Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming

Blame others but hurt yourself: blaming or sympathetic attitudes toward victims of COVID-19 and how it alters one's health status

OBJECTIVE

This study explored the relationship between blame/sympathy and blamer's/sympathizer's perceived health status.

DESIGN

We recruited participants via an online survey platform. Study 1 was a cross-sectional study using data (N = 3304, Mage = 28.22, SDage = 7.92, and 39.3% female) collected from 30 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions of China on February 3, 2020. Study 2 used the daily diary method collecting data from February 4 to 9, 2020. Sample (N = 2456, Mage = 28.49, SDage = 7.49, and 39.4% were female) was obtained by inviting participants in Study 1 on the same platform.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Self-reported health status and life satisfaction.

RESULTS

In Study 1, blame was negatively associated with perceived health status, while sympathy was positively associated with it. Negative emotions and risk perception are the underlying mechanisms, but neither of them has effects on the relationship between sympathy and perceived health status. Study 2 replicated these results using multilevel analysis.

CONCLUSION

The results highlight the importance of people's attitudes on perceived health status. While sympathy is positively related to perceived health status, blaming has a negative association with perceived health status. Negative emotions and risk perceptions are the underlying mechanisms.

It Is Belief in Dualism, and Not Free Will, That Best Predicts Helping: A Conceptual Replication and Extension of Baumeister et al. (2009)

Previous research found that experimentally reducing people's belief in free will affects social behaviors. However, more recent investigations could not replicate several findings in this literature. An explanation for the mixed findings is that free will beliefs are related to social behaviors on a correlational level, but experimental manipulations are not able to detect this relation. To test this interpretation, we conceptually replicated and extended a landmark study in the free will belief literature originally conducted by Baumeister et al. In five studies (total N = 1,467), we investigated whether belief in free will predicts helping behavior in comparison to other beliefs related to free will. Overall, our results support the original findings, as belief in free will correlated with helping behavior. However, the results also show that the best predictor of helping behavior is not belief in free will but belief in dualism. Theoretical implications are discussed.

The role of free will beliefs in social behavior: Priority areas for future research

Recent research has examined the consequences that holding views about free will has on social behavior. Specifically, through manipulating people's belief in free will, researchers have tested the psychological and behavioral consequences of free will belief change. However, findings of such manipulations have been shown to be relatively small and inconsistent. The purpose of this paper is to outline four key areas for researchers in this area to consider. We believe considering these areas will give a more nuanced understanding of the role of free will beliefs.

Manipulating Belief in Free Will and Its Downstream Consequences: A Meta-Analysis

Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.

Automatic or controlled: How does disbelief in free will influence cognitive functioning?

Most people believe in free will. Past research has indicated that reducing this belief has numerous downstream consequences including everyday outcomes as well as neural and cognitive correlates associated with a reduction of self-control. However, the exact mechanisms through which a reduction in free will belief affects self-control are still a matter of investigation. In the present registered report, we used a task switching paradigm to examine whether reducing belief in free will makes people less controlled or whether it enhances their reliance on automatic impulses. Using Bayesian sequential analysis, we failed to conceptually replicate the previous link between free will belief and cognitive control. Our registered report plan mostly accumulated substantial evidence supporting the null hypothesis. That is, diminished belief in free will does neither impact control nor automaticity. Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.

Belief in Free Will Is Related to Internal Attribution in Self-Perception

Past research indicates that individuals’ belief in free will is related to attributing others’ behavior to internal causes. An open question is whether belief in free will is related to the attribution of one’s own action. To answer this question, we tested two opposing predictions against each other by assessing the relation of belief in free will with the self-serving bias—individuals’ tendency to attribute personal success more strongly to internal forces and failure to external forces. The resource hypothesis predicts that a higher endorsement in free will belief relates to a lower self-serving bias. The intention attribution hypothesis predicts that belief in free will relates to higher internal attributions, as compared with external attributions, irrespective of success and failure. Meta-analytic evidence across five high-powered studies (total N = 1,137) supports the intention attribution hypothesis, but not the resource hypothesis (materials and data are available on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/2a89c/ ).

Comparing the Psychometric Properties of Two Japanese-Translated Scales of the Free Will and Determinism-Plus Scale

The free will and determinism-plus scale (FAD-Plus) is one of the most widely used scales to assess the lay belief of people in the existence of free will and deterministic world views. Past research has translated FAD-Plus into various languages for non-English speaking populations, and there exist two Japanese translations of FAD-Plus: the FAD+ and the FAD-J. This study aimed to compare the psychometric properties of FAD+ and FAD-J. Results revealed that while both FAD+ and FAD-J consist of the same four subscales as the original FAD-Plus, some differences exist in the item-level psychometric characteristics. In general, as for the construct validity, although results supported that both scales can assess almost the same construct in terms of the functionalities, FAD-J tends to be slightly more likely to replicate the correlations obtained in the previous research.

Direct and indirect freedom in addiction: Folk free will and blame judgments are sensitive to the choice history of drug users

People view addiction as a source of diminished free will and moral responsibility. Yet, people are also sensitive to the personal histories of moral actors, including, perhaps, the way by which people became addicted. Across two studies (N = 806), we compare people's moral intuitions about cases in which the actor becomes addicted by force or by choice. We find that perceptions of reduced free will partially mediate an association between choice (vs. no choice) in addiction and moral blame for a bad act (Study 1). We replicate this pattern and show that blame judgments are stronger when the bad act is related (vs. unrelated) to obtaining the addictive substance (Study 2). Our work is novel in demonstrating that lay people evince relatively nuanced intuitions about the role of free will in addiction and morality-they track direct and indirect paths to choices when making free will and blame judgments.