Cognitive control outside of conscious awareness

Unconscious Detection but Not Resolution of Cognitive Conflicts Occurs and Influences Conscious Control

The boundaries of unconscious processing have long been an intriguing topic. Despite existing research, the necessity of consciousness for effective high-level conflict control remains an open question. This study seeks to address this research gap through two subliminal Stroop priming experiments combined with event-related potential measurements, aiming to clarify the brain dynamics of unconscious cognitive control and its influence on subsequent conscious control. The participants were instructed to perform color-naming tasks for supraliminal Stroop or non-Stroop targets following subliminal Stroop or non-Stroop primes. In Experiment 1, the primes also served as targets, whereas in Experiment 2, they did not. In both experiments, prime-locked analyses revealed Stroop effects on N450 amplitudes but not on slow potential (SP) amplitudes. Furthermore, target-locked analysis revealed conflict adaptation effects on SP amplitudes and reaction times; the Stroop effects were smaller following Stroop primes compared with non-Stroop primes. Overall, these findings demonstrate that early-stage unconscious cognitive conflict detection occurs and affects subsequent conscious cognitive control; however, there is insufficient evidence to support unconscious conflict resolution. Our study provides valuable insights into the limits of unconscious processing and highlights the importance of further investigating the deep neural pathways underlying unconscious cognitive conflict processing.

Some scales require cognitive effort: A systematic review on the role of working memory in scalar implicature derivation

If some inferences require cognitive effort, could that mean, that all of them do? The scalar term "some" has long fascinated academics from various backgrounds, as it can be interpreted either purely semantically, as "some and possibly all", or pragmatically, as "some and not all". The pragmatic reading implies the generation of what is called a scalar implicature. While scientific investigation of such implicatures has given rise to many potential explanations of the "pragmatic enrichment" phenomenon behind them, the debate between the two dominant frameworks-the literal-first and the default accounts-has not convincingly been settled. With the birth of a new interdisciplinary field, appropriately dubbed experimental pragmatics, the last 20 years have led to a substantial amount of new empirical data on scalar implicatures. In this ongoing investigation, the loading and measuring of Working Memory has become an important experimentation tool, as it allows to test the contrasting hypotheses with regard to the cognitive effort of implicature generation, which are made by the two main theoretical accounts. The current systematic review evaluates the relevant literature until March 08, 2022 in an attempt to shed light on the role of Working Memory in implicature derivation. A comprehensive search, and two-step review procedure yielded a sample of 18 studies, containing data of 23 relevant experiments. Findings were bundled in a narrative synthesis and combined through two separate meta-analyses. Our results support the literal-first account, by showing that the derivation of scalar implicatures is a cognitively effortful process that is sensitive to changes in the available Working Memory resources. However, as the reported effects are relatively weak and capricious, we argue that the development of more sophisticated paradigms and eventually, stronger theories within the field, will be crucial in order to both fully understand the current results and set-up fruitful future research.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.