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Zheng Z, Trübutschek D, Huang S, Cai Y, Melloni L. What you saw a while ago determines what you see now: Extending awareness priming to implicit behaviors and uncovering its temporal dynamics. Cognition 2025; 259:106104. [PMID: 40058128 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106104] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2023] [Revised: 01/27/2025] [Accepted: 02/27/2025] [Indexed: 04/09/2025]
Abstract
Past experiences influence how we perceive and respond to the present. A striking example is awareness priming, in which prior conscious perception enhances visibility and discrimination of subsequent stimuli. In this partially pre-registered study, we address a long-standing debate and broaden the scope of awareness priming by demonstrating its effects on implicit motor responses. Using a large sample size (N = 48) and a novel continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm, we show that prior conscious perception not only boosts subjective visibility, objective discrimination accuracy, but also enhances implicit motor responses of subsequently encountered threshold-level stimuli. Exploratory temporal dynamics analyses confirm the transient nature of awareness priming: It peaks rapidly and decays gradually, even when high-visibility trials, which could shape subsequent perception, persist. This temporal profile sets awareness priming apart from other influences of prior experience, such as serial dependence or perceptual learning. We also make a novel observation: Recent conscious experience enhances discrimination accuracy, whereas more distant experiences primarily improve subjective visibility. These findings suggest that prior conscious perception shapes conscious awareness and discrimination accuracy through independent mechanisms, likely mediated by brain areas with differing temporal receptive windows across the cortical hierarchy. By shedding new light on the scope and temporal dynamics of awareness priming, this work advances our understanding of how previous conscious perception shapes current perception and behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zefan Zheng
- Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China; Research Group Neural Circuits, Consciousness and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; Department of Psychology, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
| | - Darinka Trübutschek
- Research Group Neural Circuits, Consciousness and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
| | - Shuyue Huang
- Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Yongchun Cai
- Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
| | - Lucia Melloni
- Research Group Neural Circuits, Consciousness and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; Predictive Brain Department, Research Center One Health Ruhr, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
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Kiefer M, Kammer T. The Relation Between Subjective and Objective Measures of Visual Awareness: Current Evidence, Attempt of a Synthesis and Future Research Directions. J Cogn 2024; 7:59. [PMID: 39035071 PMCID: PMC11259121 DOI: 10.5334/joc.381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2024] [Accepted: 06/23/2024] [Indexed: 07/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Within the realm of consciousness research, different methods of measuring the content of visual awareness are used: On the one hand, subjective measures require a report of sensory experiences related to a stimulus. On the other hand, objective measures rely on the observer's performance to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus. The most appropriate measure of awareness is currently debated. To contribute to this debate, we review findings on the relation between subjective and objective measures of awareness. Although subjective measures sometimes lag behind objective measures, a substantial number of studies demonstrates a convergence of measures. Based on the reviewed studies, we identify five aspects relevant for achieving a convergence of measures. Future research could then identify and empirically test the boundary conditions, under which a convergence or divergence of subjective and measures of awareness is observed.
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Poyo Solanas M, Zhan M, de Gelder B. Ultrahigh Field fMRI Reveals Different Roles of the Temporal and Frontoparietal Cortices in Subjective Awareness. J Neurosci 2024; 44:e0425232023. [PMID: 38531633 PMCID: PMC11097282 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.0425-23.2023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2023] [Revised: 12/07/2023] [Accepted: 12/08/2023] [Indexed: 03/28/2024] Open
Abstract
A central question in consciousness theories is whether one is dealing with a dichotomous ("all-or-none") or a gradual phenomenon. In this 7T fMRI study, we investigated whether dichotomy or gradualness in fact depends on the brain region associated with perceptual awareness reports. Both male and female human subjects performed an emotion discrimination task (fear vs neutral bodies) presented under continuous flash suppression with trial-based perceptual awareness measures. Behaviorally, recognition sensitivity increased linearly with increased stimuli awareness and was at chance level during perceptual unawareness. Physiologically, threat stimuli triggered a slower heart rate than neutral ones during "almost clear" stimulus experience, indicating freezing behavior. Brain results showed that activity in the occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal regions as well as in the amygdala increased with increased stimulus awareness while early visual areas showed the opposite pattern. The relationship between temporal area activity and perceptual awareness best fitted a gradual model while the activity in frontoparietal areas fitted a dichotomous model. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that specific experimental decisions, such as stimulus type or the approach used to evaluate awareness, play pivotal roles in consciousness studies and warrant careful consideration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marta Poyo Solanas
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht 6229 EV, The Netherlands
| | - Minye Zhan
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht 6229 EV, The Netherlands
| | - Beatrice de Gelder
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht 6229 EV, The Netherlands
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Schmidt T, Biafora M. A theory of visibility measures in the dissociation paradigm. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:65-88. [PMID: 37528279 PMCID: PMC10977871 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02332-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 08/03/2023]
Abstract
Research on perception without awareness primarily relies on the dissociation paradigm, which compares a measure of awareness of a critical stimulus (direct measure) with a measure indicating that the stimulus has been processed at all (indirect measure). We argue that dissociations between direct and indirect measures can only be demonstrated with respect to the critical stimulus feature that generates the indirect effect, and the observer's awareness of that feature, the critical cue. We expand Kahneman's (Psychological Bulletin, 70, 404-425, 1968) concept of criterion content to comprise the set of all cues that an observer actually uses to perform the direct task. Different direct measures can then be compared by studying the overlap of their criterion contents and their containment of the critical cue. Because objective and subjective measures may integrate different sets of cues, one measure generally cannot replace the other without sacrificing important information. Using a simple mathematical formalization, we redefine and clarify the concepts of validity, exclusiveness, and exhaustiveness in the dissociation paradigm, show how dissociations among different awareness measures falsify both single-valued measures and monocausal theories of "consciousness," and formulate the demand that theories of visual awareness should be sufficiently specific to explain dissociations among different facets of awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Schmidt
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Visual Attention and Awareness Laboratory, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), Erwin-Schrödinger-Str. Geb. 57, D-67663, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
| | - Melanie Biafora
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Visual Attention and Awareness Laboratory, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), Erwin-Schrödinger-Str. Geb. 57, D-67663, Kaiserslautern, Germany
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Bola M, Paź M, Doradzińska Ł, Nowicka A. The self-face captures attention without consciousness: Evidence from the N2pc ERP component analysis. Psychophysiology 2020; 58:e13759. [PMID: 33355938 DOI: 10.1111/psyp.13759] [Citation(s) in RCA: 33] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2020] [Revised: 10/12/2020] [Accepted: 11/27/2020] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
It is well established that stimuli representing or associated with ourselves, like our own name or an image of our own face, benefit from preferential processing. However, two key questions concerning the self-prioritization mechanism remain to be addressed. First, does it operate in an automatic manner during the early processing, or rather in a more controlled fashion at later processing stages? Second, is it specific to the self-related stimuli, or can it be activated also by other stimuli that are familiar or salient? We conducted a dot-probe experiment to investigate the mechanism behind the attentional prioritization of the self-face image and to tackle both questions. The former, by employing a backwards masking procedure to isolate the early and preconscious processing stages. The latter, by investigating whether a face that becomes visually familiar due to repeated presentations is able to capture attention in a similar manner as the self-face. Analysis of the N2pc ERP component revealed that the self-face image automatically captures attention, both when processed consciously and unconsciously. In contrast, the visually familiar face did not attract attention, neither in the conscious, nor in the unconscious condition. We conclude that the self-prioritization mechanism is early and automatic, and is not triggered by mere visual familiarity. More generally, our results provide further evidence for efficient unconscious processing of faces, and for dissociation between attention and consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michał Bola
- Laboratory of Brain Imaging, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
| | - Marta Paź
- Laboratory of Brain Imaging, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
| | - Łucja Doradzińska
- Laboratory of Brain Imaging, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
| | - Anna Nowicka
- Laboratory of Language Neurobiology, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
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Doradzińska Ł, Wójcik MJ, Paź M, Nowicka MM, Nowicka A, Bola M. Unconscious perception of one's own name modulates amplitude of the P3B ERP component. Neuropsychologia 2020; 147:107564. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2020.107564] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2020] [Revised: 07/10/2020] [Accepted: 07/13/2020] [Indexed: 12/30/2022]
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Andersen LM, Overgaard M, Tong F. Visual expectations change subjective experience without changing performance. Conscious Cogn 2019; 71:59-69. [PMID: 30928899 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.03.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/31/2018] [Revised: 02/07/2019] [Accepted: 03/20/2019] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
It is widely believed that visual expectations can change the subjective experiences of humans. We investigated how visual expectations in a recognition task affected objective performance and subjective perception. Using a 2-alternative-forced-choice task based on digit recognition of briefly presented and visually masked digits, we found over two experiments that expectations changed the quality of the experiences without changing the performance capabilities associated with the quality of experience. Expectations were manipulated by providing a cue indicating the set of possible digits that might appear on each trial. The results also inform the debate about whether subjective experiences can be categorized in a dichotomous manner or in a graded manner. We found that subjective experiences were graded near the objective threshold and more dichotomous away from the threshold. Furthermore, distinct expectations resulted in a more dichotomous distribution of subjective experience. We also provide evidence of an interesting relationship between stimulus duration, objective performance and subjective ratings. Only experiences that were rated as evoking some degree of perception showed systematic improvements in objective performance as a function of stimulus duration. These findings suggest that subjective experience cannot be understood without considering the broader cognitive context, namely that the quality of subjective experiences is dependent on a multitude of factors such as attention, task requirements and cognitive expectations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lau Møller Andersen
- NatMEG, Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, Nobels väg 9, 171 77 Stockholm, Sweden; Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit (CNRU), Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience (CFIN), Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Morten Overgaard
- Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit (CNRU), Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience (CFIN), Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
| | - Frank Tong
- Psychology Department, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA
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Abstract
A key mechanism behind preferential processing of self-related information might be an early and automatic capture of attention. Therefore, the present study tested a hypothesis that one's own face will attract bottom-up attention even without conscious identification. To test this, we used a dot-probe paradigm with electrophysiological recordings, in which participants ( N = 18) viewed masked and unmasked pairs of faces (other, self) presented laterally. Analysis of the sensitivity measure d ' indicated that faces were not consciously identified in the masked condition. A clear N2 posterior-contralateral (N2pc) component (a neural marker of attention shifts) was found in both the masked and unmasked conditions, revealing that one's own face automatically captures attention when processed unconsciously. Therefore, our study (a) demonstrates that self-related information is boosted at an early (preconscious) stage of processing, (b) identifies further features (beyond simple physical ones) that cause automatic attention capture, and (c) provides further evidence for the dissociative nature of attention and consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michał J Wójcik
- 1 Laboratory of Language Neurobiology, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences
| | - Maria M Nowicka
- 1 Laboratory of Language Neurobiology, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences
| | - Michał Bola
- 2 Laboratory of Brain Imaging, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences
| | - Anna Nowicka
- 1 Laboratory of Language Neurobiology, Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology of Polish Academy of Sciences
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Do semantic priming and retrieval of stimulus-response associations depend on conscious perception? Conscious Cogn 2019; 69:36-51. [PMID: 30711787 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.01.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/25/2018] [Revised: 01/07/2019] [Accepted: 01/16/2019] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
What function does conscious perception serve in human behavior? Many studies relied on unconscious priming to demonstrate that unseen stimuli can be extensively processed. However, showing a small unconscious priming effect falls short of showing that the process underlying such priming is independent of conscious perception. Here, we investigated to what extent the retrieval of learned stimulus-response associations and semantic priming depend on conscious perception by using a liminal-prime paradigm that allows comparing conscious and unconscious processing under the same stimulus conditions. The results revealed two striking dissociations. First, S-R priming was entirely independent of conscious perception, whereas semantic processing was strongly enhanced by it. Second, while priming emerged on fast trials for all conditions, only conscious semantic priming was observed on slow trials. The implications of these findings for the time course of response priming and for the contribution of unconscious processes to fast vs. slow responses are discussed.
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Kimchi R, Devyatko D, Sabary S. Can perceptual grouping unfold in the absence of awareness? Comparing grouping during continuous flash suppression and sandwich masking. Conscious Cogn 2018. [PMID: 29524681 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.02.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Abstract
In this study we examined whether grouping by luminance similarity and grouping by connectedness can occur in the absence of visual awareness, using a priming paradigm and two methods to render the prime invisible, CFS and sandwich masking under matched conditions. For both groupings, significant response priming effects were observed when the prime was reported invisible under sandwich masking, but none were obtained under CFS. These results provide evidence for unconscious grouping, converging with previous findings showing that visual awareness is not essential for certain perceptual organization processes to occur. They are also consistent with findings indicating that processing during CFS is limited, and suggest the involvement of higher visual areas in perceptual organization. Moreover, these results demonstrate that whether a process can occur without awareness is dependent on the level at which the suppression induced by the method used for rendering the stimulus inaccessible to awareness takes place.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ruth Kimchi
- Department of Psychology and Institute of Information Processing and Decision Making, University of Haifa, Israel.
| | - Dina Devyatko
- Department of Psychology and Institute of Information Processing and Decision Making, University of Haifa, Israel
| | - Shahar Sabary
- Department of Psychology and Institute of Information Processing and Decision Making, University of Haifa, Israel
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Avneon M, Lamy D. Reexamining unconscious response priming: A liminal-prime paradigm. Conscious Cogn 2018; 59:87-103. [PMID: 29329968 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.12.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2017] [Revised: 11/29/2017] [Accepted: 12/28/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
Research on the limits of unconscious processing typically relies on the subliminal-prime paradigm. However, this paradigm is limited in the issues it can address. Here, we examined the implications of using the liminal-prime paradigm, which allows comparing unconscious and conscious priming with constant stimulation. We adapted an iconic demonstration of unconscious response priming to the liminal-prime paradigm. On the one hand, temporal attention allocated to the prime and its relevance to the task increased the magnitude of response priming. On the other hand, the longer RTs associated with the dual task inherent to the paradigm resulted in response priming being underestimated, because unconscious priming effects were shorter-lived than conscious-priming effects. Nevertheless, when the impact of long RTs was alleviated by considering the fastest trials or by imposing a response deadline, conscious response priming remained considerably larger than unconscious response priming. These findings suggest that conscious perception strongly modulates response priming.
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