1
|
Számadó S, Samu F, Takács K. Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2022. [PMID: 36249330 DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.c.6214769] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/17/2023]
Abstract
How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Szabolcs Számadó
- Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Egry J. u. 1. H-1111, Budapest, Hungary
- CSS-RECENS, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Flóra Samu
- CSS-RECENS, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
- Agglomeration and Social Networks Lendület Research Group, Centre for Economic-and Regional Studies, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
- Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of Sociology, Fővám tér. 8, H-1093, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Károly Takács
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, S-601 74 Norrköping, Sweden
- CSS-RECENS, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Számadó S, Samu F, Takács K. Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2022; 9:220335. [PMID: 36249330 PMCID: PMC9532995 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.220335] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Accepted: 09/07/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Szabolcs Számadó
- Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Egry J. u. 1. H-1111, Budapest, Hungary
- CSS-RECENS, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Flóra Samu
- CSS-RECENS, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
- Agglomeration and Social Networks Lendület Research Group, Centre for Economic-and Regional Studies, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
- Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of Sociology, Fővám tér. 8, H-1093, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Károly Takács
- CSS-RECENS, CSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097, Budapest, Hungary
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, S-601 74 Norrköping, Sweden
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Galván I, Schwartz TS, Garland T. Evolutionary physiology at 30+: Has the promise been fulfilled?: Advances in Evolutionary Physiology: Advances in Evolutionary Physiology. Bioessays 2021; 44:e2100167. [PMID: 34802161 DOI: 10.1002/bies.202100167] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/03/2021] [Revised: 10/20/2021] [Accepted: 10/22/2021] [Indexed: 12/19/2022]
Abstract
Three decades ago, interactions between evolutionary biology and physiology gave rise to evolutionary physiology. This caused comparative physiologists to improve their research methods by incorporating evolutionary thinking. Simultaneously, evolutionary biologists began focusing more on physiological mechanisms that may help to explain constraints on and trade-offs during microevolutionary processes, as well as macroevolutionary patterns in physiological diversity. Here we argue that evolutionary physiology has yet to reach its full potential, and propose new avenues that may lead to unexpected advances. Viewing physiological adaptations in wild animals as potential solutions to human diseases offers enormous possibilities for biomedicine. New evidence of epigenetic modifications as mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that regulate physiological traits may also arise in coming years, which may also represent an overlooked enhancer of adaptation via natural selection to explain physiological evolution. Synergistic interactions at these intersections and other areas will lead to a novel understanding of organismal biology.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ismael Galván
- Department of Evolutionary Ecology, National Museum of Natural Sciences, CSIC, Madrid, Spain
| | - Tonia S Schwartz
- Department of Biological Sciences, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, USA
| | - Theodore Garland
- Department of Evolution, Ecology, and Organismal Biology, University of California, Riverside, California, USA
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Whitmeyer M. Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game. J Theor Biol 2020; 509:110513. [PMID: 33075365 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110513] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2020] [Revised: 08/22/2020] [Accepted: 10/04/2020] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Infamously, the presence of honest communication in a signaling environment may be difficult to reconcile with small (relative) signaling costs or a low degree of common interest between sender (beneficiary) and receiver (donor). This paper posits that one mechanism through which such communication can arise is through inattention on the part of the receiver, which allows for honest communication in settings where-should the receiver be fully attentive-honest communication would be impossible. We explore this idea through the Sir Philip Sidney game in detail and show that some degree of inattention is always weakly better for the receiver and may be strictly better. We compare limited attention to Lachmann and Bergstrom's (1998) notion of a signaling medium and show that the receiver-optimal degree of inattention is equivalent to the receiver-optimal choice of medium.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mark Whitmeyer
- Hausdorff Center for Mathematics & Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Harris KD, Daon Y, Nanjundiah V. The role of signaling constraints in defining optimal marginal costs of reliable signals. Behav Ecol 2020. [DOI: 10.1093/beheco/araa025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Abstract
The handicap principle was originally proposed to resolve the question of why, in their competition for mates, certain species invest in exaggerated ornaments that are often detrimental to their survival. Zahavi suggested that the traits that are most suitable to serve as signals are precisely those that require the burden of extra investment to increase in magnitude: that burden enables the signal to be correlated with the signaler’s quality. According to his model, the additional investment in signaling results in a functional advantage. It does so by providing more accurate information regarding the signaler as it increases the distinction between males of similar quality. There are a number of formalizations of this model, and experimental studies of the handicap principle have focused on testing them. Nonetheless, there is little consensus whether 1) ensuring reliability requires an additional investment or 2) traits that require a relatively higher investment to increase (have higher marginal costs) are selected as signals over those with lower marginal costs. Here, we present an agent-based mate choice model that quantifies the relative stability of signals with different marginal costs. Our model demonstrates how quality-independent constraints (in signal production and perception) affect the range of marginal costs for which a signal is informative. In turn, receiver preference for informative signals drives the selection of signals according to marginal cost. The presence or absence of signaling constraints can determine the outcome of costly signaling models and, thus, explain the different conclusions of Zahavi’s verbal model and its subsequent formalizations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Keith D Harris
- School of Zoology, Tel Aviv University, 55 Haim Levanon Street, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Yair Daon
- Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, 251 Mercer Street, New York, NY, USA
| | - Vidyanand Nanjundiah
- Centre for Human Genetics, BioTech Park, Electronic City (Phase I), Bengaluru, India
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Penn DJ, Számadó S. The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 2020; 95:267-290. [PMID: 31642592 PMCID: PMC7004190 DOI: 10.1111/brv.12563] [Citation(s) in RCA: 54] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2019] [Revised: 09/24/2019] [Accepted: 09/26/2019] [Indexed: 01/24/2023]
Abstract
The most widely cited explanation for the evolution of reliable signals is Zahavi's so-called Handicap Principle, which proposes that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. Here we provide a critical review of the Handicap Principle and its theoretical development. We explain why this idea is erroneous, and how it nevertheless became widely accepted as the leading explanation for honest signalling. In 1975, Zahavi proposed that elaborate secondary sexual characters impose 'handicaps' on male survival, not due to inadvertent signalling trade-offs, but as a mechanism that functions to demonstrate males' genetic quality to potential mates. His handicap hypothesis received many criticisms, and in response, Zahavi clarified his hypothesis and explained that it assumes that signals are wasteful as well as costly, and that they evolve because wastefulness enforces honesty. He proposed that signals evolve under 'signal selection', a non-Darwinian type of selection that favours waste rather than efficiency. He maintained that the handicap hypothesis provides a general principle to explain the evolution of all types of signalling systems, i.e. the Handicap Principle. In 1977, Zahavi proposed a second hypothesis for honest signalling, which received many different labels and interpretations, although it was assumed to be another example of handicap signalling. In 1990, Grafen published models that he claimed vindicated Zahavi's Handicap Principle. His conclusions were widely accepted and the Handicap Principle subsequently became the dominant paradigm for explaining the evolution of honest signalling in the biological and social sciences. Researchers have subsequently focused on testing predications of the Handicap Principle, such as measuring the absolute costs of honest signals (and using energetic and other proximate costs as proxies for fitness), but very few have attempted to test Grafen's models. We show that Grafen's models do not support the handicap hypothesis, although they do support Zahavi's second hypothesis, which proposes that males adjust their investment into the expression of their sexual signals according to their condition and ability to bear the costs (and risks to their survival). Rather than being wasteful over-investments, honest signals evolve in this scenario because selection favours efficient and optimal investment into signal expression and minimizes signalling costs. This idea is very different from the handicap hypothesis, but it has been widely misinterpreted and equated to the Handicap Principle. Theoretical studies have since shown that signalling costs paid at the equilibrium are neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain signal honesty, and that honesty can evolve through differential benefits, as well as differential costs. There have been increasing criticisms of the Handicap Principle, but they have focused on the limitations of Grafen's model and overlooked the fact that it is not a handicap model. This model is better understood within a Darwinian framework of adaptive signalling trade-offs, without the added burden and confusing logic of the Handicap Principle. There is no theoretical or empirical support for the Handicap Principle and the time is long overdue to usher this idea into an 'honorable retirement'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Dustin J. Penn
- Konrad Lorenz Institute of EthologyUniversity of Veterinary MedicineViennaAustria
| | - Szabolcs Számadó
- Department of Sociology and CommunicationBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsBudapestHungary,CSS‐ RECENSMTA Centre for Social SciencesBudapestHungary,Evolutionary Systems Research GroupMTA Centre for Ecological ResearchTihanyHungary
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Kopp C, Korb KB, Mills BI. Information-theoretic models of deception: Modelling cooperation and diffusion in populations exposed to "fake news". PLoS One 2018; 13:e0207383. [PMID: 30485356 PMCID: PMC6261583 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207383] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2018] [Accepted: 10/16/2018] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The modelling of deceptions in game theory and decision theory has not been well studied, despite the increasing importance of this problem in social media, public discourse, and organisational management. This paper presents an improved formulation of the extant information-theoretic models of deceptions, a framework for incorporating these models of deception into game and decision theoretic models of deception, and applies these models and this framework in an agent based evolutionary simulation that models two very common deception types employed in “fake news” attacks. The simulation results for both deception types modelled show, as observed empirically in many social systems subjected to “fake news” attacks, that even a very small population of deceivers that transiently invades a much larger population of non-deceiving agents can strongly alter the equilibrium behaviour of the population in favour of agents playing an always defect strategy. The results also show that the ability of a population of deceivers to establish itself or remain present in a population is highly sensitive to the cost of the deception, as this cost reduces the fitness of deceiving agents when competing against non-deceiving agents. Diffusion behaviours observed for agents exploiting the deception producing false beliefs are very close to empirically observed behaviours in social media, when fitted to epidemiological models. We thus demonstrate, using the improved formulation of the information-theoretic models of deception, that agent based evolutionary simulations employing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma can accurately capture the behaviours of a population subject to deception attacks introducing uncertainty and false perceptions, and show that information-theoretic models of deception have practical applications beyond trivial taxonomical analysis.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Carlo Kopp
- Data Science Research Group, Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia
- * E-mail:
| | - Kevin B. Korb
- Data Science Research Group, Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia
| | - Bruce I. Mills
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Western Australia, Western Australia, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Abstract
We reinvestigate a new model based on the handicap hypothesis. We show the handicap hypothesis does not explain male dimorphisms. The results are due to the ‘playing-the-field’ assumption of the model. The generality of the ‘playing-the-field’ assumption is suspect. The evolutionary stability of the proposed new equilibrium is questionable.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Szabolcs Számadó
- RECENS 'Lendület' Research Group, MTA Centre for Social Science, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Dustin J Penn
- Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, Department of Integrative Biology and Evolution, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Austria
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Hill GE. Mitonuclear Mate Choice: A Missing Component of Sexual Selection Theory? Bioessays 2018; 40. [DOI: 10.1002/bies.201700191] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2017] [Revised: 12/18/2017] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Geoffrey E. Hill
- Department of Biological Sciences; Auburn University; Auburn Alabama 36849-5414
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Galván I, Alonso-Alvarez C. Individual quality via sensitivity to cysteine availability in a melanin-based honest signaling system. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2017; 220:2825-2833. [PMID: 28546507 DOI: 10.1242/jeb.160333] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/29/2017] [Accepted: 05/21/2017] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of honest animal communication is mostly understood through the handicap principle, which is intrinsically dependent on the concept of individual quality: low-quality individuals are prevented from producing high-quality signals because, if they did so, they would pay greater production costs than high-quality individuals. We tested an alternative explanation for the black bib size of male house sparrows, Passer domesticus, an honest signal of quality the expression of which is negatively related to levels of the pigment pheomelanin in the constituent feathers. We previously showed that experimental depletion of cysteine, which participates in pheomelanogenesis, improves the phenotype (bibs larger than in controls) of high-quality males (birds with largest bibs initially) only. Here, we conducted an experiment under opposite conditions, increasing the availability of dietary cysteine, and obtained opposite results: deteriorated phenotypes (bibs smaller than in controls) were only expressed by high-quality birds. Some birds were also treated with the pro-oxidant diquat dibromide, and we found that the cellular resistance to free radicals of high-quality birds benefited more from the antioxidant activity of cysteine against diquat than that of low-quality birds. These findings support the existence of a mechanism uncoupling cysteine and pheomelanin in low-quality birds that confers on them a low sensitivity to variations in cysteine availability. This constitutes an explanation for the evolution of signal honesty that overcomes the limitations of the handicap principle, because it provides a specific definition of individual quality and because costs are no longer required to prevent low-quality individuals from producing large signals.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ismael Galván
- Ecologie Systématique Evolution, Université Paris-Sud, CNRS, AgroParisTech, Université Paris-Saclay, Orsay 91405 Cedex, France
| | - Carlos Alonso-Alvarez
- Department of Evolutionary Ecology, National Museum of Natural Sciences - CSIC, Madrid 28006, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
|
12
|
Václav R, Kolníková Z. Effects of food and thermal regimes on body condition indices and skin colouration in corn snakes. Biologia (Bratisl) 2017. [DOI: 10.1515/biolog-2017-0008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
|
13
|
Testing for links between face color and age, dominance status, parity, weight, and intestinal nematode infection in a sample of female Japanese macaques. Primates 2016; 58:83-91. [DOI: 10.1007/s10329-016-0575-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2016] [Accepted: 09/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
|
14
|
|