functional connectivity supporting the somatosensory, affective, and cognitive aspects of pain processing (i.e., a conscious experience of the unpleasantness of pain), rather than only being able to show autonomic responses to potentially harmful stimuli. Therefore, the significance of the neurophysiological approach to pain perception in PDOC seems to be clear, and despite some methodological caveats (including intensity of stimulation, multimodal paradigms, and active vs. passive stimulation protocols), remain to be solved. To summarize, an accurate clinical and neurophysiological assessment should always be performed for a better understanding of pain perception neurophysiological underpinnings, a more precise differential diagnosis at the level of individual cases as well as group comparisons, and patient-tailored management.

What Justifies the Allocation of Health Care Resources to Patients with Disorders of Consciousness?

This paper critically engages ethical issues in the allocation of novel, and potentially costly, health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness. First, we review potential benefits of novel health care resources for patients and their families and outline preliminary considerations to address concerns about cost. We then address two problems regarding the allocation of health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness: (1) the problem of uncertain moral status; and (2) the problem of accurately measuring the welfare burdens these resources would relieve. We conclude by suggesting that opportunity-based frameworks might complement standard approaches for justifying resources allocation to patients with disorders of consciousness.

Memory During the Presumed Vegetative State: Implications for Patient Quality of Life

A growing number of studies show that a significant proportion of patients, who meet the clinical criteria for the diagnosis of the vegetative state (VS), demonstrate evidence of covert awareness through successful performance of neuroimaging tasks. Despite these important advances, the day-to-day life experiences of any such patient remain unknown. This presents a major challenge for optimizing the patient’s standard of care and quality of life (QoL). We describe a patient who, following emergence from a state of complete behavioral unresponsiveness and a clinical diagnosis of VS, reported rich memories of his experience during this time. This case demonstrates the potential for a sophisticated mental life enabled by preserved memory in a proportion of patients who, similarly, are thought to be unconscious. Therefore, it presents an important opportunity to examine the implications for patient QoL and standard of care, both during the period of presumed unconsciousness and after recovery.