Modeling self on others: An import theory of subjectivity and selfhood

Ascribing consciousness to artificial intelligence: human-AI interaction and its carry-over effects on human-human interaction

The question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be considered conscious and therefore should be evaluated through a moral lens has surfaced in recent years. In this paper, we argue that whether AI is conscious is less of a concern than the fact that AI can be considered conscious by users during human-AI interaction, because this ascription of consciousness can lead to carry-over effects on human-human interaction. When AI is viewed as conscious like a human, then how people treat AI appears to carry over into how they treat other people due to activating schemas that are congruent to those activated during interactions with humans. In light of this potential, we might consider regulating how we treat AI, or how we build AI to evoke certain kinds of treatment from users, but not because AI is inherently sentient. This argument focuses on humanlike, social actor AI such as chatbots, digital voice assistants, and social robots. In the first part of the paper, we provide evidence for carry-over effects between perceptions of AI consciousness and behavior toward humans through literature on human-computer interaction, human-AI interaction, and the psychology of artificial agents. In the second part of the paper, we detail how the mechanism of schema activation can allow us to test consciousness perception as a driver of carry-over effects between human-AI interaction and human-human interaction. In essence, perceiving AI as conscious like a human, thereby activating congruent mind schemas during interaction, is a driver for behaviors and perceptions of AI that can carry over into how we treat humans. Therefore, the fact that people can ascribe humanlike consciousness to AI is worth considering, and moral protection for AI is also worth considering, regardless of AI's inherent conscious or moral status.

The typical and atypical development of empathy: How big is the gap from lab to field?

Background

Empathy-understanding and sharing someone else's feelings-is crucial for social bonds. Studies on empathy development are limited and mainly performed with behavioural assessments. This is in contrast to the extensive literature on cognitive and affective empathy in adults. However, understanding the mechanisms behind empathy development is critical to developing early interventions to support children with limited empathy. This is particularly key in toddlerhood, as children transition from highly scaffolded interactions with their parents and towards interactions with their peers. However, we know little about toddlers' empathy, in part due to the methodological constraints of testing this population in traditional lab settings.

Methods

Here, we combine naturalistic observations with a targeted review of the literature to provide an assessment of our current understanding of the development of empathy in toddlerhood as it is expressed in real-world settings. We went into toddlers' typical habitat, a nursery, and we performed 21 h of naturalistic observations of 2-to-4-year-olds. We then reviewed the literature to evaluate our current understanding of the mechanisms that underpin observed behaviours.

Results

We observed that (i) emotional contagion, possibly a primitive form of empathy, was observed at the nursery, but rarely; (ii) older toddlers often stared when someone cried, but there was no clear evidence of shared feelings; (iii) teacher and parent scaffolding might be paramount for empathy development; (iv) as some atypical empathic reactions can be observed from toddlerhood, early interventions could be developed. Several competing theoretical frameworks could account for current findings.

Conclusions

Targeted studies of toddlers and their interaction partners in both controlled and naturalistic contexts are required to distinguish different mechanistic explanations for empathic behaviour in toddlerhood. We recommend the use of new cutting-edge methodologies to embed neurocognitively-informed frameworks into toddlers' natural social world.

A conceptual framework for consciousness

This article argues that consciousness has a logically sound, explanatory framework, different from typical accounts that suffer from hidden mysticism. The article has three main parts. The first describes background principles concerning information processing in the brain, from which one can deduce a general, rational framework for explaining consciousness. The second part describes a specific theory that embodies those background principles, the Attention Schema Theory. In the past several years, a growing body of experimental evidence-behavioral evidence, brain imaging evidence, and computational modeling-has addressed aspects of the theory. The final part discusses the evolution of consciousness. By emphasizing the specific role of consciousness in cognition and behavior, the present approach leads to a proposed account of how consciousness may have evolved over millions of years, from fish to humans. The goal of this article is to present a comprehensive, overarching framework in which we can understand scientifically what consciousness is and what key adaptive roles it plays in brain function.

Mirrored Social Representations of Canadian Caseworkers with Migratory Paths Intervening with Refugees in the Host Country

In 2015, the resettlement of 25,000 Syrian refugees in Canada placed a strain on social services. Caseworkers employed in these agencies often come from similar migratory trajectories to those of the refugees. This experiential proximity requires an understanding of the subjective perspectives that caseworkers with migratory paths have of refugees in the context of their professional practice. We analyzed fifteen individual interviews with Canadian caseworkers and conducted field observations of resettlement activities in the Ottawa-Gatineau region using inductive reasoning inspired by grounded theory. Adopting a sociogenetic approach to social representation theory, this qualitative study illustrates how the social representation of refugees among foreign-born caseworkers is highly informed by their migratory past experience, as well as by the social identity and social context from which that representation was socio-generated. Our analysis reveals the mirror effect of the caseworkers as a fruitful concept for understanding the identity-otherness dynamics in the encounter between the distant other (refugee) and the self.

Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories

Here we examine how people's understanding of consciousness may have been shaped by an implicit theory of mind. This social cognition approach may help to make sense of an apparent divide between the physically incoherent consciousness we think we have and the complex, rich, but mechanistic consciousness we may actually have. We suggest this approach helps reconcile some of the current cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness. We argue that a single, coherent explanation of consciousness is available and has been for some time, encompassing the views of many researchers, but is not yet recognized. It is obscured partly by terminological differences, and partly because researchers view isolated pieces of it as rival theories. It may be time to recognize that a deeper, coherent pool of ideas, a kind of standard model, is available to explain multiple layers of consciousness and how they relate to specific networks within the brain.

Seeing Some One

This paper outlines a light approach to heavy issues of consciousness. The basic claim is that human minds are very much tailored to the requirements of action perception, that is, to what people see when they watch other people acting. I argue that the third-person perspective entailed in action perception offers an easy and more direct access to such enigmatic things as selfhood, intentionality, and agency than the first-person perspective does. In a sense, we get these things for free when we study action perception. I do not claim that the study of action perception can solve (or even dissolve) the enigmata entailed in consciousness. I do claim, however, that it sheds new light on relationships between one’s own mind and other minds.