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Laurenzi M, Raffone A, Gallagher S, Chiarella SG. A multidimensional approach to the self in non-human animals through the Pattern Theory of Self. Front Psychol 2025; 16:1561420. [PMID: 40271366 PMCID: PMC12014599 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1561420] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2025] [Accepted: 03/26/2025] [Indexed: 04/25/2025] Open
Abstract
In the last decades, research on animal consciousness has advanced significantly, fueled by interdisciplinary contributions. However, a critical dimension of animal experience remains underexplored: the self. While traditionally linked to human studies, research focused on the self in animals has often been framed dichotomously, distinguishing low-level, bodily, and affective aspects from high-level, cognitive, and conceptual dimensions. Emerging evidence suggests a broader spectrum of self-related features across species, yet current theoretical approaches often reduce the self to a derivative aspect of consciousness or prioritize narrow high-level dimensions, such as self-recognition or metacognition. To address this gap, we propose an integrated framework grounded in the Pattern Theory of Self (PTS). PTS conceptualizes the self as a dynamic, multidimensional construct arising from a matrix of dimensions, ranging from bodily and affective to intersubjective and normative aspects. We propose adopting this multidimensional perspective for the study of the self in animals, by emphasizing the graded nature of the self within each dimension and the non-hierarchical organization across dimensions. In this sense, PTS may accommodate both inter- and intra-species variability, enabling researchers to investigate the self across diverse organisms without relying on anthropocentric biases. We propose that, by integrating this framework with insights from comparative psychology, neuroscience, and ethology, the application of PTS to animals can show how the self emerges in varying degrees and forms, shaped by ecological niches and adaptive demands.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matteo Laurenzi
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Antonino Raffone
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Shaun Gallagher
- Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United States
- School of Liberal Arts (SOLA), University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
| | - Salvatore G. Chiarella
- School of Liberal Arts (SOLA), University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
- International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA), Trieste, Italy
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2
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Montoya I, Montoya D. What Is It like to Be a Brain Organoid? Phenomenal Consciousness in a Biological Neural Network. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:1328. [PMID: 37761627 PMCID: PMC10529514 DOI: 10.3390/e25091328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2023] [Revised: 09/04/2023] [Accepted: 09/11/2023] [Indexed: 09/29/2023]
Abstract
It has been shown that three-dimensional self-assembled multicellular structures derived from human pluripotent stem cells show electrical activity similar to EEG. More recently, neurons were successfully embedded in digital game worlds. The biologically inspired neural network (BNN), expressing human cortical cells, was able to show internal modification and learn the task at hand (predicting the trajectory of a digital ball while moving a digital paddle). In other words, the system allowed to read motor information and write sensory data into cell cultures. In this article, we discuss Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) theories, and their capacity to predict or even allow for consciousness in a BNN. We found that Information Integration Theory (IIT) is the only NCC that offers the possibility for a BNN to show consciousness, since the Φ value in the BNN is >0. In other words, the recording of real-time neural activity responding to environmental stimuli. IIT argues that any system capable of integrating information will have some degree of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that the pattern of activity appearing in the BNN, with increased density of sensory information leading to better performance, implies that the BNN could be conscious. This may have profound implications from a psychological, philosophical, and ethical perspective.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Daniel Montoya
- Department of Psychology, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville, NC 28301, USA;
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Hart PJB. Exploring the limits to our understanding of whether fish feel pain. JOURNAL OF FISH BIOLOGY 2023; 102:1272-1280. [PMID: 36961257 DOI: 10.1111/jfb.15386] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2023] [Accepted: 03/19/2023] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Paul J B Hart
- Department of Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour, School of Life Sciences, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
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4
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Evidence that instrumental conditioning requires conscious awareness in humans. Cognition 2021; 208:104546. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104546] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2020] [Revised: 12/02/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
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Birch J, Ginsburg S, Jablonka E. Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions. BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY 2020; 35:56. [PMID: 33597791 PMCID: PMC7116763 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-020-09772-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/18/2020] [Accepted: 10/14/2020] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
Over the past two decades, Ginsburg and Jablonka have developed a novel approach to studying the evolutionary origins of consciousness: the Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) framework. The central idea is that there is a distinctive type of learning that can serve as a transition marker for the evolutionary transition from non-conscious to conscious life. The goal of this paper is to stimulate discussion of the framework by providing a primer on its key claims (Part I) and a clear statement of its main empirical predictions (Part II).
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Birch
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
| | - Simona Ginsburg
- Natural Science Department, The Open University of Israel, 1 University Road, 4353701 Raanana, Israel
| | - Eva Jablonka
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
- The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University, 6934525 Ramat Aviv, Israel
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Budaev S, Kristiansen TS, Giske J, Eliassen S. Computational animal welfare: towards cognitive architecture models of animal sentience, emotion and wellbeing. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2020; 7:201886. [PMID: 33489298 PMCID: PMC7813262 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.201886] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 05/08/2023]
Abstract
To understand animal wellbeing, we need to consider subjective phenomena and sentience. This is challenging, since these properties are private and cannot be observed directly. Certain motivations, emotions and related internal states can be inferred in animals through experiments that involve choice, learning, generalization and decision-making. Yet, even though there is significant progress in elucidating the neurobiology of human consciousness, animal consciousness is still a mystery. We propose that computational animal welfare science emerges at the intersection of animal behaviour, welfare and computational cognition. By using ideas from cognitive science, we develop a functional and generic definition of subjective phenomena as any process or state of the organism that exists from the first-person perspective and cannot be isolated from the animal subject. We then outline a general cognitive architecture to model simple forms of subjective processes and sentience. This includes evolutionary adaptation which contains top-down attention modulation, predictive processing and subjective simulation by re-entrant (recursive) computations. Thereafter, we show how this approach uses major characteristics of the subjective experience: elementary self-awareness, global workspace and qualia with unity and continuity. This provides a formal framework for process-based modelling of animal needs, subjective states, sentience and wellbeing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Budaev
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bergen, PO Box 7803, 5020 Bergen, Norway
| | - Tore S. Kristiansen
- Research Group Animal Welfare, Institute of Marine Research, PO Box 1870, 5817 Bergen, Norway
| | - Jarl Giske
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bergen, PO Box 7803, 5020 Bergen, Norway
| | - Sigrunn Eliassen
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bergen, PO Box 7803, 5020 Bergen, Norway
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Bonn G. Commentary: The Affective Core of the Self: A Neuro-Archetypical Perspective on the Foundations of Human (and Animal) Subjectivity. Front Psychol 2017; 8:2098. [PMID: 29250019 PMCID: PMC5715505 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02098] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2017] [Accepted: 11/17/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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Gygax L. Wanting, liking and welfare: The role of affective states in proximate control of behaviour in vertebrates. Ethology 2017. [DOI: 10.1111/eth.12655] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Lorenz Gygax
- Centre for Proper Housing of Ruminants and Pigs; Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office FSVO; Ettenhausen Switzerland
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Jonkisz J. Consciousness: individuated information in action. Front Psychol 2015; 6:1035. [PMID: 26283987 PMCID: PMC4518274 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2015] [Accepted: 07/07/2015] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness - the main aim of this article -into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jakub Jonkisz
- Institute of Sociology, Department of Management, University of Bielsko-BiałaBielsko-Biała, Poland
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10
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Dawkins M. Animal Welfare and the Paradox of Animal Consciousness. ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR 2015. [DOI: 10.1016/bs.asb.2014.11.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/02/2022]
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11
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Affiliation(s)
- Boris Kotchoubey
- Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology, University of Tübingen , Germany
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12
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Abstract
Human experience of temporal durations exhibits a multi-regional structure, with more or less distinct boundaries, or horizons, on the scale of physical duration. The inner horizons are imposed by perceptual thresholds for simultaneity (≈ 3 ms) and temporal order (≈ 30 ms), and are determined by the dynamical properties of the neural substrate integrating sensory information. Related to the inner horizon of experienced time are perceptual or cognitive “moments.” Comparative data on autokinetic times suggest that these moments may be relatively invariant (≈ 102 ms) across a wide range of species. Extension of the “sensible present” (≈ 3 s) defines an intermediate horizon, beyond which the generic experience of duration develops. The domain of immediate duration experience is delimited by the ultimate outer horizon at about ≈102 s, as evidenced by analysis of duration reproduction experiments (reproducibility horizon), probably determined by relaxation times of “neural accumulators.” Beyond these phenomenal horizons, time is merely cognitively (re)constructed, not actually experienced or “perceived,” a fact that is frequently ignored by contemporary time perception research. The nyocentric organization of time experience shows an interesting analogy with the egocentric organization of space, suggesting that structures of subjective space and time are derived from active motion as a common experiential basis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jirí Wackermann
- Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health, Freiburg i.Br., Germany.
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13
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Evolution of consciousness: phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2013; 110 Suppl 2:10357-64. [PMID: 23754370 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1301188110] [Citation(s) in RCA: 69] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Are animals conscious? If so, when did consciousness evolve? We address these long-standing and essential questions using a modern neuroscientific approach that draws on diverse fields such as consciousness studies, evolutionary neurobiology, animal psychology, and anesthesiology. We propose that the stepwise emergence from general anesthesia can serve as a reproducible model to study the evolution of consciousness across various species and use current data from anesthesiology to shed light on the phylogeny of consciousness. Ultimately, we conclude that the neurobiological structure of the vertebrate central nervous system is evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved across species and that the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution. Thus, in agreement with Darwin's insight and the recent "Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals," a review of modern scientific data suggests that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind.
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Cottee SY. Are fish the victims of 'speciesism'? A discussion about fear, pain and animal consciousness. FISH PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOCHEMISTRY 2012; 38:5-15. [PMID: 21086041 DOI: 10.1007/s10695-010-9449-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2010] [Accepted: 11/01/2010] [Indexed: 05/30/2023]
Abstract
Fish welfare is currently a hotly debated topic; this is mainly due to the issue of whether or not fish have the capacity for conscious awareness, or subjective states. Because of the contentious nature of animal consciousness, the subject is often avoided in many welfare arguments, but it is argued that since welfare should be about how animals feel, this issue is unavoidable. There is also good reason to believe that the issue of assessing subjective states is not as insurmountable as some believe.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephanie Yue Cottee
- Department of Animal and Poultry Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada.
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15
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Body and self in dolphins. Conscious Cogn 2011; 21:526-45. [PMID: 22105086 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.10.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2011] [Revised: 10/03/2011] [Accepted: 10/07/2011] [Indexed: 02/08/2023]
Abstract
In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin's (Tursiops truncatus) conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational "body image" system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and ownership of their actions and may implicitly attribute those levels of self-awareness to others. Possibly, a mirror-neuron system, or its functional equivalent to that described in monkeys and humans, may mediate both self-awareness and awareness of others.
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Lou HC, Luber B, Stanford A, Lisanby SH. Self-specific processing in the default network: a single-pulse TMS study. Exp Brain Res 2010; 207:27-38. [PMID: 20878395 PMCID: PMC3008414 DOI: 10.1007/s00221-010-2425-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2010] [Accepted: 09/09/2010] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
In examining neural processing specific to the self, primarily by contrasting self-related stimuli with non-self-related stimuli (i.e., self vs. other), neuroimaging studies have activated a consistent set of regions, including medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus, and right and left inferior parietal cortex. However, criticism has arisen that this network may not be specific to self-related processing, but instead reflects a more general aspect of cortical processing. For example, it is almost identical to the active network of the resting state, the "default" mode, when the subject is free to think about anything at all. We tested the self-specificity of this network by using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to briefly disrupt local cortical processing while subjects rated adjectives as like or unlike themselves or their best friend. Healthy volunteers show a self-reference effect (SRE) in this task, in which performance with self-related items is superior to that with other-related items. As individual adjectives appeared on a monitor, single-pulse TMS was applied at five different times relative to stimulus onset (SOA: stimulus onset asynchrony) ranging from 0 to 480 ms. In 18 subjects, TMS to left parietal cortex suppressed the SRE from 160 to 480 ms. SRE suppression occurred at later SOA with TMS to the right parietal cortex. In contrast, no effects were seen with TMS to MPFC. Together with our previous work, these results provide evidence for a self-specific processing system in which midline and lateral inferior parietal cortices, as elements of the default network, play a role in ongoing self-awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hans C Lou
- Division of Brain Stimulation and Therapeutic Modulation, New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA.
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Rial RV, Akaârir M, Gamundí A, Nicolau C, Garau C, Aparicio S, Tejada S, Gené L, González J, De Vera LM, Coenen AM, Barceló P, Esteban S. Evolution of wakefulness, sleep and hibernation: From reptiles to mammals. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2010; 34:1144-60. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.01.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2009] [Revised: 01/08/2010] [Accepted: 01/19/2010] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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Abstract
It is argued that conscious emotional feelings can not be adequately explained by just particular circuits or coherent activations within the brain, as is conventionally believed; nor by activations representing environmental stimuli going to the brain. According to the model suggested herein, the limbic system responds to sensory and other inputs according to how closely they are associated with built-in rewards or punishments. It does this by (a) activating the autonomic nervous system so that it prepares the body to acquire a reward or avoid a punishment, and (b) also activating the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The PFC activations are temporally correlated with the autonomic activations and the feedback to them, so that they become identified with the autonomic attempts to acquire (a reward) or avoid (a punishment). The PFC circuit thus acquires a valence. The valence, along with arousal in a given context, underlies conscious emotional feelings. The model is related to: (a) how attention progresses along networks within working memory; (b) how a single, unified percept is formed; (c) how both value-based and cognitive-based responses are formulated; and (d) how the stream of consciousness is put together and driven forward. These concepts are integrated into a scenario of the orchestration of conscious experience and behaviour by subcortical-limbic system structures interacting with the cortex, and are shown to be consistent with much of the literature.
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Denton D, McKinley M, Farrell M, Egan G. The role of primordial emotions in the evolutionary origin of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2009; 18:500-14. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 99] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2008] [Revised: 05/28/2008] [Accepted: 06/09/2008] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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Fingelkurts AA, Fingelkurts AA. Is our brain hardwired to produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive God? A systematic review on the role of the brain in mediating religious experience. Cogn Process 2009; 10:293-326. [PMID: 19471985 DOI: 10.1007/s10339-009-0261-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 57] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/19/2009] [Accepted: 04/24/2009] [Indexed: 01/20/2023]
Abstract
To figure out whether the main empirical question "Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?" is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert "downward" causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from "explanation" to "description" of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.
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Is feeling pain just mindreading? Our mind-brain constructs realistic knowledge of ourselves. Behav Brain Sci 2009. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x09000569] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
AbstractCarruthers claims that “our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves” (target article, Abstract). This may be true in many cases. But like other constructivist claims, it fails to explain occasions when constructed knowledge is accurate, like a well-supported scientific theory. People can know their surrounding world and to some extent themselves. Accurate self-knowledge is firmly established for both somatosensory and social pain.
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22
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Rofé Y. Does Repression Exist? Memory, Pathogenic, Unconscious and Clinical Evidence. REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 2008. [DOI: 10.1037/1089-2680.12.1.63] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The current dispute regarding the existence of repression has mainly focused on whether people remember or forget trauma. Repression, however, is a multidimensional construct, which, in addition to the memory aspect, consists of pathogenic effects on adjustment and the unconscious. Accordingly, in order to arrive at a more accurate decision regarding the existence of repression, studies relevant to all three areas are reviewed. Moreover, since psychoanalysis regards repression as a key factor in accounting for the development and treatment of neurotic disorders, relevant research from these two domains are also taken into account. This comprehensive evaluation reveals little empirical justification for maintaining the psychoanalytic concept of repression.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yacov Rofé
- Interdisciplinary Department of Social Sciences, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
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Butler AB, Cotterill RMJ. Mammalian and avian neuroanatomy and the question of consciousness in birds. THE BIOLOGICAL BULLETIN 2006; 211:106-27. [PMID: 17062871 DOI: 10.2307/4134586] [Citation(s) in RCA: 50] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/12/2023]
Abstract
Some birds display behavior reminiscent of the sophisticated cognition and higher levels of consciousness usually associated with mammals, including the ability to fashion tools and to learn vocal sequences. It is thus important to ask what neuroanatomical attributes these taxonomic classes have in common and whether there are nevertheless significant differences. While the underlying brain structures of birds and mammals are remarkably similar in many respects, including high brain-body ratios and many aspects of brain circuitry, the architectural arrangements of neurons, particularly in the pallium, show marked dissimilarity. The neural substrate for complex cognitive functions that are associated with higher-level consciousness in mammals and birds alike may thus be based on patterns of circuitry rather than on local architectural constraints. In contrast, the corresponding circuits in reptiles are substantially less elaborated, with some components actually lacking, and in amphibian brains, the major thalamopallial circuits involving sensory relay nuclei are conspicuously absent. On the basis of these criteria, the potential for higher-level consciousness in these taxa appears to be lower than in birds and mammals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ann B Butler
- The Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study and Department of Psychology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030, USA.
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