The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect

Who Will Be More Egocentric? Age Differences in the Impact of Retrospective Self-Experience on Interpersonal Emotion Intensity Judgment

This study investigates whether the retrospective self-experience of older adults affects and biases interpersonal emotion judgment more than that of younger adults by adopting the paradigm of the self-generated anchoring effect. Participants (older adults: n = 63; younger adults: n = 65) were required to retrospectively consider their self-experiences and judge their possible emotion intensity in anchor-generating scenarios (high- or low-anchor scenarios). Subsequently, participants estimated the protagonist's emotion intensity in target scenarios. The age-related interaction effect showed that older adults exhibited a significant self-generated anchoring effect in more emotion categories (four emotions) compared with younger adults (two emotions). After controlling for inhibition or working memory as a covariant, this interaction effect was no longer significant. The results from multilevel regression analysis also indicated the significant effect of self-emotion across all models on participants' judgment of others' emotions. The results indicated that older adults were more affected by retrospective self-experiences, leading to more egocentric judgment, than younger adults. This different influence from the retrospective self-experiences might partially have been caused by the age-related difference in cognitive abilities.

Knowledge and the brain: Why the knowledge-centric theory of mind program needs neuroscience

The knowledge-centric theory of mind research program suggested by Phillips et al. stands to gain significant value by embracing a neurocognitive approach that takes full advantage of techniques such as fMRI and EEG. This neurocognitive approach has already begun providing important insights into the mechanisms of knowledge attribution, insights which support the claim that it is more basic than belief attribution.

Tracking developmental differences in real-world social attention across adolescence, young adulthood and older adulthood

Detecting and responding appropriately to social information in one's environment is a vital part of everyday social interactions. Here, we report two preregistered experiments that examine how social attention develops across the lifespan, comparing adolescents (10-19 years old), young (20-40 years old) and older (60-80 years old) adults. In two real-world tasks, participants were immersed in different social interaction situations-a face-to-face conversation and navigating an environment-and their attention to social and non-social content was recorded using eye-tracking glasses. The results revealed that, compared with young adults, adolescents and older adults attended less to social information (that is, the face) during face-to-face conversation, and to people when navigating the real world. Thus, we provide evidence that real-world social attention undergoes age-related change, and these developmental differences might be a key mechanism that influences theory of mind among adolescents and older adults, with potential implications for predicting successful social interactions in daily life.

Adolescents are delayed at inferring complex social intentions in others, but not basic (false) beliefs: An eye-movement investigation

Most developmental research on Theory of Mind (ToM)—our ability to infer the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others—has focused on the preschool years. This is unsurprising as it was previously thought that ToM skills are developed between the ages of 2 and 7 years. Over the last couple of decades however, studies have provided evidence for significant structural and functional changes in the brain areas involved in ToM (the “social brain”) not only during childhood but also during adolescence. Importantly, some of these findings suggest that the use of ToM shows a prolonged development through middle childhood and adolescence. Although evidence from previous studies suggests a protracted development of ToM, the factors that constrain performance during middle childhood and adolescence are only just beginning to be explored. In this article, we report two visual-world eye-tracking studies that focus on the timecourse of predictive inferences. We establish that when the complexity of ToM inferences are at a level which is comparable with standard change-of-location false-belief tasks, then adolescents and adults generate predictions for other agents’ behaviour in the same timecourse. However, when inferences are socially more complex, requiring inferences about higher order mental states, adolescents generate predictive gaze bias at a marked delay relative to adults. Importantly, our results demonstrate that these developmental differences go beyond differences in executive functions (inhibitory control or working memory) and point to distinct expectations between groups and greater uncertainty when predicting actions based on conflicting desires.