Supply and demand predict male grooming of swollen females in captive chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes

Sex and grooming as exchange commodities in female bonobos' daily biological market

The Biological Market Theory (BMT) posits that cooperation between non-human animals can be seen as a mutually beneficial exchange of commodities similarly to what observed in human economic markets. Positive social interactions are commodities in non-human animals, and mutual exchanges fulfilling the criteria of the BMT have been shown in several species. However, the study of biological markets suffers from methodological limitations that are mainly linked to the difficulty of clearly identifying the currencies and their exchanges in the short-term. Here, we test whether bonobo females are more attractive during their maximum swelling phase, whether they exchange grooming and Genito-Genital Rubbing (GGR) on a daily level of analysis, and whether these daily exchanges fulfil the BMT criteria. Females engaged more in GGR when their sexual swelling was in the maximum phase. Moreover, they exchanged grooming and sex according to the daily "market fluctuations" associated with swelling status. Females in the minimum phase (low-value) increased their probability to engage in GGR with females in the maximum phase (high-value) by grooming them preferentially. In line with the supply/demand law, the female grooming strategy varied depending on the daily number of swollen females present: the higher the number of swollen females, the lower the individual grooming preference. As a whole, our study confirms BMT as a valid model to explain daily commodity exchanges as a function of the temporary value of traders, and underlines the importance of a day-by-day approach to unveil the presence of a biological market when the value of traders frequently changes.

Social strategies used by dispersing males to integrate into a new group in Tibetan macaques (Macaca thibetana)

In group-living mammals, an individual's fitness depends, in part, on the quality of social relationships it has with others. Among species of nonhuman primates in which one sex is philopatric, individuals of that sex often develop strong social bonds and alliances with closely related kin. Less is known regarding the social processes used by dispersing adults to form stable bonds with nonkin in their new group. From May to December 2009, April to August 2010, September to December 2011, and February to May 2012, we collected data on grooming interactions in wild Tibetan macaques (Macaca thibetana), a female philopatric species, at Mt. Huangshan, China. Our goal was to compare social interactions and bond formation between resident males, recent immigrant males, and resident females. Our results indicate that recent immigrant males formed stable partner relationships with a small number of resident females and groomed these females more frequently or for longer than they received grooming. In contrast, resident males switched female grooming partners more frequently, received more grooming than they gave, and formed relationships with a greater number of female partners. We argue that the ability of recent immigrant male Tibetan macaques to maintain strong and persistent social bonds with a small set of resident adult females is a primary factor that enables them to establish residence in a new multimale-multifemale group. The present study provides new and important insights into the integrated social strategies used by dispersing males and resident females to maintain group stability.

Reciprocal Exchange Patterned by Market Forces Helps Explain Cooperation in a Small-Scale Society

Social organisms sometimes depend on help from reciprocating partners to solve adaptive problems [1], and individual cooperation strategies should aim to offer high supply commodities at low cost to the donor in exchange for high-demand commodities with large return benefits [2, 3]. Although such market dynamics have been documented in some animals [4-7], naturalistic studies of human cooperation are often limited by focusing on single commodities [8]. We analyzed cooperation in five domains (meat sharing, produce sharing, field labor, childcare, and sick care) among 2,161 household dyads of Tsimane' horticulturalists, using Bayesian multilevel models and information-theoretic model comparison. Across domains, the best-fit models included kinship and residential proximity, exchanges in kind and across domains, measures of supply and demand and their interactions with exchange, and household-specific exchange slopes. In these best models, giving, receiving, and reciprocating were to some extent shaped by market forces, and reciprocal exchange across domains had a strong partial effect on cooperation independent of more exogenous factors like kinship and proximity. Our results support the view that reciprocal exchange can provide a reliable solution to adaptive problems [8-11]. Although individual strategies patterned by market forces may generate gains from trade in any species [3], humans' slow life history and skill-intensive foraging niche favor specialization and create interdependence [12, 13], thus stabilizing cooperation and fostering divisions of labor even in informal economies [14, 15].

Trading or coercion? Variation in male mating strategies between two communities of East African chimpanzees

Across taxa, males employ a variety of mating strategies, including sexual coercion and the provision, or trading, of resources. Biological market theory (BMT) predicts that trading of commodities for mating opportunities should exist only when males cannot monopolize access to females and/or obtain mating by force, in situations where power differentials between males are low; both coercion and trading have been reported for chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Here, we investigate whether the choice of strategy depends on the variation in male power differentials, using data from two wild communities of East African chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii): the structurally despotic Sonso community (Budongo, Uganda) and the structurally egalitarian M-group (Mahale, Tanzania). We found evidence of sexual coercion by male Sonso chimpanzees, and of trading-of grooming for mating-by M-group males; females traded sex for neither meat nor protection from male aggression. Our results suggest that the despotism-egalitarian axis influences strategy choice: male chimpanzees appear to pursue sexual coercion when power differentials are large and trading when power differentials are small and coercion consequently ineffective. Our findings demonstrate that trading and coercive strategies are not restricted to particular chimpanzee subspecies; instead, their occurrence is consistent with BMT predictions. Our study raises interesting, and as yet unanswered, questions regarding female chimpanzees' willingness to trade sex for grooming, if doing so represents a compromise to their fundamentally promiscuous mating strategy. It highlights the importance of within-species cross-group comparisons and the need for further study of the relationship between mating strategy and dominance steepness.

Taking the aggravation out of data aggregation: A conceptual guide to dealing with statistical issues related to the pooling of individual-level observational data

Field data often include multiple observations taken from the same individual. In order to avoid pseudoreplication, it is commonplace to aggregate data, generating a mean score per individual, and then using these aggregated data in subsequent analyses. Aggregation, however, can generate problems of its own. Not only does it lead to a loss of information, it can also leave analyses vulnerable to the "ecological fallacy": the drawing of false inferences about individual behavior on the basis of population level ("ecological") data. It can also result in Simpson's paradox, where relationships seen at the individual level can be completely reversed when analyzed at the aggregate level. These phenomena have been documented widely in the medical and social sciences but tend to go unremarked in primatological studies that rely on observational data from the field. Here, we provide a conceptual guide that explains how and why aggregate data are vulnerable to the ecological fallacy and Simpson's paradox, illustrating these points using data on baboons. We then discuss one particular analytical approach, namely multi-level modeling, that can potentially eliminate these problems. By highlighting the issue of the ecological fallacy, and increasing awareness of how datasets are often organized into a number of different levels, we also highlight the manner in which researchers can more positively exploit the structure of their datasets, without any information loss. These analytical approaches may thus provide greater insight into behavior by permitting more thorough investigation of interactions and cross-level effects.

Egalitarian despots: hierarchy steepness, reciprocity and the grooming-trade model in wild chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes

Biological market theory models the action of natural selection as a marketplace in which animals are viewed as traders with commodities to offer and exchange. Studies of female Old World monkeys have suggested that grooming might be employed as a commodity to be reciprocated or traded for alternative services, yet previous tests of this grooming-trade model in wild adult male chimpanzees have yielded mixed results. Here we provide the strongest test of the model to date for male chimpanzees: we use data drawn from two social groups (communities) of chimpanzees from different populations and give explicit consideration to variation in dominance hierarchy steepness, as such variation results in differing conditions for biological markets. First, analysis of data from published accounts of other chimpanzee communities, together with our own data, showed that hierarchy steepness varied considerably within and across communities and that the number of adult males in a community aged 20-30 years predicted hierarchy steepness. The two communities in which we tested predictions of the grooming-trade model lay at opposite extremes of this distribution. Second, in accord with the grooming-trade model, we found evidence that male chimpanzees trade grooming for agonistic support where hierarchies are steep (despotic) and consequent effective support is a rank-related commodity, but not where hierarchies are shallow (egalitarian). However, we also found that grooming was reciprocated regardless of hierarchy steepness. Our findings also hint at the possibility of agonistic competition, or at least exclusion, in relation to grooming opportunities compromising the free market envisioned by biological market theory. Our results build on previous findings across chimpanzee communities to emphasize the importance of reciprocal grooming exchanges among adult male chimpanzees, which can be understood in a biological markets framework if grooming by or with particular individuals is a valuable commodity.

Evolution of microbial markets

Biological market theory has been used successfully to explain cooperative behavior in many animal species. Microbes also engage in cooperative behaviors, both with hosts and other microbes, that can be described in economic terms. However, a market approach is not traditionally used to analyze these interactions. Here, we extend the biological market framework to ask whether this theory is of use to evolutionary biologists studying microbes. We consider six economic strategies used by microbes to optimize their success in markets. We argue that an economic market framework is a useful tool to generate specific and interesting predictions about microbial interactions, including the evolution of partner discrimination, hoarding strategies, specialized versus diversified mutualistic services, and the role of spatial structures, such as flocks and consortia. There is untapped potential for studying the evolutionary dynamics of microbial systems. Market theory can help structure this potential by characterizing strategic investment of microbes across a diversity of conditions.