Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Predicting an Outcome Less Probable yet More Desirable than the Other

Extant research suggests that the desirability of an outcome influences the way an individual makes a prediction. The current research investigated how an outcome’s desirability influences the extent to which an individual evaluates its probability when making a prediction. Two studies were conducted using a single binary prediction based on the urn model. Individuals predicted which color—red or blue—a ball drawn from a bag would be, while being aware of the proportion of each color in the bag. The results of the first study indicated that individuals predicted the more probable outcome regardless of the probabilities of two outcomes. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the proportion of predictions became significantly correlated and better calibrated to the actual probability. This result was interpreted as showing that, when motivated to predict the more desirable but less probable outcome, individuals evaluate its probability more effortfully. This interpretation was tested in the second study. When the probabiity- matching motivation was implemented, the proportion of individuals who predicted the less probable outcome increased significantly. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the same motivation did not significantly increase the proportion of such individuals. Taken together, these results imply that individuals likely process the same probability informatio differently based on whether this information is useful for predicting a desirable outcome.

Predicting an Outcome Less Probable yet More Desirable than the Other

Extant research suggests that the desirability of an outcome influences the way an individual makes a prediction. The current research investigated how an outcome's desirability influences the extent to which an individual evaluates its probability when making a prediction. Two studies were conducted using a single binary prediction based on the urn model. Individuals predicted which color-red or blue-a ball drawn from a bag would be, while being aware of the proportion of each color in the bag. The results of the first study indicated that individuals predicted the more probable outcome regardless of the probabilities of two outcomes. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the proportion of predictions became significantly correlated and better calibrated to the actual probability. This result was interpreted as showing that, when motivated to predict the more desirable but less probable outcome, individuals evaluate its probability more effortfully. This interpretation was tested in the second study. When the probabiity- matching motivation was implemented, the proportion of individuals who predicted the less probable outcome increased significantly. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the same motivation did not significantly increase the proportion of such individuals. Taken together, these results imply that individuals likely process the same probability informatio differently based on whether this information is useful for predicting a desirable outcome.

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.