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Meimandi M, Taghizadeh G, Kheirollahi G, Haj Ghani J, HojabriFard F, von Rosen P, Azad A. A Delphi Panel of People With Parkinson's Disease Regarding Responsibility: Toward a Preliminary Taxonomy. Am J Occup Ther 2024; 78:7803205130. [PMID: 38634671 DOI: 10.5014/ajot.2024.050463] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/19/2024] Open
Abstract
IMPORTANCE A sense of agency is associated with complex occupation-related responsibilities. A taxonomy can guide clinicians in enhancing responsibility in patients with Parkinson's disease (PwPD). OBJECTIVE To (1) discover levels of responsibility in occupations for PwPD and (2) propose a taxonomy for occupations. DESIGN A two-round Delphi study with PwPD and a one-round Delphi study with international experts. SETTING Electronic survey. PARTICIPANTS PwPD (N = 75) and international experts (N = 8). OUTCOMES AND MEASURES PwPD expressed their levels of an inherent sense of responsibility for each occupation (1 = very low responsibility, 5 = very high responsibility). International experts rated their level of agreement (5 = strongly agree, 1 = strongly disagree) with each dimension of the taxonomy. A consensus was determined to have been reached if the interquartile range was ≤1 and 70% agreement in two adjacent categories was achieved. RESULTS Thirty-three occupation categories were deemed as having very high to moderate responsibility for PwPD. Consequences of actions and the presence of others made up the two-dimensional responsibility taxonomy. Occupations have more challenging responsibility characteristics when they are performed with free choice, a level of high physical effort, alone, and with moral consequences. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE This study yielded the first consensus among PwPD regarding responsibility in occupations as well as a classification system for charting the complexity of responsibility in occupations. The occupation list we have created can be beneficial to health care professionals when providing interventions or conducting outcome assessments. Plain-Language Summary: When planning interventions for patients with Parkinson's disease, it can be helpful for clinicians to be aware of patients' perspectives regarding their sense of responsibility to perform occupations. The use of a systematic sequence of challenging occupations with responsibility attributes ranging from less complex to more complex can help enhance patient occupational participation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mahsa Meimandi
- Mahsa Meimandi, PhD, is Clinician, Rehabilitation Research Center, Department of Occupational Therapy, School of Rehabilitation Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
| | - Ghorban Taghizadeh
- Ghorban Taghizadeh, PhD, is Associate Professor, Rehabilitation Research Center, Department of Occupational Therapy, School of Rehabilitation Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
| | - Golnoush Kheirollahi
- Golnoush Kheirollahi, BSc, is Clinician, Rehabilitation Research Center, Department of Occupational Therapy, School of Rehabilitation Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
| | - Jafar Haj Ghani
- Jafar Haj Ghani, is MSc student, Rehabilitation Research Center, Department of Occupational Therapy, School of Rehabilitation Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
| | - Fatemeh HojabriFard
- Fatemeh HojabriFard, BSc, is Clinician, Department of Occupational Therapy, School of Rehabilitation, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
| | - Philip von Rosen
- Philip von Rosen, PhD, is Associate Professor, Division of Physiotherapy, Department of Neurobiology, Care Sciences, and Society, Karolinska Institutet, Huddinge, Sweden
| | - Akram Azad
- Akram Azad, PhD, is Associate Professor, Rehabilitation Research Center, Department of Occupational Therapy, School of Rehabilitation Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran;
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Willemsen P, Baumgartner L, Cepollaro B, Reuter K. Evaluative Deflation, Social Expectations, and the Zone of Moral Indifference. Cogn Sci 2024; 48:e13406. [PMID: 38279901 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13406] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Revised: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 01/09/2024] [Indexed: 01/29/2024]
Abstract
Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted.
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Mosley AJ, Solomon LH. Google is Free: Moral Evaluations of Intergroup Curiosity. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2023:1461672231180149. [PMID: 37409625 DOI: 10.1177/01461672231180149] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/07/2023]
Abstract
Two experiments investigated how evaluations of intergroup curiosity differed depending on whether people placed responsibility for their learning on themselves or on outgroup members. In Study 1, participants (n = 340; 51% White-American, 49% Black-American) evaluated White actors who were curious about Black culture and placed responsibility on outgroup members to teach versus on themselves to learn. Both Black and White participants rated the latter actors as more moral, and perceptions of effort mediated this effect. A follow-up preregistered study (n = 513; 75% White-American) asked whether perceptions of greater effort cause greater perceptions of moral goodness. Replicating Study 1, participants rated actors as more moral when they placed responsibility on themselves versus others. Participants also rated actors as more moral when they exerted high versus low effort. These results clarify when and why participants view curiosity as morally good and help to strengthen bridges between work on curiosity, moral cognition, and intergroup relations.
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Niemi L, Doris JM, Graham J. Who attributes what to whom? Moral values and relational context shape causal attribution to the person or the situation. Cognition 2023; 232:105332. [PMID: 36508991 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105332] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2022] [Revised: 11/16/2022] [Accepted: 11/17/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
Eight preregistered studies (total N = 3,758) investigate the role of values and relational context in attributions for moral violations, focusing on the following questions: (1) Do people's values influence their attributions? (2) Do people's relationships with the violator (self, close other, distant other) influence their attributions? (3) Do the principles intrinsic to the violated values (e.g., loyalty to close others) further influence their attributions? We found that participants were more likely to attribute violations by distant others to the person committing the violation, rather than the situation in which the violation occurred, when participants endorsed the violated values themselves. The tendency to make dispositional attributions did not obtain for violations of participants' less highly endorsed moral values or non-moral values. Relationship with the violator also influenced participants' attributions-participants were more likely to attribute their own and close others' moral violations to situational factors, relative to distant others' violations. This relational pattern was pronounced for violations of "binding" moral values, in which protection of personal relationships and groups is primary. Collectively, these results support a relational-values account of causal attribution for moral violations, whereby attributions systematically vary based on (1) the relevance of the violated values to the attributor's moral values, (2) the attributor's personal relationship to the violator, and (3) an interaction between (1) and (2) such that the principles intrinsic to the violated values influence the effects of one's relationship to the violator.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura Niemi
- Department of Psychology, Cornell University, United States of America; Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University, United States of America.
| | - John M Doris
- Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University, United States of America; Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, United States of America
| | - Jesse Graham
- Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, United States of America
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It's not what you did, it's what you could have done. Cognition 2022; 228:105222. [PMID: 35834864 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105222] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2021] [Revised: 06/18/2022] [Accepted: 07/01/2022] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
We are more likely to judge agents as morally culpable after we learn they acted freely rather than under duress or coercion. Interestingly, the reverse is also true: Individuals are more likely to be judged to have acted freely after we learn that they committed a moral violation. Researchers have argued that morality affects judgments of force by making the alternative actions the agent could have done instead appear comparatively normal, which then increases the perceived availability of relevant alternative actions. Across five studies, we test the novel predictions of this account. We find that the degree to which participants view possible alternative actions as normal strongly predicts their perceptions that an agent acted freely. This pattern holds both for perceptions of the prescriptive normality of the alternatives (whether the actions are good) and descriptive normality of the alternatives (whether the actions are unusual). We also find that manipulating the prudential value of alternative actions or the degree to which alternatives adhere to social norms, has a similar effect to manipulating whether the actions or their alternatives violate moral norms. This pattern persists even when what is actually done is held constant, and these effects are explained by changes in the perceived normality of the alternatives. Together, these results suggest that across contexts, participants' force judgments depend not on the morality of the actual action taken, but on the normality of possible alternatives. More broadly, our results build on prior work that suggests a unifying role of normality and counterfactuals across many areas of high-level human cognition.
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Schöpfer C, Ehrler F, Berger A, Bollondi Pauly C, Buytaert L, De La Serna C, Hartheiser F, Fassier T, Clavien C. Accordons-nous, A Mobile Application for Advance Care Planning and Advance Directives: Development and Usability Test (Preprint). JMIR Hum Factors 2021; 9:e34626. [PMID: 35442206 PMCID: PMC9069299 DOI: 10.2196/34626] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2021] [Revised: 01/11/2022] [Accepted: 01/20/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Advance care planning, including advance directives, is an important tool that allows patients to express their preferences for care if they are no longer able to express themselves. We developed Accordons-nous, a smartphone app that informs patients about advance care planning and advance directives, facilitates communication on these sensitive topics, and helps patients express their values and preferences for care. Objective The first objective of this study is to conduct a usability test of this app. The second objective is to collect users’ critical opinions on the usability and relevance of the tool. Methods We conducted a usability test by means of a think-aloud method, asking 10 representative patients to complete 7 browsing tasks. We double coded the filmed sessions to obtain descriptive data on task completion (with or without help), time spent, number of clicks, and the types of problems encountered. We assessed the severity of the problems encountered and identified the modifications needed to address these problems. We evaluated the readability of the app using Scolarius, a French equivalent of the Flesch Reading Ease test. By means of a posttest questionnaire, we asked participants to assess the app’s usability (System Usability Scale), relevance (Mobile App Rating Scale, section F), and whether they would recommend the app to the target groups: patients, health professionals, and patients’ caring relatives. Results Participants completed the 7 think-aloud tasks in 80% (56/70) of the cases without any help from the experimenter, in 16% (11/70) of the cases with some help, and failed in 4% (3/70) of the cases. The analysis of failures and difficulties encountered revealed a series of major usability problems that could be addressed with minor modifications to the app. Accordons-nous obtained high scores on readability (overall score of 87.4 on Scolarius test, corresponding to elementary school level), usability (85.3/100 on System Usability Scale test), relevance (4.3/5 on the Mobile App Rating Scale, section F), and overall subjective endorsement on 3 I would recommend questions (4.7/5). Conclusions This usability test helped us make the final changes to our app before its official launch.
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Affiliation(s)
- Céline Schöpfer
- Institute for Ethics, History, and the Humanities, University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Frederic Ehrler
- Department of Medical Information Sciences, University Hospitals of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Antoine Berger
- Department of Medical Information Sciences, University Hospitals of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | | | - Laurence Buytaert
- University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | | | - Florence Hartheiser
- Institute for Ethics, History, and the Humanities, University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Thomas Fassier
- Division of Internal Medicine for the Aged, University Hospitals of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- Interprofessional Simulation Center, Faculty of Medicine, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Christine Clavien
- Institute for Ethics, History, and the Humanities, University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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Flanagan T, Rottman J, Howard LH. Constrained Choice: Children's and Adults' Attribution of Choice to a Humanoid Robot. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e13043. [PMID: 34606132 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13043] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/10/2019] [Revised: 08/16/2021] [Accepted: 08/18/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Young children, like adults, understand that human agents can flexibly choose different actions in different contexts, and they evaluate these agents based on such choices. However, little is known about children's tendencies to attribute the capacity to choose to robots, despite increased contact with robotic agents. In this paper, we compare 5- to 7-year-old children's and adults' attributions of free choice to a robot and to a human child by using a series of tasks measuring agency attribution, action prediction, and choice attribution. In morally neutral scenarios, children ascribed similar levels of free choice to the robot and the human, while adults were more likely to ascribe free choice to the human. For morally relevant scenarios, however, both age groups considered the robot's actions to be more constrained than the human's actions. These findings demonstrate that children and adults hold a nuanced understanding of free choice that is sensitive to both the agent type and constraints within a given scenario.
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8
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Predicting responsibility judgments from dispositional inferences and causal attributions. Cogn Psychol 2021; 129:101412. [PMID: 34303092 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101412] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2019] [Revised: 03/28/2021] [Accepted: 06/28/2021] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
The question of how people hold others responsible has motivated decades of theorizing and empirical work. In this paper, we develop and test a computational model that bridges the gap between broad but qualitative framework theories, and quantitative but narrow models. In our model, responsibility judgments are the result of two cognitive processes: a dispositional inference about a person's character from their action, and a causal attribution about the person's role in bringing about the outcome. We test the model in a group setting in which political committee members vote on whether or not a policy should be passed. We assessed participants' dispositional inferences and causal attributions by asking how surprising and important a committee member's vote was. Participants' answers to these questions in Experiment 1 accurately predicted responsibility judgments in Experiment 2. In Experiments 3 and 4, we show that the model also predicts moral responsibility judgments, and that importance matters more for responsibility, while surprise matters more for judgments of wrongfulness.
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Webster RJ, Vasturia D, Saucier DA. Demons with guns: How belief in pure evil relates to Attributional judgments for gun violence perpetrators. APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1002/acp.3795] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Russell J. Webster
- Psychological and Social Sciences The Pennsylvania State University, Abington College Abington Pennsylvania USA
| | - Dominic Vasturia
- Psychological and Social Sciences The Pennsylvania State University, Abington College Abington Pennsylvania USA
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10
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Woolfolk RL, Hannah ST, Wasserman R, Doris JM. Attributions of Responsibility for Military Misconduct: Constraint, Identification, and Severity. MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/08995605.2020.1838876] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Sean T. Hannah
- School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina
| | - Rachel Wasserman
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
| | - John M. Doris
- Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
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11
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Nadelhoffer T, Rose D, Buckwalter W, Nichols S. Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics. Cogn Sci 2020; 44:e12873. [PMID: 33145820 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12873] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2019] [Revised: 06/07/2020] [Accepted: 06/10/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this "natural compatibilism" is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - David Rose
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University
| | - Wesley Buckwalter
- Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester
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12
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Sommovigo V, Setti I, O’ Shea D, Argentero P. Investigating employees’ emotional and cognitive reactions to customer mistreatment: an experimental study. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF WORK AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/1359432x.2020.1745189] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Valentina Sommovigo
- Department of Brain and Behavioural Sciences- Unit of Applied Psychology, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
| | - Ilaria Setti
- Department of Brain and Behavioural Sciences- Unit of Applied Psychology, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
| | - Deirdre O’ Shea
- Department of Personnel & Employment Relations- Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
| | - Piergiorgio Argentero
- Department of Brain and Behavioural Sciences- Unit of Applied Psychology, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
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13
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Dunlea JP, Heiphetz L. Children's and adults' understanding of punishment and the criminal justice system. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103913] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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Abstract
What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology and the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance because its answer has implications for decision-making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology researchers to study the morality of war that combines the strengths of philosophical just-war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments third-party observers make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just-war theory, and the understanding of the morality of war.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hanne M Watkins
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Massachusetts Amherst
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15
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Cornwell JFM, Higgins ET. Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2430. [PMID: 31736829 PMCID: PMC6831825 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02430] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2019] [Accepted: 10/14/2019] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value—assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well—namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- James F M Cornwell
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, United States
| | - E Tory Higgins
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY, United States
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Hong JW, Williams D. Racism, responsibility and autonomy in HCI: Testing perceptions of an AI agent. COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 2019. [DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2019.06.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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18
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Rogers R, Alicke MD, Taylor SG, Rose D, Davis TL, Bloom D. Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2019. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2018.1564025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Ross Rogers
- Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA
| | - Mark D. Alicke
- Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA
| | | | - David Rose
- Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
| | - Teresa L. Davis
- Department of Psychology, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN, USA
| | - Dori Bloom
- Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA
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19
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Sense of agency is modulated by interactions between action choice, outcome valence, and predictability. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2019. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-018-0121-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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20
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When do children start to take mitigating circumstances into account when judging the act of killing? COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.07.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
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21
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Tabb K, Lebowitz MS, Appelbaum PS. Behavioral Genetics and Attributions of Moral Responsibility. Behav Genet 2018; 49:128-135. [PMID: 30094665 DOI: 10.1007/s10519-018-9916-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2018] [Accepted: 07/27/2018] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
While considerable research has examined how genetic explanations for behavior impact assessments of moral responsibility, results across studies have been inconsistent. Some studies suggest that genetic accounts diminish ascriptions of responsibility, but others show no effect. Nonetheless, conclusions from behavior genetics are increasingly mobilized on behalf of defendants in court, suggesting a widespread intuition that this sort of information is relevant to assessments of blameworthiness. In this paper, we consider two sorts of reasons why this kind of intuition, if it exists, is not consistently revealed in empirical studies. On the one hand, people may have complex and internally conflicting intuitions about the relationship between behavior genetics and moral responsibility. On the other hand, it may be that people are motivated to think about the role of genetics in behavior differently depending on the moral valence of the actions in question.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kathryn Tabb
- Center for Research on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Psychiatric, Neurologic and Behavioral Genetics, Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Medical Center, New York, NY, USA.
- Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, 708 Philosophy Hall, MC: 4971, 1150 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY, 10027, USA.
| | - Matthew S Lebowitz
- Center for Research on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Psychiatric, Neurologic and Behavioral Genetics, Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Medical Center, New York, NY, USA
| | - Paul S Appelbaum
- Center for Research on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Psychiatric, Neurologic and Behavioral Genetics, Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Medical Center, New York, NY, USA
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Monroe AE, Dillon KD, Guglielmo S, Baumeister RF. It's not what you do, but what everyone else does: On the role of descriptive norms and subjectivism in moral judgment. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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23
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Hechler S, Kessler T. On the difference between moral outrage and empathic anger: Anger about wrongful deeds or harmful consequences. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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Blakey R, Kremsmayer TP. Unable or Unwilling to Exercise Self-control? The Impact of Neuroscience on Perceptions of Impulsive Offenders. Front Psychol 2018; 8:2189. [PMID: 29354076 PMCID: PMC5759159 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02189] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2017] [Accepted: 12/01/2017] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
In growing numbers of court cases, neuroscience is presented to document the mental state of the offender at the level of the brain. While a small body of research has documented the effects of describing the brain state of psychotic offenders, this study tested the impact of neuroscience that could apply to far more offenders; that is the neuroscience of impulse control. In this online vignette experiment, 759 participants sentenced a normally controlled or normally impulsive actor, who committed a violent offense on impulse, explained in either cognitive or neurobiological terms. Although participants considered the neurobiological actor less responsible for his impulsive disposition than the cognitive actor, the neuroscientific testimony did not affect attributions of choice, blame, dangerousness, or punishment for the criminal act. In fact, the neuroscientific testimony exacerbated the perception that the offender offended consciously and “really wanted” to offend. The described disposition of the actor was also influential: participants attributed more capacity for reform, more free choice and consequently, more blame to the normally controlled actor. Participants also attributed this actor's offending more to his social life experiences and less to his genes and brain. However, this shift in attributions was unable to explain the greater blame directed at this offender. Together, such findings suggest that even when neuroscience changes attributions for impulsive character, attributions for impulsive offending may remain unchanged. Hence this study casts doubt on the mitigating and aggravating potential of neuroscientific testimony in court.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert Blakey
- Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Tobias P Kremsmayer
- Department of Communication Sciences & Disorders, Bouvé College of Health Sciences, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, United States
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25
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Kirkebøen G, Nordbye GHH. Intuitive Choices Lead to Intensified Positive Emotions: An Overlooked Reason for "Intuition Bias"? Front Psychol 2017; 8:1942. [PMID: 29163313 PMCID: PMC5681942 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01942] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2017] [Accepted: 10/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
People have, for many well-documented reasons, a tendency to overemphasize their intuitions and to follow them, even when they should not. This “intuition bias” leads to several kinds of specific intuitive biases in judgments and decision making. Previous studies have shown that characteristics of the decision process have a tendency to “leak” into the experience of the choice outcome. We explore whether intuitive choices influence the experience of the choice outcomes differently from “non-intuitive,” analytic choices. Since intuition is feeling based, we examine in particular if intuitive choices have stronger affective consequences than non-intuitive ones. Participants in two scenario studies (N = 90; N = 126) rated the feelings of decision makers who experienced a conflict between two options, one intuitively appealing and another that appeared preferable on analytic grounds. Choosing the intuitive alternative was anticipated to lead to somewhat more regret after negative outcomes and, in particular, much more satisfaction with positive outcomes. In two autobiographical studies, one with psychology students (N = 88) and the other with experienced engineers (N = 99), participants were asked to provide examples of choice conflicts between an intuitive and a non-intuitive option from their own private or professional lives. Both groups showed a tendency to report stronger emotions, in particular positive, after intuitive choices. One well-established explanation for intuition bias focuses on the nature of people’s anticipated negative counterfactual thoughts if their decisions were to turn out badly. The present data indicate that intuitive choices intensify positive emotions, anticipated and real, after successful outcomes much more than negative emotions after failures. Positive outcomes are also more commonly expected than negative ones, when we make choices. We argue that markedly amplified emotions, mediated by stronger personal involvement, in the positive outcomes of intuitive versus non-intuitive choices, is an overlooked reason for intuition bias.
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Affiliation(s)
- Geir Kirkebøen
- Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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26
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Guglielmo S, Malle BF. Information-Acquisition Processes in Moral Judgments of Blame. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2017; 43:957-971. [PMID: 28903702 DOI: 10.1177/0146167217702375] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
When people make moral judgments, what information do they look for? Despite its theoretical and practical implications, this question has largely been neglected by prior literature. The recent Path Model of Blame predicts a canonical order in which people acquire information when judging blame. Upon discovering a negative event, perceivers consider information about causality, then intentionality, then (if the event is intentional) reasons or (if the event is unintentional) preventability. Three studies, using two novel paradigms, assessed and found support for these predictions: In constrained (Study 1) and open-ended (Study 2) information-acquisition contexts, participants were most likely, and fastest, to seek information in the canonical order, even when under time pressure (Study 3). These findings indicate that blame relies on a set of information components that are processed in a systematic order. Implications for moral judgment models are discussed, as are potential roles of emotion and motivated reasoning in information acquisition.
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27
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Blakey R. Does Watching a Play about the Teenage Brain Affect Attitudes toward Young Offenders? Front Psychol 2017. [PMID: 28649215 PMCID: PMC5465281 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00964] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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28
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Turri J. Compatibilism can be natural. Conscious Cogn 2017; 51:68-81. [PMID: 28327347 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2016] [Revised: 12/18/2016] [Accepted: 01/24/2017] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Natural compatibilism is the view that in ordinary social cognition, people are compatibilists. Researchers have recently debated whether natural compatibilism is true. This paper presents six experiments (N=909) that advance this debate. The results provide the best evidence to date for natural compatibilism, avoiding the main methodological problems faced by previous work supporting the view. In response to simple scenarios about familiar activities, people judged that agents had moral responsibilities to perform actions that they were unable to perform (Experiment 1), were morally responsible for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 2), were to blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiments 3-4), deserved blame for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 5), and should suffer consequences for unavoidable outcomes (Experiment 6). These findings advance our understanding of moral psychology and philosophical debates that depend partly on patterns in commonsense morality.
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Affiliation(s)
- John Turri
- Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario N2L3G1, Canada.
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29
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Parkinson M, Byrne RMJ. Judgments of Moral Responsibility and Wrongness for Intentional and Accidental Harm and Purity Violations. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2017; 71:779-789. [DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2016.1276942] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Mary Parkinson
- School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Ireland
| | - Ruth M. J. Byrne
- School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Ireland
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30
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Shepard J, O'Grady A. What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice? Conscious Cogn 2016; 48:138-148. [PMID: 27871049 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.11.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2016] [Revised: 10/26/2016] [Accepted: 11/13/2016] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Our concept of choice is integral to the way we understand others and ourselves, especially when considering ourselves as free and responsible agents. Despite the importance of this concept, there has been little empirical work on it. In this paper we report four experiments that provide evidence for two concepts of choice-namely, a concept of choice that is operative in the phrase having a choice and another that is operative in the phrase making a choice. The experiments indicate that the two concepts of choice can be differentiated from each other on the basis of the kind of alternatives to which each is sensitive. The results indicate that the folk concept of choice is more nuanced than has been assumed. This new, empirically informed understanding of the folk concept of choice has important implications for debates concerning free will, responsibility, and other debates spanning psychology and philosophy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jason Shepard
- Emory University, Department of Psychology, United States; Emory University, Center for Ethics, Neuroethics Program, United States.
| | - Aneyn O'Grady
- Emory University, Department of Psychology, United States
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31
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Monroe AE, Brady GL, Malle BF. This Isn’t the Free Will Worth Looking For. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2016. [DOI: 10.1177/1948550616667616] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will beliefs but found strong effects when manipulating the perceived choice capacity of the judged agent. Study 4 used pretested narratives that varied agents’ apparent free will and found that perceived choice capacity mediated the relationship between free will and blame. These results suggest that people’s general beliefs about whether free will exists have no impact on moral judgments but specific judgments about the agent’s choice capacity do.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew E. Monroe
- Department of Psychology, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA
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32
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Libertus K, Greif ML, Needham AW, Pelphrey K. Infants' observation of tool-use events over the first year of life. J Exp Child Psychol 2016; 152:123-135. [PMID: 27522041 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.07.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2016] [Revised: 07/06/2016] [Accepted: 07/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
How infants observe a goal-directed instrumental action provides a unique window into their understanding of others' behavior. In this study, we investigated eye-gaze patterns while infants observed events in which an actor used a tool on an object. Comparisons among 4-, 7-, 10-, and 12-month-old infants and adults reveal changes in infants' looking patterns with age; following an initial face bias, infants' scan path eventually shows a dynamic integration of both the actor's face and the objects on which they act. This shift may mark a transition in infants' understanding of the critical components of tool-use events and their understanding of others' behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Klaus Libertus
- Department of Psychology and Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
| | | | - Amy Work Needham
- Department of Psychology and Human Development, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203, USA
| | - Kevin Pelphrey
- Autism and Neurodevelopmental Disorders Institute, The George Washington University and Children's National Health System, Washington, DC 20037, USA
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33
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Feltz A, Cokely ET, Nelson B. Experimental philosophy needs to matter: Reply to Andow and Cova. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1125458] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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34
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O’Dea CJ, Saucier DA. Negative emotions versus target descriptions: Examining perceptions of racial slurs as expressive and descriptive. GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 2016. [DOI: 10.1177/1368430216634193] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
There is a debate about whether racial slurs operate primarily as descriptives (of the ethnicity of targets) or expressives (of negative emotions toward targets). In three studies (overall N = 471), we examined whether different racial slurs used in different situations led to slurs being perceived as descriptive versus expressive, and whether this distinction was related to the perceived offensiveness of the slurs. Our results showed the descriptive and expressive natures of racial slurs are directly related to their perceived offensiveness. Specifically, as the perceived offensiveness of slurs increase in intensity, the slurs are perceived as more negatively expressive, more descriptive, less positively expressive, and comparatively less descriptive and more expressive.
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35
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Turri J. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition. Cogn Sci 2016; 41 Suppl 3:403-424. [PMID: 27016174 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12372] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/02/2015] [Revised: 01/12/2016] [Accepted: 01/15/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with acting freely and being morally responsible. Incompatibilism is the opposite view. It is often claimed that compatibilism or incompatibilism is a natural part of ordinary social cognition. That is, it is often claimed that patterns in our everyday social judgments reveal an implicit commitment to either compatibilism or incompatibilism. This paper reports five experiments designed to identify such patterns. The results support a nuanced hybrid account: The central tendencies in ordinary social cognition are compatibilism about moral responsibility, compatibilism about positive moral accountability (i.e., about deserving credit for good outcomes), neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism about negative moral accountability (i.e., about deserving blame for bad outcomes), compatibilism about choice for actions with positive outcomes, and incompatibilism about choice for actions with negative or neutral outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- John Turri
- Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo
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36
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Murray D, Lombrozo T. Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Cogn Sci 2016; 41:447-481. [PMID: 26864919 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12338] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/02/2015] [Revised: 10/01/2015] [Accepted: 10/06/2015] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
If someone brings about an outcome without intending to, is she causally and morally responsible for it? What if she acts intentionally, but as the result of manipulation by another agent? Previous research has shown that an agent's mental states can affect attributions of causal and moral responsibility to that agent, but little is known about what effect one agent's mental states can have on attributions to another agent. In Experiment 1, we replicate findings that manipulation lowers attributions of responsibility to manipulated agents. Experiments 2-7 isolate which features of manipulation drive this effect, a crucial issue for both philosophical debates about free will and attributions of responsibility in situations involving social influence more generally. Our results suggest that "bypassing" a manipulated agent's mental states generates the greatest reduction in responsibility, and we explain our results in terms of the effects that one agent's mental states can have on the counterfactual relations between another agent and an outcome.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dylan Murray
- Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
| | - Tania Lombrozo
- Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
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37
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Ye H, Chen S, Huang D, Zheng H, Jia Y, Luo J. Modulation of Neural Activity in the Temporoparietal Junction with Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Changes the Role of Beliefs in Moral Judgment. Front Hum Neurosci 2015; 9:659. [PMID: 26696868 PMCID: PMC4677104 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00659] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/11/2015] [Accepted: 11/19/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Judgments about whether an action is morally right or wrong typically depend on our capacity to infer the actor’s beliefs and the outcomes of the action. Prior neuroimaging studies have found that mental state (e.g., beliefs, intentions) attribution for moral judgment involves a complex neural network that includes the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). However, neuroimaging studies cannot demonstrate a direct causal relationship between the activity of this brain region and mental state attribution for moral judgment. In the current study, we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to transiently alter neural activity in the TPJ. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three stimulation treatments (right anodal/left cathodal tDCS, left anodal/right cathodal tDCS, or sham stimulation). Each participant was required to complete two similar tasks of moral judgment before receiving tDCS and after receiving tDCS. We studied whether tDCS to the TPJ altered mental state attribution for moral judgment. The results indicated that restraining the activity of the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) or the left the temporoparietal junction (LTPJ) decreased the role of beliefs in moral judgments and led to an increase in the dependance of the participants’ moral judgments on the action’s consequences. We also found that the participants exhibited reduced reaction times both in the cases of intentional harms and attempted harms after receiving right cathodal/left anodal tDCS to the TPJ. These findings inform and extend the current neural models of moral judgment and moral development in typically developing people and in individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hang Ye
- College of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences at Zhejiang University Hangzhou, China
| | - Shu Chen
- College of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences at Zhejiang University Hangzhou, China
| | - Daqiang Huang
- College of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences at Zhejiang University Hangzhou, China
| | - Haoli Zheng
- College of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences at Zhejiang University Hangzhou, China
| | - Yongmin Jia
- College of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences at Zhejiang University Hangzhou, China
| | - Jun Luo
- School of Economics and International Trade, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics Hangzhou, China ; Neuro and Behavior EconLab, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics Hangzhou, China
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38
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Unifying morality’s influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities. Cognition 2015; 145:30-42. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 48] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2014] [Revised: 07/31/2015] [Accepted: 08/03/2015] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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39
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Guglielmo S. Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review. Front Psychol 2015; 6:1637. [PMID: 26579022 PMCID: PMC4626624 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01637] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2015] [Accepted: 10/12/2015] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
How do humans make moral judgments about others’ behavior? This article reviews dominant models of moral judgment, organizing them within an overarching framework of information processing. This framework poses two distinct questions: (1) What input information guides moral judgments? and (2) What psychological processes generate these judgments? Information Models address the first question, identifying critical information elements (including causality, intentionality, and mental states) that shape moral judgments. A subclass of Biased Information Models holds that perceptions of these information elements are themselves driven by prior moral judgments. Processing Models address the second question, and existing models have focused on the relative contribution of intuitive versus deliberative processes. This review organizes existing moral judgment models within this framework and critically evaluates them on empirical and theoretical grounds; it then outlines a general integrative model grounded in information processing, and concludes with conceptual and methodological suggestions for future research. The information-processing framework provides a useful theoretical lens through which to organize extant and future work in the rapidly growing field of moral judgment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Steve Guglielmo
- Department of Psychology, Macalester College, Saint Paul MN, USA
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40
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Increasing the role of belief information in moral judgments by stimulating the right temporoparietal junction. Neuropsychologia 2015; 77:400-8. [PMID: 26375450 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.09.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/25/2015] [Revised: 08/28/2015] [Accepted: 09/10/2015] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Morality plays a vital role in our social life. A vast body of research has suggested that moral judgments rely on cognitive processes mediated by the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), an area thought to be involved in belief attribution. Here we assessed the role of the rTPJ in moral judgments directly by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)--a non-invasive brain stimulation technique that, by applying a weak current to the scalp, allows modulating cortical excitability of the area being stimulated. Participants were randomly and equally assigned to receive anodal stimulation (to increase cortical excitability), cathodal stimulation (to decrease cortical excitability), or sham (placebo) stimulation over the rTPJ before completing a moral judgment task. Participants read stories in which protagonists produced either a negative or a neutral outcome based on either a negative or a neutral belief that they were causing harm or no harm, respectively. Results revealed a selective group difference when judging the moral permissibility of accidental harms (belief neutral, outcome negative), but not intentional harms (belief negative, outcome negative), attempted harms (belief negative, outcome neutral), or neutral acts (belief neutral, outcome neutral). Specifically, participants who received anodal stimulation assigned less blame to accidental harms compared to participants who received cathodal or sham stimulation. These results are consistent with previous findings showing that the degree of rTPJ activation reflects reliance on the agent's innocent intention. Crucially, our findings provide direct evidence supporting the critical role of the rTPJ in mediating belief attribution for moral judgment.
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41
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Abstract
It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1–3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the “ought implies can” principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a “blame implies can” principle.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wesley Buckwalter
- Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
- * E-mail:
| | - John Turri
- Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
- Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
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42
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Goodyear K, Lee MR, O'Hara M, Chernyak S, Walter H, Parasuraman R, Krueger F. Oxytocin influences intuitions about the relationship between belief in free will and moral responsibility. Soc Neurosci 2015; 11:88-96. [PMID: 25916658 DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2015.1037463] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/18/2023]
Abstract
Philosophers have proposed that laypeople can have deterministic or indeterministic intuitions about the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. However, the psychophysiological mechanisms that generate these extreme intuitions are still underexplored. Exogenous oxytocin offers a unique opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of these underlying mechanisms, since this neuropeptide influences a wide range of outcomes related to social cognition and prosociality. This study investigated the effects of intranasal oxytocin on intuitions about the relationship between free will and moral responsibility by applying a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, between-subject design. Healthy male participants rated the moral responsibility of a hypothetical offender, who committed crimes in either a primed deterministic or an indeterministic universe. Under placebo, participants held the offender more morally responsible when acting in an indeterministic compared to a deterministic universe, which could be accredited to recognition of the offender's freely chosen action to commit the crimes. Under oxytocin, participants rated the offender's actions with greater leniency and similarly assigned lower moral responsibility in both universes. These findings strengthen the assumption that a person can have different intuitions about the relationship between free will and moral responsibility, which can be presumably dependent on motivational states associated with affiliation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly Goodyear
- a Department of Molecular Neuroscience , George Mason University , Fairfax , VA , USA
| | - Mary R Lee
- b Laboratory of Clinical and Translational Studies , National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism , Bethesda , MD , USA
| | - Martin O'Hara
- c Virginia Hospital Center, Fairfax Hospital , Arlington , VA , USA
| | - Sergey Chernyak
- a Department of Molecular Neuroscience , George Mason University , Fairfax , VA , USA
| | - Henrik Walter
- d Division of Mind and Brain Research, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy , Charité Universitaetsmedizin , Berlin , Germany
| | - Raja Parasuraman
- e Department of Psychology , George Mason University , Fairfax , VA , USA
| | - Frank Krueger
- a Department of Molecular Neuroscience , George Mason University , Fairfax , VA , USA.,e Department of Psychology , George Mason University , Fairfax , VA , USA
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43
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Monroe AE, Reeder GD, James L. Perceptions of intentionality for goal-related action: behavioral description matters. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0119841. [PMID: 25781315 PMCID: PMC4362945 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0119841] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2014] [Accepted: 02/03/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Perceptions of intentionality critically guide everyday social interactions, though the literature provides diverging portraits of how such judgments are made. One view suggests that people have an "intentionality bias," predisposing them toward labeling behaviors as intentional. A second view focuses on a more complex pattern of reasoning whereby judgments of intentionality are shaped by information about social context and mental states. Drawing on the theory of action-identification, we attempt to integrate these two perspectives. We propose that people parse intentionality into two categories: judgments about concrete, low-level behaviors and judgments about relatively more abstract, high-level behaviors. Evidence from five studies supports this distinction. Low-level behaviors were perceived as intentional regardless of mental state information, supporting the "intentionality bias" view. In contrast, judgments about the intentionality of high-level behaviors varied depending on social context and mental states, supporting the systematic view of intentionality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew E. Monroe
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
| | - Glenn D. Reeder
- Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, United States of America
| | - Lauren James
- Department of Psychology, DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America
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44
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Uhlmann EL, Pizarro DA, Diermeier D. A Person-Centered Approach to Moral Judgment. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2015; 10:72-81. [DOI: 10.1177/1745691614556679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 161] [Impact Index Per Article: 17.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.
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45
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Greene JD. The rise of moral cognition. Cognition 2014; 135:39-42. [PMID: 25498900 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2014] [Revised: 11/15/2014] [Accepted: 11/17/2014] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Abstract
The field of moral cognition has grown rapidly in recent years thanks in no small part to Cognition. Consistent with its interdisciplinary tradition, Cognition encouraged the growth of this field by supporting empirical research conducted by philosophers as well as research native to neighboring fields such as social psychology, evolutionary game theory, and behavioral economics. This research has been exceptionally diverse both in its content and methodology. I argue that this is because morality is unified at the functional level, but not at the cognitive level, much as vehicles are unified by shared function rather than shared mechanics. Research in moral cognition, then, has progressed by explaining the phenomena that we identify as "moral" (for high-level functional reasons) in terms of diverse cognitive components that are not specific to morality. In light of this, research on moral cognition may continue to flourish, not as the identification and characterization of distinctive moral processes, but as a testing ground for theories of high-level, integrative cognitive function.
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46
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Phillips J, Shaw A. Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning. Cogn Sci 2014; 39:1320-47. [DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12194] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2013] [Revised: 05/12/2014] [Accepted: 05/21/2014] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Phillips
- Department of Psychology; Yale University
- Department of Philosophy; Yale University
| | - Alex Shaw
- Department of Psychology; University of Chicago
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Rich AN, Bullot NJ. Keeping track: the tracking and identification of human agents (editorial preface). Top Cogn Sci 2014; 6:560-6. [PMID: 25219968 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12112] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Anina N Rich
- Perception in Action Research Centre & Department of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Human Sciences
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Kubota JT, Mojdehbakhsh R, Raio C, Brosch T, Uleman JS, Phelps EA. Stressing the person: legal and everyday person attributions under stress. Biol Psychol 2014; 103:117-24. [PMID: 25175000 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.07.020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2014] [Revised: 07/22/2014] [Accepted: 07/26/2014] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
When determining the cause of a person's behavior, perceivers often overweigh dispositional explanations and underweigh situational explanations, an error known as the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). The FAE occurs in part because dispositional explanations are relatively automatic, whereas considering the situation requires additional cognitive effort. Stress is known to impair the prefrontal cortex and executive functions important for the attribution process. We investigated if stress increases dispositional attributions in common place and legal situations. Experiencing a physiological stressor increased participants' cortisol, dispositional attributions of common everyday behaviors, and negative evaluations. When determining whether a crime was due to the defendant's disposition or the mitigating situation, self-reported stress correlated with increased dispositional judgments of defendant's behavior. These findings indicate that stress may make people more likely to commit the FAE and less favorable in their evaluations of others both in daily life and when making socially consequential judicial decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jennifer T Kubota
- Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA.
| | | | - Candace Raio
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA
| | - Tobias Brosch
- Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, 40, Boulevard du Pont d'Arve, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland
| | - James S Uleman
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA
| | - Elizabeth A Phelps
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA; Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA; Nathan Kline Institute, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA.
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Monroe AE, Dillon KD, Malle BF. Bringing free will down to Earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment. Conscious Cogn 2014; 27:100-8. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 65] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2013] [Revised: 04/17/2014] [Accepted: 04/22/2014] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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50
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Patil I, Silani G. Alexithymia increases moral acceptability of accidental harms. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2014. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2014.929137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/19/2022]
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