From blood donation to kidney sales: the gift relationship and transplant commercialism

The Altruism Requirement as Moral Fiction

It is widely agreed that living kidney donation is permitted but living kidney sales are not. Call this the Received View. One way to support the Received View is to appeal to a particular understanding of the conditions under which living kidney transplantation is permissible. It is often claimed that donors must act altruistically, without the expectation of payment and for the sake of another. Call this the Altruism Requirement. On the conventional interpretation, the Altruism Requirement is a moral fact. It states a legitimate constraint on permissible transplantation and is accepted on the basis of cogent argument. The present paper offers an alternative interpretation. I suggest the Altruism Requirement is a moral fiction-a kind of motivated falsehood. It is false that transplantation requires altruism. But the Requirement serves a purpose. Accepting it allows kidney donation but not kidney sale. It, in short, rationalizes the Received View.

The Morality of Kidney Sales: When Caring for the Seller's Dignity Has Moral Costs

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller's dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller's dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney.

Gift Discourse in Transplant and Its Implications in Anonymous Living Liver Donation

The Gift of Life metaphor is prevalent in pro-donation dialogue, aiming to promote transplant programs and conceptualize the act of organ donation. To obtain a better understanding of living donor perceptions on the term Gift of Life, we analyzed thematic views presented by anonymous living donors (ALLDs). Twenty-six ALLDs completed a semi-structured qualitative interview consisting of questions regarding their motivations, experiences, and perceptions on donation. The following 5 major themes relating to the Gift of Life terminology were elucidated: (1) Complete agreement with the term and its relevance to donation. (2) Their donation did not represent a Gift of Life. (3) The term was too grandiose. (4)A belief that the term has more meaning for the recipient rather than donor. (5 )That the "gift" goes both ways, with the donor also benefiting from the experience.

Ethics of Buying DNA

DNA databases have significant commercial value. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies have built databanks using samples and information voluntarily provided by customers. As the price of genetic analysis falls, there is growing interest in building such databases by paying individuals for their DNA and personal data. This paper maps the ethical issues associated with private companies paying for DNA. We outline the benefits of building better genomic databases and describe possible concerns about crowding out, undue inducement, exploitation, and commodification. While certain objections deserve more empirical and philosophical investigation, we argue that none currently provide decisive reasons against using financial incentives to secure DNA samples.

If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage

Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and a market-based procurement system introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment-for-consent futures market, and the family-reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, that consent to sell organs is invalid, that sellers will be harmed, and that commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family-reward futures market fares best in this comparison but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models and the increase in available organs they can be expected to provide.

Pure Altruistic Gift and the Ethics of Transplant Medicine

The article argues that altruistic giving based on anonymity, which is expected to promote social solidarity and block trade in human body parts, is conceptually defective and practically unproductive. It needs to be replaced by a more adequate notion which responds to the human practices of giving and receiving. The argument starts with identification of the main characteristics of the anonymous altruistic donation: social separation of the organ donor (or donor family) from the recipient, their mutual replaceability, non-obligatoriness of donation, and non-obligatoriness of reciprocation on the recipient's part. Since these characteristics are also central to typical market relations, anonymous altruistic donation not only cannot promote solidarity but may encourage proposals for (regulated) markets of transplantable organs. Thus, transplant ethics needs to be reframed. It needs to be rooted in, rather than promote, the practices of giving and receiving known to human societies. As the basis for such reframing, the idea of sharing in another's misfortune is proposed. It relies on the human practices of giving and receiving and, with appropriate regulatory safeguards, can provide a better conceptual basis for blocking commercial exchanges of human body parts.

An ethical appraisal of living-anonymous kidney donation using Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments

Ethical debates continue to shape organ transplant policies, particularly for kidneys. Facing organ shortages, governments have created incentives targeting prospective living-anonymous donors - socially and biologically unrelated to the recipient. However, these policies may transform altruistic exchanges of tissues into trades of commodities. We use Adam Smith's concept of sympathy to outline a new approach to transplantation ethics. This is accomplished using a case study analysis of six countries with established living-anonymous kidney donation practices - Iran, Israel, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. An ethical test was also developed from ethnographies of donors and Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. The case study analysis considered the role of religious and historic norms, media campaigns, adherence to the 2008 Declaration of Istanbul guidelines for each case, and how each factor related to Smith's sympathy, categorizing the countries into four tiers of altruism. Iran occupied the least altruistic tier, followed by the Netherlands, the UK and the US, and Saudi Arabia and Israel. The ethical test identified a similar ranking. Our findings suggest that a highly-selected cohort of states with established living-anonymous kidney donation programs may already utilize a Smithian approach for recruiting donors, and that socially-valued government incentives can preserve altruism. The ethical test could become a useful instrument to assess the altruism of emerging incentive policies.

The Body as Gift, Commodity, or Something in Between: Ethical Implications of Advanced Kidney Donation

An innovative program recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center allows people to donate a kidney in exchange for a voucher that a loved one can redeem for a kidney if and when needed. As a relatively new practice, the ethical implications of advanced kidney donation have not yet been widely discussed. This paper reflects on some of the bioethical issues at stake in this new donation program, as well as some broader philosophical issues related to the meaning and moral salience of commodification. I first consider whether the literature on commercial markets in organs--a longstanding topic of bioethical debate--can meaningfully inform ethical analysis of kidney voucher programs. Specifically, I consider whether and to what extent common objections to the exchange of kidneys for cash also apply to the exchange of kidneys for "kidney vouchers." Second, I argue that the contrast between the ethical issues raised by these two practices highlights the need to understand commodification as existing on a continuum, with different degrees of commodification giving rise to different ethical issues. Doing so can help sharpen our understanding of commodification as a moral concept, as well as its relevance to broader debates about the moral limits of markets.