Optimal models of decision-making in dynamic environments

Magnetic sense-dependent probabilistic decision-making in humans

Even though it is not well characterized how much humans can sense the geomagnetic field (GMF), numerous magnetosensitive animals can detect GMF broadly as a sensory cue, when a spatial decision-making is needed for orientation or migration. In an article of recent series of studies, we showed that the empirical probabilities of stone selections in Go game were significantly different from the theoretical probability. In this study, we assessed the implication of the GMF in modulating subconscious non-spatial decision-making in human subjects and the underlying mechanism with exploiting the zero-sum binary stone selection of Go game as a proof-of-principle. In a laboratory setting, the experimental probability in a decision-making was significantly hampered by the cancelation of the ambient GMF. Moreover, the attenuation of decision-making was confirmed by a specific range of magnetic resonance radiofrequency. In numerous stone selection games among amateur Go players in the artificial magnetic field setting, the analyses of stone selection rate by trials and steps for decision-making pinpointed the subconscious stone selection as a primary modulating target in the binary decision-making. Our findings may provide unique insights into the impact of sensing GMF in probabilistic decision-making in which theoretical probability is manifested into empirical probability through a magnetic field resonance-dependent mechanism.

Cognitive mechanisms of learning in sequential decision-making under uncertainty: an experimental and theoretical approach

Learning to make adaptive decisions involves making choices, assessing their consequence, and leveraging this assessment to attain higher rewarding states. Despite vast literature on value-based decision-making, relatively little is known about the cognitive processes underlying decisions in highly uncertain contexts. Real world decisions are rarely accompanied by immediate feedback, explicit rewards, or complete knowledge of the environment. Being able to make informed decisions in such contexts requires significant knowledge about the environment, which can only be gained via exploration. Here we aim at understanding and formalizing the brain mechanisms underlying these processes. To this end, we first designed and performed an experimental task. Human participants had to learn to maximize reward while making sequences of decisions with only basic knowledge of the environment, and in the absence of explicit performance cues. Participants had to rely on their own internal assessment of performance to reveal a covert relationship between their choices and their subsequent consequences to find a strategy leading to the highest cumulative reward. Our results show that the participants' reaction times were longer whenever the decision involved a future consequence, suggesting greater introspection whenever a delayed value had to be considered. The learning time varied significantly across participants. Second, we formalized the neurocognitive processes underlying decision-making within this task, combining mean-field representations of competing neural populations with a reinforcement learning mechanism. This model provided a plausible characterization of the brain dynamics underlying these processes, and reproduced each aspect of the participants' behavior, from their reaction times and choices to their learning rates. In summary, both the experimental results and the model provide a principled explanation to how delayed value may be computed and incorporated into the neural dynamics of decision-making, and to how learning occurs in these uncertain scenarios.

Quantifying decision-making in dynamic, continuously evolving environments

During perceptual decision-making tasks, centroparietal electroencephalographic (EEG) potentials report an evidence accumulation-to-bound process that is time locked to trial onset. However, decisions in real-world environments are rarely confined to discrete trials; they instead unfold continuously, with accumulation of time-varying evidence being recency-weighted towards its immediate past. The neural mechanisms supporting recency-weighted continuous decision-making remain unclear. Here, we use a novel continuous task design to study how the centroparietal positivity (CPP) adapts to different environments that place different constraints on evidence accumulation. We show that adaptations in evidence weighting to these different environments are reflected in changes in the CPP. The CPP becomes more sensitive to fluctuations in sensory evidence when large shifts in evidence are less frequent, and the potential is primarily sensitive to fluctuations in decision-relevant (not decision-irrelevant) sensory input. A complementary triphasic component over occipito-parietal cortex encodes the sum of recently accumulated sensory evidence, and its magnitude covaries with parameters describing how different individuals integrate sensory evidence over time. A computational model based on leaky evidence accumulation suggests that these findings can be accounted for by a shift in decision threshold between different environments, which is also reflected in the magnitude of pre-decision EEG activity. Our findings reveal how adaptations in EEG responses reflect flexibility in evidence accumulation to the statistics of dynamic sensory environments.

Self-motion perception and sequential decision-making: where are we heading?

To navigate and guide adaptive behaviour in a dynamic environment, animals must accurately estimate their own motion relative to the external world. This is a fundamentally multisensory process involving integration of visual, vestibular and kinesthetic inputs. Ideal observer models, paired with careful neurophysiological investigation, helped to reveal how visual and vestibular signals are combined to support perception of linear self-motion direction, or heading. Recent work has extended these findings by emphasizing the dimension of time, both with regard to stimulus dynamics and the trade-off between speed and accuracy. Both time and certainty-i.e. the degree of confidence in a multisensory decision-are essential to the ecological goals of the system: terminating a decision process is necessary for timely action, and predicting one's accuracy is critical for making multiple decisions in a sequence, as in navigation. Here, we summarize a leading model for multisensory decision-making, then show how the model can be extended to study confidence in heading discrimination. Lastly, we preview ongoing efforts to bridge self-motion perception and navigation per se, including closed-loop virtual reality and active self-motion. The design of unconstrained, ethologically inspired tasks, accompanied by large-scale neural recordings, raise promise for a deeper understanding of spatial perception and decision-making in the behaving animal. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Environmental dynamics shape perceptual decision bias

To interpret the sensory environment, the brain combines ambiguous sensory measurements with knowledge that reflects context-specific prior experience. But environmental contexts can change abruptly and unpredictably, resulting in uncertainty about the current context. Here we address two questions: how should context-specific prior knowledge optimally guide the interpretation of sensory stimuli in changing environments, and do human decision-making strategies resemble this optimum? We probe these questions with a task in which subjects report the orientation of ambiguous visual stimuli that were drawn from three dynamically switching distributions, representing different environmental contexts. We derive predictions for an ideal Bayesian observer that leverages knowledge about the statistical structure of the task to maximize decision accuracy, including knowledge about the dynamics of the environment. We show that its decisions are biased by the dynamically changing task context. The magnitude of this decision bias depends on the observer's continually evolving belief about the current context. The model therefore not only predicts that decision bias will grow as the context is indicated more reliably, but also as the stability of the environment increases, and as the number of trials since the last context switch grows. Analysis of human choice data validates all three predictions, suggesting that the brain leverages knowledge of the statistical structure of environmental change when interpreting ambiguous sensory signals.

Distinct cortico-striatal compartments drive competition between adaptive and automatized behavior

Cortical and basal ganglia circuits play a crucial role in the formation of goal-directed and habitual behaviors. In this study, we investigate the cortico-striatal circuitry involved in learning and the role of this circuitry in the emergence of inflexible behaviors such as those observed in addiction. Specifically, we develop a computational model of cortico-striatal interactions that performs concurrent goal-directed and habit learning. The model accomplishes this by distinguishing learning processes in the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) that rely on reward prediction error signals as distinct from the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) where learning is supported by salience signals. These striatal subregions each operate on unique cortical input: the DMS receives input from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) which represents outcomes, and the DLS receives input from the premotor cortex which determines action selection. Following an initial learning of a two-alternative forced choice task, we subjected the model to reversal learning, reward devaluation, and learning a punished outcome. Behavior driven by stimulus-response associations in the DLS resisted goal-directed learning of new reward feedback rules despite devaluation or punishment, indicating the expression of habit. We repeated these simulations after the impairment of executive control, which was implemented as poor outcome representation in the PFC. The degraded executive control reduced the efficacy of goal-directed learning, and stimulus-response associations in the DLS were even more resistant to the learning of new reward feedback rules. In summary, this model describes how circuits of the dorsal striatum are dynamically engaged to control behavior and how the impairment of executive control by the PFC enhances inflexible behavior.

Normative decision rules in changing environments

Models based on normative principles have played a major role in our understanding of how the brain forms decisions. However, these models have typically been derived for simple, stable conditions, and their relevance to decisions formed under more naturalistic, dynamic conditions is unclear. We previously derived a normative decision model in which evidence accumulation is adapted to fluctuations in the evidence-generating process that occur during a single decision (Glaze et al., 2015), but the evolution of commitment rules (e.g. thresholds on the accumulated evidence) under dynamic conditions is not fully understood. Here, we derive a normative model for decisions based on changing contexts, which we define as changes in evidence quality or reward, over the course of a single decision. In these cases, performance (reward rate) is maximized using decision thresholds that respond to and even anticipate these changes, in contrast to the static thresholds used in many decision models. We show that these adaptive thresholds exhibit several distinct temporal motifs that depend on the specific predicted and experienced context changes and that adaptive models perform robustly even when implemented imperfectly (noisily). We further show that decision models with adaptive thresholds outperform those with constant or urgency-gated thresholds in accounting for human response times on a task with time-varying evidence quality and average reward. These results further link normative and neural decision-making while expanding our view of both as dynamic, adaptive processes that update and use expectations to govern both deliberation and commitment.

Stable choice coding in rat frontal orienting fields across model-predicted changes of mind

During decision making in a changing environment, evidence that may guide the decision accumulates until the point of action. In the rat, provisional choice is thought to be represented in frontal orienting fields (FOF), but this has only been tested in static environments where provisional and final decisions are not easily dissociated. Here, we characterize the representation of accumulated evidence in the FOF of rats performing a recently developed dynamic evidence accumulation task, which induces changes in the provisional decision, referred to as “changes of mind”. We find that FOF encodes evidence throughout decision formation with a temporal gain modulation that rises until the period when the animal may need to act. Furthermore, reversals in FOF firing rates can be accounted for by changes of mind predicted using a model of the decision process fit only to behavioral data. Our results suggest that the FOF represents provisional decisions even in dynamic, uncertain environments, allowing for rapid motor execution when it is time to act.

A leaky accumulation model can predict rats’ changes of mind during decision making in a dynamic environment explaining reversals in frontal cortical activity and demonstrating a stable choice code despite environmental uncertainty.

A Competition of Critics in Human Decision-Making

Recent experiments and theories of human decision-making suggest positive and negative errors are processed and encoded differently by serotonin and dopamine, with serotonin possibly serving to oppose dopamine and protect against risky decisions. We introduce a temporal difference (TD) model of human decision-making to account for these features. Our model involves two critics, an optimistic learning system and a pessimistic learning system, whose predictions are integrated in time to control how potential decisions compete to be selected. Our model predicts that human decision-making can be decomposed along two dimensions: the degree to which the individual is sensitive to (1) risk and (2) uncertainty. In addition, we demonstrate that the model can learn about the mean and standard deviation of rewards, and provide information about reaction time despite not modeling these variables directly. Lastly, we simulate a recent experiment to show how updates of the two learning systems could relate to dopamine and serotonin transients, thereby providing a mathematical formalism to serotonin's hypothesized role as an opponent to dopamine. This new model should be useful for future experiments on human decision-making.

Matching Behaviours and Rewards

Matching describes how behaviour is related to rewards. The matching law holds when the ratio of an individual's behaviours equals the ratio of the rewards obtained. From its origins in the study of pigeons working for food in the laboratory, the law has been applied to a range of species, both in the laboratory and outside it (e.g., human sporting decisions). Probability matching occurs when the probability of a behaviour equals the probability of being rewarded. Input matching predicts the distribution of individuals across habitats. We evaluate the rationality of the matching law and probability matching, expose the logic of matching in real-world cases, review how recent neuroscience findings relate to matching, and suggest future research directions.

Centroparietal activity mirrors the decision variable when tracking biased and time-varying sensory evidence

Decision-making is a fundamental human activity requiring explanation at the neurocognitive level. Current theoretical frameworks assume that, during sensory-based decision-making, the stimulus is sampled sequentially. The resulting evidence is accumulated over time as a decision variable until a threshold is reached and a response is initiated. Several neural signals, including the centroparietal positivity (CPP) measured from the human electroencephalogram (EEG), appear to display the accumulation-to-bound profile associated with the decision variable. Here, we evaluate the putative computational role of the CPP as a model-derived accumulation-to-bound signal, focussing on point-by-point correspondence between model predictions and data in order to go beyond simple summary measures like average slope. In two experiments, we explored the CPP under two manipulations (namely non-stationary evidence and probabilistic decision biases) that complement one another by targeting the shape and amplitude of accumulation respectively. We fit sequential sampling models to the behavioural data, and used the resulting parameters to simulate the decision variable, before directly comparing the simulated profile to the CPP waveform. In both experiments, model predictions deviated from our naïve expectations, yet showed similarities with the neurodynamic data, illustrating the importance of a formal modelling approach. The CPP appears to arise from brain processes that implement a decision variable (as formalised in sequential-sampling models) and may therefore inform our understanding of decision-making at both the representational and implementational levels of analysis, but at this point it is uncertain whether a single model can explain how the CPP varies across different kinds of task manipulation.