Subliminal or not? Comparing null-hypothesis and Bayesian methods for testing subliminal priming

In Search of an Integrative Method to Study Unconscious Processing: An Application of Bayesian and General Recognition Theory Models to the Processing of Hierarchical Patterns in the Absence of Awareness

The dissociation between conscious and unconscious perception is one of the most relevant issues in the study of human cognition. While there is evidence suggesting that some stimuli might be unconsciously processed up to its meaning (e.g., high-level stimulus processing), some authors claim that most results on the processing of subliminal stimuli can be explained by a mixture of methodological artefacts and questionable assumptions about what can be considered non-conscious. Particularly, one of the most controversial topics involves the method by which the awareness of the stimuli is assessed. To address this question, we introduced an integrative approach to assess the extent to which masked hierarchical stimuli (i.e., global shapes composed of local elements) can be processed in the absence of awareness. We combined a priming task where participants had to report global or local shapes, with the use of subjective and objective awareness measures collected either in a separate block (offline), or trial-by-trial during the main task (online). The unconscious processing of the masked primes was then evaluated through two different novel model-based methods: a Bayesian and a General Recognition Theory modeling approach. Despite the high correlation between awareness measures, our results show that the use of alternative approaches based on different theoretical assumptions leads to diverging conclusions about the extent of the unconscious processing of the masked primes.

Consciousness Under the Spotlight: The Problem of Measuring Subjective Experience

The study of consciousness is considered by many one of the most difficult contemporary scientific endeavors and confronts several methodological and theoretical challenges. A central issue that makes the study of consciousness so challenging is that, while the rest of science is concerned with problems that can be verified from a "third person" view (i.e., objectively), the study of consciousness deals with the phenomenon of subjective experience, only accessible from a "first person" view. In the present article, we review early (starting during the late 19th century) and later efforts on measuring consciousness and its absence, focusing on the two main approaches used by researchers within the field: objective (i.e., performance based) and subjective (i.e., report based) measures of awareness. In addition, we compare the advantages and disadvantages of both types of awareness measures, evaluate them according to different methodological considerations, and discuss, among other issues, the possibility of comparing them by transforming them to a common sensitivity measure (d'). Finally, we explore several new approaches-such as Bayesian models to support the absence of awareness or new machine-learning based decoding models-as well as future challenges-such as measuring the qualia, the qualitative contents of awareness-in consciousness research.

No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition

Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses-an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition. However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label "implicit"? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Masked priming under the Bayesian microscope: Exploring the integration of local elements into global shape through Bayesian model comparison

To investigate whether local elements are grouped into global shapes in the absence of awareness, we introduced two different masked priming designs (e.g., the classic dissociation paradigm and a trial-wise probe and prime discrimination task) and collected both objective (i.e., performance based) and subjective (using the perceptual awareness scale [PAS]) awareness measures. Prime visibility was manipulated using three different prime-mask stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and an unmasked condition. Our results showed that assessing prime visibility trial-wise heavily interfered with masked priming preventing any prime facilitation effect. The implementation of Bayesian regression models, which predict priming effects for participants whose awareness levels are at chance level, provided strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that local elements group into global shape in the absence of awareness for SOAs longer than 50 ms, suggesting that prime-mask SOA is a crucial factor in the processing of the global shape without awareness.

Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Statistics for Studying Unconscious Perception: Differences Between Null Awareness Dissociation and Relative Sensitivity Dissociation

For unconscious perception research, Bayesian statistics are more appropriate for assessing null awareness of masked stimuli than traditional (frequentist) statistics. This assertion is based mostly upon the theoretical features of Bayesian statistics and modeling studies. To further assess the potential advantages, we compared frequentist and Bayesian statistical tests in a masked Stroop priming experiment in which the prime stimuli were presented at varying degrees of visibility. A novel contribution was to compare a null awareness dissociation approach (i.e., stimulus awareness = 0) to a relative sensitivity approach (indirect or priming effects > direct effects) for the same data. From a null awareness perspective, the frequentist t-tests for the Stroop effect (i.e., perception) for the briefest display conditions had non-significant outcomes. Similar Bayesian t-tests were inconclusive. In contrast, the relative sensitivity dissociation approach was more interpretable, with strong evidence against unconscious perception from a single Bayesian t test. For the longer display conditions, both statistical approaches suggested large conscious perception effects. We conclude that the utility of Bayesian statistics is highly dependent upon the type of dissociation approach, with a relative sensitivity approach being more straightforward to interpret than a null awareness approach.

Can adults with developmental dyslexia apply statistical knowledge to a new context?

We investigated transfer of artificial grammar learning in adults with and without dyslexia in 3 experiments. In Experiment 1, participants implicitly learned an artificial grammar system and were tested on new items that included the same symbols. In Experiment 2, participants were given practice with letter strings and then tested on strings created with a different letter set. In Experiment 3, participants were given practice with shapes and then tested on strings created with different shapes. Results show that in Experiment 1, both groups demonstrated utilization of pre-trained instances in the subsequent grammaticality judgement task, while in Experiments 2 (orthographic) and 3 (nonorthographic), only typically developed participants demonstrated application of knowledge from training to test. A post hoc analysis comparing between the experiments suggests that being trained and tested on an orthographic task leads to better performance than a nonorthographic task among typically developed adults but not among adults with dyslexia. Taken together, it appears that following extensive training, individuals with dyslexia are able to form stable representations from sequential stimuli and use them in a subsequent task that utilizes strings of similar symbols. However, the manipulation of the symbols challenges this ability.

Feasibility of unconscious instrumental conditioning: A registered replication

The extent to which high-level, complex functions can proceed unconsciously has been a topic of considerable debate. While unconscious processing has been demonstrated for a range of low-level processes, from feature integration to simple forms of conditioning and learning, theoretical contributions suggest that increasing complexity requires conscious access. Here, we focus our attention on instrumental conditioning, which has been previously shown to proceed without stimulus awareness. Yet, instrumental conditioning also involves integrating information over a large temporal scale and distinct modalities in order to deploy selective action, constituting a process of substantial complexity. With this in mind, we revisit the question of feasibility of instrumental conditioning in the unconscious domain. Firstly, we address the theoretical and practical considerations relevant to unconscious learning in general. Secondly, we aim to replicate the first study to show instrumental conditioning in the absence of stimulus awareness (Pessiglione et al., 2008), following the original design and supplementing the original crucial analyses with a Bayesian approach (Experiment 1). We found that apparent unconscious learning took place when replicating the original methods directly and according to the tests of awareness used. However, we could not establish that the full sample was unaware in a separate awareness check. We therefore attempted to replicate the effect yet again with improved methods to address the issues related to sensitivity and immediacy (Experiment 2), including an individual threshold-setting task and a trial-by-trial awareness check permitting exclusion of individual aware trials. Here, we found evidence for absence of unconscious learning. This result provides evidence that instrumental conditioning did not occur without stimulus awareness in this paradigm, supporting the view that complex forms of learning may rely on conscious access. Our results provides support for the proposal that perceptual consciousness may be necessary for complex, flexible processes, especially where selective action and behavioural adaptation are required.

Top-down modulation impairs priming susceptibility in complex decision-making with social implications

Could social context variables prime complex decisions? Could top-down processes impair this priming susceptibility? Complex decisions have been mainly studied from economic and moral perspectives, and Dual Process Theories provide evidence of how these processes could be affected. To address these issues from a political perspective, online experiments were conducted. Participants (n = 252) were asked to choose a face from 4 options, each associated with different frequencies (repetition priming) or with phrases with different emotional valence (emotional priming), for an unspecified task (UST group) or an important task (IMT group). The most repeated face was chosen most in the UST group, and was associated with lower response times. Positive faces were equally chosen by both groups. To compare results in a more ecological situation, a social study was conducted during the 2019 Argentine Presidential Election, including online surveys (n = 3673) and analysis of news media mentioning candidates. The familiarity and trust to each candidate explained the voting-probability for most of them, as well as correlated with their frequency of mentions in the news, their positive associations, and election results. Our results suggest complex decision-making is susceptible to priming, depending on top-down modulation.

Inferential Statistics Is an Unfit Tool for Interpreting Data

Null hypothesis significance testing is a commonly used tool for making statistical inferences in empirical studies, but its use has always been controversial. In this manuscript, I argue that even more problematic is that significance testing, and other abstract statistical benchmarks, often are used as tools for interpreting study data. This is problematic because interpreting data requires domain knowledge of the scientific topic and sensitivity to the study context, something that significance testing and other purely statistical approaches are not. By using simple examples, I demonstrate that researchers must first use their domain knowledge—professional expertise, clinical experience, practical insight—to interpret the data in their study and then use inferential statistics to provide some reasonable estimates about what can be generalized from the study data. Moving beyond the current focus on abstract statistical benchmarks will encourage researchers to measure their phenomena in more meaningful ways, transparently convey their data, and communicate their intellectual reasons for interpreting the data as they do, a shift that will better foster a scientific forum for cumulative science.

The Challenge of Inferring Unconscious Mental Processes

Studies of unconscious mental processes often compare a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with a measure of awareness (e.g., a verbal report or forced-choice response) of the critical cue or contingency taken either concurrently or separately. The resulting patterns of bivariate data across participants lend themselves to several analytic approaches for inferring the existence of unconscious mental processes, but it is rare for researchers to consider the underlying generative processes that might cause these patterns. We show that bivariate data are generally insufficient to discriminate single-process models, with a unitary latent process determining both performance and awareness, from dual-process models, comprising distinct latent processes for performance and awareness. Future research attempting to isolate and investigate unconscious processes will need to employ richer types of data and analyses.

Avoiding pitfalls: Bayes factors can be a reliable tool for post hoc data selection in implicit learning

Research on implicit processes has revealed problems with awareness categorizations based on nonsignificant results. Moreover, post hoc categorizations result in regression to the mean (RTM), by which aware participants are wrongly categorized as unaware. Using Bayes factors to obtain sensitive evidence for participants' lack of knowledge may deal with nonsignificance being nonevidential, but also may prevent regression-to-the-mean effects. Here, we examine the reliability of a novel Bayesian awareness categorization procedure. Participants completed a reward learning task followed by a flanker task measuring attention towards conditioned stimuli. They were categorized as B_Aware and B_Unaware of stimulus-outcome contingencies, and those with insensitive Bayes factors were deemed B_Insensitive. We found that performance for B_Unaware participants was below chance level using unbiased tests. This was further confirmed using a resampling procedure with multiple iterations, contrary to the prediction of RTM effects. Conversely, when categorizing participants using t tests, t_Unaware participants showed RTM effects. We also propose a group boundary optimization procedure to determine the threshold at which regression to the mean is observed. Using Bayes factors instead of t tests as a post hoc categorization tool allows evaluating evidence of unawareness, which in turn helps avoid RTM. The reliability of the Bayesian awareness categorization procedure strengthens previous evidence for implicit reward conditioning. The toolbox used for the categorization procedure is detailed and made available. Post hoc group selection can provide evidence for implicit processes; the relevance of RTM needs to be considered for each study and cannot simply be assumed to be a problem.

Stimulus variation-based training enhances artificial grammar learning

The current study was designed to explore whether statistical learning ability is affected by the diversity of the stimulus set used in the training phase. The effect of stimulus diversity was assessed by controlling and manipulating the number of exposures to a given set and the number of unique strings presented to the learner during the training phase. 147 students participated in two studies. In the unvaried stimulus study, 71 participants learned the same basic set of 15 exemplars, once(15 × 1 exposure), twice (15 × 2 exposures = 30 total strings) and 3 times (15 × 3 exposures = 45 total strings). In the varied stimulus study, 75 participants learned 15, 30 and 45, all of which were unique, unrepeated exemplars. All groups were asked to classify test strings for their grammaticality following training. Results of the d' measures in the unvaried stimulus study indicate similar performance across the groups. Conversely, the results of the varied stimulus study show that the group presented with 45 unique strings performed significantly better than the baseline group (15 strings). Analysis of the differences across the equivalent groups in the two studies (15 × 2 exposures vs. 30 unique strings and 15 × 3 exposures vs. 45 unique strings) indicates differences in performance only between the group who was presented with the same 15 strings three times and the group presented with 45 unrepeated strings. Taken together, our results shed additional light on the central role of stimulus variation in Artificial Grammar Learning.

Predictions from masked motion with and without obstacles

Predicting the future is essential for organisms like Homo sapiens, who live in a dynamic and ever-changing world. Previous research has established that conscious stimuli can lead to non-conscious predictions. Here we examine whether masked stimuli can also induce such predictions. We use masked movement-with and without obstacles-to examine predictions from masked stimuli. In six experiments a moving object was masked using continuous flash suppression (CFS). A few hundred milliseconds after the object had disappeared, a conscious probe appeared in a location that was either consistent with the masked stimulus or not. In Experiments 1-3 the movement was linear, and reaction times (RTs) indicated predictions that were based on direction and speed of movement. In Experiment 4, the masked moving object collided with an obstacle and then disappeared. Predictions in this case should reflect deflection, and indeed reaction times revealed predictions on the deflection route. In Experiments 5 and 6 we introduce an innovative way of using eye-tracking during continuous flash suppression (CFS) and report physiological evidence-in the forms of eye-movements-for masked stimuli induced predictions. We thus conclude that humans can use dynamic masked stimuli to generate active predictions about the future, and use these predictions to guide behavior. We also discuss the possible interpretations of these findings in light of the current scientific discussion regarding the relation between masked presentation, subliminal perception and awareness measurement methods.

Knowledge about the predictive value of reward conditioned stimuli modulates their interference with cognitive processes

Stimuli conditioned with a substance can generate drug-approach behaviors due to their acquired motivational properties. According to implicit theories of addiction, these stimuli can decrease cognitive control automatically. The present study (n = 49) examined whether reward-associated stimuli can interfere with cognitive processes in the absence of knowledge about stimulus–outcome contingencies. Conditioned stimuli (CS) were paired with high-reward (HR) or low-reward (LR) probabilities of monetary reward using a Pavlovian learning task. Participants were categorized as Aware or Unaware of contingencies using a Bayesian analysis. CS were then used as task-irrelevant distractors in modified flanker and N-back tasks. Results show HR CS can generate increased interference in the flanker task for participants Unaware of contingencies, contributing further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning. For the N-back task, working memory performance was affected by HR CS, albeit only for Aware participants. These results suggest that CS can interfere implicitly with cognitive processes in a similar way to drug-related stimuli. Such an effect could occur in a stimulus-driven fashion, devoid of top-down goal-directedness. These findings have implications for the conceptualization and study of implicit processes in addiction and highlights the necessity to reconsider the measurement of such phenomena.

Cross-cultural differences in implicit learning of chunks versus symmetries

Three experiments explore whether knowledge of grammars defining global versus local regularities has an advantage in implicit acquisition and whether this advantage is affected by cultural differences. Participants were asked to listen to and memorize a number of strings of 10 syllables instantiating an inversion (i.e. a global pattern); after the training phase, they were required to judge whether new strings were well formed. In Experiment 1, Western people implicitly acquired the inversion rule defined over the Chinese tones in a similar way as Chinese participants when alternative structures (specifically, chunking and repetition structures) were controlled. In Experiments 2 and 3, we directly pitted knowledge of the inversion (global) against chunk (local) knowledge, and found that Chinese participants had a striking global advantage in implicit learning, which was greater than that of Western participants. Taken together, we show for the first time cross-cultural differences in the type of regularities implicitly acquired.

Subliminal encoding and flexible retrieval of objects in scenes

Our episodic memory stores what happened when and where in life. Episodic memory requires the rapid formation and flexible retrieval of where things are located in space. Consciousness of the encoding scene is considered crucial for episodic memory formation. Here, we question the necessity of consciousness and hypothesize that humans can form unconscious episodic memories. Participants were presented with subliminal scenes, that is, scenes invisible to the conscious mind. The scenes displayed objects at certain locations for participants to form unconscious object-in-space memories. Later, the same scenes were presented supraliminally, that is, visibly, for retrieval testing. Scenes were presented absent the objects and rotated by 90°-270° in perspective to assess the representational flexibility of unconsciously formed memories. During the test phase, participants performed a forced-choice task that required them to place an object in one of two highlighted scene locations and their eye movements were recorded. Evaluation of the eye tracking data revealed that participants remembered object locations unconsciously, irrespective of changes in viewing perspective. This effect of gaze was related to correct placements of objects in scenes, and an intuitive decision style was necessary for unconscious memories to influence intentional behavior to a significant degree. We conclude that conscious perception is not mandatory for spatial episodic memory formation.

Tonal Symmetry Induces Fluency and Sense of Well-Formedness

Fluency influences grammaticality judgments of visually presented strings in artificial grammar learning (AGL). Of many potential sources that engender fluency, symmetry is considered to be an important factor. However, symmetry may function differently for visual and auditory stimuli, which present computationally different problems. Thus, the current study aimed to examine whether objectively manipulating fluency by speeding up perception (i.e., manipulating the inter-stimulus interval, ISI, between each syllable of a string) influenced judgments of tonal strings; and thus how symmetry-based fluency might influence judgments. In Experiment 1, with only a test phase, participants were required to give their preference ratings of tonal strings as a measurement of fluency. In experiment 2, participants were instructed to make grammaticality judgments after being incidentally trained on tonal symmetry. Results of Experiment 1 showed that tonal strings with shorter ISI were liked more than those with longer ISI while such difference was not found between symmetric and asymmetric strings without training. Additionally, Experiment 2 found both main effects of symmetry and ISI as well as an interaction. In particular, only asymmetric strings were more likely to be judged as grammatical when they were presented at a shorter ISI. Taken together, participants were sensitive to the fluency induced by the manipulation of ISI and sensitive to symmetry only after training. In sum, we conclude that objective speed influenced grammaticality judgments, implicit learning of tonal symmetry resulted in enhanced fluency, and that fluency may serve as a basis for grammaticality judgments.

What Is Minimally Required to Elicit Placebo Effects?

Placebo effects have often been attributed to cognitive processes described as "learning" and/or "expectancy," yet the role of conscious awareness is unclear. Furthermore, little is known about the placebo effects in patients with limited cognitive abilities, such as intellectual disability. Here, recent data on placebo mechanisms in patients with impaired cognitive function will be discussed, as well as experimental studies investigating how implicit cognitive processes may shape placebo effects. Together these studies comment on the minimum requirements in order to elicit placebo effects, both from the view of conscious awareness and from the perspective of Intelligence Quotient and basic brain function. Together with recent conceptualizations of placebo effects in terms of predictive coding, there is evidence to suggest that placebo effects are fundamental responses of the brain that have developed to promote survival.

Recalibration of hand position sense during unconscious active and passive movement

Precise knowledge of one's limbs' position in space is fundamental for goal-directed action. The brain's representation of the body in space is thought to be generated through a process of multisensory integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals. In this study, we devised a setup that allowed us to displace participants' right hand without their subjective awareness. We accomplished this task by instructing the participants to view a live video feed of their hand from the first-person perspective. In the active condition, we used a sensorimotor illusion that caused the participants to actively but unknowingly displace their unseen right hand to a location 8 cm lateral to the image of their hand. In the passive condition, we mechanically displaced the participants' hand-at a slow, unnoticeable velocity-to the same location. We found that during active displacement, the participants indicated that the location of their hand was closer to the digital image of the hand rather than the veridical location of the hand, as compared with the passive condition, in which the participants indicated that the locations of their hand were closer to the actual location. These results indicated that, compared with passive displacement, active movements cause greater recalibration of the hand's spatial position and that the boosted spatial recalibration of hand position sense in the active task is driven by error-based sensorimotor corrections. These results have bearing on the perceptual mechanisms of recalibration of perceived limb location.

Attentional responses to stimuli associated with a reward can occur in the absence of knowledge of their predictive values

Classical conditioning theories of addiction suggest that stimuli associated with rewards acquire incentive salience, inducing emotional and attentional conditioned responses. It is not clear whether those responses occur without contingency awareness (CA), i.e. are based on explicit or implicit learning processes. Examining implicit aspects of stimulus-reward associations can improve our understanding of addictive behaviours, supporting treatment and prevention strategies. However, the acquisition of conditioned responses without CA has yet to be rigorously demonstrated, as the existing literature shows a lack of methodological agreement regarding the measurement of implicit and explicit processes. The purpose of two experiments presented here was to study the emotional value acquired by CS through implicit emotional and attentional processes, trying to overcome critical methodological issues. Experiment 1 (n = 48) paired two stimuli categories (houses/buildings) with high (HR) or low (LR) probabilities of monetary reward. An Emotional Attentional Blink revealed preferential attention for HR over LR regardless of CA; while pleasantness ratings were unaffected, probably due to the intrinsic nature of CS. Experiment 2 (n = 60) replicated the effect of conditioning on the Emotional Attentional Blink utilising abstract CS (octagons/squares). In addition increased pleasantness for HR over LR was found significant overall, and marginally significant for Aware but not for Unaware participants. Here CA was rigorously determined using a signal-detection analysis and metacognitive-awareness measurements. Bayesian analyses verified the unconscious nature of the learning. These findings demonstrate that attentional conditioned responses can occur without CA and advance our understanding of the mechanisms by which implicit conditioning can occur and becomes observable. Furthermore, these results can highlight how addictive behaviours might develop.

Regressive research: The pitfalls of post hoc data selection in the study of unconscious mental processes

Many studies of unconscious processing involve comparing a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with an awareness measure (such as a verbal report or a forced-choice response) taken either concurrently or separately. Unconscious processing is inferred when above-chance performance is combined with null awareness. Often, however, aggregate awareness is better than chance, and data analysis therefore employs a form of extreme group analysis focusing post hoc on participants, trials, or items where awareness is absent or at chance. The pitfalls of this analytic approach are described with particular reference to recent research on implicit learning and subliminal perception. Because of regression to the mean, the approach can mislead researchers into erroneous conclusions concerning unconscious influences on behavior. Recommendations are made about future use of post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition.

What We Talk about When We Talk about Unconscious Processing - A Plea for Best Practices

In this perspective article, we first outline the large diversity of methods, measures, statistical analyses, and concepts in the field of the experimental study of unconscious processing. We then suggest that this diversity implies that comparisons between different studies on unconscious processing are fairly limited, especially when stimulus awareness has been assessed in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that flexible choices of methods and measures will inevitably lead to an overestimation of unconscious processes. In the concluding paragraph, we briefly present solutions and strategies for future research. We make a plea for the introduction of "best practices," similar to previous attempts to constitute practicing standards for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).

When Perception Trumps Reality

Is semantic priming driven by the objective or perceived meaning of the priming stimulus? This question is relevant given that many studies suggest that the objective meaning of invisible stimuli can influence cognitive processes and behavior. In an experiment involving 66 participants, we tested how the perceived meaning of misperceived stimuli influenced response times. Stroop priming (i.e., longer response times for incongruent than for congruent prime-target pairs) was observed in trials in which the prime was correctly identified. However, reversed Stroop priming was observed when the prime stimulus was incorrectly identified. Even in trials in which participants reported no perception of the prime and identified the primes at close to chance level (i.e., trials that meet both subjective and objective definitions of being subliminal), Stroop priming corresponded to perceived congruency, not objective congruency. This result suggests that occasional weak percepts and mispercepts are intermixed with no percepts in conditions traditionally claimed to be subliminal, casting doubt on claims of subliminal priming made in previous reports.