The pervasive impact of ignorance

Causation, Norms, and Cognitive Bias

Extant research has shown that ordinary causal judgements are sensitive to normative factors. For instance, agents who violate a norm are standardly deemed more causal than norm-conforming agents in identical situations. In this paper, we present novel findings that go against predictions made by several competing accounts that aim to explain this so-called "Norm Effect". By aid of a series of five preregistered experiments (N = 2'688), we show that participants deem agents who violate nonpertinent or silly norms - norms that do not relate to the outcome at hand, or for which there is little independent justification - as more causal. Furthermore, this curious effect cannot be explained by aid of potential mediators such as foreknowledge, desire or foreseeability of harm. The "Silly Norm Effect", we argue, spells trouble for several views of folk causality in the literature, and lends support to a Bias View, according to which Norm Effects are the result of blame-driven bias. We close with a discussion of the relevance of these findings for the just assessment of causation in the law.

The Dual Process model: the effect of cognitive load on the ascription of intentionality

Background

The classic Dual Process model posits that decision-making is determined by the interplay of an intuitive System 1 and a logical System 2. In contrast, the revised model suggests that intuition can also be logical. The Cognitive load paradigm has been used to distinguish underlying rational and intuitive processes, as it tends to lead to the use of heuristics over reasoning. Through two studies, we aimed to investigate the impact of two increasing levels of extraneous cognitive load on intentionality decision-making by comparing the two decision-making models.

Methods

The task required participants to attribute intentionality to negative and positive side effects, which were foreseeable but not deliberately intended. This compared an intuitive response, focused on the outcome, with a logical one, focused on the absence of intention. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions, each with varying cognitive loads (high cognitive load vs. low cognitive load vs. no cognitive load) and scenario valence (negative vs. positive). In Study 1, cognitive load was made by introducing a concurrent task during intentionality attribution, whereas in Study 2, cognitive load was accomplished by associating the dual-task with a time pressure paradigm. Participants under cognitive load were expected to exhibit cognitive resource exhaustion, providing greater judgments of intentionality for negative outcomes and lower for positive ones, due to the dominance of intuition, compared to evaluations provided by participants who were not under cognitive load.

Results

In both studies, cognitive load reduced intentionality attributions for positive side effects compared to the no-load condition, with response times being longer for positive side effects than for negative ones.

Conclusion

This pattern suggests System 2 intervention for positive outcomes and System 1 dominance for negative ones. Therefore, introducing cognitive load enabled us to identify the different roles of the two decision systems in intentionality attribution.

Bottom-up influences on social norms: How observers' responses to transgressions drive norm maintenance versus change

Human behavior is heavily influenced by social norms. But when and how do norms persist or change? Complementing work on the role of top-down factors in the enforcement of normative behavior (e.g., sanctioning systems, organizational culture, formal leadership, corrective actions), I introduce a model of bottom-up influences on norm development. I argue that the trajectories of social norms are shaped by behavioral responses of observers to emergent norm violations. Research on such responses can be categorized in three broad clusters that have distinct implications for norm development. Oppositional responses to norm violations (punishment, confrontation, gossip, whistleblowing, derogation, social exclusion, emotional condemnation) discourage future transgressions, thereby contributing to norm maintenance. Acquiescent responses (avoidance, tolerance) leave room for future violations, thereby contributing to norm erosion. Supportive responses (emulation, endorsement) encourage future deviance and facilitate the spreading of counternormative behavior, thereby catalyzing norm change. By linking micro-level norm violations to macro-level normative systems, this approach illuminates how norms are dynamically negotiated through social interaction.

The importance of epistemic intentions in ascription of responsibility

We investigate how people ascribe responsibility to an agent who caused a bad outcome but did not know he would. The psychological processes for making such judgments, we argue, involve finding a counterfactual in which some minimally benevolent intention initiates a course of events that leads to a better outcome than the actual one. We hypothesize that such counterfactuals can include, when relevant, epistemic intentions. With four vignette studies, we show that people consider epistemic intentions when ascribing responsibility for a bad outcome. We further investigate which epistemic intentions people are likely to consider when building counterfactuals for responsibility ascription. We find that, when an agent did not predict a bad outcome, people ascribe responsibility depending on the reasons behind the agents' lack of knowledge. People judge agents responsible for the bad outcome they caused when they could have easily predicted the consequences of their actions but did not care to acquire the relevant information. However, when this information was hard to acquire, people are less likely to judge them responsible.