Consciousness eclipsed: Jacques Loeb, Ivan P. Pavlov, and the rise of reductionistic biology after 1900

"Feature Detection" vs. "Predictive Coding" Models of Plant Behavior

In this article we consider the possibility that plants exhibit anticipatory behavior, a mark of intelligence. If plants are able to anticipate and respond accordingly to varying states of their surroundings, as opposed to merely responding online to environmental contingencies, then such capacity may be in principle testable, and subject to empirical scrutiny. Our main thesis is that adaptive behavior can only take place by way of a mechanism that predicts the environmental sources of sensory stimulation. We propose to test for anticipation in plants experimentally by contrasting two empirical hypotheses: “feature detection” and “predictive coding.” We spell out what these contrasting hypotheses consist of by way of illustration from the animal literature, and consider how to transfer the rationale involved to the plant literature.

The body of knowledge: On the role of the living body in grounding embodied cognition

Embodied cognition is a hot topic in both cognitive science and AI, despite the fact that there still is relatively little consensus regarding what exactly constitutes 'embodiment'. While most embodied AI and cognitive robotics research views the body as the physical/sensorimotor interface that allows to ground computational cognitive processes in sensorimotor interactions with the environment, more biologically-based notions of embodied cognition emphasize the fundamental role that the living body - and more specifically its homeostatic/allostatic self-regulation - plays in grounding both sensorimotor interactions and embodied cognitive processes. Adopting the latter position - a multi-tiered affectively embodied view of cognition in living systems - it is further argued that modeling organisms as layered networks of bodily self-regulation mechanisms can make significant contributions to our scientific understanding of embodied cognition.

Christfried Jakob's late views (1930-1949) on the psychogenetic function of the cerebral cortex and its localization: culmination of the neurophilosophical thought of a keen brain observer

This article follows the culmination of the scientific thought of the neurobiologist Christfried Jakob (1866-1956) during the later part of his career, based on publications from 1930 to 1949, when he was between 64 and 83 years of age. Jakob emphasized the necessity of bridging philosophy to the biological sciences, neurobiology in particular. Thus, we consider him as one of the early protagonists in the emergence of neurophilosophy in the 20th century. The topics that occupied his mind were the foundations for a future philosophy of the brain, and the 'neurobiogenetic', 'neurodynamic', and 'neuropsychogenetic' problems in relation to how consciousness emerges. Jakob's views have many elements in common with great thinkers of philosophy and psychology, including Immanuel Kant, William James, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson, Jean Piaget and Willard Quine. A common denominator can also be discerned between Jakob's dynamic approach and certain aspects of cybernetics and neurophenomenology. Jakob propounded the interdisciplinarity of sciences as an indispensable tool for ultimately solving the enigma of consciousness.

Body and self in dolphins

In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin's (Tursiops truncatus) conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational "body image" system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and ownership of their actions and may implicitly attribute those levels of self-awareness to others. Possibly, a mirror-neuron system, or its functional equivalent to that described in monkeys and humans, may mediate both self-awareness and awareness of others.

Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: the evidence from neurobiology and behavior

In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical (T-C) complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This basic anatomy and physiology is highly conserved in mammals and perhaps ancestral reptiles. While language is absent in other species, homologies in perception, memory, and motor cortex suggest that consciousness of one kind or another may be biologically fundamental and phylogenetically ancient. In humans we infer subjective experiences from behavioral and brain evidence. This evidence is quite similar in other mammals and perhaps some non-mammalian species. On the weight of the biological evidence, therefore, subjectivity may be conserved in species with human-like brains and behavior.