A rational model of people's inferences about others' preferences based on response times

Tracking minds in communication

How does social cognition help us communicate through language? At what levels does this interaction occur? In classical views, social cognition is independent of language, and integrating the two can be slow, effortful, and error-prone. But new research into word level processes reveals that communication is brimming with social micro-processes that happen in real time, guiding even the simplest choices like how we use adjectives, articles, and demonstratives. We interpret these findings in the context of advances in theoretical models of social cognition and propose a communicative mind-tracking framework, where social micro-processes are not a secondary process in how we use language - they are fundamental to how communication works.

Deliberation during online bargaining reveals strategic information

A standard assumption in game theory is that decision-makers have preplanned strategies telling them what actions to take for every contingency. In contrast, nonstrategic decisions often involve an on-the-spot comparison process, with longer response times (RT) for choices between more similarly appealing options. If strategic decisions also exhibit these patterns, then RT might betray private information and alter game theory predictions. Here, we examined bargaining behavior to determine whether RT reveals private information in strategic settings. Using preexisting and experimental data from eBay, we show that both buyers and sellers take hours longer to accept bad offers and to reject good offers. We find nearly identical patterns in the two datasets, indicating a causal effect of offer size on RT. However, this relationship is half as strong for rejections as for acceptances, reducing the amount of useful private information revealed by the sellers. Counter to our predictions, buyers are discouraged by slow rejections-they are less likely to counteroffer to slow sellers. We also show that a drift-diffusion model (DDM), traditionally limited to decisions on the order of seconds, can account for decisions on the order of hours, sometimes days. The DDM reveals that more experienced sellers are less cautious and more inclined to accept offers. In summary, strategic decisions are inconsistent with preplanned strategies. This underscores the need for game theory to incorporate RT as a strategic variable and broadens the applicability of the DDM to slow decisions.

Action Interpretation Determines the Effects of Go/No-Go and Approach/Avoidance Actions on Stimulus Evaluation

Executing go/no-go or approach/avoidance responses toward a stimulus can change its evaluation. To explain these effects, some theoretical accounts propose that executing these responses inherently triggers affective reactions (i.e., action execution), while others posit that the evaluative influences originate from interpreting these responses as valenced actions (i.e., action interpretation). To test the role of action execution and action interpretation in these evaluative effects, we developed a novel training task that combined both go/no-go and approach/avoidance actions orthogonally. Participants either responded or did not respond (i.e., go/no-go) to control a shopping cart on screen, and as a result, either collected or did not collect (i.e., approach/avoidance) certain food items. When the task instructions referred to the go/no-go actions (Experiment 1, N = 148), we observed an effect of these actions. Participants evaluated no-go items less positively than both go and untrained items. No effect of approach/avoidance actions was observed. Contrarily, when the task instructions referred to the approach/avoidance actions (Experiment 2, N = 158), we observed an approach/avoidance effect. Participants evaluated approached items more positively and avoided items less positively than untrained items. No effect of go/no-go actions was observed. This suggests that action interpretation determined whether go/no-go or approach/avoidance actions influenced stimulus evaluation, when the same motor responses were made. Further examination of the role of action interpretation can inform theories of how actions influence stimulus evaluation, and facilitate the use of these interventions in applied settings.

Teaching Without Thinking: Negative Evaluations of Rote Pedagogy

When people make decisions, they act in a way that is either automatic ("rote"), or more thoughtful ("reflective"). But do people notice when others are behaving in a rote way, and do they care? We examine the detection of rote behavior and its consequences in U.S. adults, focusing specifically on pedagogy and learning. We establish repetitiveness as a cue for rote behavior (Experiment 1), and find that rote people are seen as worse teachers (Experiment 2). We also find that the more a person's feedback seems similar across groups (indicating greater rote-ness), the more negatively their teaching is evaluated (Experiment 3). A word-embedding analysis of an open-response task shows people naturally cluster rote and reflective teachers into different semantic categories (Experiment 4). We also show that repetitiveness can be decoupled from perceptions of rote-ness given contextual explanation (Experiment 5). Finally, we establish two additional cues to rote behavior that can be tied to quality of teaching (Experiment 6). These results empirically show that people detect and care about scripted behaviors in pedagogy, and suggest an important extension to formal frameworks of social reasoning.

Humans can infer social preferences from decision speed alone

Humans are known to be capable of inferring hidden preferences and beliefs of their conspecifics when observing their decisions. While observational learning based on choices has been explored extensively, the question of how response times (RT) impact our learning of others' social preferences has received little attention. Yet, while observing choices alone can inform us about the direction of preference, they reveal little about the strength of this preference. In contrast, RT provides a continuous measure of strength of preference with faster responses indicating stronger preferences and slower responses signaling hesitation or uncertainty. Here, we outline a preregistered orthogonal design to investigate the involvement of both choices and RT in learning and inferring other's social preferences. Participants observed other people's behavior in a social preferences task (Dictator Game), seeing either their choices, RT, both, or no information. By coupling behavioral analyses with computational modeling, we show that RT is predictive of social preferences and that observers were able to infer those preferences even when receiving only RT information. Based on these findings, we propose a novel observational reinforcement learning model that closely matches participants' inferences in all relevant conditions. In contrast to previous literature suggesting that, from a Bayesian perspective, people should be able to learn equally well from choices and RT, we show that observers' behavior substantially deviates from this prediction. Our study elucidates a hitherto unknown sophistication in human observational learning but also identifies important limitations to this ability.

Computational Social Psychology

Social psychologists attempt to explain how we interact by appealing to basic principles of how we think. To make good on this ambition, they are increasingly relying on an interconnected set of formal tools that model inference, attribution, value-guided decision making, and multi-agent interactions. By reviewing progress in each of these areas and highlighting the connections between them, we can better appreciate the structure of social thought and behavior, while also coming to understand when, why, and how formal tools can be useful for social psychologists.

Visual resemblance and interaction history jointly constrain pictorial meaning

How do drawings-ranging from detailed illustrations to schematic diagrams-reliably convey meaning? Do viewers understand drawings based on how strongly they resemble an entity (i.e., as images) or based on socially mediated conventions (i.e., as symbols)? Here we evaluate a cognitive account of pictorial meaning in which visual and social information jointly support visual communication. Pairs of participants used drawings to repeatedly communicate the identity of a target object among multiple distractor objects. We manipulated social cues across three experiments and a full replication, finding that participants developed object-specific and interaction-specific strategies for communicating more efficiently over time, beyond what task practice or a resemblance-based account alone could explain. Leveraging model-based image analyses and crowdsourced annotations, we further determined that drawings did not drift toward "arbitrariness," as predicted by a pure convention-based account, but preserved visually diagnostic features. Taken together, these findings advance psychological theories of how successful graphical conventions emerge.

Rational information search in welfare-tradeoff cognition

One of the most important dimensions along which we evaluate others is their propensity to value our welfare: we like people who are disposed to incur costs for our benefit and who refrain from imposing costs on us to benefit themselves. The evolutionary importance of social valuation in our species suggests that humans have cognitive mechanisms that are able to efficiently extract information about how much another person values them. Here I test the hypothesis that people are spontaneously interested in the kinds of events that have the most potential to reveal such information. In two studies, I presented participants (Ns = 216; 300) with pairs of dilemmas that another individual faced in an economic game; for each pair, I asked them to choose the dilemma for which they would most like to see the decision that the individual had made. On average, people spontaneously selected the choices that had the potential to reveal the most information about the individual's valuation of the participant, as quantified by a Bayesian ideal search model. This finding suggests that human cooperation is supported by sophisticated cognitive mechanisms for information-gathering.

Fast deliberation is related to unconditional behaviour in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma experiments

People have different preferences for what they allocate for themselves and what they allocate to others in social dilemmas. These differences result from contextual reasons, intrinsic values, and social expectations. What is still an area of debate is whether these differences can be estimated from differences in each individual's deliberation process. In this work, we analyse the participants' reaction times in three different experiments of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with the Drift Diffusion Model, which links response times to the perceived difficulty of the decision task, the rate of accumulation of information (deliberation), and the intuitive attitudes towards the choices. The correlation between these results and the attitude of the participants towards the allocation of resources is then determined. We observe that individuals who allocated resources equally are correlated with more deliberation than highly cooperative or highly defective participants, who accumulate evidence more quickly to reach a decision. Also, the evidence collection is faster in fixed neighbour settings than in shuffled ones. Consequently, fast decisions do not distinguish cooperators from defectors in these experiments, but appear to separate those that are more reactive to the behaviour of others from those that act categorically.

Fast response times signal social connection in conversation

Social connection is critical for our mental and physical health yet assessing and measuring connection has been challenging. Here, we demonstrate that a feature intrinsic to conversation itself—the speed with which people respond to each other—is a simple, robust, and sufficient metric of social connection. Strangers and friends feel more connected when their conversation partners respond quickly. Because extremely short response times (<250 ms) preclude conscious control, they provide an honest signal that even eavesdroppers use to judge how well two people “click.”

Clicking is one of the most robust metaphors for social connection. But how do we know when two people "click"? We asked pairs of friends and strangers to talk with each other and rate their felt connection. For both friends and strangers, speed in response was a robust predictor of feeling connected. Conversations with faster response times felt more connected than conversations with slower response times, and within conversations, connected moments had faster response times than less-connected moments. This effect was determined primarily by partner responsivity: People felt more connected to the degree that their partner responded quickly to them rather than by how quickly they responded to their partner. The temporal scale of these effects (<250 ms) precludes conscious control, thus providing an honest signal of connection. Using a round-robin design in each of six closed networks, we show that faster responders evoked greater feelings of connection across partners. Finally, we demonstrate that this signal is used by third-party listeners as a heuristic of how well people are connected: Conversations with faster response times were perceived as more connected than the same conversations with slower response times. Together, these findings suggest that response times comprise a robust and sufficient signal of whether two minds “click.”