Framing deductive reasoning with emotional content: an fMRI study

The desirability bias in personality-related syllogistic reasoning

INTRODUCTION

The belief-bias effect is a tendency to evaluate syllogistic statements based on believability rather than on formal logic validity. Following this rationale, the study examines desirability bias as the tendency to evaluate syllogistic conclusions based on their desirability when reasoning is conducted on personality-relevant categorical syllogisms.

METHODS

For this purpose, 60 syllogisms were constructed based on the items of the Big Five questionnaire. Syllogisms were subsequently categorized as desirable (e.g., "I empathize with others") and undesirable (e.g., "I am passive") based on their conclusion. In each task, the second premise and the conclusion were formulated in the first person to increase a respondent's identification with the content. A total of 300 university students (Mage = 20.08, SD = 2.02) participated in the study.

RESULTS

A 2 (syllogism validity: valid, invalid) × 2 (syllogism desirability: desirable, undesirable) repeated measures ANOVA was employed. The analysis showed a greater tendency to accept desirable conclusions on valid syllogisms (valid desirable rather than valid undesirable) and reject undesirable conclusions on invalid syllogisms (invalid undesirable rather than invalid desirable).

CONCLUSION

These findings have implications for socially desirable responding in cognitive tasks, which may be further developed as a source of self-relevant content as well as for further extension of belief bias in the form of desirability bias.

Accuracy and Response Time for Modus Ponens Syllogisms Vary by Controversial Topic and Categorical Emotion

Researchers have documented differential effects of emotion on cognitive processes, debating whether emotion may increase or decrease the response time and accuracy of logical thinking. The current study proposed that differences may be due to variability occurring across topic and categorical emotions, such that assessment of several basic emotional responses in the context of performing logical reasoning tasks may provide an initial indication of these differences. Utilizing modus ponens syllogisms composed of controversial statements, the current study evoked a variety of emotional responses and tested the accuracy of participants' basic logical thinking. Results indicated that logical skills were largely preserved despite the topic and emotion, nonetheless, accuracy varied across syllogism type (controversial vs. control), with increased accuracy on controversial syllogisms. Syllogisms rated as evoking no emotion were answered more accurately than those that evoked any emotion, with disgust and anger associated with less accuracy than no emotion and gladness associated with increased accuracy. Response times also differed across syllogism type, emotion, and emotion intensity.

An experimental and simulation study of the impact of emotional information on analogical reasoning

We investigated whether and how emotional information would affect analogical reasoning. We hypothesized that task-irrelevant emotional information would impair performance whereas task-relevant emotional information would enhance it. In Study 1, 233 undergraduates completed a novel version of the People Pieces Task (Emotional Faces People Task), an analogical reasoning task in which the task characters displayed emotional or neutral facial expressions (within-participants). The emotional faces were relevant or irrelevant to the task (between-participants). We simulated the behavioral results using the Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA) model of relational reasoning. LISA is a neurally plausible, symbolic-connectionist computational model of analogical reasoning. In comparison to neutral trials, participants were slower but more accurate on emotion-relevant trials, and were faster but less accurate on emotion-irrelevant trials. Simulations using the LISA model demonstrated that it is possible to account for the effects of emotional information on reasoning in terms of how emotional stimuli attract attention during a reasoning task. In Study 2, 255 undergraduates completed the Emotional Faces People Task at either a high- or low-working memory load. The high working memory load condition of Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, showing that participants were more accurate on emotion-relevant trials than on emotion-irrelevant trials; in Study 2, this increased accuracy could not be accounted for by a speed-accuracy tradeoff. The working memory manipulation influenced the manner in which the congruence (with the correct answer) of emotion-irrelevant emotion influenced performance. Simulations using the LISA model showed that manipulating the salience of emotion, the error penalty, as well as vigilance (which determines the likelihood that LISA will notice it has attended to an irrelevant relation), could reasonably reproduce the behavioral results of both low and high working memory load conditions of Study 2.

Paradoxical Reasoning: An fMRI Study

Paradoxes are a special form of reasoning leading to absurd inferences in contrast to logical reasoning that is used to reach valid conclusions. A functional MRI (fMRI) study was conducted to investigate the neural substrates of paradoxical and deductive reasoning. Twenty-four healthy participants were scanned using fMRI, while they engaged in reasoning tasks based on arguments, which were either Zeno’s like paradoxes (paradoxical reasoning) or Aristotelian arguments (deductive reasoning). Clusters of significant activation for paradoxical reasoning were located in bilateral inferior frontal and middle temporal gyrus. Clusters of significant activation for deductive reasoning were located in bilateral superior and inferior parietal lobe, precuneus, and inferior frontal gyrus. These results confirmed that different brain activation patterns are engaged for paradoxical vs. deductive reasoning providing a basis for future studies on human physiological as well as pathological reasoning.

Neural Correlates of Causal Inferences in Discourse Understanding and Logical Problem-Solving: A Meta-Analysis Study

In discourse comprehension, we need to draw inferences to make sense of discourse. Previous neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural correlates of causal inferences in discourse understanding. However, these findings have been divergent, and how these types of inferences are related to causal inferences in logical problem-solving remains unclear. Using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach, the current meta-analysis analyzed 19 experiments on causal inferences in discourse understanding and 20 experiments on those in logical problem-solving to identify the neural correlates of these two cognitive processes and their shared and distinct neural correlates. We found that causal inferences in discourse comprehension recruited a left-lateralized frontotemporal brain system, including the left inferior frontal gyrus, the left middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and the bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), while causal inferences in logical problem-solving engaged a nonoverlapping brain system in the frontal and parietal cortex, including the left inferior frontal gyrus, the bilateral middle frontal gyri, the dorsal MPFC, and the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL). Furthermore, the pattern similarity analyses showed that causal inferences in discourse understanding were primarily related to the terms about language processing and theory-of-mind processing. Both types of inferences were found to be related to the terms about memory and executive function. These findings suggest that causal inferences in discourse understanding recruit distinct neural bases from those in logical problem-solving and rely more on semantic knowledge and social interaction experiences.

The Neurocognitive Correlates of Human Reasoning: A Meta-analysis of Conditional and Syllogistic Inferences

Inferring knowledge is a core aspect of human cognition. We can form complex sentences connecting different pieces of information, such as in conditional statements like "if someone drinks alcohol, then they must be older than 18." These are relevant for causal reasoning about our environment and allow us to think about hypothetical scenarios. Another central aspect to forming complex statements is to quantify about sets, such as in "some apples are green." Reasoning in terms of the ability to form these statements is not yet fully understood, despite being an active field of interdisciplinary research. On a theoretical level, several conceptual frameworks have been proposed, predicting diverging brain activation patterns during the reasoning process. We present a meta-analysis comprising the results of 32 neuroimaging experiments about reasoning, which we subdivided by their structure, content, and requirement for world knowledge. In conditional tasks, we identified activation in the left middle and rostrolateral pFC and parietal regions, whereas syllogistic tasks elicit activation in Broca's complex, including the BG. Concerning the content differentiation, abstract tasks exhibit activation in the left inferior and rostrolateral pFC and inferior parietal regions, whereas content tasks are in the left superior pFC and parieto-occipital regions. The findings clarify the neurocognitive mechanisms of reasoning and exhibit clear distinctions between the task's type and content. Overall, we found that the activation differences clarify inconsistent results from accumulated data and serve as useful scaffolding differentiations for theory-driven interpretations of the neuroscientific correlates of human reasoning.

Is it the picture or is it the frame? An fMRI study on the neurobiology of framing effects

Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we investigated whether a culturally defined context modulates the neurocognitive processing of artworks. We presented subjects with paintings from the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York, and labeled them as being either from the MoMA or from an adult education center. Irrespective of aesthetic appreciation, we found higher neural activation in the left precuneus, superior and inferior parietal cortex for the MoMA condition compared to the control label condition. When taking the aesthetic preference for a painting into account, the MoMA condition elicited higher involvement of right precuneus, bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Our findings indicate that mental frames, in particular labels of social value, modulate both cognitive and affective aspects of sensory processing.

Hemispheric lateralization in reasoning

A growing body of evidence suggests that reasoning in humans relies on a number of related processes whose neural loci are largely lateralized to one hemisphere or the other. A recent review of this evidence concluded that the patterns of lateralization observed are organized according to two complementary tendencies. The left hemisphere attempts to reduce uncertainty by drawing inferences or creating explanations, even at the cost of ignoring conflicting evidence or generating implausible explanations. Conversely, the right hemisphere aims to reduce conflict by rejecting or refining explanations that are no longer tenable in the face of new evidence. In healthy adults, the hemispheres work together to achieve a balance between certainty and consistency, and a wealth of neuropsychological research supports the notion that upsetting this balance results in various failures in reasoning, including delusions. However, support for this model from the neuroimaging literature is mixed. Here, we examine the evidence for this framework from multiple research domains, including an activation likelihood estimation analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of reasoning. Our results suggest a need to either revise this model as it applies to healthy adults or to develop better tools for assessing lateralization in these individuals.

Response inhibition failure to visual stimuli paired with a "single-type" stressor in PTSD patients: an fMRI pilot study

Patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) tend to misinterpret innocuous stimuli as potential threats, possibly due to a conditioning provoked by traumatic episodes. Previous neuroimaging evidence has shown an abnormal activation of the amygdala and prefrontal cortex in PTSD patients during fear conditioning and extinction. Nevertheless, the effects of a single-type adverse stressor on that circuit remain poorly explored. We tested the hypothesis that a single-type adverse episode is able to affect the prefrontal cortex and amygdala response to conditioned stimuli. To test this hypothesis, fMRI recordings were performed in PTSD patients and trauma-exposed controls during the observation of neutral and negative paired or non-paired pictures with an adverse stimulus by means of a single association. Results showed that left amygdala activation during negative reinforced stimuli was correlated with the score of PTSD clinical scale across all subjects. Furthermore, in the traumatized non-PTSD group, the activation of the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex and bilateral amygdala was lower during the observation of the reinforced (CS(+)) versus non-reinforced pictures (CS(-)) in response to emotionally negative stimuli. This was not the case in the PTSD patients. These results suggest that in PTSD patients, a single-episode conditioning unveils the failure of an inhibitory mechanism moderating the activity of the prefrontal cortex and amygdala in response to adverse and neutral stimuli.