Morally-Relevant Theory of Mind Mediates the Relationship between Group Membership and Moral Judgments

Psychopathic traits and social brain responses during moral evaluation in adolescence

Brain functioning underlying moral decision-making in adolescents with psychopathic traits is relatively less understood. This fMRI study examined the neural correlates of moral decision-making in relation to psychopathic traits, as measured by the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI), in a sample of 16 community-recruited youth (mean age=13.94) with reported behavior problems. Participants viewed images that depicted a moral violation, a conflict with no moral violation, and a neutral scenario. We analyzed activation, seed-to-voxel, and seed-to-seed functional connectivity using a social brain mask during moral reasoning and decision-making. Results indicated: a) greater activity in social brain regions while assessing acts of moral, compared to nonmoral, violations; b) positive correlations between activation of several social brain regions and YPI subscale scores; c) a positive association between YPI and functional connectivity between the social brain network and the bilateral middle cingulate cortices; d) significant effects of YPI on connectivity between social brain regions and the rest of the brain; and e) decreased connectivity between several ROIs during moral reasoning: the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the precuneus (PREC) and left amygdala (lAMYG), and the PREC and rAMYG. Clinical and developmental implications of these findings are discussed.

Increased levels of autistic traits are associated with atypical moral judgments

Despite evidence often showing differences between groups with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and neurotypical controls in moral judgment, the precise nature of these differences has been difficult to establish. At least two reasons for this are (1) that ASD (and its associated characteristics) is difficult to define and (2) that morality, and the inclinations that undergird it, are hard to measure empirically. These challenges have made conclusive associations between ASD and particular patterns of moral judgment hard to come by. Thus, in the current study, participants levels of a traits associated with ASD were assessed by their responses to a questionnaire (i.e., the Iowa Screener) before they made moral judgments across a set of 20 moral dilemmas that independently assess utilitarian and deontological processing. Interestingly, results indicated that increased levels of autistic traits were associated with fewer moral judgments corresponding to either moral theory; that is, higher levels of autistic traits were associated with atypical patterns of moral judgment. In addition, and consistent with some prior methods (e.g., Gaeth et al., 2016), participant scores on the Iowa Screener, as well as their self-identification, were used to categorize participants between two groups (i.e., ASD and Typical) for exploratory purposes. Taken together, this research better informs the relationship between ASD and its associated traits with moral judgment and can inform certain discrepant findings in the field. Implications and ideas for future research are discussed, such as whether traits associated with ASD might relate to alternative moral inclinations, beyond deontology and utilitarianism.

The influence of in-groups and out-groups on the theory-of-mind processing: evidence from different ethnic college students

According to previous studies of theory of mind (ToM), social environment and cultural background affect individuals' cognitive ability to understand other people's minds. There are cross-group differences in ToM. The present study aimed to examine whether social environment and culture affect the ToM in Uygur and Han groups and whether the individual's cognitive ToM and affective ToM show in-group advantages. Han and Uygur college students were recruited as participants. The "self/other differentiation task" was used to measure cognitive ToM (Study 1), and the "Yoni task" was used to measure both cognitive and affective ToM (Study 2). We found that Han participants processed the cognitive and affective states of others faster and more accurately than Uygur ones. Uygur and Han participants processed in-group members' cognitive and affective states faster and more accurately. Furthermore, Uygur participants were more accurate in the cognitive ToM processing of in-group members, while Han participants were faster in the affective ToM processing of in-group members. The findings indicated that ethnic culture and group identify might influence ToM processing. Strengthening exchanges between ethnic groups may enable individuals to better process out-group members' psychological states.

Claims of wrongdoing by outgroup members heighten children's ingroup biases

Little is known about how group bias may impact children's acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. Most children view cheating as unfair. However, in competitive situations, when ambiguity surrounds the potential intention to cheat, group affiliation may lead children to support claims of cheating based solely on the team affiliation of the claimant, even when those claims are not clearly substantiated. Therefore, it may be particularly important to consider the role ingroup bias may play in children's accusations of cheating in a competitive intergroup context. The current study investigated 4-10 year old children's (N = 137, M_Age = 6.71 years, SD_Age = 1.49; 47 % female) evaluations of ambiguous acts and unverified claims about those acts in a competitive, intergroup context. Results showed that children initially viewed an ambiguous act similarly, regardless of team affiliation, but demonstrated increasing ingroup biases after claims of wrongdoing were introduced. Implications for how unsubstantiated claims may impact intergroup interactions more broadly will be discussed.

The Neural Basis of Moral Judgement for Self and for Others: Evidence From Event-Related Potentials

Developmental and neuroscience works have demonstrated that the moral judgment is influenced by theory of mind (ToM), which refers to the ability to represent the mental states of different agents. However, the neural and cognitive time course of interactions between moral judgment and ToM remains unclear. The present event-related potential (ERP) study investigated the underlying neural substrate of the interaction between moral judgment and ToM by contrasting the ERPs elicited by moral judgments for self and for others in moral dilemmas. In classic moral dilemmas, the agents must choose between the utilitarian choice (taking the action to kill or harm an innocent person but saving more people) and the non-utilitarian choice (taking no action to kill or harm the innocent person but letting some people die). The ERPs were recorded from participants who made moral judgments for self and for others when the agent made utilitarian or non-utilitarian choices during the dilemma. The results revealed that the moral judgment for others elicited a larger frontal late positive component (LPC, 500–900 ms) than that for self when the agents made utilitarian choices, while no difference was observed on early components of N1, P2, and N2. Moreover, individual differences in mentalizing ability were negatively correlated with the LPC amplitudes. These findings suggested that ToM modulated the late controlled process but not the early automatic process during moral judgments.

To punish or exclude? Children’s responses to unfair and fair advantages created in competitive contexts

To determine whether children will exclude or punish a peer who creates an unfair advantage in an intergroup team context, four-to ten-year-old participants (N = 120, M_age = 6.87) were assigned a team membership and evaluated unintentional and intentional unfair advantages created by a character. Children were more likely to endorse punishment and exclusion responses when reasoning about an opponent than a teammate. This difference between groups was not observed when in-group and out-group members reasoned about punishing a character who intentionally created an unfair advantage. Older children were less likely to endorse exclusion than younger participants. Further, older children and in-group members utilized punishment more frequently than exclusion. Taken together this demonstrates that the group identity and the age of the child influences the ways in which children endorse responses to transgressions. These findings increase our understanding regarding children's conceptions of fairness responses to transgressions in intergroup contexts.

Children’s Perspectives on Fairness and Inclusivity in the Classroom

School represents an important context for children’s social, moral, and identity development. Research indicates that supportive teacher-student relationships are significantly related to positive student academic achievement. Unfortunately, teacher bias as well as peer exclusion based on group identity (gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality) pervade many school contexts. The presence of these biases in the classroom is negatively related to students’ academic development, especially for children who are minoritized and marginalized. Very little research has connected teacher bias and children’s reasoning about bias and inequalities in the classroom context. The classroom is a complex environment in which to examine children’s social and moral reasoning about bias, given teachers’ position of authority which often includes power, status, and prestige. We propose that understanding both teacher bias and peer intergroup exclusion are essential for promoting more fair classrooms. This paper reviews foundational theory as well as the social reasoning developmental model as a framework for studying how children think about fairness and bias in the classroom context. We then discuss current research on children’s social-cognitive and moral capacities, particularly in the contexts of societal inequality and social inclusion or exclusion. Finally, this article proposes new directions for research to promote fairness and inclusivity in schools and suggests how these new lines of research might inform school-based interventions.

Children's group identity is related to their assessment of fair and unfair advantages

Unfair advantages can be created either intentionally (e.g., cheating) or unintentionally (e.g., unintended benefit). Little is known regarding how children evaluate different types of advantages in situations where group identity and group membership are made salient. To investigate how children's group identity influences their evaluations and attribution of intentions in intergroup contexts, children were presented with three hypothetical advantages (unintentionally unfair, intentionally unfair, and fair) in a competitive context created by either an in-group member or an out-group member. Children (N = 120) were 4-6 years of age (n = 59; M_age = 5.29 years) and 7-10 years of age (n = 61; M_age = 8.34 years), including 64 girls and 56 boys. Participants were 67% European American, 18% African American, 11% Asian American, and 4% Hispanic. All participants were assigned to one of two teams in a contest in order to create an in-group/out-group manipulation prior to their evaluation of the actions. Out-group members viewed unintentional unfair and fair advantages as less acceptable than in-group members, but in-group and out-group members were equally negative in their assessment of an intentional transgression. When reasoning about unintentional and intentional unfair advantages, older children referenced the intentions of the advantage creator to justify their decisions more than younger children, whereas younger children reasoned about the impact of the behavior on their team more than older children. These novel findings shed light on developmental and social factors influencing children's understanding of fairness and intentionality in everyday contexts.