Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming more morally permissible?

The role of empathy in trolley problems and variants: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The role of empathy in morality is a subject of ongoing scientific debate due to the lack of systematic reviews and meta-analyses on this topic. To address this gap, we conducted a PRISMA-based systematic quantitative review to investigate the role of empathy in moral judgements, decision-making, and inclinations using trolley problems and variants, which are popular types of moral dilemmas that explore utilitarianism and deontology. We searched for articles in four databases (PsycINFO, Pubmed, WorldWideScience, and Scopus) and performed citation searches. Out of 661 records, we selected 34 that studied the associations between empathy and moral judgements, moral decision-making, and/or moral inclinations. Six meta-analyses and systematic reviews of these records consistently showed small to moderate associations between affective empathy and these moral parameters, particularly in personal moral dilemmas involving intentional harm (although some approaches highlighted more complex associations between these parameters). Regarding other empathy domains, most studies found limited or insignificant links between cognitive empathy domains and moral judgements, decision-making, and inclinations. We discuss the nuances and implications of these results.

The Consequentialist Scale: Translation and empirical investigation in a Greek sample

The Consequentialist Scale (Robinson, 2012) [89] assesses the endorsement of consequentialist and deontological moral beliefs. This study empirically investigated the application of the Greek translation of the Consequentialist Scale in a sample of native Greek speakers. Specifically, 415 native Greek speakers completed the questionnaire. To uncover the underlying structure of the 10 items in the Consequentialist Scale, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted. The results revealed a three-factor solution, where the deontology factor exhibited the same structure as the original work by Robinson (2012) [89], while the original consequentialism factor split into two separate factors. Significant Pearson's r correlations were observed between age and responses to the Consequentialist Scale. Separate EFAs were conducted for two age groups based on a medial split: younger (36 years old or less) and older (more than 36 years old). Interestingly, the younger group exhibited a two-factor solution with the same structure as the original work, while the older group showed a three-factor solution. A hierarchical k-means cluster analysis revealed that the cluster of participants who scored higher in deontology compared to consequentialism primarily consisted of older participants, whereas the two other clusters comprised of younger participants exhibited the reverse pattern. Neither gender nor previous experience with philosophy significantly affected scores on the Consequentialist Scale. Overall, our study provides evidence that the Consequentialist Scale is suitable for use in the Greek population.

Cognitive decline, socioemotional change, or both? How the science of aging can inform future research on sacrificial moral dilemmas

Older adults comprise the fastest-growing population in the United States. By exercising their right to vote, guiding the value systems of future generations, and holding political office, they shape the moral context of society. It is therefore imperative that we understand older adults' capacity for moral decision-making. Although the vast majority of research on moral decision-making has either focused specifically on younger adults or has not considered age, recent work points to age-related differences in sacrificial moral decision-making, with cognitively healthy older adults making more deontological decisions relative to younger adults. Although only a small number of studies have to date examined age-related differences, there is a wealth of relevant literature on cognitive aging, as well as on sacrificial moral decision-making in younger adults, that point to possible mechanistic explanations for the observed age-related differences. The goal of this review is to situate these age-related differences in sacrificial moral decision-making in the context of these existing literatures in order to guide future, theory-informed, research in this area. We specifically highlight age-related decline in cognitive abilities purported to support utilitarian moral decision-making in younger adults, along with age-related changes to socioemotional information processing as potential mechanistic explanations for these age-related differences. The last section of this review discusses how age-related neural changes may contribute to both cognitive decline and motivational shifts, highlighting the importance for future research to understand brain-behavior relationships on the topic of sacrificial moral decision-making and aging.

Age-related differences in Default Mode Network resting-state functional connectivity but not gray matter volume relate to sacrificial moral decision-making and working memory performance

Older adults make fewer utilitarian decisions than younger adults during sacrificial moral dilemmas, which are associated with age-related reductions in Default Mode Network resting-state functional connectivity. Decreases on tasks associated with fluid cognitive abilities, such as working memory capacity, are also associated with age-related Default Mode Network changes. Regions within this network demonstrate some of the greatest age-related gray matter atrophy. Age-related changes in structure and function of the Default Mode Network may be associated with poorer working memory capacity and reduced utilitarian moral decision-making. Alternatively, recent theories suggest that age-related changes to Default Mode Network function may be adaptive in the context of tasks that include socioemotional components. As such, reduced within-network resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network may be associated with differential outcomes in moral decision-making for younger and older adults. In the present study, there were no age-related differences in working memory capacity. Older adults were less likely than younger adults to indicate the utilitarian option when trials involved Instrumental harm. Generally, increased within-network resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network was associated with better working memory performance in both groups, and reduced bias to endorse the utilitarian option during Incidental dilemmas compared to Instrumental dilemmas in younger adults. Older adults with similar moral decision-making behavior to younger adults demonstrated increased coupling between Default Mode Network and Salience Network regions. These findings suggest that Default Mode Network functional integrity may be differentially associated with age-related changes to working memory capacity and sacrificial moral decision-making.

Awareness to utilitarian responses in later life: an ERP study with moral dilemmas

The current study aims to provide the first insights into the neural correlates of utilitarian and deontological responses to moral dilemmas across the lifespan.To this purpose, younger (n=30), middle-aged (n=29), and older adults (n=29) completed moral dilemmas during an EEG recording.Behaviorally, groups did not differ in the number of utilitarian responses and reaction times. However, at the neural level, older adults had higher Error Positivity (Pe) amplitudes than younger adults after utilitarian responses.As this effect was specific to utilitarian responses, it suggests that utilitarian decisions may induce increased conflict in the older group. These findings highlight that older adults may be more aware of the harmful outcomes of utilitarian decisions during moral decision-making.

Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.

Trolleys, triage and Covid-19: the role of psychological realism in sacrificial dilemmas

At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, frontline medical professionals at intensive care units around the world faced gruesome decisions about how to ration life-saving medical resources. These events provided a unique lens through which to understand how the public reasons about real-world dilemmas involving trade-offs between human lives. In three studies (total N = 2298), we examined people's moral attitudes toward the triage of acute coronavirus patients, and found elevated support for utilitarian triage policies. These utilitarian tendencies did not stem from period change in moral attitudes relative to pre-pandemic levels-but rather, from the heightened realism of triage dilemmas. Participants favoured utilitarian resolutions of critical care dilemmas when compared to structurally analogous, non-medical dilemmas-and such support was rooted in prosocial dispositions, including empathy and impartial beneficence. Finally, despite abundant evidence of political polarisation surrounding Covid-19, moral views about critical care triage differed modestly, if at all, between liberals and conservatives. Taken together, our findings highlight people's robust support for utilitarian measures in the face of a global public health threat, and illustrate how the dominant methods in moral psychology (e.g. trolley cases) may deliver insights that do not generalise to real-world moral dilemmas.

Temporal Stability of Moral Dilemma Judgments: A Longitudinal Analysis Using the CNI Model

Although moral dilemma judgments are influenced by a variety of situational factors, there is evidence for considerable disagreement between individuals. Using the CNI model to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas, the current research examined the temporal stability of individual differences along the three dimensions. Across two time points 1 month apart, sensitivity to consequences (r = .81) and sensitivity to norms (r = .84) showed high levels of stability that were comparable to the Big Five personality traits; general preference for inaction versus action showed lower stability (r = .41). Exploratory analyses revealed reliable associations between the three dimensions of moral dilemma judgments and three of the Big Five (extraversion, agreeableness, openness). Together, these findings provide evidence for stable individual differences in moral dilemma judgments that are related to basic personality traits.

The development and consequences of moral essentialism

Children report that many natural kinds, social groups, and psychological characteristics arise from an innate, internal "essence" that is rooted in biology and remains stable over time. These perceptions persist into adulthood, albeit often in weakened form. This chapter argues that in addition to the domains previously examined in the essentialism literature, children-and to some extent adults-also view moral characteristics in essentialist terms. This form of essentialism has important social consequences, including in the area of prosocial behavior and in the legal domain. The body of evidence reviewed here suggests that children's and adults' moral judgments depend not just on what people do but also on perceptions of who those people are, i.e., whether they are people of good or bad moral character.

The 5-HTTLPR polymorphism impacts moral permissibility of impersonal harmful behaviors

Inspired by the roles of serotonin in an emotional aversion to harmful actions, we examined to what extent serotonin transporter gene (5-HTT)–linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR), a proxy for measuring serotonin function, underpinned the individual differences in moral judgment through cross-sectional analysis and two-wave comparison. The cross-sectional analysis with a larger cohort (N = 1197) showed that the SS carriers of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism, corresponding to the low ratio of serotonin recycling from the synaptic cleft, rated impersonal harmful actions (e.g. flipping a switch to divert a train to hit one person instead of five people) as more permissible as compared with the L-allele carriers. The two-wave comparison with a subsample from the larger cohort (N = 563) indicated that the association between 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and moral permissibility of impersonal harmful actions was stable from wave 1 to wave 2. Thus, these findings highlight the importance of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism to harmful moral behaviors.

Universals and variations in moral decisions made in 42 countries by 70,000 participants

We report the largest cross-cultural study of moral preferences in sacrificial dilemmas, that is, the circumstances under which people find it acceptable to sacrifice one life to save several. On the basis of 70,000 responses to three dilemmas, collected in 10 languages and 42 countries, we document a universal qualitative pattern of preferences together with substantial country-level variations in the strength of these preferences. In particular, we document a strong association between low relational mobility (where people are more cautious about not alienating their current social partners) and the tendency to reject sacrifices for the greater good—which may be explained by the positive social signal sent by such a rejection. We make our dataset publicly available for researchers.

When do people find it acceptable to sacrifice one life to save many? Cross-cultural studies suggested a complex pattern of universals and variations in the way people approach this question, but data were often based on small samples from a small number of countries outside of the Western world. Here we analyze responses to three sacrificial dilemmas by 70,000 participants in 10 languages and 42 countries. In every country, the three dilemmas displayed the same qualitative ordering of sacrifice acceptability, suggesting that this ordering is best explained by basic cognitive processes rather than cultural norms. The quantitative acceptability of each sacrifice, however, showed substantial country-level variations. We show that low relational mobility (where people are more cautious about not alienating their current social partners) is strongly associated with the rejection of sacrifices for the greater good (especially for Eastern countries), which may be explained by the signaling value of this rejection. We make our dataset fully available as a public resource for researchers studying universals and variations in human morality.

Translation and validation of the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) for the Portuguese language in a Brazilian sample

The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently developed set of brief scenarios depicting violations of various moral foundations – enables investigators to directly examine differences in moral judgments about different topics. In the present study, we adapt the MFV instrument for use in the Portuguese language. To this end, the following steps were performed: 1) Translation of the MFV instrument from English to Portuguese language in Brazil; 2) Synthesis of translated versions; 3) Evaluation of the synthesis by expert judges; 4) Evaluation of the MFV instrument by university students from Sao Paulo City; 5) Back translation; and lastly, 6) Validation study, which used a sample of 494 (385f) university students from Sao Paulo city and a set of 68 vignettes, subdivided into seven factors. Exploratory analyses show that the relationships between the moral foundations and political ideology are similar to those found in previous studies, but the severity of moral judgment on individualizing foundations tended to be significantly higher in the Sao Paulo sample, compared to a sample from the USA. Overall, the present study provides a Portuguese version of the MFV that performs similarly to the original English version, enabling a broader examination of how the moral foundations operate.

Longitudinal Changes in Empathy Across the Life Span in Six Samples of Human Development

The development of empathy is a hotly debated topic. Some studies find declines and others an inverse U-shaped pattern in empathy across the life span. Yet other studies find no age-related changes. Most of this research is cross sectional, and the few longitudinal studies have their limitations. The current study addresses these limitations by examining changes in empathy in six longitudinal samples (total N = 740, age 13–72). In a preliminary study ( N = 784), we created and validated a measure of empathy out of the California Adult Q-Sort. The samples were combined for multilevel analyses in a variant of an accelerated longitudinal design. We found that empathy increased across the life span, particularly after age 40, and more recent cohorts were higher in empathy.

Moral Judgment in Old Age

Abstract. Younger (21–39 years) and older (63–90 years) adults were presented with scenarios illustrating either harmful or helpful actions. Each scenario provided information about the agent’s intention, either neutral or valenced (harmful/helpful), and the outcome of his or her action, either neutral or valenced. Participants were asked to rate how morally good or bad the agent’s action was. In judging harmful actions, older participants relied less on intentions and more on outcomes compared to younger participants. This age-related difference was associated with a decline in older adults’ theory of mind abilities. However, we did not find evidence of any significant age-related difference in the evaluations of helpful actions. We argue that the selective association of aging with changes in the evaluation of harmful but not helpful actions may be due also to motivational factors and highlight some implications of the present findings for judicial systems.